Introduction

In United States v. Green, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) definition of “serious drug offense,” which looks to the maximum penalty prescribed by state law, violates the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when it treats a state drug conviction as qualifying even though a materially similar federal offense would not qualify. The panel (Rosenbaum, Grant, and Brasher, JJ.) held per curiam that Congress may rationally rely on state sentencing maxima as a proxy for offense seriousness. Thus, applying ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum to Green—based in part on an Alabama marijuana offense punishable by up to 10 years—did not violate equal protection, even though comparable federal conduct (< 50 kg marijuana with intent to distribute) carries a maximum of five years.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Applying rational-basis review, the court held that Congress has a legitimate interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist offenders who commit “serious” crimes and may reasonably use state sentencing maxima to identify such offenders. Differences between state and federal maximum penalties reflect distinct policy judgments calibrated to different problems (local versus national). Because it is rational for Congress to defer to state determinations of seriousness, ACCA’s treatment of Green’s Alabama offense as “serious” while a similar federal offense is not does not violate equal protection.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024); Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
  These Supreme Court decisions articulate ACCA’s purpose: to single out serious offenses involving violence or inherent risk and to address the special danger posed by recidivists. The Eleventh Circuit drew on this purpose to justify heightened penalties and to frame Congress’s reliance on prior convictions (including state convictions) as a rational tool for incapacitation and deterrence.
• United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008).
  The court cited Rodriquez for two key propositions: (1) recidivist offenses indicate greater future danger warranting enhanced punishment; and (2) Congress may reasonably infer that a state labeling an offense punishable by 10 years regards it as serious, and Congress may defer to that judgment. This directly supports ACCA’s use of state maxima in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
• United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016).
  Within the Eleventh Circuit, White establishes that Alabama first-degree marijuana possession “for other than personal use” qualifies as a “serious drug offense” under ACCA because it is punishable by up to 10 years. This precedent undergirds the predicate classification in Green’s case.
• Equal-Protection Framework: Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); United States v. Johnson, 981 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2020).
  These authorities confirm that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause embodies equal-protection principles applicable to federal action, setting the stage for rational-basis review when no suspect class or fundamental right is implicated.
• Rational-Basis Canon: Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307 (1993); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
  These cases articulate the deferential rational-basis standard: a classification stands if any conceivable legitimate purpose rationally supports it; courts may hypothesize justifying facts; a law is void only if no conceivable set of circumstances justifies it. The Eleventh Circuit applied this standard to reject Green’s as-applied challenge.
• Sister-Circuit Consensus: United States v. Titley, 770 F.3d 1357 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Fink, 499 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Millsaps, 157 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Maynie, 257 F.3d 908 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1993).
  These decisions uniformly uphold ACCA’s state-maximum approach against similar equal-protection challenges. The Eleventh Circuit aligns itself with this prevailing view, reinforcing national doctrinal consistency.
• Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884).
  The opinion invokes Barbier’s principle that like offenses should be subject to like punishments. The court reasons the state and federal marijuana offenses are not “like” for equal-protection purposes because their seriousness may rationally differ given distinct sovereign interests and conditions, preserving the constitutionality of ACCA’s classification.

Legal Reasoning

1. Standard of Review. The court reviews the constitutionality of a sentence de novo (United States v. Deshazior). Because ACCA’s scheme does not target a suspect class or burden a fundamental right, rational-basis review applies.
2. Framing the Challenge: As-Applied, Not Facial. Green did not contest ACCA on its face. He argued that applying ACCA to him violates equal protection because his prior Alabama offense qualifies as “serious” solely by virtue of state law, while the federal analogue would not qualify.
3. Conceivable Rational Basis. The court identified multiple rationales:
   • Federalism and Local Conditions: States calibrate penalties to local harms (e.g., trafficking prevalence, organized crime, addiction rates). A state’s decision to impose a 10-year maximum for a drug offense rationally reflects local seriousness that Congress may respect.
   • ACCA’s Purpose: ACCA targets recidivists especially likely to inflict harm when armed. State convictions with higher maxima serve as reliable indicators of offender seriousness and risk.
   • Deference to State Judgments: As Rodriquez explains, Congress can presume that a state’s 10-year maximum signals seriousness; deferring to such judgments is rational.
4. “Like Offenses” Analysis under Barbier. The court concluded the federal and state marijuana offenses are not necessarily “like” in an equal-protection sense because their assessed seriousness can reasonably differ across sovereigns. Consequently, the imposition of ACCA’s enhancement in Green’s case does not impose a “different or higher punishment” for a “like” offense; rather, it reflects distinct legislative judgments each rational on its own terms.
5. Alignment with Other Circuits. The panel cited five circuits rejecting similar arguments, emphasizing that disparate outcomes produced by state-by-state variations do not transmogrify ACCA’s scheme into an equal-protection violation.

