Eleventh Circuit Clarifies: 28 U.S.C. § 1927 Does Not Reach Non‑Attorney Pro Se Litigants

Introduction

This appeal arises from a contentious Chapter 11, Subchapter V bankruptcy involving Micron Devices and its co‑founder and majority shareholder, Laura Perryman. After the bankruptcy court removed the debtor in possession and expanded the trustee’s powers, the trustee and a creditor sought monetary sanctions against Perryman for an array of allegedly frivolous pro se filings. The bankruptcy court imposed sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, awarding fees and costs to the estate and creditor and restricting Perryman’s future pro se filings without leave of court.

On appeal, Perryman argued principally that § 1927 does not apply to non‑attorney pro se litigants. The Eleventh Circuit agreed and vacated the monetary sanctions, remanding for further proceedings. Although the opinion is unpublished, it provides a clear, text‑driven statement of law in the Eleventh Circuit: § 1927’s fee‑shifting sanctions are limited to attorneys and others “admitted to conduct cases,” and do not reach unrepresented parties litigating on their own behalf.

The decision is especially important for bankruptcy practice, where pro se participation by insiders or shareholders is not uncommon, and for federal civil practice more generally, clarifying which sanctioning tools are available against pro se litigants.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Eleventh Circuit vacated monetary sanctions imposed under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 against Laura Perryman, a non‑attorney who represented herself pro se in the bankruptcy court.
• Section 1927, by its text, applies only to “any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States,” not to self‑represented parties who have not been admitted to practice before the court.
• The court did not reach Perryman’s argument that the bankruptcy court erred in finding bad faith; because § 1927 does not apply to her, that question was unnecessary to the outcome.
• The court noted that while § 1927 is unavailable, nothing prevents the bankruptcy court on remand from considering sanctions under its inherent authority (or other appropriate sources), provided it follows proper standards and procedures.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• 28 U.S.C. § 1927: Authorizes fee‑shifting against “any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States” who “multiplies the proceedings … unreasonably and vexatiously.” The case turns on who qualifies as an “attorney or other person admitted.”
• 28 U.S.C. § 1654: Provides that parties may “plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” The court uses § 1654 to underscore that a personal right to self‑representation is not the same as being “admitted to conduct cases.”
• In re Piazza, 719 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2013) and Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 274 (2018): Stand for the interpretive principle that, absent a statutory definition, courts give terms their ordinary meaning at the time of enactment/amendment (here, 1980 for § 1927). The Eleventh Circuit employs this methodology to read “admitted” as requiring approval to appear in a lawyer‑like capacity.
• Sassower v. Field, 973 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1992): Interprets “admitted” in § 1927 as applying to those with approval to appear like attorneys (e.g., admitted to the bar or pro hac vice), not to pro se litigants. The Eleventh Circuit explicitly relies on this understanding.
• Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1996): Reverses a § 1927 fee award against a non‑attorney; § 1927 sanctions can be assessed only against attorneys or those admitted to practice before the court. The Eleventh Circuit cites Meadowbriar as aligned authority.
• Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991): The Supreme Court acknowledged the district court’s view that § 1927 “applies only to attorneys” and discussed the availability of inherent‑power sanctions. While not a holding on § 1927’s scope, Chambers’ treatment supports the attorney‑only reading and reinforces that courts retain inherent sanctioning authority outside § 1927.
• L. Sols. of Chicago LLC v. Corbett, 971 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2020) and In re Englander, 95 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996): Provide standard‑of‑review guidance for sanction orders on appeal—fact findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo, and overall sanction decisions for abuse of discretion.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning is straightforwardly textualist. It begins with § 1927’s operative phrase: “Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States.”

• Ordinary meaning at the time of amendment (1980): Relying on dictionary usage, the court interprets “admitted” as “received into an office or relation,” connoting formal approval to appear in a lawyer‑like capacity. This is consistent with those who are admitted to the bar of a court or permitted to appear pro hac vice—not with individuals proceeding pro se by right under § 1654.
• Harmony with sister circuits and Supreme Court signals: The Eleventh Circuit aligns with the Second and Fifth Circuits in reading § 1927 to cover only attorneys and similarly admitted persons. Chambers’ discussion—referencing the district court’s view that § 1927 applies only to attorneys and proceeding to analyze inherent‑power sanctions—reinforces that paradigm.
• Application to Perryman: Perryman is not a lawyer and was not admitted to conduct cases in any lawyer‑like capacity. She represented herself pro se; that status falls under § 1654’s personal right of self‑representation, not under § 1927’s “admitted” category. Therefore, § 1927 could not be used to sanction her.
• Standard of review and error correction: Although sanctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, a court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard. Here, because § 1927 is inapplicable to pro se litigants as a matter of law, the bankruptcy court’s reliance on § 1927 to impose monetary sanctions constituted an abuse of discretion. Vacatur followed.
• Inherent authority left intact: The panel emphasizes that while § 1927 is unavailable, bankruptcy courts retain inherent power to sanction bad‑faith litigation conduct, provided they make appropriate findings and follow proper procedures. The opinion expressly leaves that path open on remand.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished and therefore non‑precedential under Eleventh Circuit rules, this decision offers a clear statement of how the Eleventh Circuit reads § 1927. It has immediate practical effects in federal courts within the Circuit, particularly in bankruptcy courts, where pro se filings by insiders, creditors, or shareholders frequently arise.

