Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms MDLEA Statelessness Definition, Declines Mens Rea for Drug Type/Quantity, and Confirms Speedy Trial Trigger at First Appearance in Charging District

Introduction

In United States v. Cristian Viera-Gongora (with co-appellants Pablo David Zamora-Miranda and Virgilio Valencia-Gamboa), the Eleventh Circuit (Judges Newsom, Lagoa, and Brasher) issued an unpublished, per curiam decision on March 21, 2025, affirming convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to United States jurisdiction, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(a) and (b), 18 U.S.C. § 2, and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii).

The defendants advanced three appellate challenges:

A constitutional attack on the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), contending that Congress exceeded its Article I power under the Felonies Clause by defining “vessel without nationality” to include certain craft not recognized as stateless under international law.
A trial-error claim that the district court wrongly refused (i) their proposed jury instructions requiring mens rea as to the drug’s type and weight, and (ii) related testimony about their knowledge of the specific drug and quantity.
A Speedy Trial Act claim by Viera-Gongora, arguing the indictment should have been dismissed because trial did not commence within the statutory period.

The court held that each contention was foreclosed by binding precedent and affirmed. Although the opinion is unpublished and non-precedential, it synthesizes and applies several controlling authorities, most notably the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Canario-Vilomar, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 517060 (11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2025), and the court’s drug mens rea and Speedy Trial jurisprudence.

Summary of the Opinion

Felonies Clause/MDLEA: The court rejected the contention that the MDLEA’s definition of “vessel without nationality” (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)) exceeds Congress’s Felonies Clause power by diverging from international law. That argument is foreclosed by United States v. Canario-Vilomar, which held Congress acted within its Felonies Clause authority when defining statelessness for high-seas drug interdictions.
Mens Rea for Drug Type/Quantity: The district court properly refused defendants’ requested instructions requiring the government to prove knowledge of the drug’s type (cocaine) and quantity (5 kg or more) and properly denied related testimony. Under United States v. Nunez and Supreme Court guidance in McFadden v. United States, the government need prove only that a defendant knew he was transporting a controlled substance; knowledge of drug type or quantity is not required.
Speedy Trial Act: Viera-Gongora’s speedy-trial claim failed. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) and United States v. Wilkerson, the 70-day clock starts on the later of the indictment or the defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer in the district where the charge is pending. Here, the clock began at arraignment in the Middle District of Florida on August 24, 2021, and the October 28, 2021 stipulated-facts bench trial occurred within 70 days. The transfer/transportation exclusions in § 3161(h)(1)(E)-(F) do not alter the statutory trigger.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel’s analysis is anchored in an interlocking set of Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court authorities:

