Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Rule 60(b)(3)’s One‑Year Clock Runs from Entry of the “Order,” Not Delayed by Rule 58’s Separate-Document Requirement; Reaffirms Exacting Standard for “Fraud on the Court” under Rule 60(d)(3)

Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Rule 60(b)(3)’s One‑Year Clock Runs from Entry of the “Order,” Not Delayed by Rule 58’s Separate-Document Requirement; Reaffirms Exacting Standard for “Fraud on the Court” under Rule 60(d)(3)

Case: Tina Gee v. Jada Mitchell, et al.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Date: October 29, 2025

Panel: Circuit Judges Newsom, Grant, and Luck (per curiam; Non-Argument Calendar)

Disposition: Affirmed

Note: Unpublished (“Not for Publication”). While not precedential, the opinion is persuasive within the Eleventh Circuit.

Introduction

This appeal arises from a civil-rights action filed by plaintiff-appellant Tina Gee against multiple Tuscaloosa law enforcement officers and entities, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations tied to searches of her home. After her amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice as an impermissible “shotgun pleading,” and that dismissal was affirmed on direct appeal, Gee returned to the district court with two post-judgment motions:

  • a motion to set aside the dismissal for “fraud on the court” under Rule 60(d)(3), and
  • a motion for relief for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct under Rule 60(b)(3).

The district court denied both motions, and Gee appealed again. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, establishing two practical takeaways:

  • First, Rule 60(d)(3) relief remains extraordinary: a movant must prove by clear and convincing evidence an “unconscionable plan or scheme” that directly assaults the integrity of the judicial process—examples include bribery or attorney‑implicated fabrication of evidence. Disputed legal arguments or characterizations of pleadings do not suffice.
  • Second, the one-year filing deadline in Rule 60(c)(1) for a Rule 60(b)(3) motion runs from the “entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” The use of “or” is disjunctive. Thus, where relief is sought from an “order,” the clock runs from the order’s entry, and Rule 58’s separate-document requirement governing entry of “judgment” does not delay or extend that deadline.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the district court’s denials of Gee’s Rule 60(d)(3) and Rule 60(b)(3) motions. As to Rule 60(d)(3), the Court held that Gee failed to present clear and convincing evidence of “fraud on the court.” Her contentions—that officers relied on allegedly deficient warrants, described her complaint as conclusory, and invoked the plain-view doctrine—were, at most, merits arguments and not the kind of egregious, integrity‑corroding fraud contemplated by Rule 60(d)(3).

As to Rule 60(b)(3), the Court rejected Gee’s timeliness argument that the one‑year period had not begun because the district court did not enter a separate judgment document under Rule 58. The panel emphasized the disjunctive phrasing of Rule 60(c)(1): the one‑year period runs from “the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Because Gee sought relief from the July 10, 2023 dismissal order, her December 6, 2024 Rule 60(b)(3) motion was “well over a year” late, regardless of Rule 58’s separate-document rule. No abuse of discretion occurred.

Factual Background and Procedural Posture

  • Gee sued the City of Tuscaloosa, its police department, the Tuscaloosa County Sheriff’s Department, and various officers, alleging unconstitutional searches. Her initial complaint was deemed a “shotgun pleading,” and she was ordered to amend.
  • Her 117-page amended complaint with 596 paragraphs and 43 causes of action was dismissed with prejudice as still a shotgun pleading lacking specific facts to state a claim; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that dismissal in Gee v. Mitchell, No. 23-12627, 2024 WL 4118463 (11th Cir. Sept. 9, 2024).
  • Post-mandate, Gee filed two Rule 60 motions in the district court:
    • Rule 60(d)(3) (no time limit): alleging “fraud on the court” based on defendants’ reliance on alleged warrant defects, their characterization of her allegations, and their plain-view argument;
    • Rule 60(b)(3) (one-year limit): again alleging fraud/misrepresentation through counsel.
  • The district court denied both: the Rule 60(d)(3) motion failed on the merits; the Rule 60(b)(3) motion was untimely. Gee appealed.

Standards of Review

  • Denials of Rule 60(d)(3) and Rule 60(b)(3) motions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Mills v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 102 F.4th 1235, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2024); Cox Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc. v. CTI, Inc., 478 F.3d 1303, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007).
  • An abuse of discretion occurs if the court applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the law, uses improper procedures, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings. See Sowers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 975 F.3d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir. 2020).

