Emergency Doctrine and Sudden Non‑Vehicular Highway Obstructions: Rear‑End Presumption Rebuttal, Police‑Report Hearsay, and Abandonment Clarified in Gallt v. Nelk (2025)

Introduction

In Gallt v. Nelk, 2025 NY Slip Op 04333 (App Div 4th Dept July 25, 2025), the Fourth Department confronted a multi‑vehicle collision on the New York State Thruway triggered by a pedestrian pushing a disabled vehicle into a travel lane. The plaintiff, John M. Gallt, was injured when a minivan driven by defendant Ramakrishna Yarlagadda was rear‑ended by defendant Robert A. Nelk’s pickup towing a camping trailer, propelling the minivan forward into plaintiff.

Two appeals were before the court:

Appeal No. 1: Plaintiff’s challenge to the denial of partial summary judgment asserting Nelk’s negligence as a matter of law in a rear‑end collision.
Appeal No. 2: Yarlagadda’s challenge to the denial of his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross‑claims against him.

The case sits at the intersection of New York’s rear‑end collision presumption, the emergency doctrine, rules governing chain‑reaction accidents, and evidentiary limits on police reports. It also underscores the serious procedural consequences of failing to oppose a dispositive motion—abandonment leading to dismissal.

Summary of the Judgment

Rear‑end negligence not established as a matter of law: The court affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against Nelk. Although a rear‑end collision creates a prima facie presumption of negligence against the rear driver, the record raised triable issues of fact regarding a nonnegligent explanation (sudden stop) and the possible application of the emergency doctrine, precluding judgment as a matter of law.
Abandonment and dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against Yarlagadda: The court modified the order to grant dismissal of the complaint as against Yarlagadda because the plaintiff did not oppose Yarlagadda’s summary judgment motion in the trial court or on appeal, thereby abandoning his claims.
Cross‑claims against Yarlagadda survive: The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment dismissing Nelk’s cross‑claims against Yarlagadda. Yarlagadda did not meet his prima facie burden to show that he was free from negligence or that any negligence was not a proximate cause of the collision.
Police report causation statements excluded: The court confirmed that summary conclusions about causation in a police accident report are inadmissible hearsay (not within a recognized exception) and cannot support summary judgment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Rear‑end presumption and rebuttal:
- Foote v March, 211 AD3d 1513 (4th Dept 2022) – Rear‑end collisions establish a prima facie case of negligence against the rear driver, but may be rebutted with a nonnegligent explanation (including a sudden stop). The court relied on Foote to hold that a sudden deceleration or stop by the lead vehicle can suffice to raise triable issues.
- Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906 (2008) – An unforeseeable, sudden stop in a travel lane of a busy highway where traffic is expected to move can be a nonnegligent explanation. Tutrani supplied the standard for assessing whether the stop was “unforeseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions.”
- Oswald v Ramesh, 236 AD3d 1436 (4th Dept 2025); Shah v Nowakowski, 203 AD3d 1737 (4th Dept 2022); Tate v Brown, 125 AD3d 1397 (4th Dept 2015) – Reinforce the availability of sudden‑stop as a rebuttal to the rear‑end presumption.
Emergency doctrine:
- Caristo v Sanzone, 96 NY2d 172 (2001) – Frames the emergency doctrine: faced with a sudden, unexpected circumstance leaving little time for deliberation, a person may not be negligent if actions are reasonable in context and the person did not create the emergency.
- Zynda v Waid, 221 AD3d 1578 (4th Dept 2023) – Quoted for the emergency doctrine’s scope and limitations.
- Lowhar‑Lewis v MTA, 97 AD3d 728 (2d Dept 2012) – Notes the doctrine usually does not apply to routine rear‑end cases because trailing drivers must keep a safe distance (VTL § 1129[a]).
- Maisonet v Roman, 139 AD3d 121 (1st Dept 2016), appeal dismissed 27 NY3d 1062 (2016); Barath v Marron, 255 AD2d 280 (2d Dept 1998); McGowan v Marcus, 216 AD2d 371 (2d Dept 1995) – Establish that the emergency doctrine can protect a driver suddenly cut off or confronted by an unexpected, immediate obstruction. The court extended that logic here to an obstruction created by a pedestrian pushing a disabled vehicle into the lane.
- Rivera v NYC Tr. Auth., 77 NY2d 322 (1991), rearg denied 77 NY2d 990 (1991) – Emphasizes that reasonableness in emergencies is often a jury question; cited to justify denying summary judgment on emergency‑doctrine grounds.
- Zbock v Gietz, 145 AD3d 1521 (4th Dept 2016); Sossin v Lewis, 9 AD3d 849 (4th Dept 2004), amended on rearg 11 AD3d 1045 (4th Dept 2004) – Applied to evaluate whether a party contributed to creating the emergency and whether their reaction was reasonable.
Chain‑reaction collisions and proximate cause:
- Gustke v Nickerson, 159 AD3d 1573 (4th Dept 2018), lv denied in part & dismissed in part 32 NY3d 1048 (2018) – The operator of a stopped car pushed into a vehicle ahead by a rear impact is generally not negligent because their actions are not a proximate cause of downstream injuries.
- Pagels v Mullen, 167 AD3d 185 (4th Dept 2018) – Nonetheless, the movant must still make a prima facie showing of nonnegligence; if triable issues remain, summary judgment is improper.
- Heltz v Barratt, 115 AD3d 1298 (4th Dept 2014), aff’d 24 NY3d 1185 (2014) – Contrasted as a case where moving papers sufficed; here, they did not.
Evidentiary principles—police reports:
- CPLR 4518; Silverman v Sciartelli, 26 AD3d 761 (4th Dept 2006) – Police reports can be business records.
- Huff v Rodriguez, 45 AD3d 1430 (4th Dept 2007) – Statements in police reports assigning causation are inadmissible hearsay unless a recognized exception applies. The court refused to consider the report’s “summary conclusions” on causation.
Abandonment of claims:
- Beechler v Kill Bros. Co., 170 AD3d 1606 (4th Dept 2019); Allington v Templeton Found., 167 AD3d 1437 (4th Dept 2018) – Failure to oppose a motion in the trial court (and again on appeal) constitutes abandonment; claims can be dismissed on that basis.

