EEZ Counts as “High Seas,” MDLEA Needs No U.S. Nexus, and “Stateless Vessel” Definition Is Not Cabined by International Law: Eleventh Circuit’s Summary Affirmance in United States v. Santiago, De Avila, and Ulloa

Introduction

This consolidated, unpublished per curiam decision from the Eleventh Circuit (Non-Argument Calendar) affirms MDLEA convictions of three co-defendants—Ramon Santiago, Feyber Moncaris De Avila, and Wallyst Rochist Ulloa—arising from a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine aboard a vessel subject to United States jurisdiction. The case presents familiar challenges to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–70508, including constitutional attacks premised on:

Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause to reach conduct occurring in another nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), here, waters associated with Colombia;
The statutory definition of “vessel without nationality” in § 70502(d)(1)(C), argued to be broader than international law permits;
Assertions that a prosecution without a U.S. nexus violates due process and exceeds Congress’s authority.

The government moved for summary affirmance. The appellants did not respond. Relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s robust body of prior-panel precedent, the court summarily affirmed, concluding that all of appellants’ arguments are foreclosed by existing circuit law, including United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025), and United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025).

Summary of the Opinion

The court grants the government’s motion for summary affirmance because the issues presented are “clearly” resolved by binding circuit precedent. Key holdings applied:

EEZ waters qualify as “high seas” for purposes of Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause to define and punish felonies on the high seas, and that Clause is not limited by international law (Alfonso; Canario-Vilomar). As a result, as-applied constitutional attacks based on conduct occurring in Colombia’s EEZ fail.
Congress may define “vessel without nationality” for MDLEA purposes without being constrained by customary international law; § 70502(d)(1)(C) is constitutional both facially and as applied (Canario-Vilomar).
No nexus to the United States is required for MDLEA prosecutions, and due process is not offended when prosecuting foreign nationals apprehended on the high seas for drug trafficking aboard stateless vessels (Cabezas-Montano; Hernandez; Campbell; Rendon).

Given the prior-panel-precedent rule and the clarity of existing authority, the court summarily affirmed the district court’s denial of the motions to dismiss and the defendants’ convictions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Groendyke Transportation, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969):
Establishes the standard for summary affirmance: it is appropriate when one party’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law or the appeal is frivolous. The Eleventh Circuit applies Groendyke under Bonner v. City of Prichard (adopting pre-1981 Fifth Circuit law).
Bonner v. City of Prichard (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc):
Confirms that pre-October 1981 Fifth Circuit precedent binds Eleventh Circuit panels. It provides the doctrinal foundation for relying on Groendyke’s summary-disposition standard.
United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008):
Articulates the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule: a prior panel’s holding is binding unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc. This rule drives the outcome here—the court treats Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar as dispositive.
United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025):
The cornerstone for the EEZ challenge. Alfonso holds that the Felonies Clause is not limited by international law and that EEZs are part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes. The court uses Alfonso to reject the argument that Congress exceeded its power by applying MDLEA to conduct in Colombia’s EEZ.
United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025):
Reaffirms Alfonso and directly addresses the statutory definition of “vessel without nationality.” It holds that Congress is not constrained by customary international law when defining “stateless” for MDLEA purposes and that § 70502(d)(1)(C) is constitutional. This opinion forecloses the as-applied and facial challenges to § 70502(d)(1)(C) advanced by Santiago and Ulloa.
United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2003):
Together, these cases establish that MDLEA prosecutions do not require a U.S. nexus and do not violate due process, particularly where drug trafficking on the high seas aboard stateless vessels is universally condemned, providing fair notice. The current panel leans on this line of authority to reject De Avila’s and Ulloa’s due process and nexus arguments.

Statutory Framework

46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1), (e)(1) and § 70506(b):
Criminalize possession (and attempt/conspiracy) with intent to distribute controlled substances aboard a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A):
Defines “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” to include a “vessel without nationality.”
46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C):
Defines a “vessel without nationality” to include a vessel where the master or person in charge makes a claim of registry, but the claimed nation does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” assert that the vessel is of its nationality.
46 U.S.C. § 70503(b):
Expressly applies the MDLEA extraterritorially, even when the conduct occurs outside U.S. territorial waters.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three straightforward steps:

Summary affirmance is warranted under Groendyke: The government’s legal position is “clearly right” as a matter of law because the defendants’ challenges have already been decided against them by binding circuit precedent. The lack of any response to the summary-affirmance motion underscores the absence of a substantial question on appeal.
Prior-panel precedent compels the outcome (Archer): Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar bind the panel. Alfonso resolves the EEZ-as-high-seas issue and clarifies that international law does not limit Congress’s Felonies Clause powers. Canario-Vilomar confirms that Congress’s statutory definition of “vessel without nationality” in § 70502(d)(1)(C) stands even if it diverges from customary international law’s conception of statelessness. Because neither case has been overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court, the panel must follow them.
Nexus and due process arguments fail under longstanding circuit law: The Eleventh Circuit repeatedly holds that MDLEA prosecutions require no U.S. nexus and that due process is not violated when prosecuting foreign nationals apprehended on the high seas for drug trafficking on stateless vessels (Cabezas-Montano; Hernandez; Campbell; Rendon). The rationale is that drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas is universally condemned and that the MDLEA gives fair notice of liability, meeting due process concerns.

