Encore Industries v. Travelers: Employer Intentional Torts Under Ohio R.C. 2745.01 as Uninsurable Direct-Intent Injuries

1. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Encore Industries, Inc. v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America addresses a recurring and commercially important question at the intersection of workers’ compensation exclusivity, Ohio’s employer intentional-tort statute (Ohio Rev. Code § 2745.01), and employer liability insurance coverage:

When an employee pursues an employer intentional-tort claim under § 2745.01, is the employer’s liability necessarily for an injury that was “directly intended” and thus excluded from standard accident-based coverage?

The Sixth Circuit answers yes. Relying heavily on the Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 2745.01, the court holds that:

Liability under § 2745.01—whether under subsections (A), (B), or (C)—arises only when the employer acts with deliberate, specific (direct) intent to injure, and
Because Encore’s insurance policies covered only “bodily injury by accident” and excluded “bodily injury directly intended by the insured,” they did not provide indemnity coverage for Encore’s settlement of the § 2745.01 claim.

Encore sought a declaratory judgment that its insurers, Travelers and American Guarantee, were obligated to indemnify it for a workplace-fatality settlement and also alleged breach of contract and bad faith. The district court granted the insurers’ motions for judgment on the pleadings, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Although the opinion is designated “not recommended for publication” and therefore is not binding precedent within the Sixth Circuit, it provides a clear and detailed application of Ohio law that will be influential in future coverage disputes involving employer intentional torts and insurance exclusions for intentional injury.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Factual and Procedural Background

Encore Industries, an Ohio plastics manufacturer, redesigned a thermoforming trim press in 2019. During that redesign, it allegedly removed “interlock guards” designed to stop moving parts (including the conveyor) whenever a side door to the machine was open. In 2021, employee Todd Shaffer entered the machine through a side door to clear a jam. While Shaffer was inside, the conveyor activated and fatally injured him.

Shaffer’s family filed suit in Ohio state court against Encore and others, alleging:

Wrongful death
Survivorship
Loss of consortium
An employer intentional-tort claim under Ohio Rev. Code § 2745.01

Travelers provided Encore a policy that:

Covered legal damages owed by Encore “because of bodily injury to [Encore’s] employees” caused “by accident,” and
Contained an Ohio endorsement excluding coverage for “bodily injury directly intended by the insured.”

American Guarantee issued an excess policy that “followed form” above the Travelers policy—i.e., it would pay sums in excess of Travelers’ limits if the underlying injury was otherwise covered under the Travelers policy. Therefore, both policies shared the same core coverage grant and relevant exclusion: they covered accidental injuries but excluded injuries directly intended by Encore.

Travelers defended Encore in the state litigation. The parties eventually settled the Shaffer lawsuit. After settlement, however, Travelers and American Guarantee refused to indemnify Encore for the settlement payments, citing the intentional-injury exclusion. Encore then filed a declaratory judgment and damages action in federal court (Southern District of Ohio), alleging:

Declaratory relief (obligation to indemnify),
Breach of contract, and
Bad faith denial of coverage.

All parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted judgment to the insurers and denied Encore’s motion, holding that:

Ohio workers’ compensation law made § 2745.01 the only viable theory on which Encore could be liable in the underlying suit; and
§ 2745.01 requires proof that the employer acted with “direct” or “deliberate” intent to injure, which falls squarely within the policies’ exclusion.

Encore appealed. The Sixth Circuit, reviewing de novo, affirmed across the board.

