El Chaar v. NYU College of Dentistry: Direct-Evidence Standard in §1981 Retaliation Claims

Introduction

In El Chaar v. NYU College of Dentistry, 24-1169 (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2025), the Second Circuit addressed competing claims of employment discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Dr. Edgard El Chaar, a Lebanese-born periodontology professor at NYU’s College of Dentistry, alleged that derogatory race- and ethnicity-based remarks by faculty and NYU’s subsequent refusal to appoint him to interim and permanent department chair positions constituted unlawful discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to NYU on all federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state- and city-law claims. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the hostile environment claim and the permanent-chair retaliation claim but vacated summary judgment on the interim-chair retaliation claim, clarifying when direct evidence of retaliatory intent dispenses with the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit’s summary order held that:

• Hostile Work Environment: Time-barred. All discriminatory acts that gave rise to a finding of a hostile work environment occurred before the four-year § 1981 statute of limitations cutoff (October 6, 2017). No act within the limitations period could be tied to the continuing pattern of harassment.
• Interim Department Chair (Retaliation): Direct evidence of retaliation. Dr. El Chaar testified that Dean Charles Bertolami told him, “We’re not appointing the chair because of your complaint to OEO … you should have been the acting chair, but because of your complaint, we can’t.” That admission by the decision-maker sufficed to raise a genuine issue of fact on but-for causation, requiring vacatur of summary judgment.
• Permanent Department Chair (Retaliation): No pretext. Even assuming a prima facie case, NYU presented undisputed, legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for choosing an external, tenured, consensus-building candidate over Dr. El Chaar—who lacked tenure, was described as divisive in faculty surveys, and had been denied promotion. Dr. El Chaar failed to show pretext.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan (536 U.S. 101, 2002): Established that hostile‐work-environment claims rest on a series of related acts, one of which must fall within the limitations period to survive. The court held El Chaar’s later complaints did not revive time-barred harassment.
• Banks v. General Motors, LLC (81 F.4th 242, 2023): Confirmed the four-year statute of limitations for § 1981 claims; guided the court in assessing timeliness of El Chaar’s harassment allegations.
• Byrne v. Rutledge (623 F.3d 46, 2010): Summarized the standard for reviewing summary judgment in discrimination cases—viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant.
• Littlejohn v. City of New York (795 F.3d 297, 2015): Described the burden-shifting framework for circumstantial retaliation claims under § 1981, later contrasted with direct evidence in Porter.
• Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC (737 F.3d 834, 2013): Clarified the plaintiff’s ultimate burden to prove but-for causation even after making out a prima facie case.
• Porter v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center (92 F.4th 129, 2024): Held that when a decision-maker admits retaliation in direct evidence, the McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable—a principle the court applied to the interim chair claim.
• Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. (604 F.3d 712, 2010): Confirmed that a mere failure to investigate discrimination does not itself alter employment conditions to create a hostile environment.
• Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Service Care (163 F.3d 684, 1998): Recognized that passing over an employee for promotion based on prior complaints can constitute an adverse employment action for retaliation purposes.

2. Legal Reasoning

Hostile Work Environment: The court applied Morgan’s “continuing violation” doctrine but found no actionable act within four years of suit. Later complaints and incomplete trainings by NYU leadership could not themselves prolong a time-barred pattern absent new discriminatory acts.

Retaliation—Interim Chair: The key legal point was Dean Bertolami’s admission that he denied the interim chair role to Dr. El Chaar “because of” the OEO complaint. Under Porter, such direct-evidence admissions by the decision-maker obviate the need for a prima facie showing and employer rebuttal; they automatically raise a triable issue on but-for causation.

Retaliation—Permanent Chair: Even assuming circumstantial evidence sufficed to establish a prima facie case, NYU’s proffered reasons (tenure status, interpersonal reputation, superior academic leadership qualifications) were undisputed. Dr. El Chaar could not show pretext—i.e., that those reasons were false or a sham masking retaliatory animus.

3. Impact

This decision reinforces two critical principles:

1. Time-Bar and Continuing Violations: Plaintiffs asserting hostile-work-environment claims under § 1981 must identify at least one discriminatory act within the statutory period. Unsuccessful complaint follow-ups and unengaged trainings cannot revive stale claims.
2. Direct Evidence in Retaliation: Where a decision-maker explicitly cites protected activity as the reason for an adverse action, summary judgment is inappropriate. Employers must be prepared to rebut or justify admissions of retaliatory intent at trial.

Future litigants will cite El Chaar for the proposition that an outright confession of retaliation—“I didn’t appoint you because you complained”—is legally sufficient to defeat summary judgment on but-for causation. Conversely, selection committees evaluating leadership appointments will take care to distance themselves from any admission linking hiring decisions to protected complaints.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• § 1981 Claim: Federal law guaranteeing equal contract rights regardless of race. In employment, covers hiring, firing, promotions, and retaliation.
• Hostile Work Environment: Occurs when discriminatory conduct is so frequent or severe that it alters the conditions of employment. Must show ongoing pattern, with at least one act within four years.
• Summary Judgment: A pretrial decision granting judgment to one side if no material facts are genuinely disputed. The court views evidence in favor of the non-moving party.
• Prima Facie Case: Minimal initial showing that, if unrebutted, would entitle a plaintiff to relief. Triggers burden shifting under McDonnell Douglas.
• McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting: In the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff first makes a prima facie case, the employer explains a lawful reason, then the plaintiff must show that’s a pretext.
• Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence: Direct evidence speaks directly to retaliatory intent (e.g., “I did it because you complained”). Circumstantial evidence requires inference (timing, pattern, inconsistencies).
• But-For Causation: The plaintiff must prove that the protected activity was the decisive reason for the adverse action—not merely a contributing factor.

Conclusion

El Chaar v. NYU College of Dentistry carves out a clear rule: a decision-maker’s admission of retaliatory motivation is direct evidence that can defeat summary judgment. It also underscores the unforgiving nature of § 1981’s four-year statute of limitations for hostile-environment claims. Taken together, the decision guides lower courts in distinguishing stale harassment claims from timely ones and sets a bright-line on when plaintiffs may bypass McDonnell Douglas by offering direct proof of animus. Ultimately, it alerts employers and lawyers to the risks of candid admissions in performance and promotion deliberations following discrimination complaints.