Introduction

In Bryan Dubose v. Commissioner of Social Security, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (per curiam, non-argument calendar) affirmed the denial of Title II disability insurance benefits to a former machine repairer alleging multiple mental and physical impairments, including bipolar disorder, depression, ADHD, diabetes, hypertension, and low vision.

The appeal presented three principal issues:

• Whether the administrative law judge (ALJ) complied with an Appeals Council remand directive to reassess residual functional capacity (RFC) in light of the claimant’s mental limitations;
• Whether the ALJ properly evaluated the treating psychiatrist’s opinions under the post–March 27, 2017 regulations, specifically articulating “supportability” and “consistency,” and whether the contrary RFC finding was supported by substantial evidence; and
• Whether the Appeals Council erred in denying review after submission of new evidence by failing to apply the proper legal standard.

Although unpublished and therefore not precedential, the decision is a detailed application of current Social Security rules in the Eleventh Circuit. It reinforces three practice-critical points: (1) an ALJ’s RFC narrative complies with an Appeals Council remand order when it meaningfully links paragraph B findings to RFC limitations and vocational expert (VE) hypotheticals; (2) under the 2017 medical-opinion regulations, ALJs can satisfy the articulation duty on “supportability” and “consistency” without using “magic words,” provided the reasoning is clear and evidence-based; and (3) the Appeals Council’s new-evidence gatekeeping focuses on materiality (reasonable likelihood of changing the outcome), and it need not provide a detailed supportability/consistency analysis at the review stage.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. The panel held:

• RFC and Remand Compliance: The ALJ complied with the Appeals Council’s remand order by explicitly addressing all four paragraph B functional areas and integrating those limitations into the RFC and VE hypothetical—e.g., restricting to simple tasks, occasional social interaction, and no production-rate pace.
• Medical-Opinion Evaluation: The ALJ adequately articulated and applied the 2017 regulations’ “supportability” and “consistency” factors in finding treating psychiatrist Dr. Ali Ahmadi’s disabling opinions unpersuasive. The ALJ reasonably relied on internal and external inconsistencies (including daily activities and other providers’ notes) and discounted Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores. The RFC finding that Dubose could perform a range of medium, unskilled work was supported by substantial evidence.
• Appeals Council Review of New Evidence: Whether the Appeals Council declined to consider the new submissions because they were immaterial or considered them and denied review, there was no error. The new records were cumulative and did not create a reasonable possibility/probability of changing the outcome. The Appeals Council was not required to articulate a supportability/consistency analysis when denying review.

Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

• 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; SSR 96-8p: The court recited the five-step sequential evaluation and the definition of RFC as the most the claimant can do on a regular and continuing basis. The ruling emphasizes that RFC must synthesize all relevant medical and nonmedical evidence and reflect functional limitations arising from medically determinable impairments.
• Schink v. Commissioner of Social Security, 935 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2019): Reiterated the deferential “substantial evidence” standard—courts do not reweigh evidence or substitute judgment for the Commissioner.
• Raper v. Commissioner of Social Security, 89 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2024): ALJs need not use “magic words” to satisfy the 2017 medical-opinion articulation requirements; clarity and sufficiently stated grounds suffice. The panel relies on this to uphold the ALJ’s articulation even without formulaic recitations.
• Washington v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, 806 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2015): Sets de novo review of Appeals Council materiality determinations and describes “material” evidence as that creating a reasonable possibility of changing the outcome. The opinion acknowledges this standard and harmonizes it with the Appeals Council’s “reasonable probability” phrasing by concluding the new submissions were immaterial in any event.
• Ingram v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 496 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2007): Confirms claimants may submit new evidence at any stage, including Appeals Council review. The panel uses Ingram to frame the Appeals Council’s role while emphasizing that the Council need not provide a detailed rationale when it denies review after accepting additional evidence.
• 2017 Medical-Opinion Regulations: 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c requires ALJs to evaluate “supportability” and “consistency” and articulate how those factors were considered. The court underscores these as the most important factors post–March 27, 2017.
• Appeals Council Evidence Regulation: 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 addresses when the Appeals Council will review a case and, after 2017 amendments, references a “reasonable probability” that the additional evidence would change the outcome. The panel notes the Council’s “reasonable probability” language yet concludes the result is the same under either formulation.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) RFC on Remand: Linking Paragraph B Findings to Functional Restrictions