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Role

  • Mills v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, 102 F.4th 1235 (11th Cir. 2024)
    • Confirmed that Rule 60(d)(3) has no time limit but requires clear and convincing evidence of “fraud on the court.”
    • Characterized the standard as “demanding”; the fraud must be “highly probable.”
    • The panel used Mills to articulate the exacting evidentiary burden and the narrow scope of “fraud on the court.”
  • Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978)
    • Classic articulation that only the most egregious misconduct—e.g., bribery of a judge or jury, or attorney‑implicated fabrication of evidence—constitutes “fraud on the court.”
    • The Eleventh Circuit (bound by pre-split Fifth Circuit decisions) cited Rozier to cabin the concept to truly extraordinary conduct.
  • Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Gore, 761 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1985); Davenport Recycling Assocs. v. Comm’r, 220 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2000)
    • Defined “fraud on the court” as a direct assault on the judicial machinery, perpetrated by officers of the court, and involving an “unconscionable plan or scheme.”
    • These cases shaped the court’s insistence on an integrity‑based test, focusing on systemic harm rather than ordinary adversarial missteps.
  • Cox Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc. v. CTI, Inc., 478 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2007); Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc., 205 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2000)
    • Established that for Rule 60(b)(3), the movant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the adverse party’s fraud/misconduct prevented full and fair presentation of the case.
    • Informed both the timeliness and merits framework for the Rule 60(b)(3) analysis, although this appeal turned on timeliness.
  • Booker v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 281 (11th Cir. 1987)
    • Reaffirmed the clear-and-convincing standard for fraud-based post-judgment relief.
  • Santos v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC, 90 F.4th 1144 (11th Cir. 2024)
    • Used to underscore that “or” is disjunctive in statutory and rule interpretation—the key textual move here to resolve Rule 60(c)(1)’s deadline.
    • By emphasizing the ordinary, disjunctive meaning of “or,” the panel concluded that the one‑year period can run from the “order,” independently of “judgment.”
  • Sowers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 975 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 2020); Aycock v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 769 F.3d 1063 (11th Cir. 2014)
    • Provided the abuse-of-discretion framework applied to both denials.
  • Gee v. Mitchell, No. 23-12627, 2024 WL 4118463 (11th Cir. Sept. 9, 2024)
    • Earlier appeal in the same litigation affirming the dismissal of the amended complaint as a shotgun pleading, relevant as background to the post-judgment motions at issue here.

2) Legal Reasoning

a) Rule 60(d)(3): “Fraud on the Court”

The Court reaffirmed that “fraud on the court” is a term of art. Relief under Rule 60(d)(3) requires clear and convincing evidence of misconduct that directly corrupts the judicial process itself—typically involving officers of the court (e.g., lawyers) in an “unconscionable plan or scheme,” such as bribery of a judge/jury or attorney‑implicated fabrication of evidence. Ordinary adversarial conduct—even sharp advocacy, arguable mischaracterizations of a pleading, or disputed legal positions—does not qualify.

Applying that standard, the panel concluded that Gee’s allegations that defendants:

  • relied on allegedly defective search warrants,
  • described her allegations as conclusory, and
  • argued a plain‑view rationale for one warrant,

were not probative of the kind of egregious, integrity‑destroying misconduct contemplated by Rule 60(d)(3). To the contrary, the motion read as a “camouflaged attempt to relitigate the merits” of the amended complaint already dismissed and affirmed. Because Gee failed to marshal clear and convincing evidence of an “unconscionable plan or scheme” perpetrated by officers of the court against the judicial machinery, denial was well within the district court’s discretion.

b) Rule 60(b)(3): One‑Year Deadline and Rule 58’s Separate‑Document Rule

The Court confronted a recurring procedural question: when does the one‑year period in Rule 60(c)(1) begin to run for a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, particularly if the district court did not enter a separate judgment under Rule 58?

Rule 60(c)(1) states that a Rule 60(b)(3) motion must be filed “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Emphasizing the ordinary, disjunctive meaning of “or,” as highlighted in Santos, the panel held that the one‑year clock can run from any of the listed alternatives. Where the movant seeks relief from an “order,” the relevant trigger is the “entry of the order” on the civil docket—independent of when a “judgment” is entered under Rule 58’s separate‑document requirement.

Gee sought relief from the district court’s July 10, 2023 order dismissing her amended complaint. She filed her Rule 60(b)(3) motion on December 6, 2024—more than a year after the order’s entry. Consequently, the motion was untimely. The absence of a separate judgment document under Rule 58 could not save it, because the “order” prong—not the “judgment” prong—was the relevant trigger in these circumstances.

3) Impact and Practical Implications

a) Timeliness of Rule 60(b)(3) Motions

  • Do not assume the Rule 58 separate-document requirement buys you more time. If you are seeking relief from an “order,” the one-year period runs from the date that order is entered on the docket. The Rule 58 separate-document rule affects the entry of a “judgment,” but Rule 60(c)(1) starts the clock from “judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”
  • File early. The safest practice is to file Rule 60(b)(3) motions well within one year of the earliest potential trigger—often the dispositive order—to avoid timeliness challenges.
  • Choose your target carefully. Identify whether you are attacking an “order,” a “judgment,” or a specific “proceeding,” because the selection can determine the limitations clock.

b) Substantive Limits of Rule 60(d)(3)

  • Extraordinary relief only. “Fraud on the court” is reserved for conduct that subverts the judicial process itself. Allegations that the opposing party advanced flawed legal arguments, misread pleadings, or invoked a contested doctrine (e.g., plain view) do not suffice.
  • Evidence is critical. Clear and convincing proof—often involving attorney complicity in fabrication or similar misconduct—is required. Mere assertions will be viewed as attempts to relitigate the merits.