Legal Reasoning Applied

Rear‑end presumption vs. sudden stop in a highway lane:
Although Nelk undisputedly rear‑ended Yarlagadda, plaintiff’s own summary‑judgment submissions raised a triable issue whether the lead vehicle’s sudden deceleration/stop was “unforeseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions” (Tutrani), given that it occurred “in a travel lane of a busy highway where vehicles could reasonably expect that traffic would continue unimpeded.” Because a sudden, unforeseeable stop is a recognized nonnegligent explanation, the rear‑end presumption could not carry plaintiff’s motion to judgment as a matter of law.
Emergency doctrine potentially shields the rear driver:
The record presented a scenario where a third party (the pedestrian plaintiff) abruptly pushed a disabled vehicle into the lane just ahead of the lead driver, prompting rapid braking. The court found triable issues about whether Nelk was confronted with a sudden and unexpected emergency not of his making, whether he contributed to any emergency by following too closely or failing to observe the obstruction in time, and whether his reaction was reasonable. Consistent with Rivera, those questions are for a jury unless the facts admit of only one inference, which they do not here.

Notably, the court acknowledged that while the emergency doctrine usually does not excuse rear‑end collisions (given VTL § 1129[a]’s duty to maintain a safe distance), it may apply when a driver is “suddenly cut off” or otherwise confronted with an abrupt obstruction. This decision illustrates that the obstruction may be non‑vehicular (a pedestrian pushing a disabled car) and still trigger the doctrine’s potential application.
Abandonment of claims results in dismissal:
Plaintiff did not oppose Yarlagadda’s summary judgment motion below and did not brief any argument against dismissal on appeal. Under Beechler and Allington, such silence constitutes abandonment. The appellate court therefore modified the order to dismiss the complaint as against Yarlagadda. The abandonment ruling is procedural but outcome‑determinative for plaintiff’s claims against that defendant.
Police report causation statements are inadmissible hearsay:
Even though police reports may be admissible as business records, conclusions within such reports that assign fault or opine on causation are hearsay absent a recognized exception. The court correctly declined to consider those “summary conclusions,” reminding litigants to build their motion records on admissible proof (e.g., party admissions, affidavits based on personal knowledge, deposition excerpts, certified records within an exception).
Chain‑reaction rule does not automatically absolve a stopped vehicle’s driver at summary judgment:
While Gustke recognizes that a driver whose stopped vehicle is propelled forward by a rear impact is generally not negligent because their conduct is not a proximate cause, the moving party still bears the prima facie burden. Here, triable issues persisted as to whether, “inter alia,” Yarlagadda contributed to the emergency—specifically whether he failed to perceive the disabled vehicle timely and whether anything could have been done to avoid the collision. Consequently, the cross‑claims by Nelk against Yarlagadda survive for trial.

