Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision affirms a 14-month term of imprisonment and a new 3-year term of supervised release imposed upon the second revocation of Clonet Junior Charmant’s supervised release. The appeal raised two principal issues:

• Whether the district court’s misstatement of the maximum supervised-release term at the revocation hearing rendered the defendant’s admissions unknowing and involuntary under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 and due process, thereby requiring vacatur under plain-error review.
• Whether the upward variance from the advisory Chapter 7 policy range (3–9 months) to 14 months was procedurally or substantively unreasonable, particularly in light of the court’s discussion of conduct associated with dismissed violations and the defendant’s mitigation.

The panel (Judges Newsom, Grant, and Kidd) held that any misadvice about statutory maxima did not amount to plain error affecting substantial rights and that the sentence was both procedurally proper and substantively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Although unpublished and nonprecedential, the opinion provides a practical roadmap for litigants on preserving error, the scope of permissible sentencing considerations at revocation, and the demanding nature of plain-error review in this context.

Case Background

Charmant originally received 26 months’ imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release for a fraud-conspiracy offense. Upon beginning supervision in October 2023, he was subject to standard conditions (abstain from controlled substances, drug testing, treatment, full-time work efforts, travel permission, and police-contact reporting). After his first revocation in mid-2024—based on four admitted violations—the court imposed one day of imprisonment and nearly three more years of supervised release, adding a community-service requirement while unemployed.

Months later, probation alleged six new violations: repeated marijuana positives (Violation 1), failure to complete community service while unemployed (Violation 2), failure to work full-time or adequately document job search (Violation 3), unauthorized travel (Violation 4), failure to timely report police questioning (Violation 5), and failure to attend a substance-abuse evaluation (Violation 6). At the final hearing, defense counsel announced admissions to all but Violation 2; after colloquy, the defendant personally confirmed admissions to Violations 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Following testimony, the district court found Violation 2 not established, but later accepted that the defendant withdrew his admissions to Violations 4 and 5, and sentenced only on Violations 1, 3, and 6. The court calculated an advisory policy-statement range of 3–9 months, noted (incorrectly) a five-year statutory maximum prison term and a maximum supervised-release term of “three years minus” time served and to be served, and ultimately imposed 14 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release, emphasizing repeated leniency, deterrence, public protection, and the defendant’s ongoing blame-shifting.

Summary of the Opinion

• Plain-error claim rejected: Although the district court misstated the maximum supervised-release term (and also misstated the imprisonment maximum, per a footnote), the panel held the error did not warrant relief under plain-error review. The defendant identified no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent mandating vacatur in these circumstances; he had been correctly advised at an earlier appearance; he admitted violations before the misadvice; and he lodged no contemporaneous objection. He failed to show an effect on substantial rights or on the fairness and integrity of the proceedings.
• Reasonableness affirmed: The court found no procedural error. It held the district court permissibly considered the circumstances surrounding dismissed violations and the defendant’s retraction of admissions as part of his background, character, and conduct, while expressly sentencing only for Violations 1, 3, and 6. Substantively, the upward variance to 14 months was within the range of reasonableness given the repeated violations, prior leniency, the need for deterrence and public protection, and the court’s adequate consideration of § 3553(a) factors incorporated by § 3583(e).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• United States v. King, 57 F.4th 1334 (11th Cir. 2023): Confirms abuse-of-discretion review of revocation decisions and sentences; supports deference to the district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors.
• United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014): Sets plain-error review for unpreserved procedural challenges and articulates the four-prong plain-error standard, including the requirement that any error seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Also relevant to revocation sentencing reasonableness.
• United States v. Serrapio, 754 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2014): Emphasizes broad sentencing discretion to consider a wide range of relevant material; cited to show that considering contextual information about dismissed violations is permissible.
• United States v. Morales, 987 F.3d 966 (11th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003): Establish the Eleventh Circuit’s “no-on-point-precedent, no-plain-error” rule: absent Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit authority squarely resolving the specific issue, an error typically cannot be “plain.” Critical to rejecting the misadvice claim.
• United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703 (11th Cir. 1998): Reinforces the importance of contemporaneous objections and cautions against “sandbagging”—saving an issue for appeal without raising it below.
• United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2010): Sets out the two-step review for reasonableness (procedural then substantive) and confirms that courts may consider broad background and conduct information in imposing variances.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Provides the standard for substantive reasonableness and the requirement that the court’s explanation be sufficiently compelling to support the degree of variance.
• United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Affirms district courts’ discretion to assign differing weights to § 3553(a) factors; supports weighing deterrence and public protection more heavily for repeat violators.
• United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832 (11th Cir. 2024): Confirms that a court need not explicitly address every mitigation argument on the record to impose a reasonable sentence.
• United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994): Describes minimal due process protections at revocation; supports the view that revocation does not require the full panoply of Rule 11 plea safeguards.
• Statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e), 3583(h), and § 3661. Section 3583(e) governs revocation sentencing and incorporates specific § 3553(a) factors; § 3661 allows consideration of any information concerning background, character, and conduct.

Legal Reasoning

1) Misadvice at Revocation: No Plain Error Without Prejudice

The defendant argued that the district court’s incorrect recitation of his maximum supervised-release exposure—stating “three years minus” time served rather than the correct “five years less any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation” (§ 3583(b)(1), (h))—violated Rule 32.1 and due process by rendering his admissions unknowing and involuntary. The panel assumed error but held it was not cognizable on plain-error review:

• No controlling precedent: The court invoked the Eleventh Circuit rule that, absent Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit authority squarely on point, an error is not “plain” (Morales; Lejarde-Rada). The defendant offered no such precedent compelling vacatur for misadvice of this sort during a revocation hearing.
• No prejudice: Several facts cut sharply against an effect on substantial rights. The magistrate judge at the initial appearance correctly explained the maximums; the defendant entered his admissions before the district court’s misstatement; and defense counsel did not object when invited to correct the court’s statements. On this record, the panel found no reasonable probability the outcome would have changed had the district court correctly stated the maxima at the final hearing.
• Fairness/integrity prong: Even if the first three prongs were satisfied, the panel would correct only an error that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings (Vandergrift). Given the lack of prejudice and prior correct advisement, the court declined to exercise that discretion.

