Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms the Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) Post-Bruen and Rahimi

Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms the Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) Post-Bruen and Rahimi: United States v. Eric Dennard Parker (2025)

Introduction

In United States v. Eric Dennard Parker, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was asked to decide whether the federal felon-in-possession statute—18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—remains valid in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment trilogy: District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022), and United States v. Rahimi (2024).

Appellant Eric Dennard Parker, a thirteen-time felon, sold a pistol to an undercover ATF agent in 2021. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment, and then challenged his conviction on direct appeal, contending that § 922(g)(1) facially—and as applied—violates the Second Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit, applying its stringent prior-panel-precedent rule and citing its earlier decisions in United States v. Rozier (2010) and the post-Bruen decision United States v. Dubois (2025), rejected Parker’s challenge and affirmed the district court.

Summary of the Judgment

  • Holding. Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under the Second Amendment; Parker’s conviction is affirmed.
  • Key Rationale. The panel is bound by its own precedent (Rozier). Neither Bruen nor Rahimi “demolish” or “eviscerate” Rozier; therefore the statute survives.
  • Standard of Review. The panel noted a split within its own cases on whether unpreserved constitutional challenges are reviewed de novo or for plain error, but concluded there was no error under either standard.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
    • First recognized an individual right to possess firearms for self-defense.
    • Included dicta stating that “long-standing prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” are “presumptively lawful.”
  2. United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010)
    • Applied Heller to uphold § 922(g)(1), concluding felon dispossession laws fit the “presumptively lawful” category.
  3. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
    • Repudiated “means-end” scrutiny and mandated a historical-tradition test.
    • Suggested the protected class is “law-abiding citizens,” implicitly excluding felons.
  4. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)
    • Clarified how to conduct historical analogical reasoning.
    • Upholding § 922(g)(8) indicated that dangerous persons may be disarmed.
  5. United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025)
    • Held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier.
    • Adopted the “demolition/evisceration” threshold for overturning precedents.

B. Legal Reasoning Employed by the Court

1. Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule. The Eleventh Circuit adheres to a hierarchical rule: a panel decision binds subsequent panels unless (i) an en banc Eleventh Circuit decision or (ii) a Supreme Court opinion is “clearly on point” and “directly conflicting.” Because Rozier squarely upheld § 922(g)(1), the court deemed itself powerless to revisit the issue.

2. Evaluating Post-Bruen Supreme Court Guidance. The panel analyzed whether Bruen or Rahimi undermined Rozier. It concluded they did not because:

  • Bruen targeted public carry licensing and repeated language limiting gun rights to “law-abiding citizens,” which implicitly supports felon prohibitions.
  • Rahimi applied the history-and-tradition test to uphold § 922(g)(8) and explicitly confirmed dispossession of dangerous individuals is permissible.

3. No As-Applied Exception for Parker. Parker’s extensive criminal history (13 felonies) placed him firmly outside the core Second-Amendment right recognized in Heller/Bruen, eliminating any plausible as-applied relief.

C. Impact of the Decision

  • Continuity in Felon-Dispossession Jurisprudence. The Eleventh Circuit remains aligned with the majority of circuits that have so far declined to strike down § 922(g)(1) after Bruen.
  • Precedential Reinforcement. By reaffirming the primacy of Rozier, the panel effectively insulates district courts in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia from felon-in-possession challenges, absent Supreme Court intervention.
  • Signal to Litigants. Defense counsel in the Eleventh Circuit now face a high hurdle for Second-Amendment arguments unless they can marshal Supreme Court opinions squarely invalidating § 922(g)(1).
  • Inter-Circuit Tension. Some circuits (e.g., the Third in Range, 2023) have opened the door to individualized as-applied challenges. The Eleventh Circuit’s stance sharpens a potential circuit split ripe for Supreme Court review.
  • Doctrinal Clarification. The Court’s reliance on the demolition/evisceration test offers a concrete metric for gauging when a new Supreme Court case abrogates circuit precedent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Felon-in-Possession Statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1))
Makes it a federal felony for anyone previously convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm or ammunition.
Second Amendment “Core” Right
After Heller and Bruen, the core protection centers on law-abiding citizens keeping and bearing common firearms for self-defense.
Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule
A binding rule in the Eleventh Circuit that later three-judge panels must follow earlier panel decisions unless a higher authority clearly overrules them.
History-and-Tradition Test
Announced in Bruen; a firearm regulation is valid if it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation as of 1791 (and, by extension, 1868).
“Demolish/Eviscerate” Standard
Articulated in Dubois; a Supreme Court decision must leave no “fundamental prop” of earlier circuit precedent standing in order to abrogate it.

Conclusion

United States v. Eric Dennard Parker is less a jurisprudential revolution than a critical reaffirmation. By holding that Rozier remains good law, the Eleventh Circuit preserves the federal government’s power to disarm felons, clarifies the application of the prior-panel-precedent rule in the Second-Amendment context, and delineates the limited reach of Bruen and Rahimi. Barring a direct Supreme Court pronouncement striking down § 922(g)(1), felon-in-possession prosecutions in the Eleventh Circuit will continue unabated, and district courts now have clear guidance on how to dispose of similar constitutional challenges swiftly.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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