The opinion’s phrasing—“contributed to the emergency by reasonably failing to notice the disabled vehicle”—appears to reflect a typographical choice in the slip opinion. Substantively, the court’s point is that a factfinder could determine whether a failure to notice was negligent and causally relevant.

Impact and Practical Implications

Rear‑end cases with sudden non‑vehicular obstructions: Plaintiffs can no longer assume summary judgment merely because of a rear‑end impact when the record shows a sudden, unforeseeable obstruction—even if caused by a pedestrian or a disabled vehicle entering the lane. Defense counsel should develop evidence on timing, distances, sightlines, and the sequence of events to frame an emergency‑doctrine defense.
Comparative fault in complex chains: The decision invites jury apportionment among multiple actors: the pedestrian moving a disabled vehicle into the lane, the lead driver’s reaction (braking, hazard lights, lane checks), and the trailing driver’s following distance and attention. Expect more denials of summary judgment where multiple reasonable inferences exist.
Lead driver responsibilities on highways: A lead driver who abruptly decelerates in a travel lane without checking for a safe lane change can face triable issues of negligence and proximate cause, especially where traffic would normally “continue unimpeded.” The presence or absence of hazard‑light activation and the timing of any deceleration are material facts.
Preserving and opposing motions: The abandonment ruling is a cautionary tale: a party who fails to oppose a motion risks outright dismissal on appeal. Always submit responsive papers below and briefing on appeal.
Evidence in motion practice: Police report causation statements are unreliable vehicles for summary judgment. Parties should rely on admissible evidence—sworn testimony, expert affidavits, authenticated records within hearsay exceptions—to carry the prima facie burden.
Insurance and risk allocation: Insurers should anticipate fact‑intensive trials in chain‑reaction collisions involving disabled vehicles and pedestrians. Reserves and defense strategies should account for potential apportionment and the resilience of emergency‑doctrine defenses against summary disposition.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prima facie case in rear‑end collisions: If you hit the car in front, the law presumes you were negligent. You can avoid liability only by offering a credible, non‑negligent reason for the crash (e.g., the car ahead stopped suddenly and unforeseeably).
Nonnegligent explanation: A reason that shows the crash could have happened even if the rear driver was being careful—like a sudden, unexpected stop in a highway lane.
Emergency doctrine: When a driver faces a sudden and unexpected emergency not of their own making, the driver won’t be judged negligent if their split‑second reaction was reasonable under the circumstances.
Chain‑reaction principle: In multi‑car pileups, a stopped driver pushed forward by impact is usually not at fault for the next collision. But to win on motion, that driver must still show, with admissible proof, that they acted reasonably and did not contribute to the crash.
Abandonment of claims: If a party doesn’t oppose a motion in the trial court—and doesn’t argue the point on appeal—the court can treat the claim as abandoned and dismiss it.
Business records vs. hearsay in police reports: A police report can be admissible as a business record, but any statements in it about who caused the accident are generally hearsay and can’t be used to prove fault unless a recognized exception applies.
Triable issue of fact: A genuine dispute about important facts that a jury, not a judge, must decide. When such disputes exist, summary judgment is denied.

Conclusion

Gallt v. Nelk refines the analysis of rear‑end collisions on high‑speed highways by emphasizing two key points: first, a sudden, unforeseeable obstruction—even one created by a pedestrian pushing a disabled vehicle—can rebut the rear‑end presumption and frame an emergency‑doctrine defense for the trailing driver; second, chain‑reaction doctrines do not automatically absolve the front driver at the summary‑judgment stage without a prima facie showing of nonnegligence and lack of proximate cause.

Procedurally, the decision is a sharp reminder that unopposed motions can result in abandonment and dismissal, while evidentiary rulings reaffirm that causation statements in police reports are hearsay and cannot support summary judgment. Going forward, litigants should expect more jury‑bound determinations in complex highway collisions involving sudden obstructions, with comparative‑fault allocations among pedestrians, lead drivers, and trailing drivers guided by the emergency doctrine and the foreseeability of sudden stops in fast‑moving traffic.