Precedents Cited and Their Roles

• Ray v. Swager, 501 Mich 52 (2017). Cited for the standard of review: the Court reviews de novo both summary disposition decisions and the application of governmental immunity. This underscores that the legal question—whether the sidewalk exception applies—is for the Court to decide anew.

• Sunrise Resort Ass’n, Inc. v. Cheboygan Co. Rd. Comm’n, 511 Mich 325 (2023). Clarifies that, on an MCR 2.116(C)(7) motion, the complaint’s allegations are accepted as true unless contradicted by the movant’s documentation. This procedural backdrop supports denying immunity-based dismissal where the record shows a qualifying sidewalk defect.

• Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567 (1984). Reinforces that governmental immunity is broad and exceptions are narrowly construed. The majority’s analysis adheres to this principle by rooting its holding in the precise text of MCL 691.1402a(3) and the object’s embedded location within the walking surface.

• Robinson v. City of Lansing, 486 Mich 1 (2010). Discusses the historical “two-inch rule” and the prior linkage between sidewalks and the highway exception. The Court uses this history to explain the post-2012 shift: the Legislature moved sidewalk claims into a dedicated provision (MCL 691.1402a) with an affirmative duty on municipalities.

• Rouch World, LLC v. Dep’t of Civil Rights, 510 Mich 398 (2022). Cited for the interpretive directive to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent through statutory text. The majority faults the Court of Appeals for relying on factually distinct cases instead of the controlling statutory language “in the sidewalk” and the defined rebuttal pathways in MCL 691.1402a(3).

• LaMeau v. City of Royal Oak, 490 Mich 949 (2011) (reversing COA). The earlier case involved a guy wire attached to an anchor cemented near the sidewalk; the plaintiff was injured by the wire suspended above the walkway. The majority distinguishes LaMeau because the embedded anchor did not directly interact with the pedestrian, whereas here the embedded metal stub in the walking path caused the fall. The dissent views LaMeau as supportive of excluding fixtures from “the sidewalk.”

• Weaver v. Detroit, 252 Mich App 239 (2002), and Ali v. Detroit, 218 Mich App 581 (1996). Both Court of Appeals cases construe the highway exception and treat fixtures (a streetlight pole; a bus shelter) as outside the “highway” despite attachment to or proximity with sidewalks. The dissent cites these as persuasive; the majority finds them factually distinguishable and, in any event, less probative given the Legislature’s later, specific treatment in MCL 691.1402a.

• Plunkett v. Dep’t of Transp., 286 Mich App 168 (2009). Quoted by the dissent to emphasize broad governmental immunity, framing the sidewalk exception as a narrow carve-out.

Legal Reasoning

The Court anchors its reasoning in the text of MCL 691.1402a, as amended in 2012 and 2016. Three aspects of the statutory framework are central:

1. Affirmative Duty and Presumption of Reasonable Repair (Subsections (1) and (3)).

   Municipalities must “maintain the sidewalk in reasonable repair,” but enjoy a presumption that they have done so. A plaintiff may rebut that presumption only by showing that a proximate cause of the injury was:

   • a vertical discontinuity of at least two inches in the sidewalk, or
   • a dangerous condition in the sidewalk itself of a particular character other than solely a vertical discontinuity.

   The Court held that the five-inch protruding stub simultaneously satisfies both routes: it is a vertical discontinuity greater than two inches and a dangerous condition in the sidewalk itself, because it is embedded into and protrudes from the walkway where pedestrians step.

2. Meaning of “in the sidewalk” and “paved public sidewalk.”

   The City argued that “paved public sidewalk” in MCL 691.1401(f) limits liability to flaws in the pavement material. The Court rejected that reading. The definitional phrase delineates the sidewalks to which the duty applies (paved, public, pedestrian), not the types of hazards covered. The operative text in subsection (3)—“in the sidewalk” and “in the sidewalk itself”—does not confine coverage to cracks or holes in concrete; it encompasses hazards physically embedded in and part of the walking surface that disrupt pedestrian travel.

3. Simultaneous Applicability of Subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b).

   The statute expressly permits rebuttal of the presumption by “1 or both” conditions. The dissent objected that the majority’s reasoning blends the two paths without identifying a non-discontinuity danger. The majority answered that the embedded metal stub is both a discontinuity (height change) and a distinctive dangerous condition located in the sidewalk itself, and the statute authorizes overlap.

