Eleventh Circuit reaffirms Florida third-party bad-faith duties: valuation disputes are no shield where the insurer ignores medical risk and fails to communicate settlement opportunities

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, non-argument calendar decision in Bryan Wood and Kaylee Wood v. Progressive Select Insurance Co., No. 24-13479 (11th Cir. Nov. 5, 2025). The court affirmed a jury verdict finding that Progressive acted in bad faith in handling a third-party bodily-injury claim against its insureds, the Woods, arising out of a 2015 automobile collision. The decision also affirms the denial of a new-trial motion premised on the trial court’s refusal to strike for cause a prospective juror who is a plaintiff’s attorney experienced in bad-faith litigation.

The core issues on appeal were:

Whether the evidence compelled judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for Progressive because the record reflected, at most, a reasonable dispute over claim valuation, which would not amount to bad faith under Florida law; and
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial after refusing to grant a for-cause strike of a prospective juror, thereby forcing Progressive to expend a peremptory strike.

Applying Florida’s well-settled totality-of-the-circumstances framework for third-party bad-faith claims, the Eleventh Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find bad faith based on evidence that Progressive ignored available medical information and failed to communicate or act on settlement opportunities—conduct beyond a mere valuation disagreement. On the jury issue, the court held Progressive showed no actual bias among seated jurors and that loss of a peremptory strike alone does not warrant a new trial.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Progressive’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JNOV) and its motion for a new trial.

On bad faith, the court emphasized:

Florida law imposes an objective duty on insurers to diligently investigate, evaluate, and attempt to settle within limits, considering what they knew or reasonably should have known, and to keep their insured fully informed of settlement opportunities.
Sufficient trial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Progressive acted in bad faith by, among other things, failing to reevaluate exposure in light of the claimant’s known potential need for cervical surgery, not consulting relevant medical permanency guidelines, withdrawing a medical expert after an unfavorable causation assessment, and failing to disclose settlement overtures to the insureds.
Progressive’s reliance on Deary v. Progressive was unavailing because this record presented more than a reasonable valuation disagreement.

On the juror issue, the court held:

Progressive did not demonstrate juror bias among the jurors who actually sat, which is required to obtain a new trial.
The denial of a for-cause strike and the resulting loss of a peremptory challenge did not, without more, deprive Progressive of an impartial jury.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980): The Florida Supreme Court’s foundational statement of an insurer’s good-faith duties in third-party claims. It requires the insurer to:
- Investigate the facts diligently; evaluate the claim realistically; and settle, if possible;
- Advise the insured of settlement opportunities and probable outcomes;
- Warn about the risk of an excess judgment and advise on steps to mitigate; and
- Understand that negligence in claim handling is relevant to bad faith.
The Eleventh Circuit relied on these duties to assess Progressive’s failure to reevaluate exposure and to communicate settlement overtures.
Harvey v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 259 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2018): Clarifies that bad faith is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances and that the critical inquiry is whether the insurer acted with the diligence, haste, and precision it would have exercised if it were in the insured’s shoes. The court invoked Harvey’s totality framework and “critical inquiry” lens.
Kinsale Ins. Co. v. Pride of St. Lucie Lodge 1189, Inc., 135 F.4th 961 (11th Cir. 2025): Confirms, applying Florida law, that the bad-faith evaluation is objective and turns on what the insurer knew or reasonably should have known at the time. The opinion uses Kinsale to emphasize the objective, knowledge-based yardstick.
Ilias v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 61 F.4th 1338 (11th Cir. 2023): Restates the elements of a third-party bad-faith claim in Florida: (1) bad-faith conduct; (2) causing an excess judgment. The panel cited Ilias to frame the causation requirement and to support the inference that Progressive’s conduct led to the excess verdict.
Powell v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991): Allows bad faith to be inferred from willful, unjustified delays in settlement and instructs that doubts about the prospects of a settlement effort should be resolved in favor of the insured. The court used Powell to underscore how failures to disclose settlement overtures can support a bad-faith finding.
Deary v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 536 F. Supp. 3d 1258 (S.D. Fla. 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 2916358 (11th Cir. July 25, 2022): Deary held that a mere reasonable disagreement about claim value does not presumptively establish bad faith. The court distinguished Deary because the Woods presented evidence of broader mishandling—ignoring medical information, failing to communicate settlement opportunities, and late tender post-surgery—beyond a valuation dispute.
Standards of review:
- Redding v. Coloplast Corp., 104 F.4th 1302 (11th Cir. 2024): JNOV is proper only if evidence overwhelmingly favors the movant such that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.
- McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servs., Inc., 817 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2016): New-trial rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with deference when the jury’s verdict stands.
Juror impartiality:
- McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985): A party seeking a new trial for juror bias must show a dishonest response to voir dire and that a truthful answer would have supported a for-cause strike; the key is whether views would substantially impair the juror’s duties.
- Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988); Spivey v. Head, 207 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000): Loss of a peremptory challenge is not itself a constitutional violation; claims must focus on bias among jurors who actually sat.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied Florida’s objective, totality-of-the-circumstances test to the insurer’s conduct and asked: given what Progressive knew or reasonably should have known, did it act with the diligence and urgency a prudent person would exercise if personally exposed to an excess judgment?

