Employers’ Wages as “Money or Property” in Wire Fraud: United States v. Nadege Auguste

Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Nadege Auguste, 24-10741 & 24-10757 (11th Cir. Apr. 30, 2025), resolves novel questions about the scope of the federal wire‐fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Nadege Auguste was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and wire fraud for her role in a two‐pronged scheme to sell fake nursing diplomas and transcripts. She and co‐schemers obtained bogus credentials from Florida‐licensed institutions (Sacred Heart International Institute and Siena College of Health) and helped unqualified aspirants use these documents to secure state nursing licenses and employment at health‐care providers nationwide. On appeal, Auguste argued that (1) the government impermissibly relied on the “right to control” theory of wire fraud rejected by the Supreme Court in Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306 (2023), and (2) the object of the scheme was not “money or property” as required by the wire‐fraud statute. The Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed, clarifying that (a) the “right to control” theory has no place when the government identifies concrete property interests, and (b) employer‐paid salaries and benefits are traditional “money or property” when they serve as the object of a fraud.

Summary of the Judgment

In consolidated bench trials based on stipulated evidence, the district court found that Auguste and co‐defendants:

Recruited unlicensed nursing candidates;
Arranged for false diplomas/transcripts from Florida‐licensed institutions;
Guided aspirants in submitting those documents to boards of nursing and employers;
Shared commissions (25 %) on each sale—earning approximately $372,000 (Sacred Heart scheme) and $291,000 (Siena scheme).

Auguste was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud (first indictment) and both conspiracy and substantive wire fraud (second indictment). On appeal, she renewed her district‐court motions to dismiss, arguing that the wire‐fraud statute does not cover a deprivation of the hypothetical “right to control” and that employer wages/benefits were merely incidental to her gain, not the object of the scheme. The Eleventh Circuit held (1) Ciminelli’s rejection of the “right to control” theory does not apply because the government here alleged and proved the deprivation of specific property (salaries and benefits), and (2) those wages and benefits qualify as “money or property” where they were an object of the fraudulent scheme, not just an incidental byproduct.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Ciminelli v. United States (598 U.S. 306, 2023): Rejected “right to control” as a property interest under § 1343.
Cleveland v. United States (531 U.S. 12, 2000) & Kelly v. United States (590 U.S. 399, 2020): Confirmed “money or property” requirement limits “scheme to defraud” to traditional property interests.
Schmitz (634 F.3d 1247, 11th Cir. 2011): Affirmed mail‐fraud conviction where the defendant defrauded an employer of “salary and other benefits.”
Sorich (523 F.3d 702, 7th Cir. 2008), Granberry (908 F.2d 278, 8th Cir. 1990), Doherty (867 F.2d 47, 1st Cir. 1989): Held jobs, wages, promotions, and related benefits can be “money or property” for mail‐ and wire‐fraud statutes.
Ward (486 F.3d 1212, 11th Cir. 2007): A conspirator need not perform every element of the crime so long as a co‐schemer uses the wires to further the scheme.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court applied the following principles:

Money or Property Requirement: Under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, a wire‐fraud scheme must aim to deprive a victim of “money or property.” The Supreme Court has confined that phrase to “traditional property interests” recognized in 1952.
Limitation on “Right to Control”: Ciminelli held that the intangible “right to control one’s assets” does not qualify as “property.” But when the government explicitly alleges that it was deprived of a tangible interest—here, wages and benefits—the statute is satisfied.
Object vs. Incidental Byproduct: Kelly v. United States established that incidental costs (e.g., employee time) are not a fraud object. By contrast, where the scheme’s purpose is to secure employment and compensation (as pled in the indictments), those wages and benefits are the object of the fraud. Auguste’s personal profit from up‐front fees does not negate that fact.
Conspiracy Liability: A conspirator need only willfully join the scheme; another conspirator’s use of wires suffices to establish venue and instrumentality under § 1343.

3. Impact

This decision clarifies key points for future wire‐fraud prosecutions:

Prosecutors may charge schemes that target employer‐paid salaries and benefits as “money or property” when the fraud’s object is to secure those earnings.
The Ciminelli “right to control” limitation does not invalidate typical cases where concrete property is identified.
Entities hiring under false pretenses—health‐care providers, staffing agencies, financial institutions—are recognized as fraud victims under § 1343 when they pay out wages or benefits to unqualified individuals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Scheme to Defraud: A plan involving misrepresentations or concealments designed to deprive someone of money or property.
“Money or Property” Requirement: Wire fraud prohibits deficits of tangible or traditionally recognized property interests (e.g., cash, salaries, benefits, contracts). It does not extend to abstract rights or pure regulatory interests.
“Right to Control” Theory: An impermissible theory that treats deprivation of informational decision‐making as property. Viable only if concrete property interests are not otherwise alleged.
Object vs. Incidental Byproduct: The “object” is what the fraudster aims to obtain. Incidental byproducts—such as costs to carry out the scheme—do not qualify as the object of fraud.
Conspiracy Liability: Each conspirator is liable for the reasonably foreseeable acts of co‐schemers taken in furtherance of the scheme, including wire transmissions.

Conclusion

United States v. Nadege Auguste reaffirms that federal wire fraud protects traditional property interests and rejects any broad “right to control” expansion. By confirming that employer‐paid wages and benefits can be the very object of a wire‐fraud scheme, the Eleventh Circuit ensures that those who traffic in fraudulent credentials—and thereby induce unwitting employers to pay out salaries and benefits—remain squarely within the statute’s reach. This decision provides a clear framework for prosecutors and courts to distinguish permissible charges (targeting concrete property) from the impermissible “right to control” theory.