Introduction

This appeal arises from a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) furnisher-liability suit brought by Timothy L. King against Truist Bank under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s‑2(b). After King’s counsel failed to respond to Truist’s requests for admissions, the district court deemed those matters admitted, denied King’s later motion to withdraw the admissions and file out-of-time responses, and granted summary judgment to Truist. King—pro se on appeal—challenged those rulings, arguing the court should have permitted withdrawal once he learned of his attorney’s failure, that it erred by deciding summary judgment without an oral hearing, and that summary judgment operated as a punishment for the discovery lapse.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. The opinion, though unpublished, crisply rearticulates three important principles: (1) withdrawal of Rule 36 admissions requires a specific, merits-oriented showing tethered to Rule 36(b)’s two-part test; (2) a consumer’s private FCRA claim against a furnisher under § 1681s‑2(b) fails absent evidence that the reported information was inaccurate or incomplete; and (3) there is no entitlement to an oral hearing on a summary judgment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and the Northern District of Georgia’s local rules.

Summary of the Opinion

• Rule 36 Admissions: The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying King’s motion to withdraw deemed admissions. King did not identify which admissions he sought to withdraw, how he would answer them, or how withdrawal would facilitate adjudication on the merits, as Perez v. Miami-Dade County requires.
• No Oral Hearing Required: Citing Eleventh Circuit precedent and N.D. Ga. Local Rule 7.1(E), the court confirmed there is no right to an oral hearing on summary judgment.
• FCRA § 1681s‑2(b) Merits: On de novo review, the court affirmed summary judgment for Truist. Truist met its initial burden with the account agreement and statements reflecting Kings’s past-due status. King failed to produce significantly probative evidence showing the reported delinquency was inaccurate or incomplete under Felts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Hinkle v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. Apology letters did not establish inaccuracy, and arguments about how overpayments were handled did not tie to inaccurate reporting.
• No Sanction: The court emphasized summary judgment was not imposed as a sanction for discovery failure but because King could not carry his trial burden to show inaccuracy in reported information.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Perez v. Miami-Dade County, 297 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2002): Anchors the two-prong Rule 36(b) test for withdrawing admissions: (1) withdrawal must subserve the presentation of the merits; and (2) withdrawal must not prejudice the requesting party. The opinion uses Perez to stress that a movant must concretely demonstrate how withdrawal advances truth-finding and the merits. King’s generalized assertion that the admissions covered “nearly all the essential elements” was insufficient.
• Link v. Wabash Ry. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962): Establishes that clients are bound by their counsel’s acts and omissions. The panel invoked Link to reject King’s claim that he lacked notice of the admissions; service on counsel sufficed, and the client bears the consequences of counsel’s neglect.
• Smith v. School Board of Orange County, 487 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 2007): Confirms Rule 56 does not require an oral hearing on summary judgment. This precedent, coupled with N.D. Ga. Civ. R. 7.1(E), justified deciding the motion on the papers.
• Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986): The familiar burden-shifting framework for summary judgment. Truist shouldered its initial burden with documentary evidence; the burden then shifted to King to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact.
• Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): Clarifies that “merely colorable” or speculative evidence is not enough; the nonmovant must produce significantly probative evidence on a material fact. King’s materials did not meet that threshold.
• Felts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 893 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2018): Two critical points: (1) no private right of action under § 1681s‑2(a); and (2) a § 1681s‑2(b) claim requires showing the information furnished was inaccurate or incomplete. The panel relied on Felts to dispose of the merits: without proof of inaccuracy, the claim fails as a matter of law.
• Hinkle v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 827 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2016): Details the “reasonable investigation” duty and outcomes under § 1681s‑2(b). The court implicitly applied Hinkle’s framework but stopped at the threshold because King could not establish any inaccuracy to investigate.
• Milgram v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 72 F.4th 1212 (11th Cir. 2023): Summarizes furnishers’ duties under § 1681s‑2(a) and (b) and reinforces the bifurcation between accuracy in furnishing and reasonable investigation upon notice of dispute. The panel cites Milgram to situate Truist’s obligations.

Legal Reasoning and Application

1) Rule 36 Admissions and Withdrawal:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3) deems matters admitted if a party does not respond within 30 days. King conceded no response was served. Under Rule 36(b) and Perez, the movant must show both that withdrawal promotes resolution on the merits and that the requester will not be prejudiced. King’s motion was conclusory: he did not specify which admissions he sought to withdraw, how he would answer, or why withdrawal would advance the truth. Without that specificity, he could not satisfy the “subserve the merits” prong, and the analysis necessarily ended there. The court also rejected the notion that his ignorance of counsel’s failure warranted relief, reiterating Link’s principle that service on counsel is service on the party. Denial of withdrawal was within the district court’s discretion.

2) No Right to Oral Hearing on Summary Judgment:

Rule 56 permits courts to decide motions on the papers, and the Northern District of Georgia’s Local Rule 7.1(E) expressly contemplates written disposition absent a court-ordered hearing. Smith squarely holds that Rule 56(c) does not require an oral hearing. Thus, the district court acted within its discretion in deciding Truist’s motion without oral argument.

