Precedents and Authorities Cited

• United States v. Henry, 1 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2021): Establishes the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing sentencing reasonableness. This frames the deferential lens through which the panel evaluated both procedural and substantive claims.
• United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009): Places the burden on the appellant to show unreasonableness. The opinion invokes Sarras to remind that mere dissatisfaction with the sentence is not enough.
• United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009): Distinguishes procedural from substantive unreasonableness and identifies procedural errors such as failure to consider § 3553(a) or to adequately explain the sentence.
• United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266 (11th Cir. 2025): Articulates the substantive unreasonableness test: failure to give significant weight to relevant factors, giving significant weight to an improper factor, or a clear error of judgment in weighing proper factors. The panel quotes Olson’s formulation.
• United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2023): Supports the principle that appellate courts “take the district court at its word” when it clearly states what it did or did not consider. Curtin is pivotal to rejecting Bocage’s claim that the court relied on predicted state sentencing outcomes.
• United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739 (11th Cir. 2007): Confirms that § 3553(a) requires courts to consider offense and offender characteristics that bear on the likelihood of reoffense. This undergirds the panel’s approval of the district court’s focus on dangerousness and recidivism risk, even in the presence of serious mental illness.
• United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Emphasizes district courts’ discretion in assigning weight to § 3553(a) factors. The panel relies on this deference to uphold the heavy emphasis on specific deterrence and public protection.
• Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011): Instructs that district courts must assess factors such as public safety and the defendant’s characteristics when imposing sentence. Pepper lends Supreme Court-level support to the district court’s emphasis on risk and incapacitation.
• Statutes:
  • 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1): Governs arson involving government property; carries a 5‑year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, which set the floor here.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): Lists the sentencing factors the court must consider, including the need for specific deterrence and public protection—central to the court’s variance justification.

Together, these authorities provided a stable framework: deferential review, careful parsing of procedural versus substantive claims, and affirmation of broad discretion to weigh public safety heavily—especially where the record demonstrates immediate risk and intent to reoffend.

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural reasonableness and the “we take district courts at their word” rule

Bocage’s primary procedural argument centered on a segment of the sentencing transcript where the judge remarked that it was “important that I deal with it,” referencing how other courts had addressed portions of the spree and suggesting that a Tennessee state judge might later say the conduct had been “dealt with.” The defendant argued this reflected an unsupported assumption that the Tennessee state court would impose a lenient, concurrent sentence, prompting the federal court to “over-sentence” to compensate.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected this reading for two reasons:

• Express disclaimer: The district judge stated unequivocally that “nothing about this sentence touches what is only a pending charge in Tennessee,” adding, “I don’t consider it. It is not yet adjudicated. I don’t know what will happen with it.” Under Curtin, the appellate court takes such statements at face value absent contrary evidence.
• Permissible focus on conduct, not predicted disposition: Context showed the judge was addressing the underlying conduct charged in the Rutherford County case (the Centennial Park arson), not predicting its eventual disposition. Considering relevant conduct—even if unadjudicated—is permissible at sentencing when weighing § 3553(a) factors. The opinion notes that the defendant did not dispute the propriety of considering that prior conduct.

Because the judge disclaimed reliance on speculative state sentencing outcomes and focused on the conduct as part of the totality of circumstances, there was no procedural error under Shaw.

2) Substantive reasonableness and mental illness

The district court repeatedly acknowledged Bocage’s serious mental health diagnoses (schizophrenia and bipolar disorder) and his refusal of medication and treatment. The question on appeal was whether the court impermissibly used those mental-health facts as a punitive basis for an upward variance.

The panel found no error, emphasizing the distinction between “punishing mental illness” and “assessing risk” under § 3553(a):

• Specific deterrence and public protection drove the variance: The judge described the offense as “very serious,” referenced the serial nature of the arsons, and found the need for specific deterrence and incapacitation “paramount.” The court was especially concerned by allocution in which the defendant doubled down on a Messianic mission to “rule all nations,” and his stated intent to “get God’s word out” through arson—combined with refusal of treatment.
• Mental illness as part of recidivism assessment: Citing Clay and § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C), the panel held that a sentencing judge may consider defendant and offense characteristics that bear on the likelihood of reoffense. Here, the court reasonably concluded that Bocage’s untreated serious mental illness, ideology-driven motive, and refusal to seek treatment made him more dangerous and likely to reoffend.
• Weighting factors is the trial court’s prerogative: Under Rosales-Bruno, the district court has wide latitude to assign significant weight to public-safety and deterrence concerns. Pepper confirms those concerns are among the “critical factors” courts must assess.

In short, the upward variance was not based on an improper factor (mental illness itself), but on proper § 3553(a) considerations (deterrence and protection) supported by the record, and it reflected no clear error of judgment under Olson.

3) Scope of the variance

The advisory guidelines range was calculated at 41–51 months, but the statutory minimum under § 844(f)(1) made 60 months the effective floor. The court varied upward by 18 months to 78 months and ran the sentence consecutively to a prior 20‑month federal term. The opinion does not identify any mathematical or methodological misstep (e.g., misapplication of the Guidelines or failure to recognize the mandatory minimum). Rather, the variance was tied to articulated § 3553(a) considerations, satisfying procedural requirements and, in light of the serial and ideologically motivated arsons, passing substantive muster.

Impact and Practical Implications

While unpublished, this decision offers salient guidance for Eleventh Circuit sentencing practice:

• Strategic lesson for defense counsel: Mental health can mitigate—but it can also heighten risk in the eyes of the court if untreated and tied to dangerous conduct and rhetoric. To turn mental health toward mitigation, defense presentations should emphasize documented treatment engagement, compliance with medication, concrete relapse prevention plans, and credible expert assessments of reduced risk under supervised conditions.
• Prosecutorial strategy: The government can permissibly highlight mental-health-linked risk for specific deterrence and public protection, provided the argument is framed as risk assessment rather than punishment for illness. Defendant’s own social media postings and allocution statements may markedly influence this analysis.
• Sentencing judges’ best practices: The opinion underscores how careful transcript management can inoculate sentences against procedural attacks. When discussing related or pending cases, expressly disclaiming reliance on unadjudicated outcomes and clarifying that the court is evaluating conduct—not predicting other courts’ sentences—helps ensure appellate deference.
• Consecutive versus concurrent terms: Although not squarely litigated on appeal, the court’s acceptance of a consecutive 78‑month term atop a prior 20‑month federal sentence reflects the substantial discretion district courts enjoy under 18 U.S.C. § 3584 and § 3553(a), especially where distinct episodes across jurisdictions are involved.
• Broader doctrinal point: The decision fits within a line of authority confirming that dangerousness and recidivism risk may dominate the § 3553(a) calculus—even in the face of serious mental illness—if the record supports those concerns. This has implications for cases involving ideologically motivated offenses, serial property crimes, and defendants declining treatment.

Because the decision relies on established principles (Curtin, Rosales‑Bruno, Pepper, Clay), it is likely to be cited persuasively (even if not precedential) in future disputes over the permissible use of mental-health evidence and in challenges predicated on a sentencing judge’s remarks about pending cases.