2.2 Holdings

The Sixth Circuit’s essential holdings are:

Scope of § 2745.01: Ohio Revised Code § 2745.01, as interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court, does not create two distinct categories of employer intentional torts (direct intent and substantial certainty). Instead, all liability under § 2745.01—whether via subsections (A), (B), or the rebuttable presumption in (C)—requires proof of direct, deliberate intent to injure or its “essential equivalent.”
Application to insurance coverage: Because the only actionable claim against Encore in the underlying state suit was a § 2745.01 claim, any liability Encore faced in that suit necessarily involved directly intended injury. Encore’s policies only covered “bodily injury by accident” and expressly excluded “bodily injury directly intended by the insured.” Therefore, Travelers and American Guarantee had no duty to indemnify Encore for the settlement.
Breach of contract claim: As a matter of law, the denial of indemnity was consistent with the policies’ terms; the breach of contract claim therefore fails.
Bad faith claim: Under Ohio law (as applied in Dakota Girls, LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co.), an insurer does not act in bad faith where there is a reasonable justification for denying coverage. Because the insurers’ coverage position was not only reasonable but correct, Encore’s bad faith claim was properly dismissed.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Statutory and Doctrinal Background

3.1.1 Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity and Employer Intentional Torts in Ohio

Ohio’s workers’ compensation system follows a familiar bargain:

Employees receive guaranteed, no-fault compensation for workplace injuries, and
Employers receive immunity from most civil tort suits by employees for such injuries.

The Sixth Circuit cites Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co., 709 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2013), and the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Services, L.L.C., 927 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio 2010), for this exclusivity rule: workers’ compensation benefits are ordinarily the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries.

Historically, Ohio recognized a narrow intentional-tort exception to this immunity, allowing employees to sue employers in tort where:

The employer acted with “deliberate intent” to cause harm; or
The employer knew an injury was “substantially certain” to occur, even if it did not specifically intend that the precise injury occur.

The “substantial certainty” category, grounded in cases such as Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc. (not cited in the Encore opinion but central to the historic doctrine), effectively allowed employees to recover for egregiously reckless conduct that approached but did not reach the level of specific intent to injure.

The Ohio legislature curtailed this broad judicial doctrine by enacting Ohio Rev. Code § 2745.01, which the Ohio Supreme Court has described as significantly limiting employer intentional-tort claims compared with prior common law.

3.1.2 Structure of Ohio Rev. Code § 2745.01

The statute at issue, § 2745.01, provides in relevant part:

Subsection (A): An employer is liable for an intentional tort only if it acts “with intent to injure another or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur.”
Subsection (B): For purposes of Subsection (A), “substantially certain” means that the employer acts “with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death.”
Subsection (C): Provides a rebuttable presumption that an employer acts with intent to injure when it deliberately removes an equipment safety guard (or deliberately misrepresents a toxic or hazardous substance), and an employee is injured as a direct result.

On its face, subsection (A) appears to preserve the conceptual distinction between:

Direct “intent to injure,” and
A lesser state of mind—“belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur.”

But subsection (B) then defines “substantially certain” to mean “deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury.” This drafting renders the “substantial certainty” language functionally equivalent to direct intent, thereby significantly narrowing the exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity. This is the source of the “statute at war with itself” characterization in Rudisill.

3.1.3 The Role of Subsection (C): Safety Guard Removal

Subsection (C) was added to provide a litigation-friendly evidentiary shortcut for employees in particularly dangerous situations—such as the deliberate removal of safety guards from machinery. It states that such removal creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer acted with the requisite intent to injure. Importantly, as the Ohio Supreme Court held in Hoyle v. DTJ Enterprises, Inc., 36 N.E.3d 122 (Ohio 2015), subsection (C):

Does not lower the level of intent required; it presumes the same “deliberate intent” standard required by subsections (A) and (B),
Does not create a stand-alone, lesser-intent cause of action, and
Is designed merely to assist plaintiffs in proving the high specific-intent standard without direct evidence of the employer’s subjective state of mind.

This is crucial to the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Encore, because Encore’s liability exposure arose precisely from an allegation that it had removed a safety guard from industrial machinery.