The Appeals Council initially remanded because an earlier RFC did not square with findings of moderate mental limitations (particularly in concentration/persistence/pace and adaptation/management). On remand, the ALJ:

• Reassessed the paragraph B areas, ultimately finding mild limitations in understanding/remembering/applying information and adaptation/management, and moderate limitations in social interaction and concentration/persistence/pace;
• Built a functional RFC that restricted Dubose to:
  • Medium exertional work with postural and hazard limitations;
  • Simple tasks;
  • Occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the public;
  • No production-rate/assembly-line pace;
  • Ability to adapt to changes in a simple routine.
• Explained these restrictions with reference to record evidence:
  • Consultative psychologist Larmia Robbins-Brison observed good concentration and intact memory; cooperative presentation.
  • Consultative examiner Dr. Deepti Bhasin noted normal ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and make simple decisions, despite reported anger issues.
  • Claimant’s daily activities (driving children to school/activities, personal care, meal preparation, finances, socializing, online gaming) suggested functional capacities inconsistent with disabling limitations, especially in adaptation/management.
• Posed VE hypotheticals that expressly incorporated mental limitations—simple work, occasional social contact, and no production-rate pace—and elicited jobs such as laundry worker, kitchen helper/dishwasher, warehouse worker (later also marker and cleaner).

The panel concluded this analysis “considered” Dubose’s limitations within the RFC and complied with the Appeals Council’s directive. Even assuming a failure to comply would be reversible, the record demonstrated compliance. Moreover, under substantial-evidence review, the court would not reweigh contrary evidence even if the claimant would have balanced the functional findings differently.

2) Medical Opinions Under the 2017 Regulations: “Supportability” and “Consistency” Without Ritual Phrases

The claimant argued the ALJ failed to properly weigh treating psychiatrist Dr. Ahmadi’s opinions (a 2020 questionnaire, June 2022 interrogatory responses, and July 2022 statement) that Dubose could not sustain full-time work. The court rejected this argument, holding that the ALJ:

• Addressed consistency: Found Dr. Ahmadi’s disabling assessments inconsistent with the broader record—especially the claimant’s reported activities (child transport, personal care, finances, shopping, internet use, social interactions, online gaming) and discrepancies with notes from primary-care visits. The court accepted daily activities as probative of inconsistency with extreme functional limitations.
• Addressed supportability: Discounted Dr. Ahmadi’s reliance on GAF scores, explaining SSA “does not follow” GAF as primary evidence because it conflicts with the disability evaluation process and has been deemphasized in clinical practice. This indicated the opinions were not well supported by objective evidence or reasoned explanations.
• Articulation standard satisfied: Citing Raper, the panel noted ALJs need not intone specific “magic words.” It was enough that the decision contained a clear rationale comparing the physician’s views to other evidence and analyzing the bases underpinning those views.

Having found the articulation adequate, the panel further held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s ultimate RFC, given the competing medical opinions, consultative findings, and nonmedical evidence.

3) Appeals Council New Evidence: Materiality, Not Supportability/Consistency Articulation

The claimant submitted additional treatment records from the Georgia Center for Bipolar Disorder and a statement from Dr. Ahmadi disagreeing with the ALJ’s decision. The Appeals Council denied review, stating the evidence did not show a “reasonable probability” of changing the outcome.

The Eleventh Circuit held there was no error whether the Appeals Council:

• Refused to consider the evidence as immaterial (reviewed de novo): the materials were cumulative of existing evidence (ongoing depressive symptoms, decreased energy/pleasure) and merely reiterated the treating source’s prior views. Cumulative evidence lacks materiality because it does not create a reasonable possibility/probability of changing the result.
• Considered and denied review: The Appeals Council need not supply a detailed rationale when denying review after accepting evidence; a brief explanation suffices.

The court also rejected the argument that the Appeals Council had to conduct a “supportability/consistency” analysis of the new evidence. That articulation requirement applies to ALJs when weighing medical opinions. At the Appeals Council stage, the legal threshold is whether the proffered evidence is new, material, and chronologically relevant—not whether it is persuasive under § 404.1520c.

