Eleventh Circuit: Appellate Abandonment and Strict Rule 15/Local-Rule Compliance When Attempting Post-Dismissal Amendments

1. Introduction

In Derrick James v. The Geo Group, Inc. (11th Cir. Jan. 2, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam), a state prisoner sued a private prison operator and multiple prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference after he was stabbed twice at South Bay Correctional Facility. The appeal did not turn on the merits of deliberate indifference. Instead, it centered on pleading and procedure: (1) whether the district court properly dismissed James’s third amended complaint (as a shotgun pleading and for failure to state a claim), and (2) whether it properly struck his fourth amended complaint filed pro se after counsel withdrew.

Key issues

Issue abandonment on appeal: whether an appellant who does not present developed arguments can obtain review.
Amendment procedure: whether filing an amended complaint without leave (and without required conferral) can stand.
Pro se status: whether pro se litigants are excused from procedural rules (federal or local).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that James abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of the third amended complaint because he did not argue the district court abused its discretion (shotgun pleading) or erred (failure to state a claim). It also held the district court acted within its discretion in striking the fourth amended complaint because: (1) James filed it without leave of court required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), and (2) he failed to comply with S.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1’s conferral requirement.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and how they drove the outcome)

Standards of review and deference

Barmapov v. Amuial — supplied the abuse-of-discretion framework for dismissals based on shotgun pleading, supporting broad trial-court discretion in managing noncompliant pleadings.
Henley v. Payne — provided de novo review for failure-to-state-a-claim rulings, though the court never reached merits review because the issue was abandoned on appeal.
Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co. — confirmed abuse-of-discretion review for leave-to-amend decisions, reinforcing that amendment management is primarily a district-court function.
Reese v. Herbert — emphasized “great deference” to district courts in interpreting/applying local rules, directly supporting affirmance of striking the nonconforming amendment under S.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1.
Mederos v. United States — invoked for liberal construction of pro se filings, but used here as a limiting principle (liberal construction does not excuse procedural defaults or missing appellate arguments).

Appellate abandonment doctrine

Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co. — supplied the core rule: issues not briefed are deemed abandoned and will not be addressed. This was dispositive of the third amended complaint dismissal.
Singh v. U.S. Atty. Gen. (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A)) — reinforced that an appellant must provide contentions, reasons, and citations; merely asserting an issue exists is abandonment.
Rowe v. Schreiber — supported the proposition that a bare mention without argument is insufficient.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. — further defined abandonment: perfunctory treatment or passing references are not enough.
Timson v. Sampson — applied abandonment principles to pro se appellants: unbriefed issues are abandoned even when the litigant is pro se.
Nalco Co. LLC v. Bonday and Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd. — provided the court’s rhetorical and doctrinal boundary: liberal construction does not permit the court to “make up” arguments or rewrite deficient filings.

Rule 15 amendment requirements (no “embedded” leave requests; no sua sponte leave obligation)

Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp. — critical to the holding that the court need not grant leave to amend sua sponte where the plaintiff (then represented by counsel) did not properly move for leave.
Long v. Satz — made procedure explicit: filing a motion is the proper method to request leave to amend; allusion or informal request is not enough.
Advance Tr. & Life Escrow Servs., LTA v. Protective Life Ins. Co. — used to reject “embedded” amendment requests tucked into other filings; they do not properly place leave-to-amend before the district court.

Local rules’ force and conferral obligations

Hollingsworth v. Perry — recognized district courts’ authority to adopt local rules with the force of law, supporting enforcement of S.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1.

Accountability for counsel and pro se compliance with procedural rules

Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.) — established that litigants are accountable for their attorneys’ acts and omissions, undercutting James’s attempt to shift conferral responsibility to counsel.
Albra v. Advan, Inc. (quoting Loren v. Sasser) — underscored that even pro se litigants must conform to procedural rules.
McNeil v. United States — capped the point: procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation are not interpreted to excuse mistakes by those without counsel.

