EEZs Count as “High Seas,” MDLEA’s Stateless-Vessel Rule Stands, and No U.S. Nexus Is Required: Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms in United States v. Juan De Leon Berroa

Introduction

In United States v. Juan De Leon Berroa (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2025), a per curiam, non-argument, unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a conviction under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The appeal presented three constitutional and statutory challenges commonly raised in MDLEA cases:

Whether the defendant’s arrest within the Dominican Republic’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) placed his offense outside Congress’s Felonies Clause power because EEZs are not “the high seas” under international law;
Whether Congress exceeded its Felonies Clause authority by defining “vessel without nationality” to include vessels for which a claimed flag state does not affirmatively and unequivocally confirm nationality (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)); and
Whether the prosecution violated due process and exceeded Congress’s power because the conduct lacked a nexus to the United States.

The panel—Judges Lagoa, Abudu, and Kidd—held that each argument is foreclosed by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, most notably United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied (U.S. May 19, 2025) (No. 24-6177); United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025); and United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014).

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed Berroa’s conviction on three grounds:

EEZs and the Felonies Clause: Under Alfonso and reaffirmed in Canario‑Vilomar, an EEZ is part of the “high seas” for purposes of Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 (the Felonies Clause). International law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause power, and enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZs is proper.
Stateless-Vessel Definition (§ 70502(d)(1)(C)): Relying on Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, the court rejected the argument that Congress’s definition of a “vessel without nationality”—encompassing vessels for which the claimed nation neither affirmatively confirms nor denies registry—exceeds constitutional authority or violates customary international law.
No U.S. Nexus/Due Process: Under Campbell (reiterated in Canario‑Vilomar), the MDLEA does not require a U.S. nexus for conduct on the high seas, and prosecuting drug trafficking aboard a stateless vessel does not violate due process because the law gives clear notice and rests on the universal and protective principles of international law.

Applying de novo review to the constitutional challenges, the panel emphasized the Eleventh Circuit’s prior‑panel‑precedent rule and concluded that Berroa’s arguments were squarely foreclosed. The conviction was affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Role

a. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied (U.S. May 19, 2025)

Alfonso is foundational to the court’s resolution of two of Berroa’s arguments. There, defendants interdicted in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ challenged the MDLEA under the Felonies Clause. The Eleventh Circuit held:

EEZ as “High Seas”: As a matter of first impression, an EEZ qualifies as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes. Consequently, Congress may legislate extraterritorially under the MDLEA in EEZs.
International Law Constraint Rejected: The Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law; thus, Congress’s constitutional power is not curtailed by international-law concepts of maritime zones.
Stateless-Vessel Provision: Although the court reviewed this issue for plain error in Alfonso (because of the procedural posture), it found no plain error in Congress’s inclusion of vessels whose claimed flag state does not affirmatively and unequivocally confirm nationality within § 70502(d)(1)(C).

b. United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)

Canario‑Vilomar reaffirmed and extended Alfonso:

De Novo Validation of § 70502(d)(1)(C): The court expressly rejected, on de novo review, the argument that including vessels for which a claimed nation can neither confirm nor deny registration is ultra vires or limited by customary international law.
EEZ Reach Reaffirmed: The panel confirmed that enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZs is proper, rejecting the contention that being within Colombia’s EEZ fell outside the “high seas.”
Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule: The court reiterated that intervening arguments or overlooked rationales cannot circumvent binding precedent absent an en banc or Supreme Court decision to the contrary.

c. United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)

Campbell controls the “nexus” and due-process issues:

No U.S. Nexus Required: The MDLEA’s extraterritorial application relies on the protective and universal principles; it does not require proof of intended or actual effects in the United States.
Due Process Satisfied: Drug trafficking on the high seas aboard stateless vessels is universally condemned; the MDLEA provides clear notice, satisfying due process.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Standards of Review and Threshold Doctrines

The panel applied de novo review to challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, and constitutionality, consistent with Alfonso. Importantly, even post-plea, a defendant may question the government’s constitutional power to prosecute the offense (Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 819 n.5). The court also invoked the Eleventh Circuit’s prior‑panel‑precedent rule, making clear that absent an intervening Supreme Court or en banc decision, Alfonso, Canario‑Vilomar, and Campbell control.

b. EEZs as “High Seas” Under the Felonies Clause

Berroa argued that because international law recognizes the EEZ as distinct from the high seas, Congress’s Felonies Clause power does not reach his conduct in the Dominican Republic’s EEZ. The panel rejected this argument as foreclosed by Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar:

The “high seas” in Article I, § 8, cl. 10 is a constitutional term of art whose scope, the Eleventh Circuit has held, is not limited by customary international law.
EEZs, for Felonies Clause purposes, fall within the “high seas,” permitting MDLEA enforcement in those waters.

This reasoning turns on the Eleventh Circuit’s view that Congress’s enumerated power to define and punish felonies on the high seas is not constrained by evolving maritime norms unless the Constitution itself imposes such limits.

c. Validity of the MDLEA’s Stateless-Vessel Definition (§ 70502(d)(1)(C))

Berroa contended that a verbal nationality claim is prima facie proof of nationality under customary international law and that Congress cannot treat such a vessel as “without nationality” when the claimed nation does not affirmatively and unequivocally confirm the registry. The panel held this argument was foreclosed:

Alfonso: No plain error in applying § 70502(d)(1)(C) even where a claimed nation does not confirm or deny registry.
Canario‑Vilomar: On de novo review, customary international law does not limit Congress’s authority to define “vessel without nationality” for MDLEA purposes; thus, § 70502(d)(1)(C) is valid.

