EEZs Count as “High Seas,” and Congress May Define “Vessels Without Nationality” for MDLEA Purposes: Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms MDLEA Jurisdiction and No‑Nexus Rule in United States v. Cueto‑Sanchez

EEZs Count as “High Seas,” and Congress May Define “Vessels Without Nationality” for MDLEA Purposes: Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms MDLEA Jurisdiction and No‑Nexus Rule in United States v. Cueto‑Sanchez

Introduction

This consolidated, unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision (Non-Argument Calendar) affirms the convictions of three defendants—Jose Yovanny Cueto‑Sanchez, Reinaldo Borbosa‑Guevara, and Carlos Guzman‑Javier—for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine aboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). It also affirms Guzman‑Javier’s sentence, rejecting his request for a minor‑role reduction.

The appeal presented four principal challenges:

  • Whether the United States has authority under the MDLEA and the Constitution’s Felonies Clause to prosecute drug-trafficking offenses occurring in a coastal state’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), here Venezuela’s.
  • Whether Congress exceeded its Felonies Clause authority by defining a “vessel without nationality” to include vessels that would not be deemed stateless under customary international law.
  • (As to Guzman‑Javier) Whether due process requires a U.S. nexus for MDLEA prosecutions of foreign nationals intercepted at sea.
  • (As to Guzman‑Javier) Whether the district court clearly erred in denying a minor‑role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.

Relying heavily on recent, binding published decisions—United States v. Alfonso (2024) and United States v. Canario‑Vilomar (2025)—the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that: (1) an EEZ is part of the “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s Felonies Clause power; (2) international law does not limit Congress’s power to legislate under the Felonies Clause; (3) the MDLEA’s “vessel without nationality” definition is valid even if it sweeps more broadly than customary international law; (4) no U.S. nexus is required for MDLEA prosecutions; and (5) the district court did not clearly err in denying a minor‑role adjustment to Guzman‑Javier.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Jurisdiction in the EEZ: The court reiterated that EEZs are part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes; MDLEA enforcement in EEZs is proper (citing Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar).
  • Definition of “Vessel Without Nationality”: The Eleventh Circuit again held that Congress may define a “vessel without nationality” in the MDLEA without being constrained by customary international law, including the situation where a claimed flag state neither confirms nor denies registry (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)).
  • No Nexus Requirement: Due process does not require a U.S. nexus for MDLEA prosecutions of foreign nationals intercepted at sea; the statute’s extraterritorial reach is supported by the universal and protective principles (citing Campbell and Canario‑Vilomar).
  • Sentencing—Minor‑Role Reduction: Applying De Varon’s two‑step framework and the § 3B1.2 commentary factors (as employed in Cabezas‑Montano), the panel found no clear error in denying a minor‑role reduction to Guzman‑Javier given the quantity of cocaine, his expected payment, his participation (including jettisoning cocaine), and parity of culpability with a co‑defendant, notwithstanding that another co‑defendant was the boat operator.
  • Disposition: The convictions and sentence were affirmed in full.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24‑6177 (U.S. May 19, 2025)
    Alfonso squarely held that an EEZ is part of the “high seas” for purposes of Article I’s Felonies Clause and that international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause power. That holding resolved two pillars of today’s jurisdictional challenges: (1) operations in an EEZ are constitutionally within Congress’s reach under the Felonies Clause, and (2) Congress’s choices in defining MDLEA jurisdiction are not curtailed by customary international law.
  • United States v. Canario‑Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)
    Canario‑Vilomar reaffirmed Alfonso and extended its logic to the MDLEA’s “vessel without nationality” definition, rejecting arguments that Congress acted ultra vires by including vessels for which the claimed flag state neither confirms nor denies nationality. It also reiterated that there is no due‑process nexus requirement under the MDLEA, and underscored the Eleventh Circuit’s prior‑panel‑precedent rule (including the rejection of any “overlooked reason or argument” exception).
  • United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)
    Campbell held that the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach does not require a U.S. nexus because universal and protective principles justify the assertion of jurisdiction over maritime drug trafficking.
  • United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc); United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 2015)
    These sentencing cases provide the framework and standards for § 3B1.2 minor‑role determinations. De Varon identified a two‑step method: compare the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct for which he is held accountable; then compare his role to identifiable co‑participants in that conduct. Cabezas‑Montano applied the updated commentary factors and emphasized evidence-based comparisons and the materiality of transporting significant drug quantities. Cruickshank and Boyd emphasize the deference owed to district courts under clear‑error review; Martin notes that relative lesser culpability alone does not mandate a reduction if none are minor or minimal.
  • United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc); United States v. Jews, 74 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2023)
    These cases address the role of Guidelines commentary, clarifying that commentary is authoritative insofar as a guideline is genuinely ambiguous and the commentary reasonably interprets it. In this case, the panel noted that no party contested the validity of the § 3B1.2 commentary or its interpretive use.