The majority also addressed a practical concern raised by the dissent: would this logic expose municipalities to liability if a pedestrian walked into a typical sign mounted high above the walkway? The Court said no. “Vertical discontinuity” connotes an irregularity or lack of continuity in the walking surface; a standard sign seven feet in the air is not such a discontinuity. By contrast, a five-inch metal stub embedded in the sidewalk is an abnormal, irregular obstruction in the pedestrian pathway.

Finally, the Court clarified that the Court of Appeals erred by relying on factually different “fixture” cases that either predate the 2012 restructuring of sidewalk liability or involve hazards not in the walking surface itself (e.g., suspended wires or adjacent poles).

Impact and Practical Implications

The decision significantly clarifies the reach of MCL 691.1402a and will influence both municipal risk management and litigation strategy in sidewalk-injury cases.

Key Impacts

• Embedded hazards are actionable. Objects physically embedded in the paved surface and protruding into the walking path—such as cut-off signposts, pipe stubs, valve or utility boxes that protrude, or similar embedded obstructions—may qualify as defects “in the sidewalk” under MCL 691.1402a(3).
• Not every object near a sidewalk is a “sidewalk defect.” The Court’s reasoning distinguishes normal, elevated fixtures (e.g., a standard-height signpost) and adjacent fixtures from hazards embedded in the walking surface. The focus is on hazards in the pedestrian pathway, not above or alongside it.
• Both statutory rebuttal routes may apply. Plaintiffs can invoke subsection (3)(a) and (3)(b) together when the condition is both a ≥2-inch vertical discontinuity and a distinct danger in the sidewalk itself.
• Municipal defenses remain. On remand, the City may still raise:
  • Notice under MCL 691.1402a(2): plaintiff must show the city knew or should have known of the defect at least 30 days before the injury;
  • the open and obvious defense and other premises-liability defenses under MCL 691.1402a(5); and
  • causation and comparative fault issues.
  The Supreme Court’s order addresses only whether the condition qualifies under the sidewalk exception, not these remaining issues.
• Municipal risk management. Cities should audit sidewalks for embedded protrusions and adopt removal or mitigation protocols (e.g., flush-cutting or capping signpost remnants, leveling utility boxes) because such hazards now more clearly fall within MCL 691.1402a.

Effects on Future Cases

• Litigants will pivot from debating whether fixtures are “part of the sidewalk” to whether an object is embedded “in the sidewalk itself” and within the pedestrian pathway.
• Trial courts will more frequently resolve the presumption-rebuttal question as a matter of law (MCL 691.1402a(4)) when measurement and location (e.g., a five-inch stub in the walking surface) are undisputed.
• Cases involving hazards above the walkway or adjacent to it (wires, elevated signs, poles alongside the slab) will remain less likely to qualify under MCL 691.1402a(3) absent an embedded or integrated condition in the walking surface.

Understanding the Dissent

Justice Zahra would have affirmed the Court of Appeals. The dissent’s core points:

• Not “part of the sidewalk.” The protruding signpost remnant stood on top of the sidewalk, and therefore, in the dissent’s view, was distinct from the sidewalk itself. If it is not part of the sidewalk, the analysis should end: the sidewalk exception does not apply.
• Fixture cases and statutory exclusions. The dissent relies on pre-2012 highway-exception cases (Weaver, Ali) and LaMeau to argue that fixtures attached to or near sidewalks are not “sidewalks.” The dissent also points to the definitional exclusion of “utility poles” from the “highway” definition (MCL 691.1401(c)) as a signal that poles and similar fixtures are outside the exception.
• Scope-creep concern. The dissent warns the majority’s approach could eliminate immunity whenever a pedestrian collides with an embedded or attached object, including ordinary signposts, and criticizes the majority for not identifying a danger other than “vertical discontinuity” to satisfy subsection (3)(b).

The majority answers that “vertical discontinuity” concerns the walking surface; normal, elevated signage is plainly not a discontinuity, whereas a five-inch embedded stub is an abnormal interruption in the path. The majority also stresses the text of the post-2012 sidewalk statute over fixture cases arising under the older, more generalized highway exception.