In effect, the Eleventh Circuit permits the United States to treat a vessel as stateless when a claimed flag state fails to provide an affirmative and unequivocal confirmation of nationality—an approach intended to foreclose evasion by ambiguous or unverifiable claims.

d. No Nexus Requirement and Due Process

Invoking Campbell, the panel again held that:

No Nexus: The MDLEA does not require any connection between the offense and the United States when conduct occurs on the high seas (including EEZs). The protective principle supports extraterritorial reach without a demonstrated domestic effect.
Due Process: Prosecution of foreign nationals captured on the high seas for drug trafficking does not violate due process. The MDLEA provides clear notice, and the conduct is universally condemned, particularly as to stateless vessels.

3) Impact and Forward-Looking Considerations

a. Consolidation of Eleventh Circuit MDLEA Doctrine

Although unpublished, Berroa consolidates and signals the continued vitality of three pillars of Eleventh Circuit MDLEA jurisprudence:

EEZs are “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes;
Congress’s statutory definition of “vessel without nationality” in § 70502(d)(1)(C) is valid and not limited by customary international law; and
No nexus to the United States is required, and due process is not offended by prosecuting high-seas drug trafficking aboard stateless vessels.

b. Practical Effects

Coast Guard/Prosecutors: The decision reinforces operational certainty for interdictions within foreign EEZs and for cases involving equivocal flag claims, including scenarios where the putative flag state neither confirms nor denies registry.
Defense Strategy: Constitutional challenges premised on EEZ status, customary international law limits, or nexus/due process are foreclosed in the Eleventh Circuit absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention. Defense efforts may pivot to factual disputes (e.g., whether a valid, verified nationality claim was made, whether the vessel actually qualifies as stateless under the MDLEA, the credibility and documentation of registry claims, or contamination and chain-of-custody issues for narcotics).
Interbranch/International Relations: The ruling reflects a robust congressional power conception, independent of customary international law constraints. That posture can create tension with foreign states or with evolving treaty practice, but within the Eleventh Circuit it supplies firm footing for extraterritorial maritime drug enforcement.

c. Appellate Landscape

Alfonso’s certiorari denial underscores the current stability of the Eleventh Circuit’s approach. Canario‑Vilomar’s de novo holding on § 70502(d)(1)(C) removes any ambiguity left by Alfonso’s plain‑error posture. Berroa follows directly from these authorities. Any change would likely require en banc reconsideration or a Supreme Court ruling on the scope of the Felonies Clause, the interaction between constitutional power and customary international law, or the MDLEA’s stateless‑vessel regime.

Complex Concepts Simplified

MDLEA (46 U.S.C. §§ 70501 et seq.): A federal statute criminalizing the manufacture, distribution, and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances aboard certain vessels, including those subject to U.S. jurisdiction outside U.S. territorial waters (§ 70503(b)).
“Vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” (§ 70502(c)(1)(A)): Includes “a vessel without nationality.” This triggers U.S. authority over the vessel regardless of location on the high seas.
“Vessel without nationality” (§ 70502(d)(1)(C)): Includes vessels where the master claims a registry but the purported flag state does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirm nationality. The Eleventh Circuit treats this as a valid congressional choice unaffected by customary international law constraints.
High Seas vs. EEZ: The “high seas” are areas beyond any nation’s territorial sea. An EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles from a nation’s baseline; under international law it is a sui generis zone where the coastal state has resource rights but not full sovereignty. The Eleventh Circuit holds that, for the Felonies Clause, EEZs count as “high seas.”
Felonies Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10): Grants Congress power to define and punish “Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The Eleventh Circuit has held this power is not limited by customary international law.
Protective Principle: A principle of international law allowing a state to criminalize conduct outside its territory that threatens the state’s security or core governmental interests. The Eleventh Circuit relies on this (and universal condemnation of high‑seas drug trafficking on stateless vessels) to justify the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach without a U.S. nexus.
Prior‑Panel‑Precedent Rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, a panel is bound by earlier panel decisions unless overruled by the court en banc or the Supreme Court. Arguments “overlooked” by a prior panel do not create an exception.
No Nexus Requirement: Under Campbell, the MDLEA does not require proof that the offense was intended to affect or actually affected the United States when committed on the high seas.

Conclusion

United States v. Juan De Leon Berroa consolidates the Eleventh Circuit’s now‑settled MDLEA framework: (1) EEZs are part of the “high seas” for the Felonies Clause; (2) Congress’s inclusion of vessels with unconfirmed nationality claims within “vessels without nationality” is valid and unaffected by customary international law; and (3) no U.S. nexus is required, and due process is not violated by prosecuting high‑seas drug trafficking, particularly aboard stateless vessels. While unpublished, the decision faithfully applies Alfonso, Canario‑Vilomar, and Campbell, providing clear guidance to district courts and maritime enforcement actors within the Eleventh Circuit. Absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention, defendants interdicted in EEZs or aboard vessels with unresolved flag claims will find constitutional challenges foreclosed in this circuit. The opinion thus reinforces a broad, constitutionally grounded reach for the MDLEA, aligning maritime drug interdiction practices with the court’s robust view of congressional power under Article I’s Define and Punish Clause.