• Sanctioning pro se litigants: Moving forward, parties and courts should not rely on § 1927 to seek monetary sanctions against non‑attorney pro se litigants. Instead, the appropriate tools include:
  • Inherent authority to sanction bad‑faith conduct (requires specific findings of bad faith and due process safeguards).
  • Rule 11 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 11) and Bankruptcy Rule 9011 against “an attorney or unrepresented party” for the signing and filing of papers without a proper legal or factual basis (noting the 21‑day safe‑harbor requirement for motions).
  • Prefiling injunctions/gatekeeper orders in extreme cases of vexatious litigation, tailored to the litigant’s conduct and supported by adequate findings.
  • 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and the court’s equitable powers to prevent abuse of process (used consistently with the Code and procedural rules).
• Scope of “other person admitted” under § 1927: The court’s reading strongly indicates that § 1927 covers lawyers admitted to a court’s bar and those specially admitted (e.g., pro hac vice). It does not extend to individuals exercising a personal right to self‑representation under § 1654.
• Preserving sanctions on remand: Where pro se litigant conduct has imposed unnecessary costs, courts may reframe sanctions under inherent authority or Rule 11/Bankruptcy Rule 9011, if procedural prerequisites are met. The panel’s remand invitation underscores this path.
• Bankruptcy practice: Trustees and creditors should calibrate sanction motions carefully. When the target is a non‑attorney pro se litigant, rely on Rule 9011 or inherent powers, not § 1927. Where quick corrective action is needed to curb repetitive filings, consider targeted filing‑leave requirements with articulated findings.
• Narrowness of the ruling: The Eleventh Circuit did not disturb the bankruptcy court’s separate filing‑leave restriction; the appeal before it was limited to the monetary sanctions. Parties should not read this opinion as curtailing a bankruptcy court’s ability to manage serial filings by pro se parties through appropriate gatekeeping orders.
• Alignment with other circuits: The decision brings Eleventh Circuit practice in line with at least the Second and Fifth Circuits on the attorney‑only scope of § 1927, improving doctrinal coherence across jurisdictions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• 28 U.S.C. § 1927: A fee‑shifting statute that penalizes unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings. It applies to attorneys and those formally admitted to appear in a lawyer‑like capacity—not to laypersons representing themselves.
• “Admitted to conduct cases” vs. “pro se”: Being “admitted” involves formal approval to appear as counsel (e.g., bar admission, pro hac vice). By contrast, “pro se” is a personal right to represent oneself under § 1654 and does not make the person an “admitted” practitioner.
• Inherent authority: Courts possess inherent power to sanction bad‑faith litigation conduct, independent of statutes and rules. This power is potent but must be exercised with restraint, specific findings of bad faith, and due process (notice and an opportunity to be heard).
• Rule 11/Bankruptcy Rule 9011: These rules require reasonable legal and factual bases for filed papers and certify that filings are not for improper purposes. They expressly apply to “an attorney or unrepresented party,” making them available against pro se litigants, subject to procedural requirements (including a 21‑day safe harbor before filing a motion).
• Standard of review—abuse of discretion: Appellate courts defer to trial courts’ sanction decisions unless the wrong legal standard is applied or factual findings are clearly erroneous. A legal error (e.g., applying § 1927 to pro se litigants) is itself an abuse of discretion.
• Unpublished, per curiam decision: “Per curiam” indicates the opinion is issued by the court collectively without a named author. “Not for publication” generally means the decision is non‑precedential, though it remains persuasive and instructive about the court’s view of the law.
• Debtor in possession and trustee: In Chapter 11, a debtor usually remains in control as “debtor in possession.” Courts can remove that status and appoint or empower a trustee where governance problems, interference, or ultra vires conduct arise, as the bankruptcy court did here.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Perryman provides a clear and careful textual interpretation of § 1927: the statute’s sanctions do not apply to non‑attorney pro se litigants. By reading “admitted to conduct cases” according to its ordinary meaning at the time of enactment and aligning with sister circuits and Supreme Court signals, the court ensures that § 1927 remains a tool for regulating attorney conduct and those formally admitted to appear in a lawyer‑like capacity.

The ruling does not leave courts powerless to address abusive pro se conduct. Instead, it channels sanctioning efforts toward inherent authority and Rule 11/Bankruptcy Rule 9011, with the procedural safeguards those regimes require. For bankruptcy practitioners, trustees, and creditors, the opinion underscores the need to select the correct sanctioning vehicle and to build a record that satisfies the distinct elements of each authority.

Key takeaway: In the Eleventh Circuit, monetary sanctions against non‑attorney pro se litigants cannot be imposed under § 1927. Courts must instead rely on inherent powers, Rule 11/Bankruptcy Rule 9011, or other appropriate mechanisms—and tailor any gatekeeping remedies to the litigant’s conduct with adequate findings and due process.