Eaton v. Estabrook – When Disputed Facts Block the Shield:
The Second Circuit Limits Summary-Judgment Qualified Immunity in Excessive-Force Cases

Introduction

In Eaton v. Estabrook, No. 23-151 (2d Cir. 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit tackled the perennial problem of determining, on a summary-judgment record, whether a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity for alleged excessive force. The case arises out of a 2020 protest in Stamford, Connecticut, where Officer Steven Estabrook lifted protestor Jere Eaton by her bra strap, carried her several feet, and dropped her onto the pavement without warning, allegedly causing head and neck injuries. Eaton sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment excessive force) and under Connecticut common law (assault, battery, recklessness).

The district court granted summary judgment, holding that while factual disputes existed on excessive force, the officer was protected by federal qualified immunity and Connecticut governmental immunity. The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, announcing a critical limitation on the early invocation of qualified immunity: where the same disputed facts that affect the “excessive-force” analysis also bear on whether the law was clearly established, summary judgment must be denied so that a jury can resolve those facts.

Summary of the Judgment

• Federal claim (§ 1983): The panel (Judges Lynch, Nardini & Kahn, opinion by Judge Nardini) held that genuine disputes of material fact regarding what Estabrook saw, the urgency of the “Code 30,” and the necessity and degree of force simultaneously infected both parts of the qualified-immunity test. Because a jury could find the force objectively unreasonable under clearly established Second Circuit precedent, summary judgment was inappropriate. The court vacated the federal qualified-immunity ruling and ordered trial-stage resolution.
• State-law claims: The court affirmed dismissal of Eaton’s assault, battery and recklessness claims, finding Estabrook protected by Connecticut’s discretionary-act immunity. Eaton failed to raise triable evidence of “malice, wantonness, or intent to injure,” the only relevant exception.
• Disposition: AFFIRMED in part (state immunity), VACATED in part (federal immunity), and REMANDED.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The panel relied heavily on a line of Second Circuit excessive-force cases establishing that the gratuitous application of significant force to non-resisting individuals—arrestees or protestors—violates clearly established law:

• Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004) – police dragging peaceful demonstrators, choking and lifting them by wrists; summary judgment denied.
• Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2010) – pepper-spraying a handcuffed, non-resisting arrestee is gratuitous and excessive.
• Muschette ex rel. A.M. v. Gionfriddo, 910 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2018) – taser use on compliant suspect barred; cited Tracy as clearly establishing the rule.
• Lennox v. Miller, 968 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020) – kneeling and driving an arrestee’s head into the ground after handcuffing violates clearly established law.
• Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525 (2d Cir. 2018) – LRAD sonic weapon on non-violent protestors violates Fourteenth Amendment; protesters enjoy “robust” protection.
• Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2006) – Fourth Amendment violation for baton, kicks, punches against demonstrators.

These cases, the panel reasoned, gave “fair notice” that hoisting a non-resisting protestor by a bra strap, slamming her onto concrete, without warning, exceeded constitutional limits.

2. Legal Reasoning

1. Qualified-Immunity Framework. Two questions: (a) Did the officer violate a constitutional right? (b) Was that right clearly established? Both are usually legal questions, but when underlying historical facts are disputed, a jury must decide those facts before the court answers the legal questions.
2. Excessive Force under Fourteenth Amendment.
   • Standard: whether the force was “objectively unreasonable” in relation to a legitimate governmental objective (Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015)).
   • Material disputes: meaning/urgency of “Code 30,” what Estabrook actually saw upon arrival, and whether Eaton actually obstructed him. The video is brief and ambiguous, the officer’s own testimony conflicted, and alternate less-forceful paths appear possible.
3. Clearly-Established Prong.
   • The panel emphasized that the same factual disputes—what Estabrook saw, the urgency involved, how forceful he was—determine whether a reasonable officer would have known the conduct was unlawful.
   • Under the plaintiff-friendly view of the facts, Second Circuit precedent squarely prohibited gratuitous force against a non-resisting protestor. Therefore, qualified immunity could not be granted as a matter of law on a disputed record.
   • The panel reiterated that exact factual twins are not required; it is enough that “in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness is apparent.”
4. State Immunity. Connecticut’s discretionary-act immunity protects municipal employees unless the plaintiff proves malice, wantonness, or intent to injure. The evidence (heckling, speed, litigation statements) did not reasonably permit an inference of malice.

3. Impact of the Decision

• Procedural Practice. Defence lawyers frequently seek early dismissal on the clearly-established prong even where excessive-force facts are contested. Eaton instructs district courts that summary judgment is improper if those factual disputes also influence the clarity analysis. Expect more cases to proceed to trial or at least to Rule 50 motions after factual findings.
• Police-Protest Litigation. The opinion re-affirms that non-violent protestors enjoy the same freedom from gratuitous force as compliant arrestees. Crowd-control tactics that injure non-resisting demonstrators—without warnings and where less forceful alternatives exist—risk liability.
• Qualified-Immunity Doctrine. The ruling subtly narrows officers’ ability to rely on ambiguity: when the ambiguous facts are of their own making (e.g., conflicting testimony vs. video), immunity cannot be resolved until the factfinder speaks.
• State-Law Landscape. By contrasting federal and Connecticut immunities, the panel reminds practitioners that state common-law claims may die even where federal claims survive. Plaintiffs must marshal concrete malice evidence early.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified Immunity: A legal shield protecting government officials from personal liability unless they violate “clearly established” rights. Think of it as a legal “get-out-of-court-early” card, but only when facts are undisputed and the law is clear in the officer’s favor.
• Clearly Established Law: Pre-existing appellate or Supreme Court decisions that would put a reasonable officer on notice that the conduct is unconstitutional. Exact duplicates are unnecessary; the key is fair warning.
• Fourteenth vs. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force: The Fourth Amendment governs force during arrests; the Fourteenth governs force against free citizens or pre-trial detainees. After Kingsley (2015), the standard (objective reasonableness) is practically identical.
• “Code 30” / “Code 3” Confusion: Police radio shorthand signalling an emergency. In Eaton, its exact severity was muddled, illustrating how ambiguous facts can derail early immunity.
• State Discretionary-Act Immunity (Connecticut): Municipal employees are immune for discretionary functions unless they act with malice or intent to injure. Burden rests on the plaintiff, unlike federal qualified immunity where the burden is on the officer.

Conclusion

Eaton v. Estabrook sets a significant Second Circuit precedent: qualified immunity cannot be awarded at summary judgment when the same factual disputes that color the excessive-force inquiry also drive the “clearly established” analysis. The ruling reinforces the constitutional prohibition on gratuitous force against non-resisting protestors, clarifies that crowd-control measures are judged by ordinary excessive-force principles, and illustrates the divergent burdens and standards between federal and state immunities. Litigants and courts alike must now pay closer attention to whether disputed historical facts overlap both prongs of the immunity test. Where they do, juries—not judges on a paper record—must speak first.