3.2 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

3.2.1 Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co., 709 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2013)

Rudisill is a central precedent shaping the Sixth Circuit’s understanding of § 2745.01. There, the court confronted the same textual issue: subsection (A) appearing to create two bases for liability, and subsection (B) collapsing one into the other. Rudisill concluded that:

Despite its appearance, § 2745.01 establishes a single standard—“deliberate intent” to injure,
The “substantial certainty” language, because of subsection (B)’s definition, does not preserve a separate, lesser form of intent-based liability, and
As a result, Ohio tort remedies for workplace injuries are “limited to those resulting from the employer’s deliberate intent to injure.”

In Encore, the Sixth Circuit quotes Rudisill’s “statute at war with itself” language and its conclusion that “what appears at first glance as two distinct bases for liability is revealed on closer examination to be one and the same,” using it as a foundational premise: there is no “substantial certainty” category distinct from direct intent under § 2745.01.

3.2.2 Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Products Co., 927 N.E.2d 1066 (Ohio 2010)

In Kaminski, the Ohio Supreme Court examined § 2745.01’s constitutionality and construction. The court held that § 2745.01 applies only where “an employer acts with specific intent to cause an injury.” The opinion uses terms like “specific intent,” “deliberate intent,” and “direct intent” interchangeably to describe the statute’s standard.

The Sixth Circuit in Encore relies on Kaminski to:

Confirm that § 2745.01 is meant to be a narrow, specific-intent statute, and
Support its equivalence between the statute’s “deliberate intent” and the policy exclusion’s “directly intended” language.

3.2.3 Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C., 927 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio 2010)

Stetter addressed the retroactivity and constitutionality of § 2745.01 and reiterated that workers’ compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries, subject only to the narrow statutory exception for employer intentional torts under § 2745.01. The Sixth Circuit cites Stetter to situate § 2745.01 within the exclusivity framework and to support the conclusion that, absent § 2745.01, Encore would have been immune from the Shaffers’ tort claims.

3.2.4 Hoyle v. DTJ Enterprises, Inc., 36 N.E.3d 122 (Ohio 2015)

Hoyle is especially significant for interpreting subsection (C). The Ohio Supreme Court held that:

The “whole point” of § 2745.01(C) is to presume the same injurious intent required under subsections (A) and (B) “in the absence of direct evidence,”
Subsection (C) does not alter the level of intent required; it just shifts the evidentiary burden via a rebuttable presumption, and
In analyzing insurance coverage, the court declined to decide broadly whether public policy still permits insurance for some employer intentional torts post-§ 2745.01, because the policy language in that case already foreclosed coverage.

The Sixth Circuit in Encore quotes Hoyle directly for the proposition that subsection (C) does not create a lower intent threshold. This is the key authority that blocks Encore’s argument that § 2745.01(C) preserves an “indirect intent” or “substantial certainty” track beneath “direct” intent.

3.2.5 Harasyn v. Normandy Metals, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio 1990)

Harasyn, decided under the pre-§ 2745.01 common law, addressed a different but related question: whether public policy bars insurance coverage for employer intentional torts. The Ohio Supreme Court held that, at least under then- existing law:

Insurance coverage for some intentional torts (particularly those based on “substantial certainty” of harm rather than specific desire to injure) was not categorically barred by public policy, and
There was a distinction between uninsurable “direct intent” to injure and potentially insurable “substantial certainty” situations.

Encore invokes this distinction to argue that there must still be two tiers of intent under Ohio law (direct and substantial certainty), and that § 2745.01(C) claims should fall into the latter (potentially insurable) category.

But the Ohio Supreme Court in Hoyle expressly stated that it was not resolving whether Harasyn’s public-policy rationale survives in light of § 2745.01:

“Because the terms of the [insurance policy] preclude coverage in this case, we need not broadly determine whether the rationale in Harasyn remains applicable in light of the subsequent enactment of [§] 2745.01 or whether Ohio public policy prohibits any type of indemnity coverage for employer intentional torts.”

The Sixth Circuit follows the same path here: it does not pronounce on the full scope of Ohio public policy regarding insurability of intentional employer torts. Instead, it concludes that as a matter of contract, Encore’s policies exclude coverage for the type of intentional injury that § 2745.01 requires.

