Introduction

In Edwards v. Lane, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s removal of Karla K. Lane as trustee of Trust A of the Lane Family Trust after she refused to comply with a court order directing acceptance of, and closing upon, a $1.35 million cash offer for real property held by the trust. While the appellant framed the appeal as raising a question of first impression—whether a trustee can be removed for exercising discretionary duties—the Supreme Court declined to reach the merits due to pervasive briefing and record deficiencies, holding that all arguments were waived.

The opinion sets two important guideposts for Idaho practice:

• It confirms that decisions to remove a trustee under Idaho Code section 15-7-308 are discretionary and are reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.
• It forcefully reinforces strict appellate practice requirements: issues must be preserved and properly briefed; the record must be sufficient; and appellants must articulate—rather than merely recite—the abuse-of-discretion framework. Failure to do so results in waiver and may warrant fee-shifting under Idaho Code section 12-121.

The Court also awarded the Respondents (co-trustees of Trust B) their attorney fees and costs on appeal, finding the appeal frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation under section 12-121. The case therefore functions as both a trust-litigation touchstone and a cautionary tale in appellate advocacy.

Factual and Procedural Background

Rolland (“Rollie”) and Patricia (“Patty”) Lane created the Lane Family Trust in 2004 with themselves as initial co-trustees. On the death of the first spouse, the trust was to be divided into Trust A and Trust B. Patty died in 2013, triggering the split. Rollie later amended the trust in 2018 and again in early 2019. The amendments are notable for two reasons: (1) the brief revocation and reinstatement of Trust A, with Karla, Kip, and Sheryl named as beneficiaries of Trust A; and (2) the overall division of trust assets among children of both spouses.

After Rollie died in January 2019, Karla became the successor trustee of Trust A; John Edwards, Scott Edwards, and Keith “KC” Lane served as co-trustees of Trust B (collectively, “Respondents”). The primary asset was a Caldwell, Idaho residence and acreage, owned one-half by each of Trust A and Trust B.

In October 2021, Karla sought a court order authorizing sale of the real property for not less than $1 million, citing a broker’s price opinion valuing the property between $1.156 million and $1.286 million. Around that time, a representative (Fornstrom) for prospective cash buyers expressed interest and requested access. The Respondents favored engaging with that buyer.

After access was arranged, the buyers offered $1.35 million cash, conditioned on clear title and acceptance by December 27, 2021. Respondents agreed to accept. On December 23, 2021, the district court ordered all trustees to accept the offer by December 27 and to close by January 31, 2022, with proceeds held in an interest-bearing account and split equally between the trusts.

Karla “accepted” only by court order and soon moved to reconsider, asserting title issues and claiming the property was worth “a lot more” than $1.35 million, including a letter suggesting $2,002,500 in value and expressions of interest from other potential buyers. The district court denied reconsideration and reaffirmed the closing deadline. Karla refused to sign closing documents and moved for relief from the order. The district court removed her as trustee, citing Idaho Code section 15-7-308(2)(a), (2)(b), and (2)(f), and appointed KC as successor trustee pursuant to trust terms. Karla appealed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s removal order and awarded appellate attorney fees and costs to Respondents. The Court:

• Confirmed that removal of a trustee under Idaho Code section 15-7-308 is a discretionary determination subject to abuse-of-discretion review, noting the statute’s permissive “may” language and applying Idaho’s standard discretionary review framework (Lunneborg v. My Fun Life).
• Declined to reach the merits because Karla’s appeal was fatally defective:
  • She raised arguments for the first time on appeal;
  • She failed to supply a sufficient record (Respondents had to augment it);
  • She failed to articulate how the district court abused its discretion under the Lunneborg prongs; and
  • Her briefing lacked coherent legal argument and supporting authority as required by Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6).
• Held that the appeal was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation; awarded attorney fees and costs to Respondents under Idaho Code section 12-121; and reaffirmed that section 12-123 does not apply on appeal.

Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The opinion canvasses a number of Idaho authorities to resolve the standard of review and to enforce longstanding appellate practice rules:

• Abuse-of-Discretion Framework
  • Idaho Code § 15-7-308(2): Provides that a court “may remove a trustee,” signaling a discretionary decision.
  • S. Valley Ground Water Dist. v. IDWR, 173 Idaho 762, 784, 548 P.3d 734, 756 (2024) (quoting Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995)): The term “may” in a statute is permissive, not mandatory.
  • State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 835, 252 P.3d 563, 568 (Ct. App. 2010): “May” denotes discretion.
  • Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018): Four-part test for abuse-of-discretion review—(1) perception of discretion; (2) within outer boundaries; (3) consistent with applicable legal standards; (4) reasoned decision-making.
• Issue Preservation and Adequate Briefing
  • Dodd v. Jones, __ Idaho __, 566 P.3d 379, 395 (2025) (quoting Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005)): Issues not raised below will not be considered on appeal.
  • “In general, a party must raise both the issue and their position on that issue before the trial court for this Court to review it.” (citing Siercke, 167 Idaho 715, 476 P.3d 382).
  • Groveland Water & Sewer Dist. v. City of Blackfoot, 169 Idaho 936, 940–41, 505 P.3d 722, 726–27 (2022): The appellant bears the imperative duty to provide a complete record; references I.A.R. 17(i), 29(a), and 30(a).
  • Medical Recovery Servs., LLC v. Eddins, 169 Idaho 236, 241 n.1, 494 P.3d 784, 789 n.1 (2021): Clarifies mechanisms to supplement or augment the record.
  • Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010): The Court will not sift through the record to find error.
  • Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6): Requires issues to be supported with authority and pinpoint citations to the record.
• Articulation of the Abuse-of-Discretion Theory
  • Midtown Ventures, LLC v. Capone, 173 Idaho 172, 180, 539 P.3d 992, 1000 (2023): Party alleging abuse of discretion must shoulder the burden and argue under the Lunneborg framework; failure is fatal.
  • Severinsen v. Tueller, 174 Idaho 669, 678, 559 P.3d 771, 780 (2024) (quoting Midtown): No rigid requirement to recite the standard, but the appellant must articulate the challenged prongs and argue them.
  • State v. Diaz, 170 Idaho 79, 92, 507 P.3d 1109, 1122 (2022): Reinforces the requirement of prong-specific argument.
  • Valiant Idaho, LLC v. VP Inc., 164 Idaho 314, 332, 429 P.3d 855, 873 (2018): Failure to demonstrate abuse of discretion is fatal.
• Attorney Fees on Appeal
  • Idaho Code § 12-121: Fees to prevailing party when appeal is brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
  • Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC v. Wally Enters., Inc., 170 Idaho 649, 666, 516 P.3d 73, 90 (2022) (quoted in Severinsen, 174 Idaho 669, 559 P.3d at 783): Standard for fee awards under § 12-121.
  • Idaho Code § 12-123: Does not apply on appeal. Gilbert v. Radnovich, 171 Idaho 566, 584, 524 P.3d 397, 415 (2023); Horton v. Horton, 171 Idaho 60, 78, 518 P.3d 359, 377 (2022).
  • Ada Cnty. v. Browning, 168 Idaho 856, 861, 489 P.3d 443, 448 (2021) (quoting Arnold v. City of Stanley, 158 Idaho 218, 224, 345 P.3d 1008, 1014 (2015)): Claiming “first impression” is not a free pass to pursue unreasonable arguments.
• Other Authorities Mentioned
  • International Rescue Committee v. Mohammed, 172 Idaho 789, 537 P.3d 30 (2023): Cited by Karla without articulated relevance; the Court flagged it as an example of unsupported citation.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two arcs—first, a threshold determination of the appellate standard; second, a comprehensive application of preservation and briefing rules leading to waiver and affirmance.