c) Finality and Post-Judgment Strategy

  • Finality interests are strong. The decision underscores the Eleventh Circuit’s commitment to finality, both by strictly applying Rule 60(c)(1)’s one‑year limit and by tightly circumscribing Rule 60(d)(3) relief.
  • Use direct appeal for legal errors. Legal disagreements about warrant validity or doctrinal defenses (like plain view) belong on direct appeal, not in Rule 60(d)(3) motions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Shotgun pleading: A complaint that is so vague, conclusory, or sprawling that it fails to connect specific facts to specific causes of action and specific defendants. Courts in the Eleventh Circuit often dismiss such pleadings, sometimes with leave to amend, and may ultimately dismiss with prejudice if defects persist.
  • Fraud on the court (Rule 60(d)(3)): Misconduct that corrupts the judicial process—e.g., bribery of a judge or juror, or evidence fabrication involving attorneys. It is not merely presenting weak arguments, aggressive advocacy, or even some forms of perjury; it targets the integrity of adjudication itself. No time limit applies, but the standard is extraordinarily high.
  • Rule 60(b)(3): Allows relief from a final judgment or order for “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party,” if the conduct prevented the movant from fully and fairly presenting the case. Must be filed within one year of the relevant trigger.
  • Rule 60(c)(1) one‑year period: Runs from “entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” The “or” is disjunctive; any of these events can start the clock.
  • Rule 58 separate-document rule: Generally requires that “judgment” be set out in a separate document. It affects when “judgment” is deemed entered for various purposes (like appeal deadlines). It does not delay the Rule 60(b)(3) clock when the relief is sought from an “order.”
  • Per curiam, Non-Argument Calendar: A decision by the panel without oral argument, often used when the law is settled or the outcome is clear from the record.
  • Abuse of discretion: A deferential standard of review; reversal requires showing the lower court applied the wrong law, misapplied correct law, used improper procedures, or made clearly erroneous fact findings.
  • Plain-view doctrine (briefly): A Fourth Amendment doctrine allowing officers to seize evidence without a warrant if they are lawfully present and the incriminating character of the item is immediately apparent.

Practice Pointers

  • Calendaring: Start the Rule 60(b)(3) one‑year clock from the docket entry of the order you aim to set aside; do not wait for a separate judgment document unless you are expressly targeting the judgment itself and even then, consider the earliest possible trigger.
  • Evidence for fraud claims: For Rule 60(d)(3), assemble concrete, admissible proof demonstrating egregious misconduct involving the judicial machinery—mere disagreement with legal arguments is not enough.
  • Avoid merits rehash: Frame Rule 60 motions around the rule’s specific grounds (fraud, mistake, newly discovered evidence, etc.), not as a substitute for appeal.
  • Preserve issues on appeal: If you believe the district court erred on substantive legal questions (e.g., validity of warrants), raise them on direct appeal rather than banking on post-judgment remedies.

Key Passages from the Opinion

  • On the Rule 60(d)(3) standard: “A movant who seeks relief under [Rule 60](d)(3) must establish ‘fraud on the court’ by clear and convincing evidence… ‘Generally speaking, only the most egregious misconduct, such as bribery of a judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of evidence by a party in which an attorney is implicated, will constitute a fraud on the court.’”
  • On the one‑year clock for Rule 60(b)(3): “Rule 60(b)(3)’s use of the disjunctive ‘or’ means that a movant … must seek relief … no more than one year from the (1) judgment, or (2) order, or (3) proceeding … [T]he order from which Gee sought relief … was … July 10, 2023 … [She filed] December 6, 2024 … [thus] untimely.”

Limitations of the Decision

  • Unpublished status: The opinion is not binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, though it is persuasive. Its reasoning relies on published authorities such as Mills, Rozier, and Santos, enhancing its persuasive weight.
  • Narrow procedural posture: The Court addressed only the denial of post‑judgment Rule 60 motions, not the underlying constitutional claims or the merits of the “shotgun pleading” dismissal previously affirmed.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision offers two clear, practitioner‑friendly guideposts. First, Rule 60(d)(3) “fraud on the court” remains a narrow, integrity‑focused remedy demanding clear and convincing evidence of truly egregious, officer‑of‑the‑court misconduct. Attempts to repackage merits arguments as “fraud on the court” will fail.

Second, and of practical importance across civil litigation, the one‑year time limit for Rule 60(b)(3) is triggered by the earliest of three disjunctive events: entry of the judgment, entry of the order, or the date of the proceeding. Litigants cannot use Rule 58’s separate‑document requirement to extend the Rule 60(b)(3) clock when attacking an “order.” The message is unambiguous: calendar deadlines from the earliest applicable trigger, file early, and reserve Rule 60 for its intended purposes rather than as a vehicle for second‑guessing merits decisions that should be challenged on direct appeal.

This commentary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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