Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Limits on School Liability for Student-on-Student Hazing and Reaffirms Robust Qualified and State-Agent Immunity

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Rodney K., Sr. v. Mobile County Board of Education addresses a deeply troubling factual context: years of violent hazing within a high school football program, culminating in a freshman quarterback’s broken arm and a public scandal. Despite that backdrop, the court affirms summary judgment in favor of the school board, superintendent, principal, and coaches on all federal and state claims.

The opinion is “Not for Publication” and thus non-precedential in the Eleventh Circuit, but it is a detailed and revealing application of several important doctrines:

Federal qualified immunity for school employees.
The “state action” requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Substantive due process limits on liability for failure to protect students from private violence.
Municipal liability under Monell.
Alabama’s state-agent immunity and its interaction with the state’s anti-hazing statute.

The central legal question is not whether hazing occurred—it plainly did—but whether the school officials can be held legally responsible under the U.S. Constitution or Alabama law for violence committed primarily by students against other students. The Eleventh Circuit’s answer is no: the conduct, as proved, does not satisfy the demanding standards for constitutional violations or for piercing Alabama’s state-agent immunity.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The plaintiffs (students and their parents/guardians) alleged a longstanding culture of hazing in the Davidson High School football program. Senior players repeatedly assaulted younger players, with attacks being recorded on cell phones; some videos were confiscated and deleted by coaches, and students were punished with athletic drills. A viral video of the brutal assault on R.K., a freshman quarterback, prompted a criminal investigation, arrests of student offenders, and the eventual resignation of the principal, head coach, and superintendent.

The plaintiffs brought an eleven-count complaint asserting federal constitutional claims (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments) via § 1983 and several Alabama state-law claims, including theories linked to Alabama’s anti-hazing statute. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, holding:

The coaches were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs failed to show violation of clearly established Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The school board, superintendent, and principal could not be liable under supervisory or municipal liability theories in the absence of an underlying constitutional violation by the coaches.
All defendants were entitled to state-agent immunity on the state claims.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full. The court held:

No Fourth Amendment “seizure” attributable to a state actor occurred, except possibly in a single minor physical contact by the head coach, which still did not qualify as a seizure.
No Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation arose, because, at most, the coaches were deliberately indifferent to peer-on-peer violence, which does not “shock the conscience” under existing Eleventh Circuit law.
No clearly established law existed that would have alerted reasonable coaches that failing to stop student-on-student hazing or weakly responding to it would violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments.
Without an underlying constitutional violation, supervisory and municipal liability claims against the school board, principal, and superintendent necessarily failed; in any event, there was no evidence of a board policy or custom of permitting hazing.
Alabama’s state-agent immunity shielded the coaches from state claims, because plaintiffs failed to show that coaches acted willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, or beyond their authority, and Alabama’s anti-hazing statute does not by itself defeat that immunity.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Davidson High School, part of the Mobile County Public School System, fielded a football program led by Head Coach and Athletic Director Fred Riley from 2004 until his retirement in 2018. Over that period, testimony indicated a culture where older players routinely ganged up on younger ones, described by some as “tradition,” “bonding,” or “initiation” into the varsity locker room. The conduct, however, went far beyond harmless pranks: it involved punching, kicking, slamming, beating with weights and belts, and stuffing at least one student into a trash can.

The lawsuit centered on incidents between 2015 and 2018:

2015: Assault of Lyman Collins in the locker room (Collins was not a team member).
Spring 2017: Assault of freshman team member Garrian Tre Betts.
Fall 2017: Verbal and physical harassment of student Lyman Collins, Jr. by Coach Riley, including a “belly bump” incident.
March 29, 2018: Assault of junior player Jeremiah Chatman.
April 27, 2018: Severe attack on freshman quarterback R.K., leaving him with a broken arm; this incident was recorded and went viral.

Most assaults occurred in the locker room, in areas not visible from the coach’s office. Players often recorded the attacks on their phones. The coaches confiscated phones, deleted many videos, and imposed athletic punishments such as laps and bear crawls during lunch. The videos of the R.K. and Chatman incidents were not deleted and were ultimately released to media, triggering a public outcry and investigation.

The investigation revealed:

An aggressive culture in the football locker room dating back to at least 2005.
No formal reports of the hazing to school officials or under the district’s Student Code of Conduct before the viral R.K. video.
Parents and guardians had acknowledged receipt of the Student Code of Conduct, which prohibited assault, bullying, harassment, reckless endangerment, and similar misconduct, and provided reporting mechanisms.

