Eleventh Circuit Clarifies: Misusing the Class‑of‑One Comparator Standard Can Render a Civil Rights Claim “Frivolous,” Justifying § 1988 Defense‑Side Fees

Introduction

In Hybrid Pharma LLC v. Matthew Knispel, et al., No. 25-11179 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2025) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court order awarding $52,170 in attorneys’ fees to state health officials who prevailed against a corporate plaintiff’s “class‑of‑one” Equal Protection claim. The panel (Branch, Abudu, and Anderson, JJ.) held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the suit was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Hybrid Pharma LLC sued current and former officials of the Florida Department of Health, alleging selective and irrational enforcement of laws governing pharmaceutical outsourcing facilities—the gist being that Hybrid was treated differently than other facilities. After the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and a June 2025 Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed on the merits, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees under § 1988. Hybrid appealed only the fee award; the Eleventh Circuit now affirms.

The core issue was whether Hybrid’s class‑of‑one theory—built on broad industry‑wide comparators and lacking proof of materially similar conduct treated differently—was so legally and factually deficient as to be frivolous under the Christiansburg standard for awarding fees to prevailing defendants. The appellate court concluded it was, emphasizing that (1) Hybrid advanced an unreasonable legal position on comparators, (2) produced no evidence showing similarly situated entities engaged in the same conduct but were treated more favorably, and (3) pursued its theory despite warnings and clear contrary Eleventh Circuit precedent.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying abuse‑of‑discretion review, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the § 1988 award. The court:

Recognized defendants as prevailing parties; the amount of $52,170 was uncontested and reasonable.
Applied Christiansburg Garment’s “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” standard, guided by Eleventh Circuit factors from Sullivan v. School Board of Pinellas County.
Held Hybrid failed to establish a prima facie class‑of‑one claim because it relied on an unsupportable comparator standard and provided no evidence of similarly situated entities engaging in the same misconduct but receiving better treatment.
Deemed the lack of settlement offers neutral; noted the case was resolved at summary judgment, which weighed in favor of a frivolity finding.
Rejected Hybrid’s argument that the case required “careful attention and review” (Busby), explaining the issues were neither novel nor close and the first substantive ruling (summary judgment) went for the defendants.
Considered Hybrid’s status as a counseled corporate party and the district court’s earlier warning that its theory “bordered on frivolous” as additional context supporting the fee award.