Impact and Implications

• Eleventh Circuit Precedent Cemented: After Green, defendants within the Eleventh Circuit face a steep uphill climb to mount as-applied equal-protection challenges to ACCA predicated on divergences between state and federal drug maxima. Rational-basis review will sustain ACCA’s reliance on state sentencing maxima absent extraordinary circumstances.
• Continuity with National Consensus: The decision harmonizes Eleventh Circuit law with the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, stabilizing nationwide application of ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition despite inconsistent sovereign penalties.
• State-Law Maximums Remain Dispositive Signals: Whether a state drug conviction qualifies under ACCA will continue to turn on the maximum penalty “prescribed by law.” Defense strategies should therefore focus on the precise elements of the state offense and the statutory maximum in effect, rather than on comparisons to federal analogues.
• Marijuana Policy Divergence Does Not Alter ACCA Calculus: Variations between state marijuana laws and federal penalties—particularly where a state’s maximum is ≥ 10 years—will continue to produce ACCA predicates even if the analogous federal offense would not qualify. Any harmonization of outcomes is for Congress, not the courts, under the rational-basis paradigm.
• Practical Sentencing Effects: Defendants with state-level drug priors in jurisdictions that maintain high maxima remain exposed to ACCA enhancements. Conversely, legislative reforms that reduce a state’s maximum below 10 years could, prospectively and depending on timing doctrines, narrow ACCA exposure for new convictions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)): A federal statute imposing a 15-year mandatory minimum on § 922(g) offenders who have three prior convictions for “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses,” committed on different occasions.
• Serious Drug Offense (ACCA): Includes (among other things) a state-law offense involving manufacturing or distributing (or possessing with intent to distribute) a controlled substance for which the law prescribes a maximum of at least 10 years. The focus is on the statutory maximum, not the sentence actually imposed.
• Violent Felony (ACCA): Includes crimes punishable by more than one year that have, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person.
• Equal Protection via the Fifth Amendment: Although the Fifth Amendment lacks an express Equal Protection Clause (unlike the Fourteenth), its Due Process Clause embodies equal-protection principles applicable to federal action.
• Rational-Basis Review: The most deferential constitutional standard: a law is upheld if any conceivable legitimate government purpose rationally supports the classification. Courts may hypothesize justifications; the challenger must show there is no conceivable set of facts under which the law is rational.
• As-Applied vs. Facial Challenge: An as-applied challenge targets how a statute is applied in a particular case; a facial challenge asserts the statute is unconstitutional in all or most of its applications.
• Federalism Rationale: States address local conditions and may set penalties reflecting local harms. Congress can rationally rely on state judgments (e.g., a 10-year maximum) as signals that an offense is serious within that jurisdiction.
• “Like Offenses” (Barbier): The principle that similar crimes should be treated similarly under the law. In Green, the court explained the federal and state offenses need not be treated as “like” for equal-protection purposes because sovereigns may rationally assess seriousness differently.

Practice Pointers

• Scrutinize the statutory maximum for any state drug predicates at the time relevant under governing law. A maximum of 10 years or more is the touchstone for ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition.
• Focus challenges on categorical approach questions (does the state offense necessarily involve manufacturing/distributing or possessing with intent?) and on whether priors were committed on “occasions different from one another” (see Wooden), rather than on equal-protection comparisons to federal analogues.
• Investigate whether the state conviction’s maximum rested on particular enhancements and how Eleventh Circuit precedent treats those in the ACCA analysis, noting the Supreme Court’s guidance in Rodriquez on recidivist maxima.
• For policy arguments about disparity between state and federal drug penalties (e.g., marijuana), recognize that under rational-basis review such arguments are better directed to Congress than to the courts.

Conclusion

United States v. Green reinforces a clear rule in the Eleventh Circuit: ACCA’s reliance on state sentencing maxima to define “serious drug offenses” survives Fifth Amendment equal-protection scrutiny, even when a similar federal offense would not qualify. Anchored in ACCA’s recidivist-incapacitation purpose, the decision embraces federalism-based rationales—states can and do calibrate penalties to local conditions, and Congress may reasonably defer to those judgments when identifying offenders who warrant enhanced federal punishment for firearm possession. Aligned with sister-circuit decisions, Green solidifies doctrinal stability and signals that equal-protection challenges premised on state–federal penalty mismatches will not unsettle ACCA enhancements in the Eleventh Circuit.