Eleventh Circuit Affirms that Voluntary Dismissal Forecloses Rule 60(b)(6) Relief in TRIA/ATA Asset-Turnover Cases

Introduction

In Antonio Caballero v. Leonardo González Dellan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit confronted an effort by a sanctioned Venezuelan banker to unwind a prior determination that he was an “agent or instrumentality” of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”). After settling with the terrorism victim–plaintiff and voluntarily dismissing his first appeal, González sought to reopen the judgments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) when two similarly situated defendants later prevailed in the district court. The Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s refusal to reopen, holding that (1) the defendant’s voluntary dismissal and irrevocable settlement barred him from invoking Rule 60(b)(6), and (2) he failed to demonstrate the “extreme and unexpected hardship” required for relief.

The decision reinforces the finality of ex-parte “agency or instrumentality” determinations under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”) and clarifies the stringent standards that apply when a party tries to revisit settled terrorist-asset turnover orders.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Newsom, Luck, and Anderson, JJ.) applied the abuse-of-discretion standard and per curiam affirmed.
Rule 60(b)(6) relief requires proof that, absent reopening, an “extreme and unexpected hardship” will occur; González failed to make that showing.
By voluntarily dismissing his earlier appeal and giving irrevocable consent to the turnover of his assets, González made a “free, calculated, deliberate choice” that foreclosed a later Rule 60(b)(6) request (Cavaliere principle).
The later success of co-defendants (Gorrín and Perdomo) did not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” because González had abandoned his appellate rights and never raised a hardship argument in the district court.
The judgment of the Southern District of Florida denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief was therefore affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“Stansell II”, 771 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2014); “Stansell V”, 45 F.4th 1340 (11th Cir. 2022))
These cases lay out the TRIA framework allowing terrorism victims to attach “blocked assets” of any FARC “agency or instrumentality” through ex-parte motions. The panel relied on Stansell to describe the statutory mechanism Caballero used against González.
Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677 (11th Cir. 1984)
Establishes that a Rule 60(b)(6) movant bears the burden of proving “extreme and unexpected hardship.” The panel held González did not carry this burden.
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 741 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2014)
Aldana limits Rule 60(b)(6) when a party’s strategic or voluntary litigation decisions caused the challenged judgment. The court analogized González’s situation to the Aldana plaintiffs who forewent appellate remedies.
Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111 (11th Cir. 1993)
Articulates that Rule 60(b) cannot serve as a substitute for an untaken appeal. González’s voluntary dismissal placed him squarely within this prohibition.
Other Authorities: Mills v. Commissioner, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 102 F.4th 1235 (11th Cir. 2024) (abuse-of-discretion standard); Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004) (issue forfeiture); U.S. v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (concession rule).

2. Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit broke its analysis into two dispositive prongs:

Lack of Hardship Showing
Rule 60(b)(6) functions as a “catch-all” only where a movant faces an “extreme and unexpected hardship.” The district court expressly found, and González did not contest on appeal, that he failed to allege any present or future hardship stemming from the agent-or-instrumentality label or asset forfeiture. Under the concession doctrine (Campbell), this omission alone doomed the motion.
Voluntary Relinquishment of Appellate Rights
The panel underscored that González: (a) mediated a settlement; (b) filed an irrevocable notice agreeing not to oppose turnover; and (c) voluntarily dismissed his appeal with prejudice. These deliberate acts rendered the judgment “final” and put him beyond the reach of Rule 60(b)(6). Invoking Aldana and Cavaliere, the court labeled his attempt “an effort to avoid the consequences of his own strategic choice.”
The later, contrasting outcome for Gorrín and Perdomo was therefore irrelevant because Rule 60(b)(6) is not a mechanism to secure a “second bite” after an intentional surrender of appellate review.

3. Potential Impact of the Decision

Finality in TRIA Enforcement: Terrorism victims and garnishees can rely on the stability of ex-parte agency-or-instrumentality determinations once appeals are waived or dismissed. This will accelerate asset-turnover proceedings and reduce collateral litigation.
Strategic Settlements: Defendants considering settlement in TRIA/ATA contexts must appreciate that voluntary dismissal forecloses later collateral attacks, even if co-defendants subsequently prevail on identical merits.
Uniform Rule 60(b)(6) Standard: The ruling aligns terrorism-finance cases with mainstream civil jurisprudence on Rule 60(b)(6), refusing to relax standards merely because reputational harms attach to terrorism findings.
Guidance to District Courts: Highlights the importance of making explicit hardship findings, thus insulating denials of post-judgment relief on appeal.
Financial Institutions: Banks holding blocked assets gain certainty that properly executed turnover orders will not be undone absent extraordinary circumstances.

Complex Concepts Simplified

TRIA §201(a): Allows victims of terrorism with a court judgment to seize “blocked” assets (those frozen by U.S. sanctions) belonging to a terrorist party or its “agencies or instrumentalities.”
Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA): 18 U.S.C. § 2333 permits U.S. nationals harmed by acts of international terrorism to sue and collect treble damages from the responsible terrorist entities.
Agent or Instrumentality: A person or entity that assists, supports, or acts on behalf of a designated terrorist group. TRIA makes their assets reachable even if the assets are not held by the terrorist group itself.
Ex-Parte Application: A request made to the court without notifying the opposing party, permissible under TRIA for initial agency determinations to prevent asset flight.
Rule 60(b)(6): A “catch-all” provision allowing a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief,” but only when extraordinary circumstances and extreme hardship exist.
Voluntary Dismissal of Appeal: Under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b), a party can dismiss its appeal. Once done with prejudice or accompanied by settlement terms, it typically forecloses further appellate or collateral review.

Conclusion

Caballero v. González Dellan crystallizes the Eleventh Circuit’s commitment to the principles of finality and party autonomy in post-judgment litigation. The court affirmed that:

Rule 60(b)(6) relief remains an exceptional remedy, requiring a clear demonstration of extraordinary hardship.
A litigant who voluntarily dismisses an appeal and consents to judgment cannot later invoke Rule 60(b)(6) solely because other defendants achieved better outcomes.
TRIA’s robust enforcement mechanism for terrorism judgments will not be diluted by hindsight or shifting legal theories.

Practitioners should treat this decision as a stern reminder: strategic settlements and voluntary dismissals are binding; regret, without extraordinary hardship, is not a ticket back into court. The ruling thereby fortifies the legal architecture enabling terrorism victims to obtain meaningful recovery from those who facilitate terrorist groups.