Eleventh Circuit: No Clearly Established Ban on Using Commissary Records to Gauge Religious Sincerity; Appellants Who Do Not Brief Qualified Immunity Abandon Their Appeal

Introduction

In Cantrell Hill v. Bernard Hill, No. 22-13620 (11th Cir. Sept. 23, 2025) (per curiam) (non-argument calendar) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Southern District of Georgia’s grant of summary judgment to three Georgia prison officials on qualified immunity grounds in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit brought by a pro se inmate. The case arises from a dispute over religious-diet accommodation, specifically a request to participate in the Georgia Department of Corrections’ Alternative Entrée Meal Plan (AEP). The panel resolved the appeal primarily on appellate forfeiture: the appellant did not substantively challenge the district court’s qualified-immunity ruling—the very ground on which summary judgment was entered.

The court also addressed several collateral issues: the prison mailbox rule and its effect on the timeliness of a Rule 59(e) motion; whether any mislabeling of that motion as a Rule 60(b) motion was harmless; whether the district court conducted de novo review of objections to magistrate judge Reports and Recommendations; the limits of RLUIPA remedies; mootness of requests for declaratory and injunctive relief once the prison granted the diet request; and the denial of additional discovery under Rule 56(d).

Although the panel did not reach the merits of the First Amendment free-exercise claim, it offered a noteworthy “even if” analysis: there is no clearly established law in the Eleventh Circuit, Supreme Court, or Georgia Supreme Court forbidding prison officials from using an inmate’s commissary purchases as evidence in assessing the sincerity of religious beliefs asserted to obtain an accommodation. That observation reinforces the breadth of qualified immunity where the claimed right is not specifically articulated in existing precedent.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the district court’s judgment on two principal grounds:

• Abandonment on appeal: The appellant, a pro se prisoner, failed to challenge the district court’s qualified-immunity ruling—the dispositive basis for summary judgment. Under Eleventh Circuit law, issues not clearly and specifically briefed are abandoned.
• Mootness of non-damages relief: The inmate’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because the prison had approved his AEP application, giving him the practical relief sought, and because the named defendants lacked authority to provide the additional structural relief he later requested (such as employee removal or institutional changes).

The court rejected the appellant’s other procedural challenges:

• De novo review: The district court stated it conducted de novo review of objections to the magistrate judge’s R&Rs; the record supported that assertion.
• Rule 59(e) vs. Rule 60(b): Applying the prison mailbox rule, the Rule 59(e) motion was timely. The district court erred by analyzing it under Rule 60(b), but the error was harmless because the motion would fail even under Rule 59(e) standards—no new evidence and no manifest error.
• Rule 56(d) discovery: The appellant did not specifically explain how further discovery would create a genuine dispute of material fact; denial was within the district court’s discretion.
• RLUIPA claim: The operative complaint did not include a RLUIPA claim. Even if construed to include one, RLUIPA does not permit monetary damages against officials in their individual capacities, and equitable relief was moot.

