HRPP Rule 40 Confirmed as a Constitutional Unitary Post-Conviction Procedure; Habeas Corpus Not “Abolished”; Missing Plea Transcript Does Not Trigger Burden-Shifting Where the Record Is Not Minimal

Introduction

Eason v. State sits at the intersection of post-conviction procedure, constitutional rulemaking authority, and the practical problem of missing court records decades after a guilty/no contest plea. Casey Cameron Eason pleaded no contest in 2004 to murder in the second degree without the State’s sought sentencing enhancement, receiving life with the possibility of parole. Seventeen years later—after four prior post-conviction filings that did not challenge his plea—Eason filed a fifth petition under Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 claiming his plea was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. A key factual twist drove the petition: by 2019, the judiciary had disposed of the audio/stenographic materials for the March 31, 2004 change-of-plea hearing, so no verbatim transcript could be produced.

The State appealed the Rule 40 court’s grant of relief, raising (1) a structural attack on Rule 40 itself (arguing it unlawfully expands substantive rights in violation of HRS § 602-11), (2) waiver under HRPP Rule 40(a)(3), and (3) merits issues relating to the adequacy of the plea record and voluntariness. The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi accepted transfer and issued an opinion that (a) fortifies Rule 40’s constitutional foundation, (b) clarifies the relationship between Rule 40 and habeas corpus, and (c) tightens the “minimal record/silent record” doctrine used to allocate burdens in plea validity challenges.

Summary of the Opinion

The court vacated the Rule 40 court’s judgment granting Eason relief, reinstating Eason’s 2004 conviction and sentence. It rejected the State’s jurisdictional challenge to Rule 40, explaining Rule 40 is a procedural mechanism properly promulgated under article VI, section 7, designed to consolidate common-law and statutory post-conviction remedies (including habeas corpus and coram nobis) into a unitary procedure. The court further clarified that, while Rule 40 procedures supersede statutory procedural provisions in HRS chapter 660 for post-conviction habeas practice, habeas corpus is not “abolished”—and the court corrected prior language to the contrary by partially overruling Gordon v. Maesaka-Hirata.

On Eason’s petition, the court concluded waiver “appears” to apply because Eason could have raised the plea challenge earlier while recordings still existed. Nevertheless, it reached the merits due to unusual circumstances, including mental health issues, education level, earlier efforts to obtain transcripts, and later record disposal. Substantively, the court held the record was not “minimal” despite the missing transcript because other contemporaneous sources (clerk’s minutes, signed plea form, counsel’s declaration/letters, judge’s certificate of routine practice, examiner reports, and related hearing transcripts) provided a sufficiently complete record. Accordingly, the burden remained on Eason, and he did not prove his plea was involuntary or unknowing; the plea was valid.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited

A. Constitutional rulemaking authority and rule/statute conflicts

• State v. Obrero and Cox v. Cox: The State invoked State v. Obrero (and Cox v. Cox as quoted there) to argue court rules must yield when they enlarge substantive rights contrary to statute (HRS § 602-11). The court distinguished Obrero as involving rules that the majority deemed to affect substantive rights; by contrast, Rule 40 was characterized as procedural and as implementing long-recognized post-conviction avenues already available before Rule 40’s adoption.
• State v. Hawaiian Dredging Co.: Used to reinforce the proposition that, under article VI, section 7, court-promulgated rules govern procedural matters and can render conflicting procedural statutes ineffective once rules cover the same subject.
• Briones v. State and Grattafiori v. State: Cited by the State for the general proposition that there is no constitutional right to appeal and appellate rights are statutory. The court’s response was not to dispute that premise but to reframe Rule 40 as a collateral post-conviction procedure historically available in Hawaiʻi (not an improper judicial expansion of direct appeal rights).

B. Habeas corpus, coram nobis, and the evolution of collateral review

• Oili v. Chang: A pivotal anchor for the court’s historical account: even before Rule 40 took effect, Hawaiʻi courts entertained post-conviction habeas-type challenges; Oili also noted that after January 1, 1977, such proceedings would be governed by Rule 40. The opinion uses Oili to show Rule 40 unified procedures rather than created new substantive rights.
• Carvalho v. Olim, Reponte v. State, Russell v. Blackwell, and Wong v. Among: These cases demonstrated that Hawaiʻi courts have long examined constitutional validity of guilty pleas and waivers in collateral proceedings, including shifting burdens where the record is silent/minimal. Carvalho is especially important because it supplies a model “minimal record” scenario, which the court used to distinguish Eason’s comparatively extensive record.
• Gordon v. Maesaka-Hirata and Matter of Individuals in Custody of State: The court referenced these to address the “abolition” characterization of habeas. It then corrected the doctrinal framing: Rule 40 does not abolish the writ post-conviction; it substitutes a procedural framework. The court expressly overruled Gordon v. Maesaka-Hirata “to the extent it stated the writ of habeas corpus has been abolished in the post-conviction context.”
• In re Application of Gamaya, In re Application of Palakiko and Majors, and In re Application of Abreu: Used to acknowledge earlier territorial-era limitations that confined habeas largely to jurisdictional defects. The court then noted the historical expansion of habeas/constitutional review in modern doctrine.

