Introduction

In this unpublished, non-argument per curiam decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Jose Yovanny Cueto‑Sanchez, Reinaldo Borbosa‑Guevara, and Carlos Guzman‑Javier for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine aboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), and affirmed Guzman‑Javier’s sentence. The defendants argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because their conduct occurred in Venezuela’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and that Congress exceeded its power under Article I’s Felonies Clause by defining “vessel without nationality” more broadly than customary international law. Individually, Guzman‑Javier advanced due process and minor‑role sentencing arguments.

The court rejected all challenges, leaning on recent, binding Eleventh Circuit precedents—particularly United States v. Alfonso (104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24‑6177 (U.S. May 19, 2025)) and United States v. Canario‑Vilomar (128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025))—to hold that EEZs are part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes; that international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause authority; that Congress may adopt an expansive MDLEA definition of “vessel without nationality”; and that no nexus to the United States is required. The court also affirmed the denial of a minor‑role reduction to Guzman‑Javier under the De Varon/Cabezas‑Montano framework.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Eleventh Circuit, applying de novo review to jurisdictional and constitutional questions, reaffirmed that the MDLEA validly applies to conduct occurring in a foreign state’s EEZ because, for Article I purposes, EEZs are within the “high seas.” Enforcement of the MDLEA in EEZs is therefore proper.
• The court rejected the argument that Congress exceeded its Felonies Clause authority by defining “vessel without nationality” to include vessels for which a claimed flag state fails to “affirmatively and unequivocally assert” nationality (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)), even if that definition diverges from customary international law.
• The court held that due process does not require a U.S. nexus for MDLEA prosecutions; the statute’s extraterritorial reach is supported by universal and protective principles and has repeatedly been upheld within the circuit.
• On sentencing, the district court did not clearly err in denying a minor‑role reduction to Guzman‑Javier. Applying United States v. De Varon and United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, the court found the denial supported by: the quantity and value of cocaine transported; the defendant’s participation in disposing of the cargo; the promised compensation; and parity in culpability among the identifiable crewmembers.
• Outcome: Affirmed in all respects.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Alfonso (104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24‑6177 (U.S. May 19, 2025)): The anchor precedent. Alfonso held:
  • EEZs are part of the “high seas” for Article I’s Felonies Clause.
  • International law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause authority.
  • Applying the MDLEA in EEZs is proper.
  These holdings directly foreclosed the appellants’ EEZ‑based jurisdictional challenges in this case.
• United States v. Canario‑Vilomar (128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)): Reaffirmed Alfonso and went further to reject the claim that Congress’s MDLEA definition of “vessel without nationality” (including non‑affirmed claims of registry) is ultra vires. It also reiterated that no U.S. nexus is required under the MDLEA and underscored the Eleventh Circuit’s strict prior‑panel‑precedent rule, rejecting any “overlooked argument” carve‑out.
• United States v. Campbell (743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)): Earlier MDLEA case holding that no nexus to the United States is required, because universal and protective principles support the statute’s extraterritorial reach. This case continues to foreclose due process/nexus challenges.
• United States v. De Varon (175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc)): The foundational two‑step analysis for mitigating role reductions:
  1. Compare the defendant’s role to the relevant conduct for which he is held accountable.
  2. Compare his role with that of other identifiable participants in that relevant conduct.
  De Varon also emphasizes that drug quantity can be highly probative; courier status is not dispositive; and the defendant bears the burden of proof.
• United States v. Cabezas‑Montano (949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020)): Applies De Varon after the 2015 guideline commentary amendments, emphasizing consideration of all § 3B1.2 factors, and holding courts need not compare a defendant to unknown conspirators absent evidence.
• United States v. Cruickshank (837 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2016)) and United States v. Boyd (291 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2002)): Reinforce deferential clear‑error review and the district court’s broad discretion on role determinations.
• United States v. Dupree (57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc)) and United States v. Jews (74 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2023)): Address the weight of guideline commentary and when it may be consulted. The panel noted no party challenged the § 3B1.2 commentary’s validity here, so the court relied on it.
• Prior‑Panel Precedent Rule: The panel invoked the Eleventh Circuit’s stringent rule that a prior panel’s holding binds subsequent panels unless overruled by the Eleventh Circuit en banc or the Supreme Court; there is no “overlooked argument” exception (as reiterated in Canario‑Vilomar).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) EEZs as “High Seas” and Congressional Power Under the Felonies Clause

