Precedents Cited

1) Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis

The court’s procedural vehicle was summary disposition. Quoting Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969), the panel explained summary affirmance is appropriate where one party is “clearly right as a matter of law” and the appeal presents “no substantial question.” This set the tone: the panel treated Beaubrun’s argument as controlled by precedent rather than as an open constitutional inquiry.

2) United States v. Jimenez-Shilon

Cited for the standard of review—constitutional challenges are reviewed de novo. Functionally, however, the dispositive filter was the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent doctrine, not factfinding or balancing.

3) United States v. Archer; United States v. Gillis; United States v. Lightsey

These cases supply the Eleventh Circuit’s prior panel precedent rule and the stringent standard for concluding that a later Supreme Court or en banc decision abrogates earlier panel precedent. In particular:

• United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008): a prior panel holding binds later panels unless overruled by the Supreme Court or en banc Eleventh Circuit.
• United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019): abrogation requires a later decision to be “clearly on point” and to “directly conflict,” not merely weaken the earlier case.
• United States v. Lightsey, 120 F.4th 851 (11th Cir. 2024): abrogation demands the later decision “demolish and eviscerate all the fundamental props” of the earlier precedent.

The panel used this trilogy to frame Beaubrun’s theory as an abrogation argument—and to reject it for failing to meet the Eleventh Circuit’s high bar.

4) District of Columbia v. Heller

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), is the foundational modern Second Amendment case. The opinion emphasized two Heller points that repeatedly anchor Eleventh Circuit § 922(g)(1) precedent:

• Heller recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms, but stated that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”
• It described such prohibitions as “presumptively lawful.”

In this case, as in prior Eleventh Circuit decisions, that “presumptively lawful” passage is treated as a stabilizing interpretive anchor for categorical felon disarmament.

5) United States v. Rozier

United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010), is the key controlling circuit precedent. It held that restrictions on firearm possession by felons “under any and all circumstances,” including § 922(g)(1), “do not offend the Second Amendment,” relying in substantial part on Heller’s felon-disarmament language.

Beaubrun’s position—recognizing as-applied challenges for nonviolent felons—runs directly into Rozier’s categorical phrasing. The panel treated that as a binding holding, not dicta, and therefore dispositive.

6) New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), replaced “means-end scrutiny” with a text-and-history test: if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct, the government must justify regulation by showing consistency with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Bruen also repeatedly referred to the rights of “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”

Beaubrun relied on Bruen as a doctrinal reset that should reopen § 922(g)(1) as-applied challenges. But the Eleventh Circuit viewed Bruen through the lens of its own precedent: Bruen was characterized as faithful to Heller, and therefore not clearly on point to abrogate Rozier.

7) United States v. Rahimi

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), upheld § 922(g)(8) against a facial Second Amendment challenge and clarified Bruen’s historical-analogy method, emphasizing that permissible regulations align with “principles that underpin our regulatory tradition” and are “relevantly similar” to historical analogues. Importantly for this opinion, Rahimi reiterated that felon-possession bans are “presumptively lawful.”

The panel treated Rahimi’s reiteration not as destabilizing Rozier, but as reinforcing the constitutional acceptability of felon disarmament.

8) United States v. Dubois (Dubois I), vacated; Dubois v. United States; United States v. Dubois (Dubois II)

United States v. Dubois (Dubois I), 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024), held Bruen did not abrogate Rozier. The Supreme Court then vacated and remanded: Dubois v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1041 (2025), for reconsideration in light of Rahimi. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit reinstated its holding in United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025), concluding neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier and that Rahimi’s language suggested reinforcement of the felon-disarmament premise.

Dubois II is the immediate doctrinal “gate” that blocks Beaubrun’s appeal: it squarely addresses the post-Bruen/post-Rahimi argument and reaffirms Rozier as binding.

