Eleventh Circuit Re-Affirms Absolute Legislative Immunity for County Commissioners Enacting Generally Applicable Employment Policies

Introduction

In Robert Kelly & Ricky Blalock v. Marvin Arrington, Jr., et al., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the breadth of absolute legislative immunity afforded to local legislators. The decision arose after two employees of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners (Kelly and Blalock) entered political races against incumbent commissioners who, in turn, joined their colleagues in passing a resolution requiring any county employee running for county commission to resign. Claiming tortious interference and First Amendment retaliation, the plaintiffs sued six commissioners and county administrators. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that the commissioners were absolutely immune. The Eleventh Circuit, sitting on a non-argument calendar, affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court held that voting on and passing the resolution was a “quintessentially legislative” act, triggering absolute legislative immunity under both federal common law and Georgia common law.
The immunity shielded the commissioners from both federal §1983 liability and state-law tort claims.
The Court rejected plaintiffs’ attempt on appeal to characterize the commissioners’ conduct as “administrative enforcement,” noting that the amended complaint only alleged the commissioners passed the resolution, while a county manager enforced it.
Because the plaintiffs did not preserve the argument that the commissioners also “implemented” the resolution, the Court declined to consider that theory.
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The opinion draws heavily on Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit authority:

Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998) – Established that local legislators enjoy absolute immunity for legislative activities under §1983; the Court analogized the county resolution to the budgetary ordinance in Bogan.
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 372 (1951) – Provided the historical foundation for federal legislative immunity.
Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hospital, 956 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir. 1992) – Earlier Eleventh Circuit decision extending immunity to county commissioners.
Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009) – Distinguished “prospective rules of general application” from administrative acts; cited for the proposition that policy-level employment rules are legislative.
Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1993) & Crymes v. DeKalb County, 923 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1991) – Clarified the legislative/administrative distinction.
Starship Enterprises of Atlanta, Inc. v. Nash, 850 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) and Village of North Atlanta v. Cook, 133 S.E.2d 585 (Ga. 1963) – Georgia cases confirming state common-law legislative immunity.
Dawson County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Dawson Forest Holdings, LLC, 850 S.E.2d 870 (Ga. 2020) – Demonstrated the limitation of immunity when commissioners engage in individualized enforcement actions.

These authorities collectively framed the Court’s inquiry: Was the challenged conduct “legislative” (immune) or “administrative” (potentially actionable)?

Legal Reasoning

Nature of the Act: The resolution was characterized as “prospective” and of “general application,” applying not just to the plaintiffs but to any county employee who might later seek office. That classification triggers absolute immunity.
Scope of the Pleadings: The amended complaint alleged only that the commissioners voted for the resolution; it did not allege they later enforced it. Under Eleventh Circuit pleading standards, the Court limits its analysis to those well-pleaded facts.
No Exception for Alleged Illegality: Plaintiffs contended the resolution was retroactive and therefore outside the commissioners’ authority. The Court reiterated that even allegedly unlawful or unconstitutional legislative acts remain immune. The doctrine protects the function, not the actor’s motives or the measure’s validity.
Waiver / Preservation: Although the letters from the county manager might suggest commissioner “enforcement,” those letters were not attached to or incorporated in the operative complaint, and plaintiffs did not squarely argue the point below. The Court therefore treated the argument as waived.

Impact

The ruling, though unpublished (and therefore non-precedential under 11th Cir. R. 36-2), carries substantial persuasive weight:

Expansive Shield: It underscores that county commissioners enjoy the same breadth of immunity as state legislators and members of Congress when they pass general policy measures—even if those measures directly and adversely affect identifiable individuals.
Pleading Strategy: Future plaintiffs must plead specific facts alleging administrative enforcement or non-legislative conduct if they wish to avoid dismissal. Boilerplate references to “passing and enforcing” will be insufficient.
Employment & Elections: Counties may regulate employee candidacy without fear of personal liability for commissioners, so long as rules are enacted through formal legislative procedures. Constitutional challenges must target the entity or seek injunctive relief, not personal damages against legislators.
Section 1983 Litigation: The opinion reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s consistent approach: motives and even constitutional infirmities do not pierce legislative immunity. Plaintiffs must attack implementation, not enactment, to reach individual legislators.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Legislative Immunity: A doctrine that protects lawmakers from personal liability for actions taken while performing legislative functions (debating, voting, introducing bills). It is “absolute,” meaning it cannot be overcome by showing bad faith or unconstitutional motives.
Legislative vs. Administrative Acts: Legislative acts set general policies or rules; administrative acts apply those rules to specific individuals. Immunity covers the former, not the latter.
42 U.S.C. § 1983: A federal statute allowing individuals to sue state or local officials for violations of constitutional rights.
Tortious Interference (Georgia law): A claim alleging that a defendant wrongfully disrupted the plaintiff’s contractual or business relationships.
Prospective Rule of General Application: A rule that governs future conduct and applies broadly to a class of persons, not a single individual or a past situation.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Kelly v. Arrington fortifies the principle that local legislators are absolutely immune from civil liability for the laws they enact, even when those laws have immediate and adverse effects on identifiable parties. Unless plaintiffs can demonstrate non-legislative enforcement actions, personal suits against commissioners will face quick dismissal. The ruling thus channels constitutional and statutory challenges toward the governmental entity or its executive officers, preserving the independence of the legislative function at the local level.