In a significant alternative analysis, the panel indicated that, even on the merits, the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity because there is no clearly established law prohibiting the consideration of commissary purchases as a proxy for religious sincerity in the prison setting, and prison officials are permitted to test sincerity when adjudicating accommodation requests.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Abandonment on appeal:
  • Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1298 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995): Issues not clearly identified in the brief are abandoned.
  • Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680–83 (11th Cir. 2014): Failure to challenge one of the grounds for judgment forfeits any challenge to that ground; arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not considered.
  • Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008): The abandonment rule applies even to pro se appellants.
  These authorities dictated the outcome. Because Hill did not brief any challenge to qualified immunity in his principal brief, the court treated that issue as forfeited and affirmed on that basis.
• Prison mailbox rule and motion practice:
  • Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270–73 (1988): A pro se prisoner’s filing is deemed made when delivered to prison authorities.
  • Jenkins v. Anton, 922 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2019); Metlife Life & Annuity Co. of Conn. v. Akpele, 886 F.3d 998, 1008 (11th Cir. 2018): Rule 59(e) allows correction of manifest errors or consideration of newly discovered evidence.
  • Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 243 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001); Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1250, 1267 (11th Cir. 1998); O’Neal v. Kennamer, 958 F.2d 1044, 1047 (11th Cir. 1992): Reconsideration motions cannot be used to rehash arguments that could have been raised earlier.
  • Holland v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 941 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 2019); Lugo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 750 F.3d 1198, 1207 (11th Cir. 2014): Abuse-of-discretion review for Rule 59(e)/60(b) denials.
  • Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008): Harmless error standard—no reversal unless substantive rights affected.
  These cases underpinned the panel’s conclusion that the mailbox rule rendered the Rule 59(e) motion timely and that the district court’s mislabeling as Rule 60(b) was harmless, because the motion lacked new evidence or manifest error.
• Magistrate judge review:
  • 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1): Requires de novo review of properly preserved objections.
  • LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 750 (11th Cir. 1988): De novo review means an independent evaluation of contested issues.
  The district court expressly said it conducted de novo review. The Eleventh Circuit found nothing in the record to contradict that.
• Rule 56(d) discovery:
  • Isaac Indus., Inc. v. Petroquímica de Venezuela, S.A., 127 F.4th 289, 297 (11th Cir. 2025): Denial of Rule 56(d) relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 1990): Courts may rule on summary judgment without completing discovery if there has been an adequate opportunity; the nonmovant must specifically show how delay will rebut the movant’s showing.
  • Fernandez v. Bankers Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 570 (11th Cir. 1990): Technical affidavit requirements can yield to the interests of justice, but specificity is still required.
  The appellant’s generalized discovery requests did not meet Rule 56(d)’s specificity requirement.
• RLUIPA and damages:
  • Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 288 (2011): RLUIPA does not authorize monetary damages against officials in their individual capacities.
  This foreclosed any damages theory under RLUIPA even if the complaint were construed to include such a claim (it was not).
• Mootness and declaratory relief:
  • Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201; Nat’l Tr. Ins. Co. v. S. Heating & Cooling, Inc., 12 F.4th 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2021); A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 925 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2019): Declaratory relief requires an actual, continuing controversy.
  • Warren v. DeSantis, 125 F.4th 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2025); Soliman v. U.S. ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2002): Mootness flows from Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.
  • Gagliardi v. TJCV Land Tr., 889 F.3d 728, 734 (11th Cir. 2018); Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1264 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc): Prospective relief is moot when the relief sought has already been provided; courts do not issue advisory approvals of accomplished outcomes.
  • Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985): Official-capacity suits are treated as suits against the entity, requiring a showing that a policy or custom was the moving force behind the violation.
  • Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977), rev’d in part on other grounds by Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978): Federal courts lack authority to fire state employees or take over their functions.
  Together, these authorities sustained the mootness ruling and foreclosed structural or personnel relief beyond the defendants’ authority.
• Qualified immunity and sincerity testing:
  • T.R. v. Lamar Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 25 F.4th 877, 883 (11th Cir. 2022): A right is clearly established by materially indistinguishable precedent, a broad principle, or obvious egregiousness.
  • Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) [the panel cites “Cutter v. Wilson,” likely a typographical error]: Prison officials may appropriately question the authenticity of inmates’ religious sincerity when evaluating accommodation requests.
  These cases undergirded the panel’s alternative qualified-immunity analysis, concluding that no clearly established law forbids reliance on commissary records as one piece of sincerity evidence.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is layered and methodical:

• Appellate forfeiture drove the outcome. The panel applied Sapuppo and Timson to hold that Hill abandoned any challenge to the dispositive ground (qualified immunity) by omitting it from his principal brief. His attempt to address qualified immunity in a reply brief came too late.
• Even assuming the merits were properly preserved, qualified immunity would still apply. The panel explained that:
  • Prison officials can legitimately test the sincerity of religious claims asserted to obtain accommodations.
  • No binding precedent or broad constitutional statement clearly prohibits using commissary purchasing history as one proxy indicator of sincerity (for example, buying non-vegan items while seeking a vegan diet).
  • Absent clearly established law on point—or conduct so egregious that its unconstitutionality is obvious—qualified immunity shields the officials from damages liability.
• The Rule 59(e)/60(b) issue was resolved by the prison mailbox rule. The court recognized the district court’s error in treating a timely Rule 59(e) motion as a Rule 60(b) motion. Nonetheless, the error was harmless because the motion simply re-argued points the court had already rejected and identified no manifest error or new evidence.
• The RLUIPA issue failed at the pleading and remedies stages. The operative complaint did not include a RLUIPA claim, and the court declined to rewrite the complaint. Moreover, RLUIPA does not authorize damages against officials in their individual capacities, and the only arguably available prospective relief was moot.
• Mootness was straightforward. Because the defendants approved Hill’s AEP application—the core injunctive relief sought—no live controversy remained concerning forward-looking relief. The named officials lacked authority to transfer Hill, implement institutional dietary programs, or fire employees, further confirming that the court could not grant effective relief against these defendants.
• Discovery under Rule 56(d) was properly denied. The appellant’s vague assertions about needing more discovery lacked the specificity Rule 56(d) requires to postpone summary judgment.

