Introduction

This appeal arises from two distinct suppression disputes in a federal drug and firearm prosecution: (1) warrantless entries into a home following a domestic-violence emergency call and the ensuing warrant-based search, and (2) a roadside vehicle search following a traffic stop where officers detected the odor of marijuana. In both settings, Malcolm J. Jackson challenged the admissibility of contraband discovered by law enforcement.

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion—though unpublished—reaffirms two durable Fourth Amendment principles in this circuit. First, officers may enter a home without a warrant under the “emergency aid” exigency where there is an objectively reasonable basis to believe a person inside needs immediate assistance, particularly in volatile domestic-violence contexts. Second, the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle supplies probable cause to search the vehicle, and the mere passage of time during the search does not, by itself, dissipate that probable cause.

The core issues were whether exigent circumstances justified officers’ initial entry into Jackson’s home and whether the search warrant was tainted by a false statement; and whether the vehicle search during a 45-minute stop was supported by probable cause or invalidated by an unduly prolonged detention. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of both suppression motions.

Summary of the Opinion

• Home entry justified by exigency: Responding to a 911 report that Jackson was beating his wife, accompanied by screaming and a bystander’s statement that “he” was beating her, officers lawfully entered the open-door residence under the emergency-aid exception. They did not need to wait to witness a physical injury or a blow before entering.
• Warrant supported by probable cause: The issuing affidavit cited the strong odor of marijuana emanating from the open doorway and drug-distribution paraphernalia in plain view (digital scales and torn baggies). A Franks challenge failed because the affidavit did not actually assert the allegedly false vantage-point detail; and in any event, officers could smell marijuana and see paraphernalia without relying on an illegal sweep.
• Vehicle search supported by probable cause: The odor of marijuana from Jackson’s truck—corroborated by his admission that he had recently smoked—provided probable cause to search the vehicle. The 45-minute duration of the roadside investigation did not, by itself, dissipate probable cause. Because probable cause existed, the court did not reach Jackson’s consent arguments.
• Standards of review controlled the outcome: The court emphasized deference to the district court’s credibility determinations, applied clear-error review to factual findings, de novo review to legal conclusions, and plain-error review to unpreserved arguments about dissipating probable cause.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Fourth Amendment home-entry framework:
  • Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011): Reiterates the presumption that warrantless searches inside a home are unreasonable, subject to exceptions such as exigent circumstances. The panel invokes King’s baseline and then applies the emergency-aid exigency.
  • Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006): Upholds emergency entry to prevent or address ongoing violence, emphasizing that officers need not wait for severe injury. The panel uses Stuart to reject Jackson’s suggestion that the absence of visible injury precluded entry.
  • Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009): Clarifies that emergency-aid entry requires only an objectively reasonable basis to believe someone inside needs immediate aid; ironclad proof of serious injury is unnecessary. This frames the domestic-violence call and screaming as sufficient to justify entry.
  • Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984): Identifies offense gravity as a factor in exigency analysis. The panel explains that in emergency-aid situations, the seriousness of any suspected crime is not controlling (per Fisher and Stuart), thereby limiting Welsh’s bearing here.
  • United States v. Turner, 125 F.4th 693 (5th Cir. 2025), and United States v. Newman, 472 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2006): The panel quotes Turner’s proposition that, even under exigent circumstances, officers must show probable cause that an illegal act is taking place before entering. Although some emergency-aid caselaw is framed as non-investigative, the panel notes that probable cause was not disputed in this record and proceeds on that footing.
  • Ceasar v. City of Eunice, 642 F. App’x 387 (5th Cir. 2016) (unpublished): Supports emergency entry based on a credible domestic-violence report. It underscores the volatility of domestic disputes referenced in United States v. Rodriguez, 601 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 2010).
• Warrant sufficiency and Franks challenges:
  • Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978): Provides the framework to invalidate a warrant if (i) the affidavit deliberately or recklessly contains false statements and (ii) excising the falsehoods leaves insufficient probable cause. The panel holds Jackson’s Franks attack fails because the affidavit did not actually assert the vantage-point claim he labels false; under United States v. Ortega, 854 F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 2017), a statement reasonably read as truthful is not “false.”
  • United States v. Hare, 772 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1985): An affidavit is not false simply because it summarizes or characterizes facts. This insulates the affiant’s description of seeing paraphernalia in plain view at the threshold.
  • United States v. Turner, 125 F.4th at 709: Even if officers exceeded the scope of a protective sweep, suppression is unwarranted where the challenged evidence was not discovered because of that sweep—foreshadowing an independent-source/causation analysis. The panel applies this causation logic: the odor and plain-view paraphernalia were available at or from the doorway regardless of the sweep.
• Vehicle stops and probable cause:
  • Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): Governs the analytical framework for traffic stops (seizures).
  • United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2014): Clarifies that if the detention exceeds Terry’s bounds, it must be anchored in probable cause. The panel ultimately relies on the odor-based probable cause rather than parsing Terry’s temporal boundaries.
  • United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc): The odor of marijuana supplies probable cause to search a vehicle. The panel leans heavily on Pierre, reinforced by Jackson’s admission that he had recently smoked, to uphold the vehicle search.
  • United States v. Berry, 664 F. App’x 413 (5th Cir. 2016), and United States v. Hernandez, 518 F. App’x 270 (5th Cir. 2013) (both unpublished): Probable cause does not evaporate merely due to the length of a search (finding durations of 45 minutes and 3–4 hours acceptable). These cases support rejecting Jackson’s unpreserved “dissipation” theory.
  • United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 1995): Either consent or probable cause independently sustains a vehicle search. Because probable cause existed, the panel did not need to reach consent.
• Standards of review:
  • United States v. Hearn, 563 F.3d 95 (5th Cir. 2009), United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2014), United States v. Montemayor, 55 F.4th 1003 (5th Cir. 2022), United States v. Tovar, 719 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2013), United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2010): These guide the clear-error and de novo review, and the heavy deference due to district-court credibility findings when live testimony is involved.
  • United States v. Keller, 123 F.4th 264 (5th Cir. 2024), and Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009): Furnish plain-error standards governing unpreserved arguments—dispositive here for the “probable cause dissipation” theory, which Jackson neither preserved nor substantively argued on appeal.

