Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Delatte v. Lemotte, 633 So. 2d 686 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993): Establishes that Louisiana courts require strict adherence to statutory requirements when a premium finance company cancels a policy using a power of attorney.
  Role here: The Fifth Circuit embraced strict adherence as the governing framework but emphasized that “strict adherence” means following what the statute actually prescribes—not judicially adding requirements such as a signature that the statute does not mention.
• Eaglin v. Champion Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1990): Any defect in compliance renders a cancellation ineffective.
  Role here: Reinforces that cancellation is unforgiving of statutory deviations. The court applied this rigor while finding no deviation in the absence of a traditional signature or physical receipt by an individual.
• Britten v. Reavis, 503 So. 2d 1149 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1987): Strict compliance serves to fix the exact time/date of cancellation and ensure a minimum cure period.
  Role here: Supports the significance of precision and cure opportunities, which the automated process preserves by tying cancellation to clear, demonstrable electronic receipt after the ten-day period.
• KMJ Servs., Inc. v. Hood, 115 So. 3d 34 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2013): Paraphrases the statute as requiring a “statement certifying compliance.”
  Role here: Shows Louisiana courts describe “certifying” without implying a signature requirement; the Fifth Circuit reads this consistently.
• Hodges v. Colonial Lloyd’s Ins., 546 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1989): Acknowledges cancellation upon receipt of the notice and statement from the finance company.
  Role here: Anchors the centrality of “receipt,” which the panel defined using Black’s Law Dictionary and applied to electronic receipt.
• Lewis v. Julien, 309 So. 3d 842 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2020): A recent case discussing cancellation mechanics under § 9:3550, but not on the signature question.
  Role here: Illustrates the absence of Louisiana caselaw imposing a signature requirement.
• Benitez v. Elsayed, 285 So. 3d 572 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2019): Noted that a notice lacked a signature and did not purport to certify its statements, among other deficiencies.
  Role here: Plaintiffs relied on Benitez to argue a signature is necessary. The Fifth Circuit distinguished it: the problem there included the lack of certification, not merely lack of a signature; here, the notice explicitly “certifie[d]” the statutory items.
• Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 106 F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997): Sets the Fifth Circuit’s cautious standard for certifying questions to a state supreme court.
  Role here: Applied to deny certification; absence of a state high court definition alone is not a compelling reason to certify.
• Huntley v. Bayer MaterialScience, L.L.C., 452 F. App’x 453 (5th Cir. 2011): Discussed in the district court to analogize a “private carrier,” but the panel declined to rely on that rationale.
  Role here: Signals that the Fifth Circuit did not endorse the district court’s “private carrier” interpretation because electronic receipt already resolved the case.

Legal Reasoning

1) “Certifying” does not require a signature

La. R.S. § 9:3550(G)(3)(a) requires that a premium finance company request cancellation by sending the insurer a copy of the notice of cancellation “together with a statement certifying” four enumerated facts: the presence of a valid power of attorney; uncured default; that a notice of cancellation was sent to the insured specifying the date; and that copies were sent to interested third parties (e.g., lienholders, governmental agencies). The statute is silent on signatures.

Plaintiffs contended that “certifying” implied a signature and faulted the process because a signature stamp was affixed only after the policy had been automatically cancelled. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument:

• The text contains no explicit signature requirement.
• Louisiana cases have not treated a signature as a necessary element of certification under § 9:3550(G)(3).
• Benitez does not impose a signature requirement; it faulted the absence of any certification, not just the absence of a signature.
• The statute contemplates the “insurance premium finance company” itself as the certifying actor; the court found no basis to require identification or signature of a particular individual employee.

Importantly, the panel framed the controlling principle of statutory interpretation in this context: strict adherence does not empower courts to add steps the legislature did not prescribe. Because the APAC notices expressly “certifie[d]” each statutory element, the lack of a pre-cancellation signature was not a defect.

2) “Receipt” is satisfied by automated electronic receipt

Section 9:3550(G)(3)(b)(i) provides that “[u]pon receipt of such notice of cancellation and statement from the premium finance company, the insurer shall consider that cancellation … has been requested … and the insurer may proceed to cancel such contract.” The statute does not define “receipt.”

The Fifth Circuit adopted Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of “receipt” and “receive” as taking possession, delivery, or custody. Applying those definitions to a “modern statute set in current times,” the court held that GoAuto’s computer system’s automatic capture and processing of APAC’s emailed cancellation request satisfies “receipt.” No human must first handle or stamp the documents before cancellation may occur.

