Encompassment of Final Judgment by Appeals from Rule 59(e)/60(b) Orders and the Non-Disability Character of Neutral COVID-19 Mandates: Johnson v. Maximus Services LLC

Introduction

Johnson v. Maximus Services LLC, 23-7672-cv (2d Cir. June 3, 2025) resolves two recurring procedural and substantive questions in federal appellate practice. First, it confirms that a timely notice of appeal from an order denying a post-judgment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b) automatically encompasses the underlying final judgment. Second, it applies settled ADA precedent to hold that a neutral COVID-19 testing and vaccination mandate—uniformly applied to all employees—does not create a “regarded-as” disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Plaintiff-appellant Jennifer Johnson, proceeding pro se, sued her former employer, Maximus Services LLC (“Maximus”), alleging wrongful termination and retaliation under the ADA for refusing to comply with Maximus’s COVID-19 vaccine and testing policies. The district court dismissed her amended complaint with prejudice, invoking collateral estoppel based on a prior dismissal in a companion case, and later denied her motion for relief from judgment. Johnson appealed only the denial order; the Second Circuit sua sponte clarified that her appeal also proper ly covers the underlying judgment.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit unanimously affirmed. The three-judge panel held:

1. Appellate jurisdiction: Under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(5)(B) and 4(a)(4)(A), a notice of appeal from an order denying a timely Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) motion resets the 30-day appeal clock and encompasses the underlying final judgment—even if the notice designates only the post-judgment order.
2. ADA discrimination and retaliation: Johnson’s claims failed under controlling Second Circuit decisions (notably Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc.). A neutral vaccine or testing mandate does not, by itself, render an employee “disabled,” “regarded as” disabled, or entitled to an individualized “direct threat” assessment, and objection to an already-effective policy cannot give rise to but-for retaliation under the ADA.
3. Collateral estoppel and Rule 12(b)(6): The district court correctly dismissed the complaint as barred by issue preclusion and for failure to state a claim.
4. Denial of post-judgment relief: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under Rule 59(e) or 60(b), where no new evidence, intervening change in controlling law, or manifest error was shown.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(5)(B) & 4(a)(4)(A): Governs the effect of a post-judgment motion on appellate timing and scope.
• Glinka v. Maytag Corp. (2d Cir. 1996): Timing of appeals after post-judgment motions.
• Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc. (2d Cir. 2024): Neutral vaccination mandates do not constitute “regarded as” disabilities.
• Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (2d Cir. 2019): Elements of an ADA retaliation claim.
• Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) & 60(b): Standards for altering or setting aside a judgment.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in two parallel threads:

a. Procedural Jurisdiction

Under Rule 4(a)(4)(A), filing a timely Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) motion “commences anew” the 30-day period for appeal. Rule 3(c)(5)(B) then deems a notice of appeal from an order denying that motion to encompass the final judgment itself. Applying these provisions, the panel found Johnson’s October 31 notice of appeal (from the October 10 denial) timely and sufficiently broad to include the underlying September 1 judgment.

b. ADA Substantive Claims

To state a discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), a plaintiff must show she was (or was perceived as) disabled, qualified to perform essential job functions, and discharged because of that disability. For retaliation, she must show but-for causation between her protected activity and an adverse action. Here:

• Johnson never alleged an actual disability, only noncompliance with a neutral policy.
• Under Sharikov, a universal vaccine or testing rule does not single out employees or render them “regarded as” disabled.
• Her objections post-dated the policy’s inception, so she could not show but-for causation of any adverse action.

3. Impact

This decision has two principal effects:

• Appellate practice: It cements that an appeal from a denial of Rule 59(e)/60(b) relief resets the deadline and picks up the final judgment automatically, reducing jurisdictional disputes.
• Employment law: It reaffirms that neutral public-health mandates will not, without more, trigger ADA “regarded as” or “record of impairment” protections—providing clarity for employers designing uniform safety policies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Collateral Estoppel: Once an issue of fact or law has been decided in one case, it cannot be relitigated in a later case involving the same parties.
• Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) vs. 60(b): Rule 59(e) lets a party seek amendment of a judgment within 28 days for errors or new law; Rule 60(b) allows broader post-judgment relief (e.g., mistake, new evidence) but also within strict time frames.
• “Regarded as” Disability: The ADA covers not only actual disabilities but also situations where an employer wrongly believes an employee has a substantial impairment. Neutral rules that apply to everyone do not create this misperception.

Conclusion

Johnson v. Maximus Services LLC delivers clear guidance on two fronts. Procedurally, it reaffirms that an appeal from the denial of a timely post-judgment motion automatically encompasses the underlying final judgment, streamlining appellate filings. Substantively, it reinforces established ADA doctrine that neutral COVID-19 vaccination and testing mandates do not render an employee “disabled” or “regarded as” disabled. Employers may continue to apply uniform public-health policies without fearing ADA liability so long as those policies do not single out individual employees.