Legal Reasoning

1) Home Entry and Search. The panel began from foundational Fourth Amendment principles: warrantless home entries are presumptively unreasonable unless an exception applies. The “emergency aid” exigency permitted entry where there was an objectively reasonable basis to believe someone inside needed immediate assistance. This threshold was easily met by a 911 report that Jackson was beating his wife and that “she can’t breathe,” corroborated by audible screaming and a bystander’s statement that “he” was beating her, and by officers observing an active argument through an open door.

Rejecting Jackson’s contention that officers should have waited to witness a physical blow or to see visible injury, the court applied Stuart and Fisher to stress that officers need not wait for the worst before intervening in domestic volatility. The court also rejected reliance on Welsh to argue that a misdemeanor-level offense undermines exigency; in emergency-aid cases, the focal question is immediate need for aid, not offense gravity.

In a footnote, the panel highlighted recent Fifth Circuit authority (Turner, citing Newman) that even under exigent circumstances, officers must also show probable cause that an illegal act is taking place. The court did not test the outer limits of that requirement in the emergency-aid context because neither party contested probable cause here, and the record supported it.

Turning to the search-warrant challenge, Jackson argued the affidavit was tainted by a false statement about seeing digital scales from the doorway. The panel applied Franks, Ortega, and Hare, holding that the affidavit did not actually contain the specific vantage-point claim Jackson labeled false. Because the odor of marijuana and plain-view paraphernalia were properly included, the warrant had probable cause. Moreover, consistent with Turner, the court found any potential overreach during a brief protective sweep immaterial because the evidence supporting probable cause was visible and detectable from the doorway; thus, the sweep did not cause the discovery of the evidence the warrant later authorized.

2) Vehicle Stop and Search. The roadside stop began with a taillight infraction. Critically, the officer smelled marijuana upon approaching Jackson’s truck, and Jackson admitted he had recently smoked. Under the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Pierre, the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle provides probable cause to search it. The panel credited the officers’ testimony (to which it owed deference) that the odor came from the truck, and concluded this alone met the probable cause threshold, mooting Jackson’s consent challenge under McSween.

As to duration, Jackson argued on appeal that the 45-minute length of the stop dissipated probable cause. Because he had not made that argument in the district court, the panel reviewed for plain error under Keller and Puckett. Jackson neither engaged the four-part plain-error test nor demonstrated that mere duration extinguishes probable cause. The panel cited unpublished Fifth Circuit authority (Berry and Hernandez) to emphasize that the length of a search, without more, does not dissipate probable cause. The search stood.

