Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Limits on Dismissing “Shotgun Pleadings” with Prejudice: Re-Emphasising the Futility Standard for Pro Se Litigants

Introduction

In Marc Dulcio v. Arcadis U.S. Inc., Nos. 23-13045 & 23-13474 (11th Cir. July 28 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined whether a district court may dismiss particular claims with prejudice when the operative complaint is first characterised as a “shotgun pleading.” Although the court agreed that the 229-paragraph pro se pleading was defective under Federal Rule 8, it vacated in part because the district court failed to apply the Eleventh Circuit’s long-standing rule that a pro se litigant must be given at least one meaningful chance to amend unless amendment would be futile. The decision tightens the analytical framework governing dismissals with prejudice, particularly where declaratory-judgment claims hinge on potential future enforcement actions.

Key Parties

Plaintiff-Appellant: Marc M. Dulcio, owner of the former New LifeStyle Cleaners (LSC).
Defendants-Appellees: Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP), individual FDEP employees, Arcadis U.S. Inc., GPI Properties Inc., Earth Tech Drilling Inc., and others.

Core Issues on Appeal

Was the first amended complaint properly dismissed as a “shotgun pleading”?
Did the district court abuse its discretion by dismissing certain counts with prejudice without permitting an adequate opportunity to amend?
What constitutes “futility” in the context of pro se amendments, particularly for declaratory-relief claims?

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit reached a split disposition:

Affirmed the dismissal of the entire first amended complaint as a shotgun pleading.
Affirmed dismissal with prejudice of Counts III, V, XI, XII, and XIII, finding amendment futile or voluntarily abandoned.
Vacated and Remanded as to Counts I and II (declaratory-judgment claims), holding that the district court prematurely found futility; a more precise pleading could plausibly establish standing by demonstrating an “actual, imminent” threat of future enforcement by FDEP.

The panel applied a long line of circuit precedent—particularly Woldeab v. DeKalb County Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2018)—that disfavour dismissal with prejudice at the shotgun-pleading stage unless it is “scarcely possible” a better-pleaded complaint could state a claim.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015) – provided the taxonomy of shotgun pleadings (four archetypes) and the remedial requirement to give notice before outright dismissal.
Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) – reiterated abuse-of-discretion review for shotgun dismissal and emphasised the wastefulness of such pleadings.
Woldeab v. DeKalb County Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289 – cornerstone rule granting pro se litigants at least one chance to amend unless amendment is plainly futile.
O’Halloran v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 350 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2003) & Silva v. Bieluch, 351 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir. 2003) – created the “err on the side of generosity” standard where the futility question is close.
Malowney v. Federal Collection Deposit Group, 193 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999) – set out the constitutional-standing requirements for declaratory relief (real, immediate controversy, not speculative).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) – basic plausibility requirement under Rule 8, invoked to contrast shotgun formulations.

These precedents collectively guided the panel’s two-step approach: (1) confirm the pleading is defective, then (2) evaluate whether futility truly forecloses cure.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Shotgun Pleading Diagnosis: The panel echoed Weiland, underscoring two classic defects present here—wholesale incorporation of 50 paragraphs into every count and undifferentiated allegations against multiple defendants—making it “nigh-impossible” to discern which facts supported which legal theories.
Futility vs. Opportunity to Amend: Applying Woldeab, the panel scrutinised each count individually:
- Counts III & V: facially barred as a matter of law (wrong statute; no constitutional right to record a private inspection) → dismissal with prejudice affirmed.
- Counts XI & XII: plaintiff omitted them from his proposed amendment, signalling abandonment → dismissal affirmed.
- Count XIII: sovereign-immunity bar against FDEP/EPA → futility established.
- Counts I & II: Declaratory-judgment counts were not hopeless. The panel noted that ongoing FDEP civil/criminal investigations and a search warrant could, if fleshed out, satisfy the “real and immediate” threat test under Malowney. Therefore, concluding futility was error; leave to amend should have been granted.
Pro Se Generosity Principle: Even where plausibility is tenuous, the Eleventh Circuit instructs courts to “err on the side of generosity.” The district court did not follow this directive when it permanently foreclosed Counts I-II without allowing a second shot.

3. Potential Impact on Future Litigation

The decision generates a practical, if not doctrinal, precedent: district courts within the Eleventh Circuit must conduct a claim-by-claim futility analysis before dismissing any part of a shotgun pleading with prejudice—especially for pro se litigants. Key ramifications include:

Heightened Judicial Discipline: Judges must articulate specific reasons why each challenged count is incurable. A blanket “shotgun” label no longer suffices for outright prejudice.
Declaratory-Judgment Pleadings: Litigants facing environmental or administrative enforcement actions may find it easier to survive dismissal where future penalties or investigations are still active.
Environmental-regulation suits: Entities accused of contamination will likely cite this case to argue for declaratory relief at early stages, leveraging the requirement that agencies articulate clear future intent if they wish to defeat standing.
Litigation Efficiency vs. Access: While the case reinforces Rule 8 discipline, it balances efficiency with the constitutional demand that claims be heard unless patently futile.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Shotgun Pleading: A pleading style that chats or “sprays” countless facts and defendants across counts without telling the court or defendants which fact supports which legal claim. It violates Rule 8’s “short and plain statement” requirement.
Dismissal with Prejudice: Permanent dismissal; the claim cannot be filed again. Courts grant it only when amendment would be useless (“futile”).
Futility: In this context, a proposed amendment is futile if, even when written perfectly, the claim would still fail as a matter of law (e.g., barred by immunity, outside statute, or missing a constitutional element).
Declaratory Judgment: A court order that clarifies the legal rights or obligations of parties before full damages accrue. Must address an actual, imminent controversy, not an abstract dispute.
Standing: Constitutional prerequisite to sue. For declaratory relief, plaintiff must show a real and immediate threat of injury—not hypothetical—to obtain the court’s declaration.
Pro Se Litigant: A litigant who represents himself without a lawyer. Courts grant pro se litigants certain procedural leeway but not substantive advantage.

Conclusion

Dulcio v. Arcadis does not radically rewrite Eleventh Circuit doctrine, but it sharpens an essential procedural safeguard: a shotgun pleading may be dismissed, yet individual claims should not be buried with prejudice unless true futility is unambiguously shown. By vacating dismissal of the declaratory-judgment counts, the court re-affirms that pro se litigants deserve a genuine chance to cure defects, aligning judicial economy with constitutional fairness. Going forward, district courts must perform a meticulous, count-specific futility analysis and articulate a clear rationale before precluding amendment, thereby promoting both clarity in pleadings and access to justice.