B. Legal Reasoning

Third amended complaint: abandonment foreclosed review. The court treated the appeal as an appellate briefing problem, not a merits dispute. James told the court he could not argue whether the pleading was shotgun or whether dismissal was proper. Under Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co. and Singh v. U.S. Atty. Gen., that failure to present developed arguments required affirmance without reaching the substance of the dismissal.
Fourth amended complaint: no leave under Rule 15(a)(2). Once James had already amended as of right, further amendment required either consent or court leave. The court emphasized that the district court’s order allowing counsel to withdraw and allowing James to proceed pro se was not an order granting leave to amend. Under Long v. Satz and Advance Tr. & Life Escrow Servs., LTA v. Protective Life Ins. Co., an “embedded” or informal request is not a proper motion for leave to amend.
Independent basis: failure to comply with S.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1 conferral. The striking was additionally justified because James did not confer with opposing counsel before seeking relief, and local rules apply to pro se parties (as the opinion noted through the local rules’ definitional provisions). Reese v. Herbert and Hollingsworth v. Perry supported deference to, and enforceability of, local procedural requirements.
No “either/or” escape: counsel blame and pro se leniency both fail. The opinion rejected the notion that James could avoid the conferral rule by blaming counsel, while also invoking pro se leniency to excuse noncompliance. Under Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, represented parties bear responsibility for counsel’s omissions; and under Albra v. Advan, Inc. and McNeil v. United States, pro se status does not excuse procedural noncompliance.

C. Impact

Reinforces strict appellate briefing requirements in prisoner civil-rights appeals: even pro se appellants must articulate why the district court erred; a request that the appellate court “determine” the issue is insufficient.
Clarifies a common procedural trap in amendment practice: filing an amended complaint after prior amendments—especially during counsel withdrawal or a shift to pro se status—still requires a proper Rule 15(a)(2) motion (or written consent), not a self-executing filing.
Strengthens enforceability of local conferral rules: the decision signals that district courts in the Eleventh Circuit may strike filings (including from pro se litigants) for failure to confer when required.
Practical consequence: procedural missteps can end potentially substantial Eighth Amendment claims without merits adjudication, particularly after a plaintiff has already been warned and given opportunities to cure pleading defects.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Shotgun pleading: A complaint so unclear or “lumped together” that the court and defendants cannot tell which factual allegations support which legal claims against which defendants. Courts may require repleading and can dismiss if the plaintiff repeatedly fails to fix the defects.
Issue abandonment (on appeal): If an appellant does not actually argue an issue—with reasons and citations—the appellate court treats it as waived/abandoned and will not decide it. The court will not invent arguments for the appellant.
Rule 15(a)(2) leave to amend: After the one “as of right” amendment is used, any further amendment needs the opponent’s written consent or the judge’s permission. A party must properly request leave (typically by motion); simply filing a new complaint does not make it operative.
Local-rule conferral requirement: Many federal courts require parties to confer before filing certain motions to reduce unnecessary disputes. Failing to confer can be grounds to deny or strike a motion/filing, even for pro se parties.
Standards of review: “De novo” means the appellate court reviews the issue fresh; “abuse of discretion” is deferential and asks whether the district court’s decision was within a permissible range. Here, the dispositive rulings (shotgun pleading dismissal, striking for procedural noncompliance) were reviewed deferentially.

5. Conclusion

The opinion’s significance lies less in prison-conditions doctrine and more in procedural enforcement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed because (1) James abandoned any meaningful challenge to dismissal of his third amended complaint by failing to brief it, and (2) his attempted fourth amendment was properly stricken for noncompliance with Rule 15(a)(2) and S.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1. The decision underscores a hard line: pro se status and dissatisfaction with counsel do not relieve litigants of the duty to follow procedural rules, and appellate courts will not supply arguments that a party declines (or fails) to make.