Impact and Significance

• Emergency-aid entries in domestic-violence settings: The opinion underscores that officers responding to credible domestic-violence reports—with corroborating indicia like screaming, bystander statements, and visible conflict—may enter a home immediately without a warrant to protect life and safety. Officers do not need to wait for visible injury. This strengthens rapid-response policing in domestic contexts within the Fifth Circuit (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi).
• Exigency and probable cause after Turner: By quoting Turner, the panel signals that in this circuit, exigent entry into a home may require probable cause that an illegal act is occurring, even while the emergency-aid justification remains focused on immediate aid. Future cases may further clarify how this requirement interacts with purely caretaking entries where criminality is unknown. Here, probable cause was undisputed, so the panel did not delineate the boundaries.
• Odor-of-marijuana doctrine endures: The Fifth Circuit continues to treat the odor of marijuana as sufficient probable cause to search a vehicle under Pierre, even amid evolving marijuana and hemp regimes. Litigants should assume that credible testimony about marijuana odor will sustain vehicle searches in federal cases in this circuit absent contrary binding authority.
• Duration does not inherently defeat probable cause: The decision aligns with prior circuit dispositions that the mere passage of time (e.g., 45 minutes) during a search does not “dissipate” probable cause. Defendants challenging prolonged searches should preserve the issue and develop facts showing unreasonable delay that affects the constitutional analysis, rather than rely on elapsed time alone.
• Franks challenges must target actual statements: The court’s resolution reaffirms a practical point: Franks requires a demonstrably false statement (or omission) in the warrant affidavit itself, made intentionally or recklessly, that is material to probable cause. Attacks on supposed implications or officer testimony outside the affidavit are insufficient absent a concrete, material misrepresentation within the four corners of the affidavit.
• Causation matters in suppression: The panel’s Turner-based reasoning highlights the importance of causal nexus. Even if some officer conduct is questionable (e.g., scope of a sweep), suppression will fail if the challenged evidence was discovered by independent, lawful means (odor and plain view at the threshold) and the allegedly unlawful conduct did not cause the discovery.
• Preservation and standards of review are outcome-determinative: The opinion illustrates how deference to district court credibility findings and strict application of plain-error review can foreclose appellate relief, especially where arguments are raised for the first time on appeal or are insufficiently developed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Exigent circumstances: Situations so urgent that officers may act without a warrant, such as to prevent harm, destruction of evidence, or suspect escape. The emergency-aid exception is a subset focused on immediate assistance to someone in danger.
• Emergency-aid exception: Officers may enter a home without a warrant when they reasonably believe someone inside needs immediate help. They do not need proof of a crime or visible injury—credible indications of danger can suffice.
• Probable cause: A fair probability, based on the totality of circumstances, that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. In vehicle cases, the odor of marijuana is often enough.
• Plain view: If officers are lawfully present and see items whose incriminating nature is immediately apparent, they may consider those items in establishing probable cause (and may seize them in some circumstances).
• Protective sweep: A quick, limited check of spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest to ensure officer safety by locating other persons who might pose a danger. It is not a full search for evidence.
• Franks challenge: A bid to invalidate a warrant by showing the affidavit contains intentional or reckless falsehoods that, if removed, would leave no probable cause. The false statement must actually be in the affidavit and be material.
• Plain-error review: When a party fails to raise an argument in the trial court, an appellate court will review only for “plain error”—a clear or obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. It is a demanding standard that often defeats unpreserved arguments.

Conclusion

United States v. Jackson fortifies two long-standing Fourth Amendment rules in the Fifth Circuit. First, officers responding to what reasonably appears to be an ongoing domestic emergency may enter a home without a warrant to render aid, without waiting for visible injury or a fresh blow, even if the underlying offense might be a misdemeanor. Second, the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle provides probable cause to search that vehicle, and the simple fact that a search lasts 45 minutes does not, standing alone, unravel that probable cause.

On the home search, the panel’s reliance on Stuart and Fisher fits the emergency-aid paradigm, while its citation to Turner highlights an ongoing Fifth Circuit theme: exigency does not eliminate the probable-cause requirement for warrantless home entries—though the panel left the precise interaction of those doctrines for another day because probable cause was undisputed. On the vehicle search, Pierre continues to control, and the court’s plain-error analysis underscores that suppression arguments must be preserved and fully developed in the district court.

Although unpublished and thus nonprecedential, Jackson offers persuasive guidance for practitioners and law enforcement: in domestic-violence emergencies, act swiftly on credible danger signals; when drafting affidavits, anchor them in sensory observations that independently establish probable cause; and in vehicle searches, credible odor testimony remains a powerful foundation for probable cause in the Fifth Circuit.