3.2.6 Dakota Girls, LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co., 17 F.4th 645 (6th Cir. 2021)

Dakota Girls provides the key standard for bad faith under Ohio law in the insurance context. It reiterates that:

An insurer acts in bad faith only when its denial of coverage is without reasonable justification—that is, “totally arbitrary and capricious,” and
“The mere wrongful denial of a claim is not actionable under Ohio law.”

Applying Dakota Girls, the Sixth Circuit in Encore holds that because the insurers’ reading of the policies was not only reasonable but correct, Encore’s bad faith claim fails as a matter of law. Even if the coverage question had been debatable, the complaint lacked any factual allegations showing that the insurers’ position was arbitrary or capricious.

3.3 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.3.1 Standard of Review and Procedural Posture

The case reached the Sixth Circuit after the district court granted the insurers’ motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and denied Encore’s competing motion. The Sixth Circuit reviews such orders de novo.

On a motion for judgment on the pleadings:

The court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the non-movant’s pleadings, and
Resolves purely legal questions—such as statutory interpretation and interpretation of unambiguous insurance policy language—on the face of the pleadings and exhibits (here, the policies and the state-court complaint).

The Sixth Circuit frames the core question as whether, after stripping away allegations that the insurers denied, Encore’s complaint still states a viable legal cause of action in light of Ohio law and the policies’ terms. Because the coverage issue is purely legal and dispositive, the court can affirm judgment on the pleadings.

3.3.2 Why § 2745.01 Was the Only Actionable Underlying Claim

A crucial step—sometimes overlooked in coverage analyses—is identifying precisely what liability the insured faced in the underlying suit. The district court, and the Sixth Circuit by agreement of the parties, concluded:

Under Ohio workers’ compensation law, employers are generally immune from common-law tort claims for workplace injuries (negligence, recklessness, etc.), and
The only statutory exception that would permit the Shaffers to recover civil damages from Encore was an employer intentional-tort claim under § 2745.01.

Thus, even though the Shaffers pleaded multiple theories (wrongful death, survivorship, loss of consortium, § 2745.01), the only legally viable route around workers’ compensation exclusivity was the § 2745.01 intentional-tort claim. As the Sixth Circuit puts it, “the only claim upon which damages could [have] be[en] awarded” against Encore was the § 2745.01 claim.

That means Encore’s liability exposure in the underlying case was entirely coextensive with the elements of § 2745.01. Therefore:

If § 2745.01 liability necessarily requires direct, deliberate intent to injure,
Then any settlement payment by Encore reflects potential liability for a directly intended injury.

This connection is what allows the court to link the statutory intent standard directly to the policies’ “directly intended” injury exclusion.

3.3.3 Interpretation of § 2745.01: A Single “Direct Intent” Standard

Encore’s primary statutory argument was that § 2745.01 preserves two distinct tiers of intent:

Direct intent (where the employer specifically desires the injury), and
Substantial certainty (a form of “indirect” intention, where the employer does not desire the injury but knows it is almost certain to occur).

Encore contended that:

Subsection (A)’s language (“intent to injure” versus “belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur”) reflects these two tiers, and
Subsection (C), dealing with deliberate removal of safety guards, codifies the substantial certainty/indirect intent category, such that liability under (C) can exist without direct intent.

The Sixth Circuit rejects this interpretation for three interlocking reasons:

Textual structure of § 2745.01(A)-(B):
- Even though subsection (A) appears to adopt a two-tier structure, subsection (B) defines “substantially certain” as “deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury.”
- Thus, under the plain text, both prongs of subsection (A) require deliberate intent to cause injury; there is no lesser “substantial certainty” category surviving as a distinct legal standard.
- The Sixth Circuit, echoing Rudisill, notes that what appears as two bases for liability is “revealed on closer examination to be one and the same.”
Authoritative state-court construction:
- Kaminski and Stetter characterize § 2745.01 as a statute that allows recovery only when the employer acts with specific, deliberate intent to injure.
- The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently described the statute in these terms, leaving no room for a distinctly lower “substantial certainty” tier.
Role of subsection (C), as clarified in Hoyle:
- Hoyle squarely holds that subsection (C) does not alter the level of intent required by (A) and (B); it merely creates an evidentiary presumption of that same intent when an employer removes a safety guard and an injury results.
- The Sixth Circuit cites Hoyle for the proposition that the “whole point” of (C) is to presume “the injurious intent required under divisions (A) and (B) in the absence of direct evidence.”
- Accordingly, liability under (C) still hinges on the same deliberate-intent standard; (C) does not codify a lesser form of culpability akin to pre-statute “substantial certainty.”

The court concludes that Encore cannot overcome “the plain meaning of the statute and clear, repeated instructions from Ohio courts that liability under § 2745.01 requires direct intent.”

3.3.4 Encore’s “Direct vs. Indirect Intent” Argument and Insurance Policy Language

Encore also argued from the policy text itself, focusing on the phrase “bodily injury directly intended by the insured.” It reasoned:

If the policy excludes only “directly” intended injury,
Then by implication there must be some category of “indirectly” intended injury that remains covered, and
Substantial certainty or § 2745.01(C)-type injuries fall into this “indirect” category, so the exclusion should not apply.

The Sixth Circuit does not fully parse all possible meanings of “direct” versus “indirect” intent in the abstract. It takes a narrower, more decisive route:

Ohio Supreme Court cases (Kaminski, Hoyle) use “direct intent,” “deliberate intent,” and “specific intent” interchangeably when interpreting § 2745.01.
Because § 2745.01 only applies where the employer has deliberate, direct intent to injure, any liability under that statute necessarily involves injury that is “directly intended” by the employer in the statutory sense.
Thus, whatever nuances might theoretically exist between direct and indirect intent in other contexts, they are irrelevant here, because the underlying statutory cause of action itself is confined to directly intended injuries.

In other words, the statutory element of intent in § 2745.01 and the policy’s “directly intended injury” exclusion describe the same level of intent for this case’s purposes. That alignment makes coverage impossible.

3.3.5 “Bodily Injury by Accident” and Workers’ Compensation Overlay

The policies limited coverage to “bodily injury by accident.” The opinion does not extensively analyze the meaning of “accident” because the statutory context makes it unnecessary:

Because any liability under § 2745.01 necessarily involves intentional (deliberately caused) injury,
Such liability is inherently outside the scope of “bodily injury by accident,” and
Even if there were some debate at the margins of what counts as an “accident,” the explicit exclusion for “bodily injury directly intended by the insured” independently forecloses coverage.

It is also significant that workers’ compensation provides the exclusive remedy for accidental or negligence-based injuries. Only intentional injuries can escape that exclusivity, and those are precisely the injuries the policies exclude from coverage. This creates a structural “gap”:

Accidental workplace injuries → generally covered by workers’ compensation (not by the CGL/employers’ liability policy’s intentional-tort exclusion side),
Employer-intentional injuries (as defined by § 2745.01) → actionable in tort but excluded from these policies as “directly intended” injuries.

That structural arrangement is consistent with the traditional understanding that liability insurance generally does not cover damages the insured deliberately inflicts.

3.3.6 Bad Faith Claim

Encore’s complaint also alleged that Travelers and American Guarantee acted in bad faith by refusing to indemnify it. The complaint stated, in essence, that the insurers failed to “acknowledge” that their duty to indemnify was not conditioned on circumstances that provided “reasonable justification” for denial.

Applying Dakota Girls and Ohio law, the Sixth Circuit holds:

Because the policies clearly excluded coverage for directly intended injuries, and § 2745.01 only applies to such injuries, the insurers’ legal position on coverage was correct.
Even if the coverage question had been more debatable, Ohio law requires proof that the insurer’s denial was “totally arbitrary and capricious and without reasonable justification.” Mere disagreement over policy interpretation is not enough.
Encore’s complaint alleged no additional facts suggesting arbitrary or capricious conduct (such as undue delay, failure to investigate, or denial contrary to settled law).