C. Impact and Practical Implications

• RFC Drafting on Remand: ALJs in the Eleventh Circuit should explicitly bridge paragraph B findings to RFC terms. Specific limitations—such as simple tasks, occasional social interaction, and explicit “no production-rate pace” restrictions—can validly operationalize moderate concentration/persistence/pace deficits and social-functioning limits.
• Medical-Opinion Articulation: Post-2017, ALJs can fulfill the duty to address “supportability” and “consistency” without formulaic language, so long as the decision clearly compares the opinion to the record and examines the opinion’s objective basis. This decision reinforces Raper’s “no magic words” principle.
• Weight of Daily Activities: Claimants and counsel should anticipate that routine activities (child care/transport, finances, online activity, socializing) may be used to find inconsistency with disabling opinions, particularly as to adaptation/management and sustained concentration. Rebuttal evidence should detail the frequency, duration, assistance, and aftereffects of such activities.
• GAF Scores: This case confirms that ALJs may discount reliance on GAF given its diminished clinical role and poor fit with SSA’s functional framework. Claimants should not rely on GAF as primary proof of functional limitation.
• Appeals Council Submissions: New evidence must be genuinely additive and outcome-relevant—merely cumulative treatment notes or provider disagreements typically will not meet the materiality threshold. Submissions should concretely show deterioration, new diagnoses, or objective findings tied to vocationally meaningful limitations in the adjudicated period.
• “Reasonable Possibility” vs. “Reasonable Probability”: While Washington used “reasonable possibility,” the Appeals Council now speaks in terms of “reasonable probability” post-2017 amendments. The panel avoided resolving any tension by finding immateriality under either phrasing. Practically, claimants should assume a demanding materiality showing.
• Non-Precedential Yet Persuasive: Although unpublished, this decision provides a roadmap for ALJ RFC narratives, opinion evaluation under § 404.1520c, and Appeals Council materiality analysis consistent with Eleventh Circuit doctrine.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): A detailed description of what the claimant can still do at work on a regular, sustained basis despite impairments (e.g., how long they can stand, the complexity of tasks they can handle, how much social interaction they can tolerate).
• Paragraph B Criteria: Four mental domains used at step three to gauge severity: (1) understanding/remembering/applying information; (2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself. “Moderate” or “mild” ratings help inform, but do not dictate, the RFC.
• Supportability (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)): How well a medical opinion is backed by objective medical evidence (tests, clinical findings) and the provider’s explanations.
• Consistency (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)): How well a medical opinion aligns with the totality of other medical and nonmedical evidence in the record.
• Substantial Evidence: A deferential standard—enough relevant evidence that a reasonable person could agree with the agency’s conclusion. Courts do not reweigh or decide facts anew.
• Materiality of New Evidence: On Appeals Council review, evidence is “material” only if there is at least a reasonable likelihood it would change the outcome. Cumulative or repetitive evidence usually fails this standard.
• GAF (Global Assessment of Functioning): A now-deemphasized numerical scale once used to rate overall psychological functioning. SSA does not treat GAF as primary evidence for disability determinations, and DSM-5 discontinued it.
• Production-Rate Pace: Fast, quota-driven work typical of assembly lines. Barring “production-rate pace” can accommodate limitations in sustaining concentration and pace.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Dubose affirms the Commissioner by methodically applying the 2017 framework for medical-opinion evaluation and longstanding principles of RFC assessment and Appeals Council review. The court emphasizes that:

• Compliance with an Appeals Council remand directive is measured by whether the ALJ meaningfully integrates paragraph B findings into the RFC and VE hypotheticals with record-based explanations;
• ALJs satisfy the 2017 articulation duties on “supportability” and “consistency” without ritualistic language if the reasons are clear and grounded in the record; and
• The Appeals Council’s role is gatekeeping for materiality; it does not have to deliver a detailed supportability/consistency analysis when denying review, and cumulative evidence will not meet the materiality threshold.

For practitioners, the case is a practical guide: ensure the RFC narrative contains explicit, evidence-linked functional limitations addressing each relevant mental domain; develop noncumulative, outcome-directed new evidence for Appeals Council submissions; and anticipate that daily activities and the diminished weight of GAF may be decisive in discounting disabling opinions. While unpublished, Dubose offers persuasive clarity on how Eleventh Circuit panels are applying the post-2017 regulatory regime in disability adjudications.