Election of Remedies Bars Parallel Declaratory-Judgment Back-Pay Claims When a Teacher Elects CBA Arbitration

Election of Remedies Bars Parallel Declaratory-Judgment Back-Pay Claims When a Teacher Elects CBA Arbitration

1. Introduction

In Clifton Peasley v. City of Providence, by and through its Treasurer, Shomari Husband (R.I. Jan. 22, 2026), the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a tenured teacher’s Superior Court action seeking a declaration of entitlement to back pay under the Teachers’ Tenure Act, G.L. 1956 § 16-13-5(b), while his union-driven back-pay grievance proceeded through arbitration under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA).

The case arose after Clifton Peasley, a tenured Providence teacher, was criminally charged with second-degree child abuse, placed on paid administrative leave, later suspended without pay, and ultimately reinstated after the criminal charge was dismissed. The central legal issue was whether Peasley could pursue a judicial declaratory remedy under § 16-13-5(b) at the same time he had already invoked (and was still pursuing) the contractual grievance/arbitration process seeking the same back pay.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the equitable election of remedies doctrine barred Peasley’s declaratory-judgment action because he (through the union) had already elected the CBA grievance/arbitration route to contest the denial of back pay. Relying primarily on Martone v. Johnston School Committee, the Court concluded that once a party elects the contractual remedy for the dispute, the same dispute may not be pursued simultaneously (or subsequently) in court. The Superior Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was therefore affirmed.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Montaquila v. Flagstar Bank, FSB: Cited for the motion-to-dismiss principle allowing consideration of certain documents outside the complaint (documents referenced in the complaint, undisputed authenticity, official public records). This supported the Court’s ability to consider procedural history and related records when evaluating the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
  • Doe v. Brown University and Mokwenyei v. Rhode Island Hospital: Cited for the standard Rule 12(b)(6) framework—assume pleaded facts are true and resolve doubts in plaintiff’s favor—setting the baseline for reviewing the dismissal of Peasley’s declaratory complaint.
  • Tucker Estates Charlestown, LLC v. Town of Charlestown: Supplies the stricter lens for dismissing declaratory-judgment actions at the pleadings stage: dismissal is proper only when “beyond a reasonable doubt” the declaration sought is an impossibility. The Court effectively treated election of remedies as making the requested declaration unavailable as a matter of law in the posture presented.
  • Martone v. Johnston School Committee (central authority): A tenured teacher pursued a CBA grievance and, while it was pending, sought mandamus compelling a statutory tenure hearing. The Court held the election of remedies doctrine “applies and is dispositive.” Peasley applies Martone directly: Peasley elected arbitration for back pay, then filed in Superior Court for declaratory relief seeking the same core remedy, which is barred by election of remedies.
  • State Department of Environmental Management v. State Labor Relations Board: Quoted in Martone and again here for the doctrine’s purpose: preventing unfairness and double redress for a single wrong. It also provides the operative formulation that a party who uses the grievance process and loses may not pursue the same dispute in court.
  • School Committee of North Kingstown v. Crouch: Cited via Martone for the reciprocal application: electing a statutory administrative remedy and losing can bar later pursuit of the same dispute through the grievance process. This reinforces the “one track for one dispute” theme.
  • Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC: Invoked by Peasley to argue that some statutory rights are so important they cannot be displaced absent a “clear and unmistakable” waiver. The Court rejected treating the Teachers’ Tenure Act as equivalent to antidiscrimination statutes at issue in Weeks, and declined to accept Peasley’s “absolute approach.”
  • Bochner v. Providence School Committee: Used to contextualize tenure rights and waiver, emphasizing that statutory rights of appeal under tenure statutes are not revoked by arbitration clauses absent an express relinquishment. The Court cited Bochner to rebut Peasley’s broad analogy to Weeks, while still enforcing election of remedies on these facts.
  • Terzian v. Lombardi and McGarry v. Pielech: Cited for appellate waiver: because Peasley did not develop any argument about whether the CBA contained a “clear and unmistakable” waiver, the Court would not address that question.
  • Cranston Teachers' Association v. Cranston School Committee: A close analogue: after invoking CBA grievance procedures for back pay, teachers sought declaratory relief under the UDJA. The Court affirmed dismissal because the parties elected arbitration as the initial determination mechanism. Peasley relies on this to reject the argument that the UDJA independently authorizes parallel litigation.
  • City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Lodge No. 4, Fraternal Order of Police: Reinforces that a party cannot submit a dispute to arbitration, obtain an unfavorable result, and then return to court via the UDJA for a second try. It underscores the Court’s institutional concern with preventing end-runs around arbitration outcomes.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three main steps:

  1. Identify the governing equitable principle. Election of remedies prevents unfairness and duplicative redress by requiring a party to pursue a chosen remedial path to conclusion, rather than litigating the same dispute in multiple forums.
  2. Determine whether Peasley “elected” a remedy for the same dispute. Peasley (through the union) filed a back-pay grievance and agreed to proceed directly to arbitration. While that arbitration was pending, Peasley filed a Superior Court declaratory-judgment action seeking a declaration of entitlement to back pay under § 16-13-5(b). The Court treated these as the same dispute (entitlement to back pay for the unpaid-suspension period), pursued in parallel tracks.
  3. Apply controlling authority to bar the parallel court action. Under Martone and Cranston Teachers' Association, once arbitration is selected for adjudicating the dispute, a declaratory action seeking the same relief is foreclosed—despite the UDJA’s broad language authorizing declarations of rights.

The Court also addressed and rejected two attempted workarounds:

  • Teachers’ Tenure Act as “nonwaivable” like civil rights statutes. Peasley argued the tenure statute should be treated like RICRA/FEPA in Weeks. The Court refused to equate tenure protections with the “landmark antidiscrimination protections” at issue in Weeks, and it declined to adopt Peasley’s proposed categorical rule.
  • UDJA allows simultaneous pursuit. The Court relied on Cranston Teachers' Association to hold that UDJA does not permit parallel litigation when arbitration has been elected.

Finally, Peasley expressed concern that the City might contest arbitrability. The Court noted that, by oral argument, the back-pay grievance had been arbitrated and the parties were awaiting a decision, eliminating the practical concern that arbitration might be avoided.

C. Impact

The opinion strengthens (and reaffirms) a practical rule for public-sector labor disputes in Rhode Island: when a teacher (or union on the teacher’s behalf) elects CBA arbitration to pursue a remedy like back pay, the teacher cannot maintain a parallel Superior Court declaratory action seeking the same remedy under the Teachers’ Tenure Act or the UDJA.

Likely effects include:

  • Forum discipline and procedural efficiency. Litigants must choose a track and complete it, reducing duplicative litigation and inconsistent adjudications.
  • Greater stakes at the grievance/arbitration election point. Unions and employees should evaluate early whether to proceed via contractual arbitration or statutory routes, mindful that parallel filings may be dismissed.
  • Limited reach of Weeks outside civil-rights statutes. The Court signaled that “clear and unmistakable waiver” analysis in the CBA context is not automatically imported into tenure/back-pay disputes, and in any event must be properly raised and developed on appeal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Election of remedies doctrine: A fairness-based rule preventing a party from seeking multiple “bites at the apple” for the same wrong by pursuing multiple remedial paths for the same dispute. Once you pick one adequate remedy process (like arbitration) for that dispute, courts can bar a second, duplicative attempt in another forum.
  • CBA grievance/arbitration: A contract-based process (often ending in binding arbitration) for resolving disputes between employees (and their union) and the employer.
  • Declaratory judgment (UDJA): A court order declaring parties’ legal rights. It is not a license to litigate in parallel when another chosen process is already deciding the same controversy.
  • “Vindicated” under § 16-13-5(b): A statutory trigger for back pay after a teacher’s suspension if the teacher is cleared through the statutory hearing/appeal process. Here, Peasley argued dismissal of the criminal charge amounted to vindication entitling him to pay; the Court did not reach the merits because election of remedies barred the lawsuit.
  • Rule 48(a) dismissal: A prosecutor’s dismissal of charges; it terminates the prosecution. The dismissal mattered factually to reinstatement and Peasley’s back-pay theory, but it did not overcome the procedural bar.
  • “Clear and unmistakable” waiver: A heightened standard from Weeks for waiving access to a judicial forum for RICRA/FEPA claims in a CBA. The Court did not apply it here (and noted Peasley did not argue any CBA language).

5. Conclusion

Peasley reaffirms that Rhode Island’s election of remedies doctrine bars a teacher from pursuing a Superior Court declaratory-judgment action for back pay while simultaneously pursuing (or after electing) a CBA grievance/arbitration seeking the same relief. Grounded in Martone and Cranston Teachers' Association, the decision prioritizes fairness and finality by preventing duplicative litigation and preserving arbitration as the chosen adjudicative route.

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