Eleventh Circuit Re-Affirms § 922(g)(1) Constitutionality and State-Law Predicate Rule After Rahimi: Commentary on United States v. Virgil (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

United States v. Shamonte Virgil marks the Eleventh Circuit’s first reported opportunity to apply its 2025 en banc-confirmed decision in United States v. Dubois II to a fresh direct appeal. The panel (Newsom, Grant, Abudu JJ.) confronts three familiar but post-Bruen/Rahimi flashpoints:

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon-in-possession) survives Second Amendment scrutiny;
Whether Georgia convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute still qualify as “controlled substance offenses” under the Sentencing Guidelines after the 2018 Farm Bill and changing cannabis definitions; and
The substantive reasonableness of a bottom-of-Guidelines 70-month sentence.

The defendant pled guilty without a plea bargain and challenged both the legal framework and the district court’s exercise of discretion. The Eleventh Circuit, invoking its prior-panel-precedent rule, affirmed across the board.

Summary of the Judgment

Constitutionality: § 922(g)(1) remains facially and as-applied constitutional after Bruen and Rahimi; precedent in Rozier and reaffirmed in Dubois II controls.
Guidelines: Georgia marijuana-distribution convictions are properly treated as “controlled substance offenses” for § 2K2.1(a)(2) and § 4B1.2(b) enhancement purposes because the state regulated the drug at the time of conviction.
Sentence: A 70-month term—bottom of a correctly calculated 70-to-87-month range, and well below the 10-year statutory maximum—was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010) – long-standing precedent upholding § 922(g)(1).
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) – changed Second Amendment methodology but left felon prohibitions presumptively intact.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) – upheld § 922(g)(8) (DV restraining order), reinforcing historical-tradition framework.
United States v. Dubois I, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024) & Dubois II, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) – held that state-law drug regulation at time of conviction, not federal schedules at time of sentencing, governs Guideline “controlled substance” analysis.
Prior-panel-precedent rule cases: In re Lambrix; Gillis.
Sentencing reasonableness framework: Irey, Trailer, Butler.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Second Amendment Challenge

The panel applied the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule: because Rozier remains binding and was expressly reaffirmed in Dubois II, the court lacked authority to re-open the constitutional question. Rahimi did not “clearly overrule” Rozier; instead it confirmed that firearm restrictions for dangerous persons enjoy historical pedigree. Because felons are a classic category of persons historically disqualified from arms, the statute survives both facial and as-applied scrutiny without further analysis.

b. Guidelines – “Controlled Substance Offense”

The district court enhanced Virgil’s base offense level to 24 (§ 2K2.1(a)(2)) based on two prior marijuana-distribution felonies. Virgil argued Georgia’s definition of “marijuana” swept more broadly than federal law after the 2018 Farm Bill, rendering the convictions non-categorical matches.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected the contention for three reasons drawn from Dubois II:

The text of § 4B1.2(b) does not require matching federal schedules; it looks to “controlled substance” generically.
For state predicates, the proper inquiry is whether the substance was regulated by that state at the time of conviction—here, marijuana plainly was.
State-law definitional breadth (e.g., inclusion of hemp, whole cannabis genus, stalks) is irrelevant so long as the state criminalised the conduct—overbreadth arguments target the wrong benchmark.

An attempt to rely on C.W. v. DHS (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) failed because federal courts are bound by circuit precedent, not intermediate state-court dicta, and because C.W. addressed a child-neglect statute, not criminal drug schedules.

c. Substantive Reasonableness

The panel performed the usual two-step review:

Procedural: No Guideline error (because enhancement proper); court referenced § 3553(a) and provided a reasoned explanation.
Substantive: 70 months sat at the low end of the range and well below the 10-year maximum. The district court balanced rehabilitation evidence against post-offense positive marijuana tests and the seriousness of fleeing with a loaded, defaced firearm. This fell “within the ballpark of permissible outcomes.”

3. Likely Impact

Second Amendment Litigation: Virgil cements within the Eleventh Circuit that felon-in-possession challenges are dead on arrival absent Supreme Court intervention. Litigants will need to frame challenges outside the prior panel’s scope (e.g., non-violent felonies, special populations) or await an en banc/Supreme Court shift.
Drug Predicate Disputes: The opinion underscores that Dubois II controls all Georgia (and most likely Alabama & Florida) marijuana predicate arguments. Defense counsel must either identify a de-criminalized state substance or focus on Shepard-document mismatches, not categorical breadth.
Sentencing Discretion: The court’s deferential language (“ballpark of permissible outcomes”) reinforces the high bar for overturning within-Guidelines sentences, even when defendants present compelling mitigation. Practitioners should marshal extraordinary factors or demonstrate procedural irregularities to succeed on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule: A binding Eleventh Circuit doctrine: once a published panel decision decides an issue, later panels must follow it unless the Supreme Court or the circuit en banc clearly overrules it.
Categorical Approach: Method of comparing elements of a prior offense to a federal definition without looking at underlying facts. In Virgil, the court said the approach does not even apply because § 4B1.2(b) looks to state regulation, not element matching.
§ 922(g)(1): Federal statute criminalising firearm possession by anyone convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” (a felony).
§ 3553(a) Factors: Statutory list guiding sentencing: seriousness, deterrence, respect for law, protection of public, rehabilitation, and need to avoid unwarranted disparities.
Plain-Error Review: A four-prong appellate standard applied when an issue was not raised below: error must be (1) error, (2) plain, (3) affect substantial rights, and (4) seriously affect the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings.

Conclusion

United States v. Virgil does not blaze new doctrinal trails, but it performs an important consolidating function: it translates the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Rahimi Second Amendment and sentencing-predicate jurisprudence into a practical, defendant-specific context. The decision:

Affirms—once again—the constitutional footing of § 922(g)(1) for felons;
Confirms that state-law control, not federal definitional overlap, governs Guideline drug predicates;
Reiterates that bottom-range sentences are almost unassailable on appeal absent clear errors.

Going forward, defendants raising Second Amendment or marijuana-predicate arguments in the Eleventh Circuit face an uphill battle. Strategically, counsel may pivot to exploring statutory max discrepancies, Shepard-document deficiencies, or seek policy-based variances in the district court, where the discretionary space remains widest.

Eleventh Circuit Re-Affirms § 922(g)(1) Constitutionality and State-Law Predicate Rule After Rahimi: A Commentary on United States v. Shamonte Virgil (2025)