The offending students were arrested and granted youthful offender status and were disciplined by the school system (suspension and placement in alternative schools for “assault third degree”). The principal, head coach, and superintendent eventually resigned.

Plaintiffs sued under § 1983 and Alabama law, alleging:

Fourth Amendment violations (unreasonable seizures).
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violations (bodily integrity, freedom from excessive corporal punishment, and state-created danger theories).
State-law claims, including violations of Alabama’s anti-hazing statute (§ 16-1-23), and common-law theories of negligence or wantonness (which the opinion addresses only indirectly through the immunity analysis).

The district court entered summary judgment for all defendants, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

B. Qualified Immunity and the Federal Claims Against the Coaches

1. Structure of the Qualified Immunity Inquiry

Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damages unless their conduct:

Violates a constitutional right, and
The right was “clearly established” at the time.

The court cites Johnson v. Miami Beach, 18 F.4th 1267 (11th Cir. 2021), Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686 (11th Cir. 2021), Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 2019), and Patel v. Lanier County, 969 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2020). There is no dispute that the coaches were acting within their discretionary authority (coaching and supervising students). Thus, the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to show both:

A constitutional violation, and
That the violated right was clearly established.

Following Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), the district court elected to resolve the case on the second prong—holding that no clearly established right was violated—without deciding whether a constitutional violation occurred. The Eleventh Circuit holds that this sequencing choice is permissible and not error, underscoring that courts have discretion to resolve qualified immunity on whichever prong is more efficient.

Nevertheless, the appellate panel proceeds to analyze the underlying constitutional questions (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments) and the clearly established law prong, thereby supplying more substantive guidance.

2. Fourth Amendment – State Action and Student-on-Student Hazing

The plaintiffs argued that the violent hazing constituted unconstitutional “seizures” under the Fourth Amendment. The court accepts, for purposes of analysis, that being violently attacked by peers is a “seizure” in the ordinary sense—i.e., a termination of freedom of movement. The key issue is whether those seizures are attributable to the state, so as to be actionable under § 1983.

Section 1983 imposes liability only for deprivations of constitutional rights “under color of state law.” As the Supreme Court held in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999), purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, is not actionable under § 1983.

Here, nearly all physical assaults were committed by students (private actors), not by coaches or other officials. Only the “belly bump” by Coach Riley involved direct physical contact by a state actor. Thus, the plaintiffs could only recover for the student-on-student assaults if they could show that the coaches’ role converted this private violence into “state action.”

a. State-Actor Tests and Their Application

The court invokes the familiar three tests for when private conduct becomes attributable to the state (quoting Charles v. Johnson):

State compulsion test: The state has coerced or significantly encouraged the conduct.
Public function test: The private party performs a function traditionally exclusively reserved to the state.
Nexus/joint action test: The state is so intertwined with the private party that they act as joint participants.

Plaintiffs’ theory most naturally sounded in the state compulsion test: that coaches had effectively directed, endorsed, or significantly encouraged hazing by refusing to stop it and by destroying videos.

The Eleventh Circuit agrees with the district court that, at most, the record shows inaction or insufficient action by the coaches. It does not show coercion or “significant encouragement.” The opinion emphasizes:

There was no evidence that coaches expressly or affirmatively directed hazing.
While coaches may have known hazing occurred and “turned a blind eye,” the evidence shows that when they witnessed incidents, they told students to stop and disciplined them (e.g., by laps and bear crawls).
A passive or inadequate response—even if negligent or worse—does not satisfy the state compulsion test.

The court then addresses plaintiffs’ reliance on Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397 (11th Cir. 1986), where a causal connection between an official’s conduct and a constitutional injury can be shown either by:

Personal involvement in the acts, or
Liability based on a policy or custom the official established.

Even assuming plaintiffs could bypass the formal state-actor tests via this “causal connection” route, the Eleventh Circuit finds:

No evidence that the coaches were personally involved in the assaults.
No evidence that the coaches established or implemented a policy of hazing; rather, the record reflects a practice of punishing, not encouraging, hazing-type conduct when it was observed.