C. Waiver doctrine under Rule 40

• Grindling v. State, Fragiao v. State, and Fagaragan v. State: These cases supplied the modern analytical structure for HRPP Rule 40(a)(3): the rebuttable presumption that failure to raise an issue earlier is knowing/understanding, and the role of “extraordinary circumstances.” The court concluded the Rule 40 court misapplied this framework by treating an alleged lack of a competency finding as essentially dispositive of waiver and by identifying “extraordinary circumstances” that did not explain why Eason failed to raise the plea issue earlier.
• Gilbert v. State: Not a Hawaiʻi decision, but cited to illustrate that “interests of justice” review is a recognized way courts sometimes bypass procedural bars. The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court used it to justify reaching merits here despite apparent waiver—while still reversing on the merits.

D. Plea validity, on-the-record colloquy, and “minimal record” burden rules

• State v. Merino, State v. Dicks, State v. Vaitogi, and Boykin v. Alabama: Together these establish that guilty/no contest pleas must be voluntary and knowing, and that HRPP Rule 11 implements the constitutional requirement through an on-the-record colloquy. Vaitogi also provided the “no ritualistic litany” principle, allowing flexibility in colloquy content as long as understanding is shown.
• State v. Hernandez: Reinforced that accepting a no contest plea without adequate on-the-record inquiry can be plain error; in Eason, however, the issue was not the absence of any inquiry but the later unavailability of a verbatim transcript.
• Eli v. State, Medeiros v. State, and Mara v. Naauao: These cases underscore that courts must not presume waiver from a silent record; in silent/minimal-record scenarios, the State may bear the burden to prove a valid plea. The court used Eli to restate the framework, then held Eason’s record was not silent or minimal.
• North Carolina v. Alford: Provided the core test: whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternatives.
• State v. Ganotisi and Mayer v. City of Chicago: These supported the practical point that appellate/post-conviction review does not always require a full verbatim transcript if a “record of sufficient completeness” exists through alternatives.
• State v. Pedro: The court relied on Pedro to position the signed change-of-plea form (“Form K” conceptually) as probative though not independently dispositive of constitutional validity.

E. Standards and interpretive principles (framework citations)

• State v. Milne, State v. Castillon, and State v. Abihai: Provide statutory interpretation methodology, used in the opinion’s general standards section and background framing.
• Citizens Against Reckless Dev. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals: Cited for resort to extrinsic aids when ambiguity exists.
• Matter of Hawaiian Elec. Co. and State v. Mortensen-Young: Provide the rule-interpretation framework (court rules construed using statutory construction principles).
• In re FG: Used for de novo constitutional review principles.

2) Legal Reasoning

A. Rule 40’s validity: procedure, not substantive-rights expansion

The court’s Rule 40 analysis proceeds in three steps.

1. Constitutional source of authority: The court foregrounded article VI, section 7 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution, emphasizing its grant of “full rule-making power” relating to process, practice, procedure, and appeals, with the “force and effect of law.” The opinion buttressed this with detailed constitutional history from the 1950 convention materials, framing the judiciary’s rulemaking power as intentionally flexible and designed to avoid “slower legislative process.”
2. Rule 40’s purpose and lineage: Rule 40 was characterized as a “unitary post-conviction procedure” modeled on American Bar Association standards, consolidating habeas corpus and coram nobis post-conviction practice. Importantly, the court emphasized that before Rule 40, Hawaiʻi courts already entertained post-conviction constitutional challenges through habeas/coram nobis mechanisms (e.g., Carvalho v. Olim, Wong v. Among), so Rule 40 did not create a new substantive remedy; it standardized procedures.
3. Distinguishing rule/statute conflict cases: The State’s State v. Obrero argument failed because the court found no impermissible substantive-right enlargement. Rule 40 does not purport to extend the time for direct appeal under HRS § 641-11; it provides a collateral vehicle long recognized in Hawaiʻi law. Thus, the Rule 40 court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

B. Habeas corpus clarification and partial overruling

The opinion draws a careful distinction between (1) the existence of habeas corpus as a substantive constitutional privilege (article I, section 15) and (2) the procedural vehicle used post-conviction to litigate claims “in or in the nature of habeas corpus.” The court held Rule 40 does not abolish habeas corpus; it governs the procedures for pursuing it post-conviction, superseding conflicting procedural statutes in HRS chapter 660 under article VI, section 7.

This produced a notable corrective move: the court overruled Gordon v. Maesaka-Hirata “to the extent it stated the writ of habeas corpus has been abolished in the post-conviction context,” replacing “abolition” language with a “procedural supersession” understanding. This is not merely semantic; it harmonizes Rule 40 practice with constitutional habeas protections while maintaining Rule 40’s gatekeeping structure (including waiver and previously-ruled-upon limits).

