Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision affirms a dismissal for lack of Article III standing in a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) suit arising from an allegedly erroneous medical debt collection. The panel held that allegations of “wasted time” disputing a debt, time spent consulting counsel to learn one’s rights, and generalized emotional distress—without more—do not constitute a concrete injury for federal jurisdiction. The court emphasized that such harms are “self‑imposed” and insufficient absent concrete downstream effects like out‑of‑pocket loss, publication of inaccurate information to third parties, or a negative credit impact. The opinion fits squarely within the Supreme Court’s Spokeo and TransUnion jurisprudence and the Eleventh Circuit’s own recent articulation in Nelson v. Experian that self‑inflicted efforts to fix otherwise harmless errors cannot manufacture standing.

Parties and posture: Plaintiff‑Appellant Alex El Bachiri sued Medicredit, Inc. (a debt collector) and MD Now Medical Centers, Inc. (the medical provider), alleging that after MD Now refunded a prepayment for a service never performed (stitch removal), it improperly re‑billed him and sent the account to collections. The district court dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice for lack of standing, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal because El Bachiri failed to plead a concrete injury in fact. His allegations of:

• wasted time disputing the debt and consulting an attorney, and
• generalized emotional distress (frustration, stress, anxiety, surprise, shock, embarrassment), and
• a threat of potential credit reporting

were deemed insufficient without allegations that he paid money he did not owe, suffered a negative credit score or other publication-based harm, or otherwise acted to his detriment in response to the letters. The court relied on Spokeo, TransUnion, and Muransky to reiterate that statutory violations alone do not confer standing. It further relied on its 2025 decision in Nelson v. Experian for the principle that plaintiffs cannot rely on “self‑imposed injuries” like time spent calling a collector or consulting counsel to establish Article III standing. The panel distinguished Walters, Pedro, and Losch—cases where standing existed because inaccurate information was disseminated to third parties and/or caused concrete harms (credit‑score declines, out‑of‑pocket expenditures, extensive corrective efforts tied to consequential harm). The panel also noted that the debt had been removed from collections months before suit and, in any event, the sub‑$500 amount was unlikely to appear on credit reports given intervening CFPB policy guidance regarding medical debts.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016). Spokeo anchors the modern standing inquiry: a plaintiff must allege an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent. Statutory violations do not automatically produce concrete injury. The panel invoked Spokeo to require more than technical FDCPA/FCCPA noncompliance—there must be a real‑world harm.

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021). TransUnion clarified that the mere existence of inaccurate information in a company’s internal files is not a concrete injury; publication to third parties (creating a defamation‑like harm) is often pivotal for intangible injuries. The panel applied this publication principle: without third‑party dissemination or credit impact, the alleged harms remained abstract.

Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Muransky reinforces that at the pleading stage, allegations must “plausibly and clearly” allege a concrete injury; conclusory claims of harm will not suffice. The panel used Muransky both for the standard of review and to reject conclusory emotional‑distress allegations unmoored from concrete consequences.

Drazen v. Pinto, 74 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). Drazen underscores the jurisdictional nature of Article III’s case‑or‑controversy requirement; if standing is absent, federal courts lack power to adjudicate. It frames the threshold posture of the dispute.

Nelson v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 144 F.4th 1350 (11th Cir. 2025). Nelson is central: plaintiffs cannot rely on “self‑imposed injuries” to satisfy Article III. Time spent calling a collector or seeking legal advice about an unpublicized, non‑harmful error does not mirror a traditionally cognizable harm and thus is insufficient. The panel leaned on Nelson to reject El Bachiri’s “wasted time” and attorney‑consultation theories.

Pierre v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 29 F.4th 934 (7th Cir. 2022). Cited as persuasive authority, Pierre held that neither making a call to a debt collector nor seeking legal advice, absent detrimental reliance, is closely related to a historically cognizable harm. The panel deployed Pierre to show consensus that such self‑directed efforts are not concrete injuries.