1. Standard of review: trustee removal is discretionary and reviewed for abuse of discretion

The Court recognized it had not previously squarely decided the applicable standard of review for a district court’s decision to remove a trustee. Observing that Idaho Code section 15-7-308(2) uses the permissive “may” and that both parties accepted abuse-of-discretion review, the Court confirmed that removal decisions are discretionary and therefore reviewed under the Lunneborg framework. This alignment with the statute’s text mirrors broader Idaho jurisprudence treating “may” as permissive, and thus a grant of discretion, rather than a mandate.

2. Preservation and briefing deficiencies compelled affirmance without reaching the merits

The Court then declined to address the substantive trust-law question—whether a trustee can be removed for declining an offer in purported pursuit of a higher sale price—because the appeal failed on multiple independent procedural grounds:

• New arguments on appeal: All of Karla’s theories (e.g., that she acted within discretionary authority; that declining the offer was in beneficiaries’ best interests; and that she did not breach fiduciary duties) were raised for the first time on appeal. Idaho law squarely prohibits raising new issues or positions on appeal.
• Insufficient record: Karla failed to provide a record sufficient for review; Respondents had to augment the record to supply core motions and declarations. Appellants bear the “imperative duty” to provide a complete record.
• No prong-specific abuse-of-discretion argument: Karla neither attacked specific Lunneborg prongs nor explained how the district court erred within the abuse-of-discretion framework. Idaho precedent repeatedly labels such failure “fatal.”
• Inadequate authority and citations: The brief contained conclusory assertions, “meandering” sentences, irrelevant authorities, and non-specific record citations (e.g., citing 182-page ranges), contrary to I.A.R. 35(a)(6).

With all arguments waived, the Court affirmed the district court’s removal order without addressing the trust-law merits.

3. Fees and costs: appeal deemed frivolous under § 12-121

The Court concluded that the appeal was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. Although an issue might be framed as one of first impression, that label does not excuse failures to preserve issues or present coherent, supported arguments. Accordingly, Respondents—prevailing on appeal—were awarded attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code section 12-121. The Court reiterated that section 12-123 provides no basis for appellate fees.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Trust litigation: trustee removal and compliance with court orders

Even though the Supreme Court did not address the substantive grounds for removal, its affirmance leaves in place a district court order removing a trustee for refusing to close on a sale ordered by the court. Practitioners should take away three points:

• Trial court discretion is paramount: Removal of a trustee under Idaho Code § 15-7-308 is entrusted to the trial court’s discretion. Appellate review will be deferential and confined to Lunneborg’s prongs.
• Court orders in trust administration must be obeyed: A trustee’s refusal to comply with a sale order can support removal under multiple statutory grounds (the district court cited § 15-7-308(2)(a), (2)(b), and (2)(f)). Trustees should promptly raise valuation or title issues in the trial court and seek relief or modification rather than unilaterally refusing compliance.
• Practical governance of co-owned trust assets: Where two subtrusts co-own a principal asset, trustees must coordinate. Failure to cooperate or to execute a court-approved transaction can “substantially impair the administration” and invite removal.

2. Appellate practice: rigorous enforcement of preservation, record, and briefing rules

Edwards v. Lane fortifies Idaho’s already strict appellate standards:

• Preservation is non-negotiable: Raise issues and your position on them in the trial court, or lose them on appeal.
• Build the record: Appellants must ensure the record includes all filings necessary to evaluate alleged error; use I.A.R. 17(i), 29(a), 30(a) where needed.
• Argue the Lunneborg prongs: Identify the challenged prongs and explain how the trial court (1) misperceived discretion, (2) exceeded its boundaries, (3) applied incorrect legal standards, or (4) failed to exercise reason. Mere recitation or conclusory statements are insufficient.
• Support with authority and pinpoint citations: I.A.R. 35(a)(6) demands developed argument, relevant authority, and accurate, specific record citations. Expect the Court to reject “sweeping” page citations or irrelevant case law.
• Fee exposure for frivolous appeals: Weak, undeveloped, or unpreserved appeals can trigger fee-shifting under § 12-121. The “first impression” label will not immunize an appellant from fees.

