Eleventh Circuit: Sentencing May Weigh Overdose-Related Investigation Context Without Proving Causation

Case: United States v. Sudiata Neket Zanja Stinson, No. 24-11993 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025) (per curiam) (Non-Argument Calendar) (unpublished)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Panel: Newsom, Grant, and Kidd, JJ.

Introduction

This appeal asked whether a top-of-the-Guidelines, 188-month sentence for two counts of distributing fentanyl was substantively unreasonable where the district court referenced an earlier overdose investigation involving the defendant, received victim impact statements from the decedent’s family, and emphasized deterrence in light of the defendant’s persistent recidivism. The defendant, Sudiata Stinson, was never charged in connection with the overdose death; however, his continued drug sales after being questioned by police about that death informed the sentencing court’s weighing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It underscored two complementary principles: (1) a sentencing court may consider the context that a defendant continued trafficking after being questioned in a death investigation without finding that the defendant caused the death; and (2) while victim impact statements from an uncharged death are “arguably improper,” any passing reference without reliance does not render a within-Guidelines sentence substantively unreasonable. The Court also reiterated that attorney assertions are not evidence at sentencing and that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

Holding: The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 188-month, within-Guidelines sentence. The sentence was substantively reasonable.
Uncharged Overdose Context: The government did not prove Stinson’s culpability for the 2022 overdose, and counsel’s assertions were not evidence. Even so, the sentencing court permissibly considered that Stinson continued selling fentanyl after being questioned about the overdose. This conduct related to his history and characteristics and to deterrence and protection of the public under § 3553(a).
Victim Impact Statements: Considering victim impact statements from the decedent’s family was “arguably improper” given Stinson’s denial of involvement, but the district court referenced them only “in passing” and did not rely on their content in determining the sentence.
Weight of § 3553(a) Factors: The district court was entitled to give substantial weight to punishment and deterrence given the nature of fentanyl distribution and Stinson’s recidivism, notwithstanding mitigation related to his traumatic upbringing.
Disparity Argument: Claim of unwarranted disparity was not addressed because it was raised for the first time in the reply brief.

Background

Following a 2022 overdose death in Vero Beach, Florida, law enforcement investigated Stinson after messages and surveillance suggested he had sold fentanyl to the decedent. He was not charged with that death. The investigation led to two controlled buys from Stinson by a confidential source. Stinson pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(C).

The Presentence Investigation Report calculated:

Base offense level 18 (16–24 grams of fentanyl) under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(11) (Nov. 2023).
Career offender enhancement to offense level 32 based on three predicate controlled substance convictions under § 4B1.1(b)(3).
Three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a), (b).
Total offense level 29; Criminal History Category VI (13 points and career offender), yielding an advisory range of 151–188 months.

The government sought 188 months, emphasizing Stinson’s recidivism, the danger of fentanyl, and his decision to continue dealing after being questioned in the overdose investigation. Stinson sought a 144-month downward variance, citing a traumatic upbringing and arguing that the career-offender range overstated incremental deterrent needs.

The district court adopted the Guidelines calculations and, after weighing the § 3553(a) factors, imposed 188 months (concurrent) and three years of supervised release. It emphasized deterrence and punishment in light of Stinson’s history, including his continued sales after the overdose investigation. Stinson’s objection to substantive reasonableness followed.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Establishes deferential abuse-of-discretion review for substantive reasonableness and holistic review of the totality of circumstances. The panel applied Gall’s framework, focusing on whether the sentence lies within a range of reasonable outcomes.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Articulates abuse-of-discretion in sentencing: failure to consider relevant factors, giving weight to improper factors, or clear error of judgment. The panel used Irey’s “definite and firm conviction” standard to conclude no clear error in the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a).
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007): Reiterates § 3553(a)’s parsimony principle—sentence must be sufficient but not greater than necessary. The panel confirmed the district court’s explicit parsimony analysis.
United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2013): Attorney factual assertions at sentencing are not evidence. This precedent undercut the government’s unsubstantiated causation theory tying Stinson to the death. The panel expressly noted insufficient proof of culpability.
United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010): There is broad latitude at sentencing to consider information about a defendant’s background, character, and conduct; judicial fact-finding about relevant conduct supporting a sentence within the statutory maximum does not offend the Sixth Amendment in the advisory Guidelines era. The panel relied on Belfast to affirm consideration of Stinson’s conduct surrounding the overdose investigation and to situate the Sixth Amendment point.
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): A court may consider uncharged conduct for § 3553(a) purposes (here, as to respect for law, deterrence, and public protection). The panel used Butler to validate the district court’s focus on Stinson’s continued drug sales after being questioned about the overdose.
United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): The weight assigned to each § 3553(a) factor is committed to the district court’s discretion; heavy emphasis on criminal history and deterrence can be reasonable. This supported the district court’s decision to prioritize punishment/deterrence over mitigation.
United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007): A court need not address every mitigating argument to demonstrate consideration. The panel cited Amedeo to reject the claim that the district court ignored Stinson’s childhood trauma.
United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2016): A within-Guidelines sentence and one well below the statutory maximum are indicators of reasonableness. The 188-month term was within 151–188 months and far below the cumulative 40-year statutory maximum (two counts, § 841(b)(1)(C)).
United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2018): New arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief. The panel declined to reach Stinson’s disparity claim on this basis.