Walters v. Fast AC, LLC, 60 F.4th 642 (11th Cir. 2023); Pedro v. Equifax, Inc., 868 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2017); Losch v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 995 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2021). The panel carefully distinguished these cases, each of which recognized standing in the presence of concrete downstream consequences:

• Walters: time and money expended correcting errors that affected credit score; credible emotional distress based on tangible consequences;
• Losch: reporting of a non‑existent debt to third parties post‑bankruptcy discharge; significant stress and some 400 hours of corrective activity tied to real harm;
• Pedro: published inaccuracies resulting in a 100‑point credit‑score drop; harm analogous to defamation and time expended correcting the record.

Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013); Tsao v. Captiva MVP Restaurant Partners, LLC, 986 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2021). These cases stress that speculative future injuries do not suffice; plaintiffs cannot create standing by incurring costs to avoid non‑imminent risks. The panel used this to dismiss El Bachiri’s “threat of reporting” theory as not “certainly impending,” especially given record evidence of removal of the charge and the sub‑$500 amount’s unlikelihood of appearing on credit reports.

Toste v. Beach Club at Fountainbleau Park Condo. Ass’n (11th Cir. Sept. 7, 2022) (unpublished). Not binding. The panel noted Toste involved prior concrete harm (a lien and refusal to release it), and the legal‑consultation costs were in defending a legal action—not merely learning one’s rights. It does not aid plaintiffs whose only harm is self‑directed time and consultation stemming from an error that never produced concrete consequences.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Framing the inquiry—injury in fact only: The panel limited its analysis to the first standing element—injury in fact—because traceability and redressability were not in dispute for purposes of the appeal.
2. Wasted time and consulting counsel are self‑imposed, non‑concrete harms: Relying on Nelson and Pierre, the court held that time spent calling a collector or consulting an attorney to learn one’s rights is not a historically cognizable harm, and is instead a self‑imposed cost that cannot manufacture standing. Absent downstream effects, these acts lack the requisite “close relationship” to a traditionally recognized tort.
3. Emotional distress allegations were conclusory and untethered to concrete consequences: Citing Muransky, the court found the bare recitals of stress, anxiety, shock, and embarrassment insufficiently pled. The allegations lacked factual specificity and, more importantly, lacked any connection to concrete harms (e.g., adverse publications, loss of credit opportunities, or medical treatment attributable to distress).
4. No publication, no defamation‑like injury: TransUnion and Pedro make publication central to intangible harms grounded in defamation analogies. Here, El Bachiri did not allege that the debt was reported to anyone, nor that his credit score or access to credit suffered.
5. Speculative future harm is insufficient: The asserted “threat” of credit reporting was not “certainly impending.” The record showed the collection entry was removed months before suit, and—separately—CFPB policy indicates sub‑$500 medical debts should not appear on credit reports, further undermining imminence.
6. Distinguishing plaintiff‑friendly precedents: Walters, Losch, and Pedro are not contrary; in those cases, plaintiffs suffered concrete consequences (publication, credit score impact, financial losses), with corrective efforts and emotional distress flowing from real harm. None held that “effort to correct an otherwise harmless error” is, by itself, a concrete injury.
7. Procedural posture—consideration of evidence: While standing questions at the pleading stage typically accept well‑pled allegations as true, a defendant may mount a factual attack on jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), in which case courts may consider extrinsic evidence. The panel noted district court evidence showed the $202.88 charge had been removed two months before suit—further negating imminence of publication or credit impact and reinforcing the absence of concrete injury.

C. Impact and Implications

For FDCPA/FCCPA plaintiffs in the Eleventh Circuit:

• Pleading must show concrete consequences. Allegations limited to time spent disputing a debt, seeking legal advice, and generalized emotional upset will not confer federal standing. Plaintiffs should plead and, if possible, document:
  • third‑party dissemination (e.g., reporting to credit bureaus, communications to employers, lenders, or others);
  • credit score declines, denied credit, higher borrowing costs, or other financial consequences;
  • out‑of‑pocket costs (postage, fees, paid credit monitoring, phone charges), where reasonably incurred to address a concrete harm;
  • detrimental reliance (e.g., making a payment or promising to pay due to a misleading letter);
  • specific, non‑conclusory emotional distress tied to concrete effects (e.g., medical treatment, documented physical symptoms), if applicable.
• Medical debt nuances matter. The panel’s reliance on CFPB policy regarding sub‑$500 medical debts not appearing on credit reports reduces the plausibility that small medical collections will imminently harm credit. Plaintiffs should be prepared to allege facts overcoming that general presumption (e.g., actual reporting notwithstanding the policy).
• Forum selection strategy. Dismissal was without prejudice. FDCPA and FCCPA claims can be litigated in state courts, which are not constrained by Article III’s injury requirements. Plaintiffs without a federal concrete injury may still pursue state‑law causes of action and FDCPA claims in state forums, subject to state standing rules.
• Beware of “self‑imposed” cost theories. Incurring costs to learn one’s rights or to preempt speculative harm will likely be characterized as self‑inflicted and non‑cognizable under Article III in this Circuit.

For defendants:

• Early standing challenges are potent. Move to dismiss for lack of Article III standing where the complaint alleges only self‑directed efforts (calls, letters, legal consultations) and generalized distress, without publication, financial harm, or detrimental reliance.
• Use factual attacks when appropriate. Submit competent evidence showing lack of dissemination, removal of accounts before suit, no credit score impact, and—where applicable—CFPB medical‑debt policies to undercut imminence.

For courts:

• Consistent application of TransUnion’s publication requirement. This case underscores that defamation‑adjacent injuries require third‑party dissemination; mere internal records do not suffice.
• Careful parsing of “lost time” theories. The panel’s reading aligns with a growing body of authority distinguishing time and effort linked to a concrete harm (actionable) from time spent responding to a harmless, non‑disseminated error (not actionable).

Broader trend: The opinion continues a trend of tightening Article III gatekeeping in consumer‑protection cases post‑Spokeo and TransUnion. While unpublished, it is consistent with—and buttressed by—published Eleventh Circuit authority like Nelson, Muransky, and Drazen, and by persuasive sister‑circuit authority such as Pierre. Expect more threshold dismissals where plaintiffs cannot plead tangible or publication‑based harms.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article III Standing: A federal court can hear a case only if the plaintiff shows (1) an injury in fact, (2) caused by the defendant, and (3) redressable by the court. This case turned solely on the first element.
• Concrete Injury: A real, not abstract, harm. It can be tangible (money lost, property damaged) or intangible (like reputational harm), but it must resemble harms historically recognized in court, and it cannot be merely a statutory technicality.
• Publication Requirement (TransUnion): For reputation‑based claims, harm generally requires that false information be shared with someone else; an error sitting in a private file typically does not cause concrete harm.
• Self‑Imposed Injury: Costs a plaintiff chooses to incur (e.g., calling a collector, consulting a lawyer to learn rights) to respond to a non‑harmful error or non‑imminent risk. These cannot “manufacture” standing.
• Facial vs. Factual Attack on Jurisdiction: A facial attack argues that the complaint’s allegations, even if true, don’t show standing. A factual attack presents evidence contradicting jurisdictional facts; courts can consider materials beyond the complaint.
• Unpublished/Per Curiam/Non‑Argument Calendar: Unpublished decisions are not binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit but may be cited as persuasive. Per curiam means the opinion is issued in the court’s name without a single judge’s authorship. Non‑Argument Calendar indicates the case was decided without oral argument.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in El Bachiri reinforces a clear boundary: in FDCPA and FCCPA cases, allegations of wasted time disputing a debt, learning one’s rights from an attorney, and generalized emotional distress—without publication to third parties, detrimental reliance, out‑of‑pocket loss, or concrete credit harm—do not satisfy Article III. Rooted in Spokeo and TransUnion and crystallized by Nelson, the court characterizes such harms as self‑imposed and conjectural. The ruling leaves the door open for plaintiffs who can plead concrete consequences (especially publication‑based or financial harms) and signals that some claims may belong in state court when federal standing is absent. The opinion will likely shape pleading strategies and early motion practice in medical‑debt collection litigation throughout the Eleventh Circuit.