Accordingly, the bad faith claim was properly dismissed on the pleadings alongside the coverage and contract claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 “Direct Intent,” “Deliberate Intent,” and “Substantial Certainty”

Direct (or specific, deliberate) intent:
- The actor wants the harmful result to occur or engages in conduct for the purpose of causing that harm.
- Example: An employer physically assaults an employee intending to injure him.
Substantial certainty (pre-§ 2745.01 sense):
- The actor does not necessarily desire the harm, but knows that harm is virtually certain to occur as a result of its conduct.
- Example: An employer repeatedly sends workers into a confined space with known explosive gas levels, knowing explosions are almost certain though not actually wanting anyone hurt.

Before § 2745.01, Ohio law treated “substantial certainty” as equivalent to intent for employer intentional-tort purposes, allowing tort recovery in especially egregious cases of recklessness. The statute, however, redefined “substantial certainty” in subsection (B) to mean “deliberate intent,” thereby collapsing the two categories into one very narrow, specific-intent standard.

4.2 Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity

“Exclusivity” means that workers’ compensation is the only remedy an injured employee normally has against the employer for workplace injuries. The employee:

Does not need to prove fault to receive benefits, but
Cannot sue the employer in tort for additional damages (such as pain and suffering or punitive damages) for most workplace injuries.

Only a narrow class of employer intentional torts under § 2745.01 escapes this exclusivity rule. Those intentional torts are precisely what Encore faced in the Shaffer lawsuit.

4.3 Rebuttable Presumptions (Subsection (C))

A rebuttable presumption is a rule of evidence that tells the court to assume a fact is true unless the opposing party presents evidence to the contrary. Under § 2745.01(C):

If an employer deliberately removes a safety guard from equipment, and
An employee’s injury directly results from that removal,

then the law presumes the employer acted with the intent required by § 2745.01(A)-(B). The employer can try to rebut this presumption by showing, for example, that the guard’s removal was mistaken or that it did not intend any harm. However, the underlying standard of intent remains the same (deliberate intent to injure).

4.4 Duty to Defend vs. Duty to Indemnify

Two distinct insurer obligations are relevant:

Duty to defend:
- Broader obligation; triggered if the allegations in the complaint arguably fall within coverage, even if they ultimately do not.
- Travelers fulfilled this duty by defending Encore in the Shaffer lawsuit.
Duty to indemnify:
- Narrower obligation; triggered only if the facts that actually give rise to liability fall within coverage.
- Because the only actionable theory was a § 2745.01 intentional tort (requiring direct intent to injure), the insurers had no duty to indemnify due to the intentional-injury exclusion.

The Encore decision concerns indemnity, not the initial defense obligation.

4.5 Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings (Rule 12(c)) is similar to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but filed after the pleadings are closed. It:

Assumes the well-pleaded factual allegations in the non-movant’s pleadings are true,
Considers the pleadings and attached exhibits (e.g., the insurance policies and the underlying complaint), and
Resolves purely legal questions—like whether, taking those facts as true, the plaintiff has any viable legal claim.

Because the key questions in Encore were purely legal (interpretation of § 2745.01 and of unambiguous policy language), the Sixth Circuit could affirm judgment for the insurers at this early stage without discovery or trial.