Legal Reasoning

1) EEZs as “High Seas” Under the Felonies Clause; MDLEA Enforcement

The MDLEA criminalizes knowing or intentional possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance on board a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and conspiracy to do so (46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(b)). A “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” includes a “vessel without nationality” (id. § 70502(c)(1)(A)), and the statute expressly applies extraterritorially (id. § 70503(b)).

Defendants argued that the Felonies Clause (“To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10) does not extend to conduct within an EEZ, contending that EEZs are excluded from the “high seas” under international law. The panel, following Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar, rejected that premise, reiterating two core propositions:

  • International law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause power.
  • For purposes of the Felonies Clause, an EEZ is constitutionally part of the “high seas,” rendering MDLEA enforcement in EEZs proper.

Under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior‑panel‑precedent rule, those holdings bound the panel. The court also underscored there is no “overlooked reason or argument” exception to that rule; new arguments cannot circumvent binding precedent.

2) Congress’s Authority to Define “Vessel Without Nationality”

The MDLEA’s definition of a “vessel without nationality” includes a vessel whose master claims registry, but the claimed flag state “does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality” (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)). Defendants contended this departs from international law’s conception of statelessness and thus exceeds Congress’s power.

Relying on Canario‑Vilomar (which itself relied on Alfonso’s rejection of international-law constraints on the Felonies Clause), the panel reaffirmed that Congress may define “vessel without nationality” for MDLEA purposes even if the statutory definition extends beyond customary international law. The argument was therefore foreclosed.

3) Due Process and Nexus

Guzman‑Javier separately argued that due process requires a nexus to the United States before prosecuting foreign nationals for conduct on the high seas. The court rejected this argument as “plainly foreclosed” by Eleventh Circuit precedent—particularly Campbell and Canario‑Vilomar—which hold that the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach does not require a U.S. nexus because universal and protective principles justify U.S. enforcement against maritime drug trafficking.

4) Sentencing—Minor‑Role Reduction

The panel reviewed for clear error the district court’s denial of a minor‑role reduction to Guzman‑Javier. Applying De Varon’s two‑step framework and the § 3B1.2 commentary factors (as synthesized in Cabezas‑Montano), the panel emphasized:

  • Step One (Relevant Conduct): The court held Guzman‑Javier accountable only for the cocaine he transported. His role transporting a large quantity of cocaine, his participation in jettisoning contraband, and the substantial promised payment (approximately $15,000) weighed against a reduction, even though he had limited decision‑making authority and did not organize others.
  • Step Two (Comparative Culpability): Comparing identifiable participants in the same conduct, the court found Guzman‑Javier and Borbosa‑Guevara equally culpable; Cueto‑Sanchez, the boat operator, was more culpable (and received an enhancement). But the fact that one co‑defendant is more culpable (or enhanced) does not automatically entitle another to a reduction. Nor was the district court required to weigh the culpability of unindicted or unknown conspirators absent record evidence.

Given the record and the deferential standard, the denial of a minor‑role adjustment was not clear error.