The court therefore declines to treat the student hazers as state actors and concludes there is no Fourth Amendment violation attributable to coaches for the peer-on-peer assaults.

b. The “Belly Bump” Incident

The only direct physical contact by a state actor occurred when Coach Riley allegedly “belly bumped” student Lyman Collins, Jr. Collins testified that Riley stared aggressively, protruded his stomach, and walked into Collins in a bumping manner as Collins exited to go to tutoring. Collins stepped back, asked what Riley was doing, and then walked around him and left.

Under United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), a person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes only if, under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021), adds that a seizure requires the use of force with the intent to restrain.

Even assuming physical contact occurred, the panel finds:

No objective evidence that Riley intended to restrain Collins.
Collins was, in fact, free to leave—and did leave—without further interaction.

Therefore, the belly bump did not amount to a Fourth Amendment seizure.

3. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process – Limits of “Deliberate Indifference”

The plaintiffs also invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process (“SDP”) protection of bodily integrity, arguing that coaches’ tolerance of hazing amounted to arbitrary and conscience-shocking abuse of power.

The court emphasizes, drawing heavily on Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent:

The Due Process Clause is a limit on state power, not a guarantee of minimal safety. It does not generally require the state to protect individuals from private harms (DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2003)).
Conduct by government actors violates substantive due process only if it is arbitrary or “shocks the conscience” (Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992); Dacosta v. Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir. 2002)).
Negligence is insufficient, and even many intentional torts under state law do not rise to the level of a due process violation (Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Waddell).

In the specific context of excessive corporal punishment in schools, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that some SDP claims can succeed, but only under a demanding two-part test from Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Board of Education, 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000):

The school official intentionally used an amount of force that was obviously excessive under the circumstances; and
The force posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious bodily injury.

This standard was applied and reaffirmed in Kirkland ex rel. Jones v. Greene County Board of Education, 347 F.3d 903 (11th Cir. 2003).

The panel contrasts Neal and Kirkland with the present facts:

In Neal, a coach struck a student in the face with a metal weight lock as punishment for fighting, knocking the student’s eye out of its socket.
In Kirkland, a principal struck a student in the head, ribs, and back with a metal cane as discipline.
In Rodney K., none of the coaches physically assaulted students (apart from the non-seizure “belly bump”). The assaults were committed by other students.

The evidence showed, at most, that:

Coaches knew hazing was occurring,
Did not prevent all hazing, and
Sometimes failed to respond as strongly as they might have.

This might be characterized as “deliberate indifference” to peer violence. But the Eleventh Circuit, citing Hill ex rel. BHJ v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 980 (11th Cir. 2015), reaffirms that:

“Deliberate indifference is not, without more, a basis for finding substantive due process liability in cases arising in the school context.”

That line — deliberate indifference is not enough — is crucial. It confirms that the very high bar for substantive due process is not satisfied simply because officials fail to act reasonably (even if their conduct would support negligence or recklessness under state tort law).

Accordingly, the court concludes that the coaches’ conduct, although arguably deficient, did not rise to the level of arbitrary, conscience-shocking action necessary to trigger a Fourteenth Amendment violation.

4. The “Clearly Established Law” Analysis

Even if one assumed a constitutional violation, qualified immunity would still apply unless the right violated was “clearly established.” The panel undertakes a careful “clearly established” analysis, reinforcing the narrowness of this prong.

Citing Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176 (11th Cir. 2023), Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 1999), Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 690 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2012), Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc), Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109 (11th Cir. 2013), and King v. Pridmore, 961 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2020), the court explains that a right can be clearly established in three ways:

Existing case law with materially similar facts from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Alabama Supreme Court.
A broad statement of principle that, though not fact-specific, clearly applies to the given context.
“Obvious clarity” cases, where conduct is so egregious that it is obviously unconstitutional even without prior on-point precedent.

Plaintiffs did not identify any binding precedent with facts closely resembling a coach’s alleged failure to stop student-on-student hazing. They instead argued via the second and third methods:

A broad principle that students have a right to be free from excessive corporal punishment and to bodily integrity on campus.
An “obvious clarity” theory that the coaches’ conduct was so egregious that they should have known it violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The panel rejects these arguments:

It acknowledges that Neal and Kirkland clearly establish that direct excessive corporal punishment by school officials can violate substantive due process.
But there is no broad principle or case law clearly extending that rule to peer-inflicted violence where officials are only peripherally aware and do not affirmatively direct the conduct.
The general rule that the Fourth Amendment applies in schools (e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O.) is far too abstract to guide a coach’s conduct regarding peer hazing.
The facts do not qualify as “obvious clarity” because, absent clear case law, it is not self-evident that a coach’s failure to stop hazing constitutes a constitutional violation—as opposed to a matter for discipline, employment, or state tort law.

