Introduction

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon et al. v. Smith et al., 494 U.S. 872 (1990), represents a pivotal Supreme Court decision that redefined the boundaries of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The case confronted the intersection of religious freedom and state regulation, particularly focusing on whether a neutral, generally applicable law could disqualify individuals from unemployment benefits due to their religiously motivated actions.

The plaintiffs, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, were members of the Native American Church who were terminated from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation company after they ingested peyote—a hallucinogenic drug—during religious ceremonies. Following their dismissals, their applications for unemployment benefits were denied based on a state law that excludes those discharged for work-related misconduct. The crux of the dispute centered on whether the denial of benefits infringed upon the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to freely exercise their religion.

Summary of the Judgment

In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt individuals from complying with a neutral, generally applicable law prohibiting conduct that incidentally burdens religious practices. Specifically, the Court ruled that Oregon's denial of unemployment benefits to Smith and Black for their sacramental use of peyote did not violate the First Amendment. The ruling emphasized that states are permitted to enforce neutral laws of general applicability even when they incidentally restrict religious practices, provided these laws do not target religion directly and are constitutional as applied to non-religious conduct.

Analysis

The Court's decision heavily engaged with prior Supreme Court rulings to establish its framework:

• SHERBERT v. VERNER (1963): Established the compelling interest test, requiring that any government action substantially burdening religious practice must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored.
• REYNOLDS v. UNITED STATES (1879): Affirmed that religious duty was not a suitable defense to a criminal indictment, laying groundwork for non-exemption of religiously motivated acts under general laws.
• WISCONSIN v. YODER (1972): Upheld the Amish's right to abstain from compulsory schooling beyond eighth grade, emphasizing the protection of religious beliefs against state interference.
• CANTWELL v. CONNECTICUT (1940): Broadened religious freedom protections by applying the First Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
• PRINCE v. MASSACHUSETTS (1944): Reiterated that religious beliefs do not excuse individuals from complying with general laws.
• Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940): Demonstrated the limitations of religious exemptions, later overturned by West Virginia State BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BARNETTE (1943).

Justice Scalia, delivering the majority opinion, articulated that the Free Exercise Clause does not permit individuals to circumvent neutral laws of general applicability even when personal religious beliefs coincide with prohibited conduct. The Court emphasized the principle that allowing exemptions based solely on religious motivation would enable individuals to "become a law unto themselves," thereby undermining the uniform application of laws essential for societal order.

The Court distinguished between laws that directly target religious practices and those that are neutral but incidentally affect religious actions. In this case, Oregon's controlled substance law did not specifically target religious use but was a general prohibition against possessing peyote. Therefore, the denial of unemployment benefits was deemed permissible as the law was applied uniformly, regardless of the religious context.

Additionally, the Court addressed the applicability of the Sherbert test, asserting its inapplicability to generally applicable criminal laws. The ruling maintained that the balancing approach of determining a compelling state interest was reserved for cases where laws are neither neutral nor generally applicable.

The decision in EMPLOYMENT DIVISION v. SMITH fundamentally altered the landscape of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. By rejecting the application of the Sherbert test to neutral, generally applicable laws, the Court set a precedent that allowed states greater latitude in enforcing their laws without accommodating individual religious practices.

This shift prompted Congress to respond with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993, aiming to restore the compelling interest test for cases involving federal laws. However, Smith remains a cornerstone case illustrating the tension between religious freedom and state regulatory power, influencing numerous subsequent cases and legislative actions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Part of the First Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from interfering with individuals' religious practices and beliefs. It ensures that people can follow their religion without undue government restriction.

A law that applies to everyone equally, without targeting specific groups or practices. Such laws are considered neutral and do not favor or disfavor any particular religion or belief system.

A legal standard requiring the government to demonstrate that a law serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest before infringing on constitutional rights. This test originated from cases like SHERBERT v. VERNER.

Conclusion