Bottom line: Even if the appellate panel might not have awarded fees in the first instance, the district court acted within its “range of choice,” so the affirmance followed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). The cornerstone for defense‑side fees in civil rights cases: a prevailing defendant may recover fees when a plaintiff’s action is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” even without bad faith. The Eleventh Circuit applied Christiansburg’s cautionary balance—protecting bona fide civil rights litigants while deterring baseless suits—and concluded Hybrid’s suit fell on the frivolous side.
Sullivan v. School Board of Pinellas County, 773 F.2d 1182 (11th Cir. 1985). Provides the Eleventh Circuit’s “general guidelines” for assessing frivolity: (1) whether a prima facie case was established; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the case was dismissed prior to trial. The court used these factors, emphasizing the absence of a prima facie showing and pretrial resolution.
Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1991). Adds the “careful attention and review” principle: if a case presents difficult or debatable issues that warrant close judicial consideration, fees are generally inappropriate. The court held Hybrid’s suit did not meet this threshold.
Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005). Confirms that the “frivolousness” determination itself is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court applied this deferential standard to uphold the district court’s call.
Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 1994); In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989). Together, these cases frame the abuse‑of‑discretion standard as a “range of choice” within which the district court’s fee decisions are upheld absent clear error of judgment or legal/ factual error. This standard anchored the affirmance.
Royal Palm Props., LLC v. Pink Palm Props., LLC, 38 F.4th 1372 (11th Cir. 2022). Addresses “prevailing party” status across fee statutes; Hybrid did not contest that status after defendants won summary judgment and prevailed on appeal.
Quintana v. Jenne, 414 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2005). Settlement‑offer factor: absent evidence of a substantial offer, the factor is neutral. Applied here to treat the lack of settlement offers as neither favoring nor disfavoring fees.
Class‑of‑One Comparator Line: PBT Real Estate, LLC v. Town of Palm Beach, 988 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2021); Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2007); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2008); Chabad Chayil, Inc. v. School Board of Miami‑Dade County, 48 F.4th 1222 (11th Cir. 2022); Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2006); E&T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1987). These authorities require comparators to be “similarly situated in all material respects,” especially regarding factors relevant to an objectively reasonable governmental decisionmaker—most notably, the nature of the alleged misconduct. The Eleventh Circuit held Hybrid’s broad “same industry/regulated entity” approach conflicted with this binding line of cases.
Jones v. Texas Tech Univ., 656 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1981). A former Fifth Circuit decision (binding in the Eleventh Circuit) that Sullivan cites regarding the “arguable merit” lens for frivolity. The court focused on whether Hybrid’s case had arguable merit; it did not.
Fishman & Tobin, Inc. v. Tropical Shipping & Construction Co., 240 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 2001). Reiterates that Eleventh Circuit panels and district courts are bound by Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, not by distinguishable district court decisions. Hybrid’s reliance on a single, distinguishable district court opinion could not overcome binding circuit authority.
Walker v. NationsBank, N.A., 53 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1995) (Cox, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). Cited as touchstone language contrasting truly close cases (where a plaintiff “almost, but not quite” meets the burden) with ones lacking evidence. The court categorized Hybrid’s case as the latter.
Sanctions Context: United States v. Morse, 532 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2008); King v. United States, 789 F.2d 883 (11th Cir. 1986); Woods v. IRS, 3 F.3d 403 (11th Cir. 1993). Though arising under Rule 38, these cases recognize the court’s greater reluctance to sanction pro se litigants and its greater willingness when litigants are counseled and warned. The panel analogized: Hybrid was represented by sophisticated counsel and was expressly warned its position bordered on frivolous—factors supporting fees.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeded in three integrated steps: the governing standards, the legal defect in Hybrid’s comparator theory, and the factual void.

Governing Standards. The court reviewed the fee award for abuse of discretion, including the threshold finding of frivolity. Under Christiansburg and Sullivan, the court considered whether the case was “so lacking in arguable merit” as to be groundless, guided by the prima facie/settlement/pretrial‑disposition factors and Busby’s “careful attention” concept. It emphasized that these are flexible guidelines applied case by case.
Legal Defect: Misstating the Comparator Standard. Hybrid framed comparators at an overbroad industry level—other pharmaceutical outsourcing facilities also subject to regulation—rather than identifying entities that engaged in the same or materially similar misconduct but were treated more favorably. Eleventh Circuit precedent requires comparators to be similar in all material respects with a focus on factors relevant to an objectively reasonable decisionmaker (e.g., type and severity of alleged violations, compliance history, timing, and context). Hybrid’s position, which would “encapsulate nearly all drug compounders subject to the same regulations,” was deemed unreasonable and inconsistent with binding cases like PBT Real Estate, Griffin Industries, Douglas Asphalt, Chabad Chayil, and Campbell/E&T Realty.
Factual Defect: No Evidence of Materially Similar Comparators. Beyond misarticulating the test, Hybrid produced no evidence that any comparator committed the same or similar violations yet escaped sanction. As the court put it in the earlier merits appeal, Hybrid’s evidence showed, at most, “potentially justifiable disparate treatment.” The absence of comparator evidence undermined any prima facie case and supported a finding of frivolity under Sullivan and Cordoba.

The court then weighed the Sullivan/Busby factors:

Prima facie case: Not established; both legal and factual deficits supported frivolity.
Settlement offers: None; treated as neutral (Quintana).
Stage of resolution: Summary judgment; pretrial disposition favored a finding of frivolity.
Careful attention: Not a complex or close case. No novel Eleventh Circuit issues; the first substantive ruling favored defendants; prior district court warning that Hybrid’s view “bordered on frivolous.”

Additional context buttressed the outcome: Hybrid was a counseled corporate litigant; it relied chiefly on a distinguishable district court decision (non‑binding); and it persisted after being warned. Given the deferential “range of choice” review, the appellate court affirmed even while noting it might not have awarded fees itself in the first instance.