Thus, even if one assumed a constitutional violation, qualified immunity would still bar liability: a reasonable coach would not have known that failing to prevent, or inadequately responding to, student-on-student hazing violated clearly established Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights.

C. Supervisory and Municipal Liability: Board, Superintendent, Principal

The plaintiffs also sued the Mobile County Board of Education and its members, the superintendent, and the principal, invoking supervisory liability and municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

The Eleventh Circuit reaffirms a key precondition: supervisory or municipal liability under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation. Without a constitutional violation by a subordinate, there can be no derivative liability. The court cites:

Baker v. Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1282 (11th Cir. 2023) (no municipal liability where no underlying violation).
Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005) (no supervisory liability without constitutional violation by subordinate).
Young v. Augusta ex rel. DeVaney, 59 F.3d 1160, 1169 (11th Cir. 1995), citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).

Because the coaches did not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, all supervisory and municipal claims necessarily fail.

The court also explains why, even if there had been a violation, the school board would not be liable under Monell:

School boards cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for employees’ actions (Denno v. School Board of Volusia County, 218 F.3d 1267, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Liability arises only if the violation results from an official policy or a longstanding custom or practice that is the “moving force” behind the constitutional injury (Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003)).
There was no evidence that the board had a policy or custom of permitting hazing; on the contrary, the Student Code of Conduct prohibited assault, bullying, harassment, and related behavior, and provided reporting mechanisms.
No complaints about hazing were made under that Code before the viral R.K. incident, and the board had no notice of systemic violence in the football program.

These findings reinforce the idea that § 1983 does not provide a vehicle for suing school boards based simply on their employees’ failure to prevent peer violence where formal policies condemn such conduct and there is no prior notice.

D. Alabama State-Agent Immunity and the Anti-Hazing Statute

1. State-Agent Immunity Framework

Turning to state-law claims, the court applies Alabama’s state-agent immunity doctrine, codified in Ala. Code § 36-1-12 and elaborated in numerous Alabama Supreme Court decisions. State-agent immunity protects public employees when performing discretionary functions in the course of their work.

The framework (drawing on Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450 (Ala. 2006), Ex parte Hayles, 852 So. 2d 117 (Ala. 2002), and Ex parte Brown, 182 So. 3d 495 (Ala. 2015)), is:

The defendant must first show that the claim arises from a function that would entitle the state agent to immunity.
If so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show an applicable exception, namely that the agent:
- Acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or
- Acted beyond his or her authority, or
- Acted under a mistaken interpretation of the law coupled with such culpable intent.

Additionally, Ala. Code § 16-1-24.1(g) provides specific immunity to school employees for actions taken in conformity with rules regarding discipline, control, suspension, and expulsion—except for excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment.

Citing Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541 (Ala. 2003), the court notes that supervising and educating students is a classic area where state-agent immunity applies. It is undisputed that the coaches were performing supervisory and educational functions.

2. Does Violating the Anti-Hazing Statute Defeat Immunity?

Plaintiffs attempted to defeat immunity by invoking Alabama’s anti-hazing statute, Ala. Code § 16-1-23, which:

Defines “hazing” as willful actions or situations created that recklessly or intentionally endanger the mental or physical health of a student, including striking, beating, bruising, or maiming.
Prohibits engaging in, encouraging, aiding, or knowingly permitting hazing, and criminalizes such conduct as a Class C misdemeanor.

Plaintiffs argued that the coaches’ conduct violated § 16-1-23 and thus stripped them of immunity under § 36-1-12(d)(1), which withholds immunity where federal or state law “requires otherwise.”

The Eleventh Circuit rejects this use of the anti-hazing statute:

Section 16-1-23 is a criminal statute, creating a misdemeanor offense; it does not itself create a civil cause of action.
Because it does not expressly impose civil liability, it does not trigger the “requires otherwise” exception in § 36-1-12(d)(1).

Thus, plaintiffs cannot use § 16-1-23 to automatically override state-agent immunity. They must instead rely on § 36-1-12(d)(2): showing that coaches acted willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, or beyond their authority.