Note on statutory maxima: In a footnote, the panel also observed that the district court misstated the maximum imprisonment term under § 3583(e)(3). That acknowledgment reinforces the presence of error but does not alter the plain-error analysis because the misstatement was not preserved, did not affect the outcome, and was preceded by a correct advisement at the initial appearance.

2) Reasonableness Review: Procedure and Substance

Applying the standard two-step framework (Tome), the panel first assessed procedural reasonableness and then substantive reasonableness under the totality of circumstances.

Procedural reasonableness: The defense contended that the court improperly considered dismissed Violations 2, 4, and 5. The panel rejected this characterization:

• Scope of information: Sentencing courts may consider any reliable information regarding the defendant’s background, character, and conduct (§ 3661; Serrapio; Tome). The record contained testimony and argument about the circumstances of those violations.
• Limited use, proper purpose: Critically, the district court expressly sentenced on Violations 1, 3, and 6 only. It explained that the defendant’s retraction of admissions and blame-shifting signaled poor acceptance of responsibility and a lack of respect for supervision—factors relevant to his history/characteristics and the need for deterrence and public protection. The panel found no plain error in considering that information contextually.

Substantive reasonableness: The upward variance from the 3–9 month advisory range to 14 months was upheld:

• Weight of § 3553(a) factors: The district court had twice extended leniency (including after the first revocation) and found that shorter sanctions had not deterred the defendant. It emphasized deterrence, protection of the public, and the defendant’s repeated noncompliance—quintessential § 3553(a) considerations incorporated by § 3583(e). Assigning greater weight to these aims was within the court’s discretion (King; Rosales-Bruno).
• Explanation and fit: The court tied the variance to case-specific reasons: repeated violations, unsuccessful prior leniency, and ongoing supervision needs for a defendant with a history of serious financial crimes. The explanation was “sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance” (Irey; Tome), even though the court was not required to address every mitigating point in detail (Hayden).

Impact and Practical Significance

• Preservation matters: Defense counsel should contemporaneously object to any misstatements about statutory maxima at revocation hearings. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s strict plain-error doctrine, failure to object—combined with earlier correct advisement and a weak showing of prejudice—will usually be fatal to an appeal.
• Admissions at revocation are not Rule 11 pleas: Revocation proceedings carry minimal due process protections (Frazier), not the full panoply of Rule 11 safeguards. Misadvice, without more, is unlikely to void admissions absent a concrete showing that it altered the outcome.
• Broad evidentiary latitude at revocation sentencing: District courts may consider the context of dismissed allegations, shifts in a defendant’s explanations, and similar background/conduct information, so long as the sentence is anchored to established violations and the permissible § 3553(a) factors incorporated by § 3583(e).
• Upward variances are sustainable for repeat violators: The opinion reinforces that repeated noncompliance after lenient sanctions can justify substantial upward variances from the Chapter 7 policy range, based on deterrence and public protection.
• § 3583(h) aggregation remains key: Courts must aggregate all imprisonment imposed upon revocation(s) and subtract that total from the otherwise-available supervised-release cap (here, five years for a Class A/B offense) when imposing a new term. While the district court misstated the number, the actual term imposed (three years) was within the lawful ceiling.
• Unpublished but instructive: Although nonprecedential, the decision is a practical guidepost in the Eleventh Circuit for litigating misadvice claims and reasonableness challenges in revocation settings.

Complex Concepts, Simplified

• Plain error: An appellate standard for unpreserved issues. The appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear or “plain,” (3) that affected substantial rights (likely changed the outcome), and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit generally requires on-point Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent to treat an error as “plain.”
• Revocation vs. guilty plea: Admitting supervised-release violations is not the same as pleading guilty to a new crime. Revocation hearings involve fewer formalities and different rights than Rule 11 plea colloquies.
• Chapter 7 policy statements: The Sentencing Commission’s revocation ranges are advisory policy statements, not binding guidelines. District courts must consider them but may vary for good reasons tied to § 3553(a) factors.
• § 3583(e) and § 3553(a): When revoking supervised release, courts consider a subset of § 3553(a) factors (e.g., nature of violations; history and characteristics; deterrence; public protection; treatment needs; policy statements; avoiding unwarranted disparities), and impose a term of imprisonment within statutory caps.
• § 3583(h) “time-left” rule: If a court imposes a new supervised-release term after revocation, the maximum is the original statutory cap for the offense (often up to five years for Class A/B felonies) minus all imprisonment imposed for revocations in that case.

Conclusion

United States v. Charmant confirms two practical propositions in revocation jurisprudence within the Eleventh Circuit. First, misstatements about maximum penalties at a revocation hearing will rarely justify vacatur under plain-error review without on-point authority and a concrete showing of prejudice—especially where the defendant received correct advisement earlier, admitted violations before the misadvice, and failed to object. Second, district courts retain wide latitude under § 3583(e) to consider the defendant’s broader conduct and the context of dismissed allegations when fashioning an appropriate revocation sentence, provided the sentence rests on proven violations and the incorporated § 3553(a) factors. The 14-month upward variance in this case was upheld as a measured response to repeated noncompliance despite prior leniency, emphasizing deterrence and public protection. While unpublished, the opinion offers clear, practitioner-focused guidance on preserving error and on the breadth of permissible considerations at revocation sentencing.