The defendants argued the MDLEA cannot apply in Venezuela’s EEZ because EEZs are not the “high seas” under international law. The panel, following Alfonso, held that for purposes of Article I’s Felonies Clause, the “high seas” includes EEZs. As a result, Congress can legislate to “define and punish felonies committed on the high seas” in areas including EEZs, and MDLEA enforcement there is valid. The court underscored that international law does not constrain Congress’s exercise of Felonies Clause power.

2) Congress’s Authority to Define “Vessel Without Nationality”

The defendants further contended that the MDLEA’s definition of “vessel without nationality”—notably, 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C), which treats a vessel as “without nationality” when a claimed flag state fails to “affirmatively and unequivocally assert” nationality—exceeds Congress’s constitutional authority because it departs from customary international law conceptions of statelessness. The panel rejected this argument as foreclosed by Canario‑Vilomar, which held that because the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law (per Alfonso), Congress may adopt a domestic statutory definition of statelessness for MDLEA purposes. Accordingly, a vessel is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” if it is “without nationality” under the MDLEA’s terms (46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A)).

3) Due Process and the Lack of a U.S. Nexus Requirement

Guzman‑Javier asserted that applying the MDLEA without a nexus to the United States violated due process and exceeded Felonies Clause limits. The panel, citing Canario‑Vilomar and Campbell, held that within this circuit the MDLEA does not require any U.S. nexus: its extraterritorial application is sustained by universal and protective principles of jurisdiction. This argument was “plainly foreclosed” by binding precedent.

4) Sentencing: Minor‑Role Reduction

On the minor‑role question, reviewed for clear error, the court applied De Varon and Cabezas‑Montano. At step one, the district court appropriately limited the relevant conduct to the cocaine that Guzman‑Javier transported and examined the § 3B1.2 factors. The record supported that he:

• Likely knew the boat was carrying cocaine (given the promised large fee and his participation in jettisoning cargo);
• Performed a critical transportation function involving a large quantity of high‑value drugs;
• Stood to receive $15,000 (the inquiry concerns the expected benefit, not the amount actually received);
• Lacked decision‑making and organizational authority, but so did a co‑participant, making him not substantially less culpable than most participants.

At step two, the court compared him to identifiable co‑participants: Cueto‑Sanchez (the operator, who received an enhancement) and Borbosa‑Guevara. The district court found Guzman‑Javier and Borbosa‑Guevara equally culpable, and emphasized that even if one participant receives an aggravating‑role adjustment, it does not automatically entitle others to minor‑role reductions. Citing Cabezas‑Montano, the panel noted courts are not required to compare a defendant to unknown conspirators absent evidence. On this record, denial of the role reduction was not clear error.