Impact

While the decision is unpublished and thus non-precedential, it has several practical and doctrinal implications:

• Appellate practice, especially for pro se litigants: The opinion underscores a strict application of abandonment rules. Failure to directly challenge the dispositive ground—here, qualified immunity—in the opening brief will typically be fatal. Raising the issue in a reply brief will not cure the forfeiture.
• Qualified immunity in prison religious-exercise cases: The panel’s alternative analysis signals that, at least as of this decision, there is no clearly established Eleventh Circuit or Supreme Court authority prohibiting officials from considering commissary records as part of a sincerity assessment. Plaintiffs seeking to overcome qualified immunity in similar cases will need to:
  • Identify materially similar binding precedent clearly forbidding this practice; or
  • Show a broad, clearly applicable principle that squarely covers the use of commissary data; or
  • Demonstrate conduct so patently egregious that it violates the Constitution regardless of prior case law.
  Absent such a showing, damages claims will likely fail on qualified-immunity grounds.
• Relief design and mootness strategy: Defendants who promptly afford the core accommodation sought (e.g., approve a diet request) can often moot claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs seeking systemic reforms should promptly name the proper entity or officials with authority to implement policy changes and consider exceptions to mootness (such as voluntary cessation), if supported by facts.
• RLUIPA pleading and remedies: The case reiterates that RLUIPA does not provide a damages remedy against officials in their individual capacities. Plaintiffs should plead official-capacity claims against the appropriate entity or officials for prospective relief and recognize that obtaining the accommodation can moot the claim.
• Motion practice precision: The prison mailbox rule can preserve timeliness, but mislabeling errors will be deemed harmless when the motion lacks substantive merit. Parties must use Rule 59(e) for genuine manifest-error or new-evidence arguments, not to re-urge previously rejected points.
• Discovery under Rule 56(d): Vague requests for “more discovery” will not forestall summary judgment. Nonmovants must identify specific facts they expect to obtain and explain how those facts will rebut the movant’s showing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified immunity: A doctrine that protects government officials from being sued for money damages unless they violated a constitutional or statutory right that was “clearly established” at the time. A right is clearly established if (1) a prior case with materially similar facts said the conduct was unlawful, (2) a broad legal principle puts the unlawfulness beyond debate in the relevant context, or (3) the conduct is so obviously unconstitutional that no precedent is needed.
• Abandonment on appeal: Appellate courts generally consider only the issues the appellant clearly argues in the opening brief. If you do not address a ground on which the lower court ruled, you have abandoned any challenge to that ground.
• Prison mailbox rule: For incarcerated, unrepresented litigants, a document is considered filed on the date it is handed to prison authorities for mailing, not when the court receives it.
• Rule 59(e) vs. Rule 60(b): Rule 59(e) allows a party to ask the district court to alter or amend a judgment shortly after entry, typically for manifest errors or new evidence. Rule 60(b) provides relief from a final judgment for specific reasons (e.g., mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud) and operates under different timing and standards.
• RLUIPA vs. First Amendment: RLUIPA provides strong protection for religious exercise in prisons but has limited remedies—no individual-capacity damages. First Amendment claims can allow damages against individuals, but qualified immunity may bar them unless the right was clearly established.
• Mootness: Federal courts only decide live disputes. If the plaintiff already received the requested prospective relief, there is nothing left for the court to order, and the claim is moot.
• Official-capacity suits: These are treated as suits against the governmental entity itself. Liability typically requires showing that an official policy or custom was the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. Individual officials without authority to provide structural relief are not proper targets for such relief.
• Rule 56(d) discovery: When faced with a summary judgment motion, a party who needs more evidence can ask the court to postpone the ruling, but must specify what discovery is needed and why it matters to create a genuine factual dispute.
• Sincerity assessment in religious accommodation: Courts recognize that prisons may test whether a claimed religious belief is sincerely held (as opposed to pretextual), and an inmate’s actions (including commissary purchases) may be considered as evidence bearing on sincerity. The absence of a clearly established prohibition on using commissary data means officials typically have qualified immunity from damages for using it.

Conclusion

Cantrell Hill v. Bernard Hill is a careful application of core appellate and civil-rights doctrines. On the procedural front, it is a pointed reminder that appellants—pro se or not—must directly attack the dispositive ground of judgment in their opening briefs or risk forfeiture. On the merits front, the panel’s alternative analysis reinforces that qualified immunity remains robust in the prison religious-exercise context absent clearly established law: there is no Eleventh Circuit or Supreme Court authority prohibiting officials from considering commissary purchases as part of a sincerity evaluation for religious diets.

The opinion also provides practical guidance: the prison mailbox rule can salvage timeliness, but harmless-error review will neutralize labeling mistakes when the motion lacks substance; RLUIPA’s remedial limits matter; and plaintiffs seeking prospective relief must sue appropriate officials or entities and anticipate mootness if the accommodation is granted. Even as a non-precedential decision, the case offers a roadmap for litigants and courts handling similar disputes at the intersection of prison administration, religious accommodation, and qualified immunity.