3. “Beyond Authority” and the Need for Detailed Rules

To show that a state agent acted “beyond authority,” Alabama law requires proof that the agent failed to discharge duties prescribed by detailed rules or regulations—rules akin to a checklist that remove the agent’s discretion. The court cites:

Ex parte Wilcox County Board of Education, 374 So. 3d 641, 647 (Ala. 2022) (“checklist” standard).
Odom v. Helms, 314 So. 3d 220, 228 (Ala. 2020) (duty must remove judgment/discretion).
T.R. ex rel. Brock v. Lamar County Board of Education, 25 F.4th 877 (11th Cir. 2022) (applying Alabama’s standard in federal court).

The panel holds that § 16-1-23 does not set out such a detailed checklist. While it prohibits hazing and related conduct, it requires:

Judgment about whether a particular incident constitutes “hazing” or is a run-of-the-mill fight or horseplay.
Assessment of intent, recklessness, the purpose of the behavior (e.g., initiation or “affiliation”), and context.

Because:

Not every physical altercation between an upperclassman and a younger student is hazing, and
The statute leaves substantial room for discretion in deciding whether a given act is hazing and what response is appropriate,

it does not remove the coaches’ judgment and therefore cannot be used to say they acted beyond their authority when they supposedly misapplied it.

4. Willfulness, Malice, and Bad Faith

The remaining path for plaintiffs was to show that coaches acted willfully, maliciously, or in bad faith. Alabama decisions define these concepts strictly:

Willfulness: “The conscious doing of some act or omission of some duty under knowledge of existing conditions accompanied with a design or purpose to inflict injury” (Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d at 546).
Malice: “The intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act” (Ex parte Montgomery, 272 So. 3d 155, 168 n.5 (Ala. 2018)).
Bad faith: More than poor judgment or negligence; it implies a dishonest purpose, breach of known duty for self-interested or ill-willed reasons (Hill, 797 F.3d at 981 (quoting Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 924 (Ala. 1981))).

Moreover, as explained in Ex parte Ingram, 229 So. 3d 220, 236 (Ala. 2017) (Murdock, J., concurring), such mental states require “volitional culpability” or scienter; an employee cannot act willfully or maliciously without knowing he is doing something wrongful.

Plaintiffs argued that the coaches:

Misunderstood or ignored the definition of hazing under § 16-1-23.
Deleted videos and failed to fully report or stop hazing.

The court acknowledges that coaches might have misinterpreted the law or exercised poor judgment, but stresses, relying on Hill and Segrest v. Lewis, 907 So. 2d 452 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), that:

“Not every innocent misinterpretation of the law revokes an official’s state-agent immunity … If nothing more were required than an innocent misinterpretation of the law, ‘that exception would swallow the whole of the general rule of immunity itself.’”

Misinterpretation must be coupled with willfulness, malice, or bad faith to strip immunity.

On the record, the court concludes:

There is no evidence that coaches planned or intended to injure students.
When they saw assaults, they tried to stop them and imposed discipline on perpetrators.
This shows, at worst, incompetence or poor judgment, not malicious or bad-faith intent.

Accordingly, no exception to state-agent immunity applies, and the coaches are immune from the state-law claims.

E. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion weaves together a series of federal and state precedents. Their roles can be summarized as follows:

1. Qualified Immunity Structure and Sequencing

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) – Authorizes courts to skip directly to the “clearly established” prong of qualified immunity without deciding whether a constitutional violation occurred. The Eleventh Circuit invokes Pearson to uphold the district court’s method.
Johnson v. Miami Beach, Charles v. Johnson, Hinson v. Bias, Patel v. Lanier County – These cases restate the two-pronged qualified immunity test and the discretionary authority requirement, which plaintiffs conceded here.

2. Fourth Amendment State Action and Seizure

American Manufacturers v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) – Confirms private conduct is not actionable under § 1983 without state action.
Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686 (11th Cir. 2021) – Provides the three-part state-actor framework (state compulsion, public function, nexus/joint action).
Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) – Explains that merely approving or acquiescing in private conduct does not create state action.
Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397 (11th Cir. 1986) – Establishes that an official can be liable either by personal involvement or by policy/custom causing the violation; plaintiffs relied on this to argue a causal connection.
Vaughn v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2003) – Defines a seizure as “governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.”
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) and Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021) – Supply the standards for when physical contact by a government actor constitutes a seizure (intent to restrain plus no freedom to leave).