United States v. Canario-Vilomar, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 517060 (11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2025): Decisive on the Felonies Clause question. The court reaffirmed that Congress’s power “to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas” is not cabined by customary international law definitions when Congress defines domestic offenses for conduct on the high seas. Accordingly, the MDLEA’s statutory definition of “vessel without nationality” in § 70502(d)(1)(C) is a valid exercise of Article I power.
United States v. Nunez, 1 F.4th 976 (11th Cir. 2021): Governs mens rea in MDLEA prosecutions. Nunez held the government must prove only that a defendant knew he was transporting a controlled substance, not the specific drug. Nunez also explained that earlier circuit authority—United States v. Restrepo-Granda (5th Cir. 1978) and United States v. Gomez (11th Cir. 1990)—controls under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule, and that United States v. Narog (11th Cir. 2004), to the extent it suggested otherwise, is not binding.
McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186 (2015): The Supreme Court clarified that the government must prove knowledge of the controlled nature of the substance (or knowledge of the substance’s features that make it controlled), not that the defendant knew statutory scheduling or precise drug identity. The Eleventh Circuit has extended this principle to MDLEA cases through Nunez.
United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179 (11th Cir. 2021): Reinforces the no-need-to-prove-specific-drug-identity principle in controlled-substances prosecutions within the circuit.
United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Gomez, 905 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1990): Foundational precedents establishing that the government need not prove knowledge of the precise controlled substance involved; knowledge of transporting a controlled substance suffices. Because Restrepo-Granda predates the Eleventh Circuit’s split from the Fifth, it binds the Eleventh Circuit under the Bonner rule.
United States v. Narog, 372 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004): To the extent Narog suggested a stricter mens rea for drug identity, Nunez held it is inconsistent with earlier binding circuit precedent and thus not controlling under the prior-panel-precedent rule.
United States v. Ruiz, 59 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 1995): Articulates the standard for a defendant’s entitlement to a theory-of-defense instruction. A requested instruction must be legally correct, not otherwise covered, and concern a point so vital that its omission seriously impairs the defense. Here, because the requested mens rea instruction misstated the law, the district court properly declined it.
United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770 (11th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2011): Set review standards for evidentiary rulings (abuse of discretion) and for legal correctness of instructions (de novo), which the panel applied.
United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2016): Confirms jury instructions are subject to harmless-error review; here the panel found no error at all.
United States v. Wilkerson, 170 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 1999): Controls the Speedy Trial Act trigger. The 70-day clock begins on the later of the indictment’s public filing or the defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer of the court where the charge is pending. The panel relied on this plain-text reading to reject arguments premised on pre-trigger transfer or transportation delays.
Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010), and United States v. Turner, 602 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2010): Cited by the defendant, but distinguished. Bloate addressed whether certain pretrial-motion preparation time is automatically excludable time; it did not alter § 3161(c)(1)’s trigger. Turner is nonbinding and dealt with post-trigger delays, unlike the pre-trigger period at issue here.
United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016), and United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010): Provide standards of review for subject-matter jurisdiction and constitutional challenges, respectively.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning is straightforwardly precedent-driven:

Felonies Clause: The defendants argued the MDLEA’s statutory definition of “vessel without nationality” (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)) improperly extends beyond international law, thereby exceeding Congress’s Felonies Clause power. The panel held that Canario-Vilomar forecloses this argument: Congress may define and punish felonies on the high seas without being tethered to customary international law’s precise contours. Consequently, treating vessels as “without nationality” where the claimed flag state does not affirmatively and unequivocally confirm registry is lawful under the Felonies Clause.
Mens Rea for Drug Type and Quantity: The court applied Nunez and McFadden to reject the defendants’ proposed instructions. The government’s burden is to prove that defendants knew they were transporting some controlled substance; it need not establish knowledge that the substance was cocaine or that the amount met a statutory threshold. Because the proposed instructions incorrectly demanded proof of knowledge of type and quantity, Ruiz’s threshold requirement—that an instruction be a correct statement of law—was not met. For the same reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying, without prejudice, the introduction of testimony about the defendants’ supposed ignorance of the drug’s identity and weight; such testimony was immaterial to guilt under the governing legal standard.
Speedy Trial Act: The statute provides that trial shall commence within 70 days from the filing and public disclosure of the indictment or from the defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever is later. Applying Wilkerson’s plain-text reading, the panel identified August 24, 2021 (arraignment before a Middle District of Florida magistrate judge), as the trigger date. The October 28, 2021 stipulated-facts bench trial was within 70 days. The court declined to graft a “should-have-appeared” concept onto the statute, noting that such an indefinite trigger would be unworkable. It further concluded that the exclusions in § 3161(h)(1)(E)-(F) governing transfer and transportation delays do not shift the trigger earlier; they merely exclude certain days once the trigger has occurred.