9) NRA v. Bondi (en banc)

NRA v. Bondi, 133 F.4th 1108 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc), upheld Florida’s restriction on firearm purchases by minors (including 18–20-year-olds) under the Bruen/Rahimi historical tradition framework. Beaubrun argued Bondi established that all as-applied Second Amendment challenges must be evaluated under Bruen/Rahimi, which would purportedly displace Rozier’s categorical approach.

The panel rejected the claimed conflict because Bondi did not involve a felon-disarmament statute and did not suggest Rozier was inconsistent with Bruen and Rahimi. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s abrogation standard, generalized methodological language in an en banc decision does not “demolish and eviscerate” a directly controlling, statute-specific holding like Rozier as reaffirmed in Dubois II.

10) Florida Commissioner of Agriculture v. Attorney General

Florida Commissioner of Agriculture v. Attorney General, 148 F.4th 1307 (11th Cir. 2025), allowed medical marijuana users to proceed with an as-applied challenge to § 922(d)(3) and (g)(3) at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The panel there emphasized that the plaintiffs were not felons and that the government had not identified a tradition of disarming misdemeanants; it also noted (in a key footnote) the government might later show plaintiffs are “relevantly similar to felons . . . who can categorically be disarmed.”

Beaubrun characterized Florida Commissioner as reaffirming Bruen/Rahimi’s applicability to all federal arms restrictions, including § 922(g)(1). The panel disagreed, treating Florida Commissioner as consistent with Rozier: it distinguished felons from nonfelons and explicitly left room for categorical disarmament of felons.

Legal Reasoning

1. Binding precedent controls unless abrogated. The panel began with the prior panel precedent rule and its demanding abrogation standard. This placed the burden on Beaubrun to identify a clearly on-point Supreme Court or en banc decision that directly conflicts with Rozier (or with Dubois II’s reaffirmation of Rozier).
2. Rozier remains the Eleventh Circuit’s governing rule for § 922(g)(1). Rozier held that § 922(g)(1) does not offend the Second Amendment, relying on Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language concerning felon prohibitions.
3. Bruen and Rahimi do not abrogate Rozier; Dubois II says so explicitly. Dubois II, decided after Rahimi, reaffirmed that Rozier survived both Bruen and Rahimi. The Beaubrun panel treated Dubois II as directly controlling, leaving no room for a new merits analysis of § 922(g)(1).
4. Bondi and Florida Commissioner do not create a conflict. The court emphasized subject-matter fit: neither Bondi nor Florida Commissioner adjudicated a felon-disarmament statute; neither held Rozier’s approach incompatible with Bruen/Rahimi; neither “demolished” Rozier’s “fundamental props.”
5. Result: summary affirmance. Because the outcome was dictated by binding precedent, the government was “clearly right as a matter of law,” making summary disposition appropriate under Groendyke.

Notably, the panel did not conduct a fresh Bruen step-one/step-two historical analysis. The opinion instead treats the question as already answered—institutionally—by the combination of Rozier and Dubois II, and procedurally insulated by the prior panel precedent rule.

Impact

Within the Eleventh Circuit, Beaubrun cements a practical litigation posture: defendants convicted under § 922(g)(1) should expect as-applied Second Amendment challenges— including “nonviolent felon” theories—to be rejected as foreclosed, at least unless and until the Supreme Court (or the Eleventh Circuit en banc) directly alters the controlling framework for felon prohibitions.

Doctrinally, the opinion underscores a key separation: the Eleventh Circuit may apply Bruen/Rahimi in many Second Amendment contexts (as in Bondi and Florida Commissioner), but it treats felon-in-possession under § 922(g)(1) as governed by a distinct, already-settled line anchored in Heller’s “presumptively lawful” assurance and maintained through Dubois II.

Procedurally, the case shows the force of summary affirmance in constitutional appeals where the court views precedent as decisive: instead of extended merits briefing and argument, the court can resolve the matter quickly when “no substantial question” exists under current law.