3. Strategic guidance for fiduciaries and counsel

• Document valuation concerns early: If a trustee believes a property is undervalued, marshal appraisals or market evidence and properly present them to the trial court before or at the time of sale approval.
• Seek relief, don’t resist: If a sale order issues, pursue timely motions for reconsideration or modification and, if necessary, stays—do not refuse to close.
• Coordinate with co-trustees: Where co-trustees disagree, consider interim stipulations, neutral brokers, or special masters to avoid impeding administration.
• Anticipate discretionary review: Frame trial arguments with the Lunneborg prongs in mind, building a record to support each prong for potential appellate review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Abuse of Discretion (Lunneborg Test)

When a decision is discretionary (as with trustee removal under § 15-7-308), the appellate court asks whether the trial court:

1. Understood it had discretion;
2. Stayed within the bounds of that discretion;
3. Applied the correct legal standards; and
4. Reached its decision through reasoned analysis.

The appellant must identify which of these went wrong and how.

Waiver/Forfeiture on Appeal

Appellate courts will not consider new issues or new legal theories raised for the first time on appeal. A party must have raised both the “issue” and the “position” on that issue in the trial court. Failure to do so results in waiver or forfeiture.

Record on Appeal

The appellant must ensure that all relevant pleadings, motions, declarations, and exhibits are included in the record. If something is missing, use:

• I.A.R. 17(i): designations;
• I.A.R. 29(a): motion to add within 28 days of service of the clerk’s record; or
• I.A.R. 30(a): motion to augment.

I.A.R. 35(a)(6) – Argument Requirements

Briefs must contain developed argument with citations to relevant authority and precise record cites. Conclusory assertions and irrelevant case citations do not suffice.

Idaho Code § 15-7-308 – Removal of Trustee

The statute authorizes trial courts to remove a trustee for enumerated reasons and uses permissive language (“may remove”), underscoring trial court discretion. In this case, the district court cited subsections (2)(a), (2)(b), and (2)(f) in removing the trustee. While the Supreme Court did not reach the merits, the grounds commonly include serious breach of trust, lack of cooperation among co-trustees that impairs administration, persistent failure or unwillingness to administer, and other conditions identified by statute.

Attorney Fees on Appeal: §§ 12-121 and 12-123

• Section 12-121 permits fee awards to the prevailing party when the appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
• Section 12-123 does not apply on appeal (see Gilbert and Horton).

Trust A/Trust B Structure

Many marital trusts split into two subtrusts on the first spouse’s death—commonly a survivor’s trust (Trust A) and an irrevocable trust (Trust B). Each subtrust may hold undivided interests in shared assets, requiring trustee cooperation or court involvement for sale or distribution.

Conclusion

Edwards v. Lane is significant on two fronts. Substantively, the Idaho Supreme Court confirms that trustee removal under Idaho Code § 15-7-308 is a discretionary determination reviewed for abuse of discretion. Procedurally, it emphatically enforces Idaho’s appellate rules: issues must be preserved, arguments must be developed under the Lunneborg framework, the record must be sufficient, and citations must be relevant and specific. The Court declined to reach the trust-law merits because Karla’s appeal failed on each of these fronts and, accordingly, affirmed her removal as trustee.

The decision also sends a practical message to fiduciaries: court orders administering trust assets are not optional; if a trustee believes a transaction is improvident, the appropriate route is to seek relief in the trial court with proper evidentiary support, not to resist compliance. Finally, for appellate practitioners, the case underscores that inadequate briefing and record preparation not only doom the appeal but also carry real cost consequences, as demonstrated by the fee award under § 12-121.

Bottom line: Trustee-removal decisions will receive deferential review, and Idaho’s appellate standards will be strictly applied—with fee-shifting—where an appeal is pursued frivolously or without foundation.