Impact

This unpublished decision reinforces several practical and doctrinal points with real consequences for civil rights litigants, especially those pressing class‑of‑one claims in regulated industries:

Comparator rigor is dispositive in class‑of‑one claims. Plaintiffs must identify comparators “similarly situated in all material respects,” with a tight focus on the same misconduct and enforcement context. Broad industry‑wide comparators are insufficient. Misapplying this standard risks a finding of frivolity and a defense‑side fee award.
Evidence matters, not labels. Courts will look for concrete proof that similarly situated actors engaged in the same conduct but were treated more favorably. Absent such evidence, even well‑pleaded theories fail—potentially with fee exposure.
“Careful attention” is a shield for close or novel cases, not routine disputes. Invoking Busby does not bar fees where issues are settled by ample Eleventh Circuit precedent and the case is resolved on the first substantive ruling. Complex briefing alone does not make a case “difficult.”
Warnings and counsel sophistication matter. When a court flags an argument as borderline frivolous and the party proceeds anyway—especially with sophisticated counsel—fee exposure increases.
Settlement silence is neutral. The absence of settlement offers neither helps nor hurts fee entitlement under Sullivan/Quintana; parties should not assume silence inoculates against fees.
Appellate posture and timing. District courts may stay fee awards pending merits appeals, but merits affirmances will often solidify defense‑side fee awards, as occurred here.

For government regulators and other defendants facing class‑of‑one suits, the decision provides a roadmap for fee motions under § 1988: emphasize comparator law, the plaintiff’s evidentiary deficits, the stage of resolution, and any warnings issued. For plaintiffs, the message is clear: build a comparator record that aligns with Eleventh Circuit standards or risk paying the other side’s fees.

Complex Concepts Simplified

42 U.S.C. § 1988 fee shifting: A statute allowing courts to award attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases. Plaintiffs who win often recover fees; defendants may recover only if the suit is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” (Christiansburg).
“Class‑of‑one” Equal Protection claim: A claim that the government singled out one person/entity for different treatment compared to others who are similarly situated, without a rational basis. To prove it, the plaintiff must identify comparators who are materially alike, especially in the conduct at issue, but who were treated better.
Comparator standard (“similarly situated in all material respects”): In the Eleventh Circuit, comparators must match on factors an objective decisionmaker would consider relevant (e.g., the same violation, timing, history), not merely share an industry or regulatory umbrella.
Frivolousness under Christiansburg/Sullivan: A suit lacking arguable merit—legally or factually. Courts consider whether a prima facie case was made, whether settlement was offered, and whether the case was dismissed before trial.
“Careful attention and review” (Busby): If a case presents difficult or debatable issues requiring close judicial scrutiny, defense‑side fees are usually inappropriate. Routine or settled issues do not qualify.
Abuse of discretion (“range of choice”): Appellate courts defer to district courts’ fee decisions unless they rest on legal error, clearly erroneous facts, or a clear error of judgment. The question is not whether the appellate court would award fees, but whether the district court reasonably could.
Prevailing party: A litigant who obtains a material alteration of the legal relationship (e.g., summary judgment). Here, the defendants were the prevailing parties.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished affirmance in Hybrid Pharma underscores a practical but potent rule: class‑of‑one equal protection claims that ignore the circuit’s rigorous comparator requirement and lack evidence of materially similar comparators are vulnerable not only to summary judgment but also to defense‑side fee awards under § 1988. The court’s application of Christiansburg and Sullivan—paired with Busby’s “careful attention” safeguard—reflects a calibrated balance: protect legitimate civil rights litigants, but deter baseless suits that press unreasonable legal theories and sparse records, particularly after judicial warnings.

For plaintiffs, the case is a cautionary tale. A class‑of‑one theory built on “same industry” comparators is not just weak—it can be deemed frivolous. For defendants and district courts, the opinion validates awarding fees where plaintiffs persist with untenable legal positions and no comparator evidence. And for the bar, it is a reminder that reliance on distinguishable district court authority cannot overcome binding circuit precedent; doing so may carry real fee exposure.

The judgment: Affirmed. The district court’s award of $52,170 in attorneys’ fees under § 1988 stands.