C. Impact and Forward‑Looking Considerations

• Operational certainty for maritime interdictions in the Eleventh Circuit: The decision solidifies that interdictions in EEZs—common in Caribbean and Atlantic/Caribbean trafficking corridors—fall within the MDLEA’s ambit without necessitating proof of a U.S. nexus.
• Statutory statelessness rule remains robust: The court’s adherence to § 70502(d)(1)(C) means that a flag state’s failure to “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirm nationality triggers MDLEA jurisdiction, even if international law might not deem such vessels stateless. Expect government reliance on claim‑of‑registry procedures and flag‑state responses to establish jurisdiction.
• Prior‑panel‑precedent discipline: Litigants advancing new angles on EEZ coverage or statelessness will face the Eleventh Circuit’s strict rule foreclosing arguments already resolved by published panels. Meaningful change would likely require en banc or Supreme Court intervention.
• Sentencing strategy in maritime cases: Defendants seeking minor‑role reductions must marshal concrete, comparative evidence showing substantially lesser culpability than identifiable crewmates and address all § 3B1.2 factors. Merely asserting “courier” status or limited authority is insufficient, especially where drug quantity and expected compensation are significant.
• Unpublished yet anchored in published authority: Although this opinion is “not for publication,” its force derives from published, binding decisions (Alfonso, Canario‑Vilomar, Campbell). As a practical matter, it confirms the trajectory of MDLEA jurisprudence in the Eleventh Circuit.

Complex Concepts, Simplified

• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline in which that state has special rights to exploit natural resources. Importantly, EEZs are not the coastal state’s “territorial sea”; many high‑seas freedoms remain. For Eleventh Circuit constitutional purposes, EEZs are part of the “high seas” under Article I’s Felonies Clause.
• Felonies Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10): Grants Congress power to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas. In the Eleventh Circuit, this power is not constrained by customary international law, allowing Congress to legislate broadly for maritime drug crimes.
• MDLEA’s “Vessel Without Nationality” (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C)): A vessel is “without nationality” if the person in charge claims a registry, but the claimed nation does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that nationality when asked. Under § 70502(c)(1)(A), such vessels fall within “vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
• Universal and Protective Principles: Doctrines of international jurisdiction supporting a state’s authority to proscribe certain serious offenses committed outside its territory (universal), or to protect its security or governmental functions (protective). The Eleventh Circuit has relied on these to uphold the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach without a nexus requirement.
• Minor‑Role Reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): A 2–4 level reduction for defendants substantially less culpable than most participants. Courts consider five non‑exhaustive factors: understanding of the scheme; planning/organization involvement; decision‑making authority; nature/extent of participation; and expected benefit. The De Varon two‑step test controls in the Eleventh Circuit.
• Prior‑Panel‑Precedent Rule: A binding principle of Eleventh Circuit practice: a published panel decision binds later panels unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court. There is no exception for “overlooked” arguments.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Guzman‑Javier (and its consolidated appeals) is a firm reaffirmation of the circuit’s modern MDLEA jurisprudence:

• EEZs are treated as part of the “high seas” for Article I purposes, validating MDLEA prosecutions there.
• International law does not confine Congress’s Felonies Clause power; accordingly, Congress’s expansive MDLEA definition of “vessel without nationality” stands.
• No U.S. nexus is required under the MDLEA, consistent with universal and protective jurisdiction principles.
• Minor‑role reductions require robust, comparative proof; where the record shows significant drug quantity, participation in transport/disposal, and substantial expected compensation, denial is unlikely to be clear error.

While unpublished, the opinion’s reliance on recent, published Eleventh Circuit precedents (Alfonso, Canario‑Vilomar, Campbell) signals continued stability and predictability in maritime drug enforcement within the circuit. For practitioners, the message is clear: jurisdictional and due‑process challenges to MDLEA prosecutions premised on EEZ location, international‑law notions of statelessness, or lack of U.S. nexus will face steep—indeed, almost insurmountable—headwinds in the Eleventh Circuit absent en banc or Supreme Court intervention. On sentencing, persuasive evidence targeting all § 3B1.2 factors and demonstrating substantially lesser culpability than identifiable co‑participants is essential to secure a mitigating‑role adjustment.

Case Metadata

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Date: September 24, 2025
• Panel: Circuit Judges Newsom, Grant, and Marcus
• Disposition: Affirmed (convictions and, for Guzman‑Javier, sentence)
• Nature: Unpublished, Non‑Argument Calendar, Per Curiam
• Statutes: 46 U.S.C. §§ 70502, 70503, 70506 (MDLEA); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2