Legal Reasoning

The panel began with the deferential standard for substantive reasonableness. It recognized a potential evidentiary problem: the government had not proved that Stinson’s drugs caused the overdose. Relying on Washington, the Court emphasized that counsel’s unsupported assertions cannot establish facts at sentencing. Nevertheless, reversal was unwarranted because the sentencing record did not show that the district court found Stinson responsible for the death or relied on improper factors.

Instead, the district court’s expressed concern—anchored in the parties’ stipulation—was that Stinson continued to sell fentanyl after being confronted by police about a death investigation. The Eleventh Circuit framed this as classic § 3553(a) material under Belfast and Butler: it goes to the defendant’s history and characteristics and bears on respect for law, deterrence, and protection of the public. In other words, the court did not need to find causation to weigh the defendant’s response to a known, grave risk associated with his conduct.

Regarding the victim impact statements from the decedent’s family, the panel called their consideration “arguably improper,” given Stinson’s maintained innocence regarding the death. But any error was nonprejudicial because the court referenced the statements only in passing and did not discuss their content or rely on them substantively in selecting the sentence. The decisive factors were Stinson’s criminal history, his ongoing sales despite prior punishments and supervision, and the acute dangers of fentanyl—all squarely within § 3553(a).

The district court’s weighting of deterrence and punishment over mitigation was permissible under Rosales‑Bruno, and its omission to address every mitigating detail did not imply neglect under Amedeo. The 188-month sentence, being within the advisory range and far below the statutory ceiling, carried a presumption of reasonableness in practice (though not formally in law) per Croteau. Finally, the disparity argument was forfeited under Castillo because it appeared only in the reply brief.

Impact and Prospective Significance

Although unpublished and thus not binding precedent, this decision has noteworthy persuasive value in Eleventh Circuit sentencing practice—particularly in fentanyl distribution cases where overdose investigations often accompany distribution charges without “death resulting” enhancements.

Overdose Context Without Causation: District courts may consider that a defendant continued trafficking after being questioned in a fatal overdose investigation, as relevant to the defendant’s character and to the goals of deterrence and public protection under § 3553(a). Proof that the defendant’s drugs caused the death is not required for that limited purpose.
Limits on Victim Impact From Uncharged Harm: The panel’s “arguably improper” label signals caution: victim impact statements tied to uncharged conduct, especially disputed causation, should be used sparingly. If included, the record should clearly show the court did not rely on them to attribute culpability or inflate punishment.
Government’s Evidentiary Burden at Sentencing: Prosecutors seeking to link a defendant to a death must present reliable evidence; attorney proffers alone are insufficient. This decision encourages more rigorous evidentiary showings (e.g., toxicology, chain-of-supply proof) if causation is to be considered.
Judicial Discretion to Emphasize Deterrence: Especially in fentanyl cases, district courts may place heavy weight on general and specific deterrence in response to recidivism and disregard for known risks, even when mitigation is substantial.
Appellate Preservation: Defense counsel must raise disparity and other arguments in the opening brief; raising them in a reply is too late.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantive reasonableness: On appeal, the question is not whether the appellate court would have imposed a different sentence, but whether the sentence the district court chose is within a range of reasonable outcomes after considering § 3553(a).
Abuse of discretion in sentencing: Occurs if the court ignores important factors, relies on improper ones, or commits a clear error in balancing the proper factors. Deference is high.
Uncharged conduct: Actions not resulting in a conviction can be considered at sentencing if reliable and relevant to § 3553(a). The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence; however, mere attorney assertions do not satisfy this standard.
Victim impact statements: Typically appropriate where the defendant’s conduct victimized the speaker. When tied to uncharged or disputed harms, courts must be careful not to rely on them to attribute culpability without a reliable evidentiary basis.
Parsimony principle (§ 3553(a)): The sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation.
Career offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1): A designation that substantially increases the offense level and often the criminal history category when the defendant has certain prior felony convictions, leading to higher advisory ranges.
Advisory Guidelines and statutory maximum: Since the Guidelines are advisory, judges may find facts at sentencing and sentence anywhere up to the statutory maximum. A within-Guidelines sentence well below the statutory cap often signals reasonableness.

Practical Takeaways

For prosecutors: If seeking to connect a defendant to a death, present reliable evidence beyond assertions (e.g., messages corroborated by controlled buys, forensic links). If relying on overdose context rather than causation, clarify that the inference concerns disregard for risk and deterrence, not attribution of death.
For defense counsel: Object to victim impact statements tied to uncharged deaths; request a reliability determination and a clear record that the court is not attributing causation. Preserve disparity and other arguments in the opening brief. Where the court emphasizes deterrence, differentiate the instant conduct from prior conduct and propose targeted, supervised-release conditions as alternatives to lengthy incarceration.
For district judges: When uncharged harms surface, build a clean record distinguishing between permissible context (e.g., continued dealing after an investigation) and impermissible assumptions of causation. If victim statements are received, note their limited relevance and that they do not affect causation or the sentence length.

Conclusion

United States v. Stinson confirms that a sentencing court may consider a defendant’s continuation of drug dealing after being questioned in a fatal overdose investigation as part of the § 3553(a) analysis, without finding the defendant caused the death. The decision simultaneously cautions against relying on victim impact statements from an uncharged death and reiterates that attorney assertions cannot establish sentencing facts. In a landscape shaped by fentanyl’s lethality and recidivism concerns, the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance—though unpublished—signals continued deference to district courts that emphasize deterrence and public protection within the advisory Guidelines framework, so long as they avoid attributing unproven culpability.

Note: This opinion is designated “Not for Publication” and, under Eleventh Circuit practice, is not binding precedent but may be cited as persuasive authority.