5. Impact and Implications

5.1 For Employers and Risk Management

For Ohio employers, especially those operating in heavy industry or manufacturing:

No indemnity for § 2745.01 intentional torts under standard accident-based policies:
- This opinion reinforces that where a claim truly arises under § 2745.01 (and is the only actionable claim due to workers’ compensation exclusivity), liability exposure will almost certainly fall outside standard employers’ liability/CGL coverage that (a) is limited to “accidents” and (b) excludes “bodily injury directly intended by the insured.”
Incentive structure:
- The combination of workers’ compensation exclusivity and intentional-injury exclusions creates a stark dichotomy: routine or negligent injuries → covered (by workers’ comp and possibly liability coverage); deliberate-intent injuries → potentially catastrophic and largely uninsured.
- This sharply reinforces the deterrence function around intentional removal or disabling of safety mechanisms.
Policy review and specialized coverage:
- Employers should closely review policy language and consider whether any specialized endorsements or alternative risk-financing arrangements exist (if legally permitted) to address exposure from employer-intentional torts, recognizing that Ohio public policy may limit insurability of truly deliberate injury.

5.2 For Insurers and Policy Drafting

For insurers, the decision provides additional federal appellate support for:

Alignment of policy language with statutory intent standards:
- Using exclusions for “bodily injury directly intended by the insured” is sufficient, in the Ohio context, to avoid indemnity for § 2745.01 claims, so long as courts continue to interpret the statute as requiring deliberate intent to injure.
Reliance on state high-court precedent:
- The opinion underscores that federal courts construing Ohio law will follow the Ohio Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 2745.01 (e.g., Kaminski, Hoyle) over attempts by insureds to resurrect pre‑statute “substantial certainty” doctrine.
Bad faith exposure:
- Where policy language is clear and the only actionable underlying claim is a § 2745.01 intentional tort, insurers can deny indemnity with strong protection against bad faith claims so long as their position is grounded in a reasonable reading of the contract and Ohio law.

5.3 For Plaintiff’s Counsel in Workplace Injury Litigation

Plaintiffs’ lawyers representing injured employees or their families in Ohio should draw several lessons:

The § 2745.01 bar is very high:
- To overcome workers’ compensation exclusivity, the employer’s conduct must amount to deliberate intent to injure—now further underscored by this case and its reliance on Kaminski, Rudisill, and Hoyle.
Limited insurance funds for intentional-tort recoveries:
- Because standard employer liability policies will not cover deliberate-intent injuries, there may be limited or no insurance assets available to satisfy a large judgment or settlement under § 2745.01.
- This reality may affect strategy, including:

5.4 Unpublished Status and Persuasive Weight

The opinion is labeled “NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION,” which in the Sixth Circuit means:

It is not binding precedent on future panels,
But it may be cited for its persuasive reasoning, particularly when consistent with published authority.

Given its close tracking of Ohio Supreme Court decisions and prior Sixth Circuit precedent (Rudisill, Dakota Girls), Encore is likely to be persuasive in future coverage disputes involving:

Employer intentional torts under § 2745.01, and
Policy exclusions for “bodily injury directly intended by the insured” or similar intent-based exclusions.

6. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Encore Industries, Inc. v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America reinforces a clear and important legal alignment in Ohio:

Ohio Rev. Code § 2745.01, as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court, permits employer liability for workplace injuries only when the employer acts with deliberate, specific (direct) intent to injure, including via the evidentiary presumption in subsection (C) for deliberate safety-guard removal.
Standard employer liability insurance and excess policies that:
- Cover only “bodily injury by accident,” and
- Expressly exclude “bodily injury directly intended by the insured,”
do not provide indemnity coverage for such § 2745.01 claims.
Workers’ compensation exclusivity and intentional-injury exclusions together create a regime in which:
- Ordinary workplace injuries are handled through the no-fault compensation system, while
- Deliberately inflicted injuries—though actionable in tort—fall outside typical liability insurance coverage.
Insurers that deny indemnity on this basis, when grounded in the statute and Ohio Supreme Court precedent, do not act in bad faith under Ohio law.

Although unpublished, Encore provides a comprehensive synthesis of Ohio’s employer intentional-tort framework and its interaction with intentional-injury exclusions in liability insurance policies. Its reasoning will likely shape how courts, insurers, and litigants approach coverage for § 2745.01 claims in Ohio going forward.