Applied here, the defendants’ challenges cannot succeed. The location of the offense in Colombia’s EEZ is legally immaterial to Congress’s Felonies Clause authority as construed by Alfonso. The statutory jurisdictional hook—“vessel without nationality” per § 70502(d)(1)(C)—is constitutionally valid under Canario-Vilomar regardless of customary international law. And the lack of a U.S. nexus is no bar to prosecution under settled Eleventh Circuit law; due process is satisfied by the MDLEA’s clear extraterritorial reach and the universal condemnation of drug trafficking at sea.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

Although unpublished, the decision is consequential within the Eleventh Circuit because it signals that:

EEZ prosecutions are on firm ground: MDLEA cases arising in foreign EEZs will continue to be treated as “high seas” felonies under the Felonies Clause. Alfonso holds the field, and Canario-Vilomar reinforces it. The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Alfonso further reduces the prospect of near-term doctrinal change.
“Stateless vessel” remains broadly defined: The statutory definition in § 70502(d)(1)(C) controls, even if it sweeps more broadly than customary international law. Practically, if the Coast Guard solicits confirmation and the purported flag state does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirm nationality, MDLEA jurisdiction attaches through statelessness.
No nexus requirement persists: Defendants cannot evade MDLEA liability by arguing that the offense lacked a U.S. nexus. That strategy is foreclosed by a long line of Eleventh Circuit authority.
Due process arguments remain nonstarters: The court continues to deem the MDLEA’s notice adequate because drug trafficking aboard stateless vessels on the high seas is universally condemned.
Increased use of summary affirmance: Given the clarity of circuit law, future MDLEA appeals raising identical constitutional attacks may be summarily resolved without oral argument. Defendants seeking to preserve these issues would need to aim for en banc rehearing or Supreme Court review—neither currently promising avenues, given Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar.

For prosecutors and maritime enforcement agencies, the decision confirms the viability of interdictions and prosecutions in Caribbean and Atlantic corridors, especially where flag verification does not yield an unequivocal confirmation. For defense counsel, the most fertile battlegrounds remain factual: contesting the adequacy and reliability of the government’s statelessness proof; scrutinizing the Coast Guard’s communication records with the claimed flag state; and litigating suppression or evidentiary issues not resolved by the precedents cited here.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Felonies Clause: Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 empowers Congress to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas. The Eleventh Circuit interprets this power as not limited by customary international law. Congress can thus criminalize conduct on the high seas (including EEZs) regardless of international-law limits.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): The EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline. The coastal state has sovereign rights over resources there, but, under Eleventh Circuit law, these waters are treated as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes. Thus, MDLEA prosecutions can reach conduct in a foreign EEZ.
High seas vs. territorial sea: Territorial seas generally extend 12 nautical miles from the coastline and are part of a state’s sovereign territory. The high seas lie beyond the territorial sea. The EEZ is not territorial sea but, per Alfonso, falls within the high seas for Felonies Clause analysis.
Vessel without nationality (stateless vessel): Under § 70502(d)(1)(C), if a vessel’s master claims a nationality but the purported flag state does not affirmatively and unequivocally confirm it, U.S. law treats the vessel as stateless. The Eleventh Circuit holds Congress may adopt this definition without being bound by customary international law’s narrower conceptions.
Nexus requirement: Some extraterritorial criminal laws require a connection (nexus) to the United States. The Eleventh Circuit has consistently held that the MDLEA does not. The government need not show the drugs were bound for the United States or that the defendants had any U.S. connection.
Due process in extraterritorial prosecutions: Due process requires fair notice and non-arbitrary enforcement. The Eleventh Circuit finds that the MDLEA provides fair notice because maritime drug trafficking on stateless vessels is universally condemned, and the statute explicitly applies extraterritorially.
Prior-panel-precedent rule: A panel of the Eleventh Circuit must follow earlier published panel decisions unless they are overruled by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc. This rule allows the court to dispose of repetitive challenges quickly when the law is settled.
Summary affirmance: An expedited disposition affirming the lower court without full briefing or oral argument when the outcome is clear as a matter of law.

Conclusion

United States v. Santiago (and consolidated appeals) adds another clear marker to a well-established Eleventh Circuit path. The panel summarily affirms the MDLEA convictions by applying binding precedent that:

treats EEZ waters as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes;
holds that Congress’s Felonies Clause authority is not limited by customary international law;
upholds § 70502(d)(1)(C)’s definition of “vessel without nationality” even if it is broader than international law;
rejects any requirement of a U.S. nexus for MDLEA prosecutions; and
finds no due process violation in prosecuting foreign nationals for drug trafficking on the high seas.

While unpublished, the opinion fortifies the Eleventh Circuit’s stable MDLEA jurisprudence and signals that constitutional attacks identical to those raised here will be summarily rejected. For practitioners, the message is practical: unless and until the Eleventh Circuit en banc or the Supreme Court revisits Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar, the terrain for successful constitutional challenges to MDLEA jurisdiction in EEZ cases remains exceedingly narrow. The most significant litigation opportunities lie in the facts—especially the proof of statelessness and the integrity of interdiction procedures—rather than in reasserting foreclosed constitutional theories.