Eleventh Circuit Re-Affirms the “Schuurman Rule”: 30-Day Appeal Clock Begins on the Amendment Deadline, Not on Later Clerk-Entered Judgment

Introduction

Richard Burt, a tenured English professor at the University of Florida, sued University administrators after being disciplined for email communications protesting the university’s return to in-person teaching during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the complaint raised First Amendment and procedural-due-process claims, those constitutional issues never reached the merits on appeal.

Instead, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Richard Burt v. President of University of Florida (No. 23-12616, Aug. 20, 2025) turned entirely on a question of appellate timing: When does the 30-day deadline in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) start to run after a district court dismisses a complaint with leave to amend?

Relying on its 1986 precedent Schuurman v. Motor Vessel Betty K V, the court held that the dismissal order became a final, appealable judgment on the last day the plaintiff was allowed to amend even though the clerk did not enter a separate judgment until eleven days later. Because Professor Burt filed his notice of appeal 38 days after the amendment deadline, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Summary of the Judgment

Holding: The notice of appeal was untimely. Under Schuurman, the June 21 dismissal order became final on July 3, the deadline the district court set for amendment. The 30-day clock therefore expired on August 2; Burt’s August 10 notice was eight days late.
Result: Appeal dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court did not reach the underlying First Amendment or due-process questions.
Key Rationale: The Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule compelled adherence to Schuurman unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court, notwithstanding tension with Jung v. K. & D. Mining Co. and the 2002 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Schuurman v. Motor Vessel Betty K V, 798 F.2d 442 (11th Cir. 1986)
Established that when a district court sets a specific deadline to amend after dismissing a complaint, the order becomes final on that deadline, starting the appeal period even without a separate judgment. The present panel deemed Schuurman “idiosyncratic” but binding.
Jung v. K. & D. Mining Co., 356 U.S. 335 (1958)
The Supreme Court held that a dismissal with leave to amend is not final until an “order of absolute dismissal” is entered. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the tension but stated that Schuurman controlled under circuit precedent rules.
2002 Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 & Rule 4(a)(7)
These amendments created a 150-day “drop-dead” date after which a judgment is deemed entered if the clerk fails to file a separate document. They directly addressed the uncertainty Schuurman sought to cure. Still, the panel held that these amendments did not displace Schuurman within the Eleventh Circuit.
Other Circuit Cases—e.g., WMX Techs. v. Miller (9th Cir.), Britt v. DeJoy (4th Cir.)
Cited to show that most circuits reject Schuurman’s approach, underscoring the split and the likelihood of future Supreme Court involvement.

Legal Reasoning

The panel applied a two-step analytical framework:

Identify the controlling legal rule. Circuit precedent dictates that a later panel must follow an earlier panel on a directly conflicting point of law unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court.
Apply the rule to the procedural facts. Because the June 21 dismissal order specified July 3 as the last day to amend, Schuurman rendered the order final on that date. Consequently, the period in Rule 4(a)(1)(A) began July 3 and expired August 2. The August 10 notice was therefore jurisdictionally out of time.

The court declined to carve out an exception even though (a) the district judge expressly stated that the clerk’s separate entry of judgment would “immediately trigger” appellate rights, and (b) Rule 58’s separate-document requirement and 150-day fallback could have provided a different, textually grounded approach.

Impact on Future Litigation and the Law

Binding Authority in the Eleventh Circuit: Litigants must file notices of appeal within 30 days of the amendment deadline whenever a dismissal order grants leave to amend and sets a specific date, regardless of subsequent docket entries.
Practice Tip: Plaintiffs should no longer wait for the clerk’s separate judgment once the amendment period lapses; a protective notice of appeal is essential.
Inter-Circuit Conflict: The decision entrenches a minority approach, heightening the probability of Supreme Court review or en banc reconsideration, especially given the textual changes to Rule 58.
Judicial Economy vs. Fair Notice: By privileging procedural certainty over the literal language of Rule 58 and explicit district-court directions, the Eleventh Circuit prioritizes docket management but may increase the risk of unsuspecting appellants losing substantive rights.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Final Judgment: A court decision that ends the litigation on the merits. Only final judgments are immediately appealable unless an exception applies.
Dismissal with Leave to Amend: The court throws out the complaint but allows the plaintiff a specified time to fix deficiencies. The key question is whether the case is “final” before the plaintiff amends or the time to amend passes.
The “Schuurman Rule”: In the Eleventh Circuit, if a dismissal order sets a date for amendment, that date—not the later clerk entry—marks finality for appellate purposes.
Separate-Document Requirement (Rule 58): Generally, a judgment must be on its own document, distinct from any opinion, to start the appeal clock. If the clerk forgets, the judgment is “deemed entered” after 150 days.
Prior-Panel-Precedent Doctrine: A binding rule that a published decision of an earlier Eleventh Circuit panel controls later panels on the same legal issue unless changed by the Supreme Court or the court en banc.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Burt v. President of University of Florida does not resolve the professor’s substantive constitutional claims but instead crystallizes a procedural directive: within this circuit, Schuurman remains the law. Litigants who receive a dismissal with leave to amend—where the district court sets a hard deadline—must file their notice of appeal within 30 days of that deadline, no matter what subsequent docket entries suggest.

While the decision promotes procedural clarity in the Eleventh Circuit, it exacerbates an existing split with most other circuits and arguably conflicts with the textual scheme of Rule 58 after its 2002 overhaul. Until the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc or the Supreme Court addresses this tension, practitioners must treat the amendment deadline as the point of no return for appellate jurisdiction in this circuit.