Key evidentiary anchors supporting the verdict included:

Known surgical risk and exposure: More than a year before a limits-demand deadline, Progressive knew Buckner was a candidate for cervical surgery (a high-cost, high-exposure development) and would incur escalating damages if surgery occurred. Yet Progressive declined to tender the $50,000 limit when the opportunity existed.
Failure to communicate settlement overtures: Evidence showed Progressive did not disclose settlement opportunities to the insureds during the underlying litigation. Under Boston Old Colony and Powell, failure to keep the insured informed and to resolve uncertainties in the insured’s favor can support a bad-faith finding.
Inadequate evaluation practices: A claims adjuster did not consult permanency guidelines because the claimant had not missed work—an approach the jury could view as negligent evaluation relevant to bad faith under Boston Old Colony.
Medical expert withdrawal: Evidence indicated Progressive withdrew a medical expert after the expert concluded that, at a minimum, the crash aggravated pre-existing spinal issues. The jury could infer that Progressive failed to reevaluate exposure in light of that unfavorable assessment.
Late tender: Progressive did not tender policy limits until after the claimant underwent surgery, by which point the claimant rejected a limits settlement and sought recovery in excess of limits. The jury could view the post-surgery tender as too late to cure prior failures to settle when it was possible.

These facts allowed the jury to infer not simply a valuation disagreement but a broader pattern of claim-handling lapses violating the “settle if possible” and “keep insured informed” duties. Under Ilias, that conduct could be found to have caused the excess judgment of $267,608.50 over the $50,000 policy limit.

On Progressive’s reliance on Deary, the court stressed the distinction: Deary involved a summary judgment record reflecting a reasonable valuation dispute, whereas this case included evidence of uncommunicated settlement opportunities, failure to reevaluate known surgical exposure, and evaluation missteps—adequate for the jury to find bad faith under the objective totality test.

On the juror challenge, the court applied Ross and Spivey to hold that even assuming error in the for-cause ruling, Progressive showed no actual bias among the empaneled jurors. The mere fact that a prospective juror was a plaintiff’s lawyer involved in bad-faith cases did not, without more, mandate removal. The loss of a peremptory strike—without proof of partiality among the jurors who sat—did not warrant a new trial.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished, the decision is instructive in several ways when Florida law governs:

Valuation disputes are not a safe harbor. Insurers cannot rely on a generic “reasonable disagreement” over value to defeat bad-faith claims where the record shows failures to investigate, evaluate, communicate, or settle in light of known risk.
Objective “what you knew or should have known” standard drives outcomes. The case underscores Kinsale’s framing: adjusters must act on medical information and foreseeable risk (e.g., surgical recommendations) with urgency and precision, lest a jury infer bad faith.
Communication with the insured is pivotal. Boston Old Colony and Powell remain potent: failing to disclose settlement opportunities or material claim developments to the insured can alone support a bad-faith verdict.
Late tenders after adverse developments carry little weight. A post-surgery limits tender may not erase preexisting failures to settle when it was possible and prudent to do so earlier.
JNOVs are difficult to obtain in bad-faith cases. Given the fact-intensive, totality-based analysis, appellate courts will rarely second-guess juries where there is any reasonable basis to infer bad faith and causation of an excess verdict.
Voir dire challenges require proof of actual bias among seated jurors. The mere loss of a peremptory strike due to a denied for-cause challenge is not, standing alone, a ground for reversal. Parties should develop a record showing partiality in the empaneled jury.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Third-party bad faith (Florida): When someone sues an insured driver, the insurer must protect the insured from an excess judgment by reasonably investigating, evaluating, communicating, and settling within policy limits where possible. Failure to do so can make the insurer responsible for the whole judgment, even beyond the policy limits.
Totality-of-the-circumstances test: Courts consider everything the insurer knew or should have known and ask whether it acted as a prudent person would if personally on the hook for any excess judgment.
Objective standard: The insurer’s conduct is measured by external reasonableness—what a careful, prudent insurer would have done—not by the insurer’s subjective belief that its actions were good enough.
Excess judgment: A verdict or judgment exceeding the policy limits. In third-party cases, this is often the key damages trigger for a bad-faith claim.
JNOV (judgment notwithstanding the verdict): A post-trial motion asking the judge to override the jury’s verdict because no reasonable jury could have reached that result based on the evidence. It is granted only in rare cases.
For-cause vs. peremptory juror challenges: A for-cause challenge seeks removal of a juror who cannot be impartial. A peremptory strike removes a juror without stating a reason (subject to Batson-type limits). Losing a peremptory strike due to denial of a for-cause challenge is not reversible error unless a biased juror actually sat.
AMA “permanency guidelines” (as referenced): Medical criteria used to assess lasting impairment. An adjuster’s failure to consult relevant medical standards can be negligent, and negligence is relevant to bad faith.

Practical Takeaways for Claims Handling

Immediately share all settlement demands and material negotiation developments with insureds, and document those communications.
Continuously reevaluate exposure when medical records indicate significant or escalating risk (e.g., surgical recommendations), and do not anchor on low out-of-pocket figures or earlier assessments.
Consult relevant medical guidelines and appropriately weigh independent medical evaluations—even if they are unfavorable. Do not withdraw experts or ignore evidence without a principled, documented rationale.
When a policy-limits resolution is feasible, tender promptly. A late tender after adverse developments typically will not cure prior failures.
On voir dire, build a clear record of actual bias among seated jurors if seeking appellate relief; occupation alone (e.g., plaintiff’s lawyer) rarely suffices.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms core features of Florida’s third-party bad-faith regime: the insurer’s duty is objective, proactive, and insured-focused. A mere valuation dispute does not insulate an insurer from bad-faith liability when evidence shows it ignored known medical risks, failed to reassess exposure, did not consult appropriate medical standards, or failed to communicate settlement opportunities to the insured. The opinion also reiterates that new-trial relief for juror issues requires proof of actual bias among those who sat, not simply the loss of a peremptory strike.

While unpublished, the ruling offers a practical blueprint for how juries may infer bad faith from timing, communication, and evaluation decisions in third-party claims. For insurers operating under Florida law, it underscores the importance of early, transparent, and well-documented efforts to settle within limits when liability is clear and damages threaten to exceed coverage.