Introduction

This petition for review arose from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of asylum and withholding of removal to Minerva Carbajal-Recinos and her nephew, Delmer Carbajal-Duque, natives of Honduras. The family had lived on a farm in Las Brisas. Beginning in 2008, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) members pillaged the farm, pressured male relatives to join the gang, and extorted the farm’s owner, Isaias (Carbajal-Recinos’ brother and Carbajal-Duque’s uncle). After Isaias reported extortion to the police, MS-13’s violence escalated, culminating in the murders of Isaias and his son (2009) and later Isaias’ wife (2012). The family fled; Petitioners later lived in Colon for years without direct harm before reports surfaced that gang members were asking about their whereabouts, prompting their 2015 flight to the United States.

The core legal issue on review was nexus: whether Petitioners established that any past or feared harm was “on account of” a protected ground—here, membership in a proposed particular social group (PSG), “immediate members of the Carbajal family”—and, specifically, whether that protected ground was “at least one central reason” for the persecution.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit denied the petition for review. Although the Immigration Judge (IJ) had rejected the claims on both PSG cognizability and nexus (and Petitioners had conceded at the hearing that the harms did not amount to past persecution), the BIA affirmed solely on nexus. The Third Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that MS-13’s conduct was motivated by money and criminal aims (extortion, pillaging, intimidation), and that any connection to the family relationship was at most incidental or tangential—insufficient under the “one central reason” standard for asylum and withholding.

The court also addressed the BIA’s citation to Matter of M-R-M-S-, noting that after the Third Circuit’s decision in Lopez v. Attorney General, portions of that BIA precedent were problematic. Still, the court concluded that in this case remand was unnecessary because the BIA’s reliance did not implicate the aspects of Matter of M-R-M-S- that Lopez rejected, and the record otherwise supported the nexus finding.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Lopez v. Att'y Gen., 142 F.4th 162 (3d Cir. 2025): Cited for de novo review of legal determinations, and—through the opinion’s discussion of footnote 15—for its rejection of a “subordination-based conception of nexus” as incompatible with the INA. This case frames the court’s caution about the BIA’s reliance on Matter of M-R-M-S- and supplies the benchmark for assessing whether reliance on that decision necessitates remand.
• Thayalan v. Att'y Gen., 997 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2021): Provides the substantial evidence standard for nexus review and reinforces the principle that targeting “out of a simple desire for money” is not persecution on account of a protected ground. The panel used Thayalan to anchor the economic-motive analysis.
• Myrie v. Att'y Gen., 855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017): Governs the scope of review where the BIA affirms and partially reiterates the IJ—reviewing both decisions only insofar as the IJ’s reasoning informs the BIA’s relied-upon grounds. This also explains why the court did not reach PSG cognizability: the BIA did not rely on it.
• Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att'y Gen., 781 F.3d 677 (3d Cir. 2015): Cited for the proposition that withholding of removal also uses the “one central reason” nexus test (as framed in this opinion).
• Ndayshimiye v. Att'y Gen., 557 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2009): Supplies the gloss on “one central reason,” clarifying that a protected ground must be more than “incidental, tangential, or superficial,” even where multiple motives exist.
• Shehu v. Att'y Gen., 482 F.3d 652 (3d Cir. 2007): Reinforces that persecution motivated by a “bare desire for money” cannot support asylum or withholding—supporting the panel’s conclusion that extortion/pillaging-driven harm does not satisfy nexus.
• Garcia v. Att'y Gen., 665 F.3d 496 (3d Cir. 2011): Cited for waiver/forfeiture principles: because Petitioners did not renew in the opening brief a challenge to the past-persecution concession, the court did not address it.
• Matter of M-R-M-S-, 28 I&N Dec. 757 (BIA 2023): Cited by the BIA as support for its nexus conclusion. The Third Circuit flagged that Lopez v. Attorney General later criticized “much” of its analysis, but held the citation did not require remand here.
• Alexander-Mendoza v. Att'y Gen., 55 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2022): Provides the “so superior” formulation of substantial evidence review: the alternative interpretation must be so compelling that no reasonable adjudicator could agree with the agency.

Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds in three doctrinal steps:

1. Identify the governing nexus rule. For asylum, Petitioners had to show a protected ground “was or will be at least one central reason” for persecution (8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)); the panel states the same “one central reason” test applies to withholding (citing Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att'y Gen.). The court emphasizes that even when there are multiple motives, the protected one must not be “incidental, tangential, or superficial” (quoting Ndayshimiye v. Att'y Gen.).
2. Apply the economic-motive line of cases to the record. The panel accepted the BIA’s determination that MS-13’s core purpose was monetary: extortion, pillaging livestock/crops, and targeting those believed to have cash. The court highlighted Petitioners’ own testimony describing the killings and threats in money-linked terms (Isaias targeted “because of extortion”; Isaias’ wife targeted because “she had money”). Under Thayalan v. Att'y Gen. and Shehu v. Att'y Gen., profit-driven targeting typically fails nexus because the protected trait is not a central motive.
3. Defer under substantial evidence and reject remand arguments. Petitioners argued alternative motives—fear of vengeance and a broader “pattern and practice” of targeting families. The court treated this as an invitation to reweigh evidence, which substantial evidence review forbids. Under Alexander-Mendoza v. Att'y Gen., Petitioners had to show their inference was not just plausible but compelled. The court found it significant that Petitioners’ parents—members of the same asserted family group—lived in Colon throughout proceedings without harm, weakening the claim that family membership drove MS-13’s renewed interest.

The court also addressed a procedural/administrative-law concern: the BIA cited Matter of M-R-M-S-, and the Third Circuit had “remain[ed] concerned” about that reliance because Lopez v. Attorney General rejected parts of M-R-M-S- as inconsistent with the INA. Still, the panel concluded that the BIA’s decision, read with the whole record, did not turn on the disapproved “subordination” rationale and therefore did not warrant remand.

Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion is a useful indicator of how the Third Circuit is likely to handle two recurring issues:

• Family-based PSG claims still hinge on motive evidence. Even when violence affects multiple relatives, the court treats extortion/pillaging narratives as paradigmatic “money motive” cases unless applicants can show the family relationship itself is a central reason for targeting (e.g., retaliation uniquely tied to kinship, identity-based animus, or family status as the reason for selection rather than merely a convenient set of victims).
• Post-Lopez scrutiny of BIA reasoning is contextual, not automatic. The panel signals that a bare citation to Matter of M-R-M-S- will not automatically trigger remand; litigants must show the agency actually relied on the portion of M-R-M-S- that Lopez found incompatible with the INA.
• Relocation facts can indirectly affect nexus credibility. While the court did not decide the well-founded-fear question, it used the family’s safe residence in Colon (especially the parents’ safety) as practical evidence undermining the claim that the family relationship itself was driving a nationwide hunt.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Nexus”: The required link between the harm feared and a protected characteristic (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or PSG). It is not enough to show danger; the applicant must show the danger is because of a protected trait.
• “One central reason”: A protected ground must be an important motive for the persecutor—not merely an incidental backdrop. Mixed motives are allowed, but the protected one cannot be “tangential.”
• “Particular social group (PSG)”: A legally recognized group defined by shared characteristics. Here it was “immediate members of the Carbajal family.” The Third Circuit did not decide whether that PSG was legally cognizable because the BIA resolved the case on nexus alone.
• “Substantial evidence” review: A highly deferential standard. The court does not ask whether it would have decided differently; it asks whether the evidence compels a different result.
• “Remand”: Sending the case back to the agency for reconsideration. The court declined remand despite concerns about Matter of M-R-M-S- because it found the outcome did not rest on the disapproved rationale.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit upheld the BIA’s denial of asylum and withholding because substantial evidence supported the finding that MS-13’s actions were centrally motivated by economic gain and criminal objectives, not by Petitioners’ membership in the Carbajal family. The opinion also signals a pragmatic post-Lopez approach: even where the BIA cites Matter of M-R-M-S-, remand is not required unless the agency’s reasoning actually depends on the portion of that decision deemed incompatible with the INA. In practical terms, applicants advancing family-based theories must marshal concrete motive evidence showing family membership is a principal driver of targeting—beyond the fact that multiple relatives were harmed in a criminal extortion campaign.