Ejectment Requires Plausible Present Title: Historic Georgia Land Grant and Lineage Allegations Are Insufficient Without a Non-Speculative Chain of Title

1. Introduction

In Scott Brown v. Travis E. Taylor (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 2026) (unpublished), Scott Brown sued current landowners and lenders in an ejectment action under Georgia Code § 44-11-1, claiming fee-simple rights to 202.5 acres in Troup County, Georgia allegedly traceable to an 1829 Georgia land lottery grant to his purported ancestor, Edmund Lashley. Brown sought possession, damages for use/occupation and alleged timber/mineral activity, and relief setting aside lenders’ security interests.

The central issues were whether Brown’s amended complaint plausibly (1) described the property with sufficient certainty for ejectment and (2) alleged sufficient present legal title (or its equivalent) and right of entry—despite the passage of nearly two centuries and the existence of current owners and recorded interests.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Even assuming Brown’s exhibits (the 1829 grant and plat) might satisfy property description requirements, the Court held Brown failed independently and fatally to plead sufficient evidence of present title. Brown’s theory—(i) his descent from the grantee and (ii) an asserted “unbroken chain” from the sovereign—was deemed speculative because he did not plausibly allege or show that the land was never conveyed away after Lashley received fee simple ownership. The Court also rejected reliance on Brown’s self-to-self quitclaim deed as incapable of establishing underlying rights.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

A. Federal pleading and Rule 12(b)(6) framework

Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2010): The Court applied de novo review and reiterated that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff—undercutting Brown’s claim that the district court improperly favored defendants.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd, 941 F.3d 504 (11th Cir. 2019): Together, these cases supplied the “plausibility” and “above the speculative level” standard. The panel used that standard to characterize Brown’s “no transfer ever occurred” narrative as conjecture rather than a plausible allegation of present title.
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986): The Court invoked the rule that legal conclusions “couched as” facts need not be accepted as true. Brown’s assertion that his ancestors were “forced off” the land (and thus never conveyed it) was treated as precisely the kind of conclusory allegation that cannot establish plausibility.
Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd (again) and Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009): The panel emphasized that exhibits attached to a complaint are part of the pleading, and that when exhibits contradict broad allegations, the exhibits govern. This reinforced the court’s willingness to measure Brown’s title theory against what his documents actually proved (a grant to Lashley), not what Brown asserted they implied (an unbroken chain to Brown).
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014): The Court relied on the “multiple independent grounds” principle: because the district court dismissed on both inadequate description and inadequate title, Brown had to show both were wrong. The panel affirmed on the title ground alone without reaching the description issue.

B. Georgia ejectment elements and the property-description requirement

Bell v. Lopez, 368 Ga. App. 101, 888 S.E.2d 284 (2023): Provided the key Georgia ejectment rule: plaintiff must possess legal title (or its equivalent) and the right of entry at filing. The Eleventh Circuit used this as the doctrinal anchor for dismissing a claim premised on ancestral entitlement without plausible present title.
Scoville v. Lamar, 149 Ga. 333, 100 S.E. 96 (1919): Stated that ejectment requires a description sufficiently certain for a writ of possession such that a sheriff can deliver possession. Although the panel declined to decide this point, the citation framed the strictness of Georgia’s identification requirement in ejectment pleadings.

C. Title consequences of land grants/patents, fee simple, and later transfers

Ga. Code § 44-6-24(a): The Court applied Georgia’s abolition of fee tails to treat the “to Edmund Lashley his heirs and assigns . . . forever in fee simple” language as conveying an absolute fee.
United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. 525 (1864), and French's Lessee v. Spencer, 62 U.S. 228 (1858): These cases supported a critical move: even if the original grant/patent is “highest evidence of title” at issuance, it does not immunize the land from later lawful transfers. The panel used them to reject Brown’s “good against the world” framing, emphasizing that the grantee could convey away the fee-simple estate like any other owner.

D. Quitclaim deeds and the “you can’t convey what you don’t have” problem

Georgia Lien Servs., Inc. v. Barrett, 272 Ga. App. 656, 613 S.E.2d 180 (2005): The Court used this to dispose of Brown’s self-executed quitclaim deed: a quitclaim transfers only the grantor’s existing interest; it cannot create title or prove the grantor had title.