3. Substantive Due Process and Corporal Punishment

DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) and Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2003) – Reinforce that the Due Process Clause does not create a general duty to protect individuals from private violence.
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992) and Dacosta v. Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir. 2002) – Articulate the “shocks the conscience” test for substantive due process.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) – Warns against turning substantive due process into a general “font of tort law.”
Neal v. Fulton County Board of Education, 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000) and Kirkland v. Greene County Board of Education, 347 F.3d 903 (11th Cir. 2003) – Establish the excessive corporal punishment test. Rodney K. distinguishes these cases because they involved direct, severe physical punishment by school officials themselves.
Hill ex rel. BHJ v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948 (11th Cir. 2015) – Holds that deliberate indifference by school officials to student misconduct is not enough, by itself, to create a substantive due process violation.

4. Clearly Established Law

Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176 (11th Cir. 2023), Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 1999), Loftus v. Clark-Moore, Coffin v. Brandau, Maddox v. Stephens, King v. Pridmore, and Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2017) – Describe the three methods by which a right can be clearly established, emphasizing that “obvious clarity” cases are rare.
Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003) – Clarifies that in this circuit, only decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court of the state can clearly establish rights.
City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9 (2021) – Reiterates that clearly established rules must be defined with high specificity, not broad generalities.

5. Supervisory and Municipal Liability

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) – Denies respondeat superior liability and requires a policy or custom as the basis for municipal liability.
Denno v. School Board of Volusia County, 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000) and Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) – Apply Monell in the school context and emphasize that most plaintiffs must show a custom or practice that is the moving force behind a constitutional violation.

6. Alabama State-Agent Immunity

Ex parte Hayles, 852 So. 2d 117 (Ala. 2002), Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450 (Ala. 2006), Ex parte Brown, 182 So. 3d 495 (Ala. 2015), Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541 (Ala. 2003), Ex parte Wilcox County Board of Education, 374 So. 3d 641 (Ala. 2022), and Odom v. Helms, 314 So. 3d 220 (Ala. 2020) – Together, these cases define the contours of state-agent immunity, including what it means to act beyond authority (failing to follow detailed, checklist-like rules).
Ex parte Montgomery, 272 So. 3d 155 (Ala. 2018), Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916 (Ala. 1981), and Ex parte Ingram, 229 So. 3d 220 (Ala. 2017) – Define willfulness, malice, bad faith, and the need for scienter to pierce immunity.
Segrest v. Lewis, 907 So. 2d 452 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) – Warns that treating every legal misinterpretation as “beyond authority” would swallow immunity.
T.R. ex rel. Brock v. Lamar County Board of Education, 25 F.4th 877 (11th Cir. 2022) and Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010) – Federal cases applying Alabama’s state-agent immunity standards.

F. Complex Concepts Simplified

Several complex legal concepts are central to understanding this decision:

1. Qualified Immunity (Federal)

Protects government employees from personal liability for damages unless:
1. They violated someone’s constitutional rights, and
2. The law was so clear at the time that any reasonable official in their position would have known the conduct was unconstitutional.
Even if a court believes the official’s conduct was wrong or unreasonable, qualified immunity still applies unless both prongs are satisfied.

2. State Action Requirement in § 1983

Section 1983 covers only actions “under color of state law.”
Private misconduct (like violence by one student against another) is not, by itself, a constitutional violation, even if it happens in a public school.
Coaches or school officials can be responsible for private acts only if they directed, coerced, significantly encouraged, or jointly participated in them.

3. Substantive Due Process vs. Ordinary Torts

Substantive due process protects fundamental rights (like bodily integrity) against abusive governmental power, not against every form of negligence or recklessness by state officials.
The “shocks the conscience” standard means only truly outrageous, arbitrary government conduct qualifies.
Negligence, carelessness, or even some intentional torts may violate state law but not reach the constitutional threshold.

4. Municipal Liability Under Monell

Cities, counties, and school boards can be sued under § 1983, but only if a constitutional violation was caused by:
- An official policy, or
- A longstanding, widespread custom or practice that is effectively official policy.
They are not automatically liable for employees’ actions (no vicarious liability).