Impact

While unpublished, the decision has clear practical significance:

MDLEA Constitutional Challenges: After Canario-Vilomar, challenges in the Eleventh Circuit premised on international-law limits to the Felonies Clause—at least as to the MDLEA’s statelessness definition—are functionally closed. Defendants can expect courts to summarily reject arguments that § 70502(d)(1)(C) is ultra vires.
Mens Rea in Maritime Drug Cases: The panel fortifies the Eleventh Circuit’s position that neither drug identity nor quantity is a mens rea element under the MDLEA. Defense strategies premised on lack of knowledge of cocaine specifically or of threshold quantities are unlikely to warrant jury instructions or support exclusion of guilt-phase evidence. The key trial battleground remains whether the government can prove knowledge that the cargo was a controlled substance at all.
Speedy Trial Litigation: Defendants removed or transferred between districts cannot rely on inter-district delay to advance the Speedy Trial clock’s start. The operative start date remains the first appearance before a judicial officer in the charging district. Counsel seeking relief from transfer delays must pursue other procedural avenues (e.g., motions to expedite removal or raise due process concerns), not the Speedy Trial Act’s trigger provision.
Stability Through the Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule: The court’s express reliance on earlier published decisions (and its sidelining of Narog) underscores the Eleventh Circuit’s strict adherence to its prior-panel-precedent rule. Absent en banc rehearing or Supreme Court intervention, these doctrines will continue to govern maritime drug prosecutions in the circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Felonies Clause vs. Offences Clause: The Constitution’s Felonies Clause gives Congress power to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas. Unlike the Offences Clause (which ties to “Offences against the Law of Nations”), the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law when Congress defines domestic criminal prohibitions for high-seas conduct.
MDLEA and “Vessel Without Nationality”: The MDLEA criminalizes certain drug offenses on vessels subject to U.S. jurisdiction. A “vessel without nationality” includes, in part, a vessel whose claimed flag state does not affirmatively and unequivocally confirm its nationality after a claim of registry. Congress has chosen to treat such vessels as stateless for domestic enforcement purposes.
Knowledge Requirement (Mens Rea): In MDLEA cases, the government must prove the defendant knew he possessed or transported a controlled substance, but it need not prove he knew which controlled substance (e.g., cocaine) or the amount (e.g., 5 kilograms). Drug identity and quantity affect statutory penalties and must be proved as facts beyond a reasonable doubt—but not as to the defendant’s mental state.
Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, if two panel decisions conflict, the earlier one controls unless overruled by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. That is why older decisions like Restrepo-Granda and Gomez trump the later Narog where they conflict.
Speedy Trial Act Trigger: The 70-day clock starts on the later of (a) the public filing of the indictment or (b) the defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer in the district where the charge is pending. Time consumed by transfer or transportation between districts is addressed by exclusions, but those exclusions do not move the trigger date earlier.
“Do Not Publish” and Non-Argument Calendar: “Do Not Publish” means the decision is non-precedential in the Eleventh Circuit and will not bind future panels, though it may be cited as persuasive authority. “Non-Argument Calendar” indicates the case was decided on the briefs without oral argument, often reflecting that existing law clearly controls the outcome.

Conclusion

United States v. Viera-Gongora is a clear, precedent-driven affirmance that consolidates three strands of Eleventh Circuit doctrine:

Congress acted within its Felonies Clause power in defining “vessel without nationality” for MDLEA purposes; international law does not constrain that domestic definition for high-seas felonies (Canario-Vilomar).
In maritime drug prosecutions, the government need only prove knowledge of transporting a controlled substance—not knowledge of the specific drug or quantity—so defense requests for such mens rea instructions or related guilt-phase testimony are properly denied (Nunez, McFadden, Colston, Restrepo-Granda, Gomez).
The Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day period begins at the later of indictment or the defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer in the charging district, and transfer-related delays do not alter that trigger (Wilkerson).

Although unpublished, the opinion faithfully applies binding precedent and offers a practical roadmap for how similar MDLEA, mens rea, and Speedy Trial arguments will fare in the Eleventh Circuit. For practitioners, it underscores the importance of focusing MDLEA defenses on the core knowledge-of-a-controlled-substance element, recognizing the limited utility of international-law-based Felonies Clause challenges post-Canario-Vilomar, and timing Speedy Trial Act arguments from the correct statutory trigger.