Eleventh Circuit Clarifies 30-Day Acceleration Notice Requirement Under Mortgage Note Paragraph 6(C)

Introduction

In Nathan Sluss v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 23-13949 (11th Cir. May 28, 2025), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a mortgage servicer’s series of correspondence gave the borrower the requisite thirty-day notice to cure a default under the terms of the promissory note. Pro se plaintiff Nathan Sluss challenged Bank of America’s foreclosure process as a breach of contract, arguing that his lender failed to provide the full thirty-day notice mandated by Paragraph 6(C) of the note before accelerating the debt and proceeding toward sale of the property in Atlanta, Georgia. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the servicer complied with the note’s acceleration notice provision and that Sluss had not pled a plausible breach claim.

Summary of the Judgment

The borrower entered into a 2006 mortgage note containing Paragraph 6(C), which requires thirty days’ written notice of acceleration of the full unpaid principal and accrued interest following a default.
In March 2022, Bank of America sent Sluss a “reinstatement quote” good through March 17, 2022, but did not state that it was accelerating the debt on that date.
In July 2022—over four months later—counsel for the bank provided formal acceleration notice, expressly stating that the loan could be reinstated if cured within thirty days and scheduling a foreclosure sale more than thirty days out.
Sluss sued, alleging breach of the thirty-day cure requirement; the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The panel relied on a line of Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit decisions governing pleading standards and contract-interpretation principles:

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): A complaint must state “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are insufficient.
EEOC v. STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2019): De novo review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014): Pro se pleadings are construed liberally but may not be rewritten by courts.
McAlister v. Clifton, 313 Ga. 737 (2022): Georgia law requires (1) breach, (2) damages, and (3) contract-holder status for a breach of contract claim.
Jackson v. City of Atlanta, 97 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2024): Courts may consider documents attached to or referenced in the complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s rationale can be broken into three core points:

Scope of Paragraph 6(C): The provision governs acceleration of the amount due upon default, not the timing of a foreclosure sale. It requires thirty days’ notice before acceleration of principal and accrued interest, but does not itself delay a subsequent foreclosure beyond standard statutory or regulatory timeframes.
Timeline of Notices: Although Sluss received a March 9 letter with a reinstatement payoff quote expiring March 17, that communication did not purport to accelerate his loan on March 17—rather, it invited him to request an updated quote. The formal acceleration notice arrived July 26, 2022, giving more than thirty days to cure before the scheduled sale.
Pleading Deficiencies: Even assuming arguendo that the March letter triggered acceleration, Sluss failed to allege facts showing that the servicer accelerated on an earlier date than disclosed or that he suffered actual damages as a result of any procedural defect. The exhibits attached to his complaint contradicted his theory of breach and demonstrated compliance with Paragraph 6(C).

Impact

This decision clarifies two important principles for mortgage servicers and borrowers in the Eleventh Circuit:

Servicers may provide a loan reinstatement quote without triggering the note’s acceleration clause, so long as they do not expressly announce acceleration or set an imminent deadline tied to acceleration.
Borrowers asserting a breach of the acceleration notice provision must point to a specific communication showing the servicer accelerated the debt without affording thirty days to cure. General foreclosure notices or reinstatement quotes will not, by themselves, support a breach claim.

For future litigation, counsel should carefully track the content and timing of default, acceleration, and foreclosure communications to confirm compliance with contractual and statutory requirements.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Default: The borrower’s failure to make mortgage payments when due.
Acceleration: The lender’s contractual right to declare the entire unpaid principal and interest immediately due upon a default.
Reinstatement: The borrower’s option to cure a default by paying all past-due sums (and sometimes costs) within a specified period, thereby stopping acceleration and foreclosure.
Foreclosure Sale: The public auction of mortgaged property after acceleration if the borrower does not cure the default.
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion: A challenge to a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Pro Se Pleading: A legal filing prepared by a party who is not represented by counsel; courts interpret these documents liberally but will not rewrite them.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Sluss reaffirms the strict textual approach to mortgage-note provisions governing acceleration and cure periods. By distinguishing between a mere payoff quote and a formal acceleration notice, the court provided clear guidance on the thirty-day requirement of Paragraph 6(C). Borrowers must identify an unambiguous acceleration communication issued less than thirty days before acceleration, and servicers can rely on carefully drafted letters to preserve their rights without inadvertently triggering a shorter cure window. This precedent will shape the drafting of servicing notices and the evaluation of foreclosure-related claims in Georgia and beyond.