E. Contract Clause / fee tail argument rejected

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810): Brown invoked Contract Clause concepts, but the panel distinguished them: abolishing fee tails did not “impair” Georgia’s obligation to transfer land under the grant; it only affected how such estates are treated thereafter.
Southwell v. Purcell, 172 Ga. 739, 158 S.E. 588 (1931), and Harper v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 173 Ga. 51, 159 S.E. 687 (1931): The Court cited these Georgia authorities to confirm that conveyances “to [a person] and the heirs of [his/her] body” vest an absolute fee in the named grantee under Georgia law—reinforcing that Lashley held an alienable fee simple, which could have been transferred away long before Brown’s suit.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The decision turns on a straightforward but demanding principle: ejectment is not a vehicle for historical grievance or genealogical probability; it is a possessory remedy requiring a plausible allegation of present legal title and right of entry at the time suit is filed.

The Court accepted that Brown produced evidence of an 1829 grant to Lashley. But that evidence, by itself, did not plausibly bridge the gap from Lashley’s fee-simple ownership to Brown’s present ownership. Once the Court treated the grant as an alienable fee simple (under Ga. Code § 44-6-24(a)), the key question became whether Brown alleged non-speculatively that title remained in the Lashley line (or otherwise came to Brown) without being conveyed, devised, foreclosed, lost to tax sale, or otherwise transferred over nearly 200 years.

Brown attempted to fill that gap with a conclusory assertion that his ancestors were “forced off” the land and never conveyed it. Applying Papasan v. Allain and the Twombly/Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd plausibility standard, the Court treated this as speculation rather than factual matter making present title plausible. The self-to-self quitclaim deed failed for a separate reason: under Georgia Lien Servs., Inc. v. Barrett, it can convey only existing interests and cannot bootstrap title into existence.

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished, the opinion has practical significance for quiet-title-adjacent and ejectment pleadings in federal court applying Georgia law:

Genealogy plus an original grant is not enough. Plaintiffs seeking ejectment based on historic grants must plead (and ideally attach) nonconclusory facts supporting a plausible present chain of title or other recognized route to current legal title.
Courts will treat “no conveyance ever happened” as a plausibility problem. Where the complaint offers only speculation to negate the possibility of later transfers, dismissal is likely.
Quitclaim deeds cannot cure missing title. Using a quitclaim (especially self-to-self) as “proof” of ownership will fail when the underlying interest is not plausibly established.
Appellate strategy matters. Under Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., multiple independent dismissal grounds require the appellant to defeat each ground; otherwise affirmance can rest on a single unrefuted basis.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Ejectment: A lawsuit to recover possession of land. In Georgia, it requires the plaintiff to have present legal title (or equivalent) and the right to enter the land.
Fee simple (absolute): The most complete form of private land ownership; it is freely transferable.
Fee tail: A historically restricted estate intended to keep land in a family line. Georgia has abolished it; language that once created a fee tail generally becomes an absolute fee in the named grantee.
Patent / land grant: A sovereign conveyance of land. It is strong evidence of title at issuance but does not prevent later transfers by the grantee.
Quitclaim deed: Transfers only whatever interest the grantor actually has—no promises. If the grantor has nothing, the grantee gets nothing.
Plausibility pleading: Federal complaints must allege facts making entitlement to relief reasonably believable, not merely possible or speculative.
Writ of possession: The court order used to put a winning ejectment plaintiff in possession; the property description must be clear enough for a sheriff to execute it.

5. Conclusion

Scott Brown v. Travis E. Taylor reinforces a practical rule for Georgia ejectment claims in federal court: producing a historic land grant and asserting family descent does not plausibly establish present legal title. Because the 1829 grant vested an alienable fee simple, Brown needed non-speculative allegations (and ideally documentary support) showing how title reached him and was not transferred away. Conclusory narratives of dispossession and self-serving quitclaim paperwork cannot substitute for a plausible chain of title, and failure to plead that chain is fatal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.