3) FCRA § 1681s‑2(b) Merits and Summary Judgment:

Only § 1681s‑2(b) is privately enforceable against furnishers; it imposes a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation after a consumer reporting agency (CRA) notifies the furnisher of a dispute. Yet the plaintiff must first identify inaccurate or incomplete information that was furnished. Truist submitted the account agreement and monthly statements showing King’s account was 60 days past due for the March 2022 payment and 30 days past due for the April 2022 payment as of late May 2022. This met Celotex’s initial burden.

The burden then shifted to King to produce probative evidence of inaccuracy. He did not dispute missing payments. He questioned whether the “minimum” and “past-due” amounts were correctly calculated, but he did not substantiate that contention with competent evidence. His declaration’s cited paragraphs did not assert inaccuracies in the specific amounts, and the two Truist letters “admitting and apologizing for errors” did not connect any error to the reported delinquencies. Likewise, an argument that overpayments were applied inconsistently with the agreement did not show that the credit reporting of delinquency was false or misleading. Under Anderson, such speculative, non-probative assertions do not create a genuine dispute. Because King failed to identify an actual inaccuracy, he could not establish a § 1681s‑2(b) violation as a matter of law under Felts.

The panel also underscored that summary judgment was not a sanction for discovery default; it flowed from the merits: King, who would bear the trial burden, failed to make the required showing of inaccuracy in the furnished information (Celotex; Felts).

Impact and Implications

• Rule 36 Practice: The decision is a cautionary tale: unanswered requests for admission can become case-dispositive. Withdrawal is not automatic—even when counsel is at fault—and requires specificity. Litigants must:
  • Identify each admission to be withdrawn;
  • Explain the proposed response and why it aids adjudication on the merits;
  • Address prejudice to the requesting party (e.g., reliance and additional discovery needs).
• Agency Principles and Client Accountability: Link’s rule remains potent: clients are bound by counsel’s litigation missteps. Courts will not reopen deadlines merely because a party later discovers counsel’s neglect.
• FCRA Furnisher Claims: The opinion reinforces a threshold requirement that often proves dispositive: consumers must marshal evidence that the furnished information was inaccurate or incomplete. Procedural criticisms of a furnisher’s investigation do not matter if the underlying data were correct. Apology letters, absent linkage to the reported tradeline, are not enough.
• No Hearing Presumption: Practitioners should not expect oral argument on dispositive motions in the Northern District of Georgia. Written presentation must fully address the record and legal standards.
• Strategic Documentation: For plaintiffs: maintain documentary proof tying any alleged bank errors to specific tradeline inaccuracies as reported to CRAs. For furnishers: retain and present clear account agreements and statements demonstrating payment histories and delinquency status; those documents can carry the initial summary judgment burden.
• Pro Se Considerations on Appeal: While courts construe pro se filings liberally, they will not relax evidentiary burdens. The Eleventh Circuit’s adherence to Celotex/Anderson standards underscores that appeals hinge on the underlying record, not equitable pleas.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Requests for Admissions (Rule 36): A discovery tool asking the other side to admit certain facts or the authenticity of documents. If you do not answer in 30 days, the statements are automatically deemed admitted and can eliminate factual disputes.
• Withdrawing Admissions: You can ask the court to undo deemed admissions, but you must show: (1) doing so helps the case be decided on its merits (by explaining what your real answers would be and why they matter), and (2) the other side won’t be unfairly harmed (e.g., because it relied on the admissions to skip discovery).
• Summary Judgment (Rule 56): A way to end a case without trial if there is no genuine dispute of material fact. The moving party presents evidence; if they meet their burden, the opponent must respond with real, admissible evidence showing a factual dispute.
• No Right to Oral Hearing: Courts can decide motions on the papers. In N.D. Ga., hearings occur only if the judge orders one.
• FCRA Furnishers and § 1681s‑2(b): “Furnishers” (like banks) supply data to credit bureaus. If a bureau tells a furnisher that a consumer disputes an item, the furnisher must reasonably investigate. But a consumer’s lawsuit requires proof that the information furnished was actually inaccurate or incomplete.
• Reasonable Investigation vs. Accuracy: Even if an investigation seems imperfect, a furnisher is not liable if the reported information was accurate. Accuracy is the gateway issue.
• Client Bound by Counsel’s Acts: In litigation, service on your attorney counts as service on you. You are generally bound by your lawyer’s actions and inactions.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in King v. Truist Bank reinforces three practical and doctrinal checkpoints in civil litigation and FCRA practice. First, Rule 36 admissions are powerful; withdrawal requires a concrete, merits-focused showing and cannot be salvaged by generalized assertions or attorney error alone. Second, there is no entitlement to an oral hearing on summary judgment in the Northern District of Georgia, making comprehensive written advocacy paramount. Third, and most consequential for FCRA plaintiffs, the viability of a § 1681s‑2(b) furnisher claim depends on evidence of inaccuracy or incompleteness in the furnished information; without that, the reasonableness of any investigation is immaterial, and summary judgment for the furnisher follows. The decision thus serves as a roadmap both for defending FCRA claims and for structuring them effectively: tie alleged account errors directly to demonstrable inaccuracies in the tradeline reported to the CRAs, and build the record with specific, admissible proof.

Affirmance here rested not on sanctions or procedural technicalities, but on core civil procedure and FCRA elements: burden allocation under Celotex/Anderson, the binding effect of deemed admissions and agency principles under Link, and the threshold inaccuracy requirement under Felts and Hinkle. Future litigants should heed these gatekeepers from the outset of discovery through summary judgment.