Eleventh Circuit Clarifies that “Knee-on-Neck” Force on Restrained, Non-Resisting Suspects Is Clearly Established Excessive Force

Introduction

Ray Shepard v. Anthony Paul (No. 23-13611, 11th Cir. 25 June 2025) presented the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit with an interlocutory qualified-immunity challenge arising from a high-stakes police response to a reported armed robbery. Deputy Anthony Paul appealed the district court’s refusal to grant him complete qualified immunity on Shepard’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive-force claim and the court’s refusal to grant summary judgment on parallel Florida tort claims. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the partial denial of qualified immunity and dismissed the remainder of the appeal for want of jurisdiction, thereby underscoring a critical principle: once a suspect is handcuffed, subdued, and no longer resisting, the gratuitous application of a knee to that suspect’s neck for several minutes is clearly established as unconstitutional excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.

Summary of the Judgment

• Qualified Immunity (Federal Claim) – Affirmed the district court’s denial in part: Deputy Paul is not entitled to qualified immunity for pressing his knee onto Shepard’s neck after Shepard was handcuffed, on the ground, and non-resistant.
• State-Law Claims – Appeal dismissed: the Eleventh Circuit lacked interlocutory jurisdiction to examine the district court’s discretionary dismissal of Florida intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress and battery claims.

The panel held that established Eleventh-Circuit precedent clearly forbade gratuitous force against a non-resisting, fully secured suspect, placing Deputy Paul on notice that his knee-on-neck restraint was unconstitutional.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s qualified-immunity analysis pivoted on two competing lines of Eleventh-Circuit authority:

• The “Gratuitous-Force” Line
  Cases such as Acosta v. Miami-Dade County, Lee v. Ferraro, Hadley v. Gutierrez, Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Smith v. Mattox, Saunders v. Duke, and Slicker v. Jackson establish that once a suspect is handcuffed or otherwise subdued and no longer poses a threat, any gratuitous or disproportionate force violates the Fourth Amendment.
• The “De Minimis-Force” Line
  Croom v. Balkwill and comparable decisions tolerate minor, transitory force used to secure a scene or maintain officer safety, especially when multiple potential threats remain.

The Court reconciled the two doctrines by reiterating that de minimis force does not immunize gratuitous force. Once hands are cuffed and resistance ceases, the “gratuitous-force” rule overrides.

2. Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction
   Under Mitchell v. Forsyth, interlocutory review is proper only for pure legal questions. The Court confined its review to whether the use of the knee violated clearly established law, refusing to examine discretionary state-law dismissals.
2. Constitutional Violation
   Applying Graham-factor analysis:
   • Severity of crime: armed-robbery threat was serious.
   • Immediate threat: once Shepard was handcuffed and prone, none existed.
   • Active resistance: Shepard was compliant.
   • Need/amount relationship: minutes-long neck restraint far exceeded any legitimate need.
   • Injury: significant orthopedic damage and PTSD evidence tipped factors further against the officer.
3. Clearly Established Law
   Rather than requiring a case with identical facts, the panel invoked a “broader, obvious-clarity principle”: “an officer may not use gratuitous force on a non-resisting suspect who poses no threat.” The Court found that earlier precedents, read together, gave unequivocal notice that the knee-on-neck restraint was forbidden.
4. Rejection of the Officer’s Arguments
   Deputy Paul’s reliance on Croom failed because (i) Shepard was already secure, (ii) the force lasted several minutes, and (iii) the amount of pressure created risk of asphyxiation—qualitatively different from a brief stabilizing knee-in-back maneuver.

3. Impact of the Decision

• Guidance for Law-Enforcement Training – Agencies within the Eleventh Circuit must train officers that continued neck compression or similar tactics on subdued suspects is per se excessive.
• Qualified-Immunity Litigation – Plaintiffs need not locate a factually identical “knee-on-neck” precedent; the broad gratuitous-force principle suffices.
• Tactical Operations – Officers may briefly use stabilizing force in volatile, multi-suspect settings, but must immediately moderate force once individual suspects are secured.
• Section 1983 Pleading Strategy – Counsel should highlight whether force occurred after restraint, shifting the case into the plaintiff-friendly gratuitous-force category.
• State-Law Claims – By dismissing supplemental claims without prejudice, the Court nudges litigants toward Florida state courts for intentional-tort theories, potentially increasing state-court scrutiny of police conduct.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified Immunity – A defense shielding officers unless (1) they violated a constitutional right that (2) was “clearly established” at the time.
• De Minimis Force – Minor, fleeting physical contact insufficient to offend the Constitution.
• Gratuitous Force – Force with no law-enforcement necessity, applied to a compliant, non-threatening person.
• Interlocutory Appeal – An appeal taken before final judgment; allowed in qualified-immunity denials involving pure legal questions.
• Supplemental Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1367) – Power of federal courts to hear state-law claims tied to federal claims; district courts may decline when federal issues become peripheral.

Conclusion

Ray Shepard v. Anthony Paul cements a crucial boundary on police use of force within the Eleventh Circuit: officers are on clear notice that compressing the neck of a handcuffed, prone, and non-resisting suspect for an extended period is unconstitutional. The opinion harmonizes two strands of precedent—de minimis and gratuitous-force cases—by stressing context and proportionality. Going forward, departments must revisit restraint protocols, litigators can invoke the decision to overcome qualified-immunity hurdles, and courts possess a sharpened standard for evaluating excessive-force claims at summary judgment. Although unpublished, the reasoning resonates with nationwide debates on prone restraints and serves as persuasive authority that the knee-on-neck tactic, post-George Floyd, falls squarely outside the ambit of permissible policing when a suspect no longer poses a threat.