The record showed:

• APAC’s system sends an email to a GoAuto web service with the cancellation request and the notice.
• GoAuto’s web service, acting as a “listener,” receives the message and executes the cancellation automatically.
• Only later that morning does an APAC employee apply a signature stamp to printed copies, and a GoAuto employee stamps them “received.”

By the time of the human stamps, cancellation had already occurred based on electronic receipt. The court confirmed that such automated receipt is legally sufficient under § 9:3550(G)(3)(b)(i).

3) Strict adherence without judicial add-ons

Throughout, the court reaffirmed Louisiana’s insistence on strict compliance but emphasized that the judiciary cannot add to the legislature’s list of requirements. The critical compliance items are the ones the statute actually enumerates, not additional formalities such as signatures or physical hand-receipts unless the statute says so.

4) Certification to the Louisiana Supreme Court declined

Applying Jefferson, the court declined to certify the questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The mere absence of a controlling state high court decision on “receipt” or on whether certification requires a signature does not, by itself, justify certification. The panel was comfortable predicting Louisiana law based on text, purpose, and existing intermediate appellate decisions.

5) District court’s “private carrier” alternative not reached

The district court had alternatively reasoned that an APAC employee delivering documents could qualify as a “private carrier,” thereby satisfying one of the statute’s permitted transmission methods (“mail,” “private carrier,” or “electronic mail”). The Fifth Circuit described that analysis as “imaginative and unconventional,” and did not adopt or reject it because electronic receipt already provided a sufficient basis to affirm.

Impact and Practical Consequences

Immediate doctrinal clarifications

• Unsigned certifications: Finance companies operating in Louisiana need not obtain a pre-cancellation handwritten or electronic signature on the certification so long as the company’s notice expressly certifies each of the statutory items.
• Electronic receipt: Insurers may treat electronically received cancellation requests as “receipt” for purposes of § 9:3550(G)(3)(b)(i), and may cancel upon automated receipt without waiting for physical handling or marking as “received.”
• Strict compliance remains: The absence of a signature does not relax other statutory elements—finance companies must still strictly comply with the content of the certification and the insured/interested-party notice requirements.

Effects on stakeholders

• Insurers and premium finance companies:
  • Can confidently rely on automated workflows (web services, email gateways) to both receive and act upon cancellation requests.
  • Should maintain reliable audit logs showing the timestamp of electronic receipt and the content of the received certification and notice.
  • May discard legacy practices that relied on human stamping before cancellation; however, robust recordkeeping remains crucial to prove strict compliance if challenged.
• Policyholders:
  • Should understand that cancellations may take effect as soon as the insurer’s system electronically receives the finance company’s certified request after the cure period—potentially early in the morning after the tenth day—without additional human review.
  • The decision underscores the importance of curing premium defaults within the statutory window; late payment after electronic receipt may not prevent cancellation absent other statutory protections.
• Third-party claimants:
  • Coverage disputes premised on alleged defects such as lack of signature or lack of human physical receipt will likely fail where the finance company’s email and certification comply with the statutory text.
• Courts and regulators:
  • Offers a workable, technology-neutral interpretation consistent with modern business practices and the statute’s express allowance of “electronic mail.”

Compliance checklist under § 9:3550(G)(3)

To minimize litigation risk, premium finance companies and insurers should ensure:

• Premium finance agreement includes a valid power of attorney authorizing cancellation upon default.
• Default occurred and was not timely cured within the statutory ten-day period after notice to the insured.
• The finance company sent a ten-day notice of cancellation to the insured, specifying the date of sending, with proof of mailing/dispatch retained.
• Copies of the notice were sent to all persons with an interest (e.g., governmental agencies, lienholders, other third parties identified in the finance agreement), with names/addresses recorded.
• The finance company sent to the insurer, by mail, private carrier, or electronic mail, a copy of the notice and a statement certifying all required items (i)–(iv).
• The insurer maintains reliable systems to receive the notice and certification and contemporaneously record the time of receipt; automated cancellation upon receipt is permitted.
• All communications and logs are retained in retrievable form to demonstrate strict adherence in any later challenge.

Open questions and boundaries not decided

• The court did not opine on whether a defective email (e.g., spam filtering, bounced messages) would count as “receipt,” or how to treat disputes over the exact moment of receipt if system logs are incomplete or inconsistent.
• The decision did not address the sufficiency of the finance company’s notice to third parties with an interest, beyond accepting the record that such certifications were made.
• The panel left unresolved any broader definition of “private carrier” in § 9:3550(G)(3)(a), cautioning that the district court’s analogy was “imaginative.”
• While authoritative for federal courts in the Fifth Circuit applying Louisiana law, the ruling is a predictive Erie determination; the Louisiana Supreme Court could, in a future case, construe the statute differently.