5. Alabama State-Agent Immunity

Alabama law broadly protects state and local employees (including teachers and coaches) when they exercise judgment in performing their jobs.
To overcome this immunity, plaintiffs must show more than simple negligence:
- Willful or malicious intent to harm,
- Bad-faith conduct (dishonest or with ill will), or
- Violation of specific, detailed rules that leave no room for discretion.
General statutory duties, like “do not allow hazing,” usually leave discretion and do not themselves defeat immunity.

6. Criminal Statutes vs. Civil Liability

A criminal statute (like Alabama’s anti-hazing law) makes certain behavior a crime, but it does not automatically allow private lawsuits for damages unless it expressly creates a civil cause of action.
Thus, even if coaches had violated the anti-hazing statute (a question the court does not definitively resolve), that fact alone would not create civil liability or strip their state-agent immunity.

G. Impact and Future Implications

Although unpublished, this decision is a detailed application of existing Eleventh Circuit and Alabama law to a highly salient and recurring problem: hazing and violence in school athletics.

1. For Future Federal Civil Rights Litigation

High bar for constitutionalizing hazing: The decision strongly signals that even pervasive, known hazing in school athletics is unlikely to support a federal § 1983 claim unless state actors:
- Directly participate in the violence, or
- Explicitly order, coerce, or significantly encourage it.
Deliberate indifference is not enough: Consistent with Hill v. Cundiff, coaches who know about hazing but respond inadequately do not violate substantive due process merely by failing to protect students from other students.
Neal/Kirkland confined to official corporal punishment: The line of cases recognizing substantive due process claims for excessive corporal punishment remains limited to situations where a school official personally and physically inflicts punishment. The doctrine does not extend to peer abuse absent clear, affirmative involvement by officials.
Qualified immunity remains robust: The court’s insistence that there is no clearly established law for peer hazing liability—even in an athletic context—suggests that future plaintiffs will face steep hurdles unless and until the Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit issues more fact-specific precedents to the contrary.

2. For School Boards and Administrators

Importance of written codes and reporting mechanisms: The existence of a Student Code of Conduct that banned assault, bullying, and harassment—and the absence of prior formal reports—played a key role in defeating Monell liability. Boards should:
- Maintain and publicize robust policies on hazing and bullying,
- Ensure reporting channels are clear and accessible, and
- Document responses to reported incidents.
Reality check: immunity is not an endorsement: The legal conclusion that officials are immune does not mean the conduct was appropriate. The investigation led to criminal charges against students and resignations of key officials. School systems still face reputational, ethical, and policy consequences even when courts decline to impose civil damages.

3. For State-Law Reform and Litigation Strategy

Limits of using the anti-hazing statute in civil suits: The court’s holding that Alabama’s anti-hazing law is criminal only, and not a basis to override state-agent immunity, narrows one possible path for civil plaintiffs. If the Alabama Legislature intends to create civil remedies against public employees for hazing-related failures, it would likely need to do so explicitly.
Focus on direct perpetrators and non-immune actors: Because both federal qualified immunity and Alabama state-agent immunity strongly protect educators for discretionary supervision, plaintiffs may increasingly focus on:
- Direct suits against student perpetrators,
- Claims against non-governmental entities, and
- Employment, administrative, or licensing consequences rather than damages suits.

IV. Conclusion

Rodney K., Sr. v. Mobile County Board of Education is a stark illustration of the gap between morally troubling facts and the stringent requirements of constitutional and state-agent liability. The Eleventh Circuit accepts that a longstanding hazing culture existed and that school officials failed to fully prevent it. Yet it concludes:

The assaults were primarily acts of private violence by students, not state actors.
The coaches neither seized the students nor used excessive corporal punishment themselves, and at most were deliberately indifferent to peer misconduct.
Such deliberate indifference, without more, does not violate substantive due process in the school context.
No clearly established law warned reasonable coaches that their conduct, as proved, was unconstitutional.
Without an underlying constitutional violation, supervisory and municipal liability theories collapsed.
Under Alabama law, state-agent immunity shielded the coaches from state claims, because plaintiffs could not show willfulness, malice, bad faith, or violation of specific, non-discretionary rules, and because the anti-hazing statute is criminal only and does not override immunity.

As a result, the court affirmed summary judgment for all defendants. The decision does not condone hazing; instead, it underscores that remedies for such conduct will often lie outside federal constitutional litigation—through criminal law, state tort law (where immunity allows), administrative discipline, and institutional reforms—rather than through § 1983 suits against school officials.