Impact and Implications

  • Maritime Jurisdiction Cemented in the Eleventh Circuit: This decision reinforces that drug-trafficking interdictions in EEZs fall within the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes. Defendants cannot avoid MDLEA exposure by operating within another nation’s EEZ rather than farther offshore.
  • Congress’s MDLEA Definitions Stand: Arguments that the MDLEA’s “vessel without nationality” definition is constrained by customary international law remain foreclosed in the Eleventh Circuit. The Coast Guard’s standard practice—seeking flag-state confirmation and treating a “neither confirm nor deny” response as statelessness—remains sufficient to establish MDLEA jurisdiction under § 70502(d)(1)(C).
  • No Nexus Requirement: Foreign nationals interdicted at sea in the Eleventh Circuit cannot rely on due process nexus arguments to defeat MDLEA charges. The universal and protective principles continue to justify extraterritorial enforcement.
  • Prior‑Panel‑Precedent Rule: Litigants should recognize that Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar presently control these issues. Raising newly framed versions of previously rejected arguments will not succeed at the panel level.
  • Sentencing of Maritime Couriers: This opinion, consistent with De Varon and Cabezas‑Montano, signals that couriers moving substantial quantities for significant payment, who participate in transport and disposal of contraband, will face an uphill battle on minor‑role reductions unless they present concrete, comparative evidence showing they are substantially less culpable than most other identifiable co‑participants in the relevant conduct.
  • Practical Note on Precedential Status: While this opinion is unpublished and not binding as precedent, it faithfully applies—and thus functionally extends—the Eleventh Circuit’s published holdings on MDLEA jurisdiction and sentencing. Its value lies in illustrating how district courts and panels are implementing Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline. The coastal state has sovereign rights over natural resources and certain jurisdictional powers, but it does not exercise full sovereignty there. For U.S. constitutional purposes under the Felonies Clause (per the Eleventh Circuit), EEZs are part of the “high seas.”
  • High Seas: In general international law, the “high seas” are areas beyond national territorial seas and internal waters. The Eleventh Circuit interprets the constitutional term “high Seas” broadly enough to include EEZs for Felonies Clause purposes.
  • Felonies Clause: Article I, § 8, cl. 10 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The Eleventh Circuit has held that this power is not constrained by customary international law when Congress legislates domestically (e.g., through the MDLEA).
  • Vessel Without Nationality: Under the MDLEA, a vessel can be deemed “without nationality” (and thus subject to U.S. jurisdiction) in several circumstances, including when the master claims registry but the claimed flag state does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” assert nationality (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)).
  • Universal and Protective Principles: Public international law concepts that justify a state’s criminal jurisdiction beyond its territory. Universal jurisdiction permits any state to prosecute certain offenses recognized as of international concern; the protective principle permits a state to criminalize and prosecute conduct outside its territory that threatens its security or governmental functions. The Eleventh Circuit uses these principles to support the MDLEA’s extraterritorial application without a U.S. nexus.
  • Prior‑Panel‑Precedent Rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, a later panel is bound by an earlier published panel decision unless it is overruled by the Eleventh Circuit en banc or by the Supreme Court. There is no exception for “overlooked” arguments that were not raised earlier.
  • Minor‑Role Reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): A sentencing reduction for defendants who are substantially less culpable than most participants in the criminal activity. Courts evaluate the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct and compare it against identifiable co‑participants, considering factors such as understanding of the scheme, planning/organizational role, decision‑making authority, nature and extent of participation, and expected benefit.

Conclusion

United States v. Cueto‑Sanchez confirms the Eleventh Circuit’s clear, recent trend: EEZs are treated as the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes; international law does not cabin Congress’s MDLEA enactments; vessels fall within U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA’s statelessness definition even if that definition exceeds customary international law; and the MDLEA requires no U.S. nexus for due process. On sentencing, the court’s application of De Varon and Cabezas‑Montano reiterates that maritime couriers transporting substantial quantities for meaningful compensation face significant hurdles in obtaining minor‑role reductions absent strong, record‑based comparative proof.

Although unpublished, the opinion is a faithful application of binding, published precedents—especially Alfonso and Canario‑Vilomar—and thus provides a reliable roadmap for district courts and practitioners. For the foreseeable future in the Eleventh Circuit, EEZ interdictions, MDLEA jurisdiction over “vessels without nationality,” and no‑nexus prosecutions will continue to be upheld, while minor‑role relief will turn on granular, evidence‑driven comparisons within the specific relevant conduct.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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