C. Waiver: doctrinal strictness tempered by “interests of justice”

The court reaffirmed that waiver under HRPP Rule 40(a)(3) is ordinarily a threshold barrier and criticized the Rule 40 court for treating the alleged absence of a competency determination as “dispositive” to rebut the presumption of knowing failure. The supreme court emphasized a functional understanding of “extraordinary circumstances”: they must explain why the petitioner failed to raise the issue earlier, not simply describe why the current record is difficult.

Yet the court then exercised discretion to reach the merits, citing “unusual circumstances” (mental health issues, limited education, earlier albeit unsuccessful transcript efforts, and later record disposal) and invoking “interests of justice,” with Gilbert v. State as an illustrative authority. The resulting posture is important: the court preserved the doctrinal force of waiver while signaling that, in rare cases involving serious consequences and structural record-loss concerns, it may address the merits—without relaxing the merits standards.

D. “Minimal record” and burden allocation: missing transcript is not dispositive

The central procedural correction in the merits analysis is the court’s rejection of the Rule 40 court’s “minimal record” finding. The court distinguished classic minimal/silent record cases like Carvalho v. Olim, where essentially no contemporaneous plea record existed. Here, the court identified a multi-source record sufficient to evaluate plea validity: clerk’s minutes expressly finding voluntariness and understanding; a signed written plea form; counsel’s contemporaneous declaration and letters documenting plea discussions; a certificate from the retired judge describing routine practice; examiner reports finding fitness; other hearing transcripts (including the March 11, 2004 hearing showing Eason’s awareness of the seriousness of the charge and consequences); and sentencing/PSI materials.

This finding controlled the burden of proof. Under Eli v. State and Wong v. Among, a silent/minimal record can place the burden on the State to prove a valid waiver/plea. But because the record was not minimal, the burden remained with Eason to prove by a preponderance that the plea was not voluntary and intelligent. The court held Eason failed to carry that burden.

E. Voluntariness and knowledge: credibility assessment against the “entire record”

Applying Eli v. State’s directive to consider the “entire record,” the court concluded Eason’s coercion claim was not “credible and worthy of belief,” pointing to:

• clerk’s minutes stating the court found voluntariness and understanding;
• PSI statements indicating Eason’s own reason for accepting the plea (fear of a third party), not coercion by counsel or mother;
• testimony from the prosecuting attorney that the plea was carefully reviewed and that Eason even modified the plea form; and
• fitness findings by multiple examiners.

On knowledge/intelligence, the court emphasized counsel’s extensive written communications explaining plea consequences and trial risks, the March 11, 2004 transcript showing Eason’s expressed understanding, and the plea form’s recitation of rights waived (jury trial, calling witnesses, etc.). It also treated boilerplate inconsistencies in the plea form as insufficient to undermine the core advisements that life with possibility of parole was the sentence exposure under the agreement.

3) Impact

A. укрепление (fortification) of Rule 40 against structural attacks

The opinion supplies a robust constitutional-history justification for Rule 40, making future attempts to invalidate the rule on HRS § 602-11 grounds more difficult. The court’s key move is to frame Rule 40 as procedural codification of preexisting collateral remedies rather than a judicial creation of new substantive rights. Practically, this insulates Rule 40 from arguments that it impermissibly “expands appeals” beyond HRS chapter 641.

B. Doctrinal clarification: habeas corpus persists, procedures shift

By partially overruling Gordon v. Maesaka-Hirata, the court resets how litigants and lower courts should describe post-conviction habeas practice: the writ is not abolished; Rule 40 supplies the procedural channel. This matters for constitutional framing (article I, section 15), statutory interpretation of HRS chapter 660, and how courts analyze separation-of-powers objections.

C. Plea litigation with missing transcripts: “record not minimal” becomes a meaningful gate

The decision narrows the set of cases where the State bears the burden to reconstruct and prove plea validity. A missing verbatim transcript, even when due to lawful record disposal, does not automatically make the record “minimal.” Where minutes, a plea form, counsel communications, fitness reports, and other transcripts exist, the petitioner likely retains the burden. This will influence post-conviction strategy: petitioners will need to show not only transcript absence but substantive gaps across the broader record that prevent a meaningful constitutional assessment.

D. Waiver: reaffirmed rigor with a safety valve

Although the court criticized the Rule 40 court’s waiver reasoning, it still reached the merits “in the interests of justice.” Future petitioners may cite Eason to argue discretionary merits review despite waiver—especially where record loss complicates review—but the opinion simultaneously signals that such review does not mean relaxed burdens or presumptions on the merits.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• HRPP Rule 40 (post-conviction relief): A single, comprehensive procedure for challenging a final criminal conviction or custody after conviction. It consolidates older tools like habeas corpus and coram nobis into one rules-based process.
• Procedural vs. substantive rights: “Procedural” rules govern how a right is asserted in court (deadlines, filings, hearings). “Substantive” rights define what rights people have (e.g., the right to appeal, the elements of a crime). Courts can generally make procedural rules; they cannot create or expand substantive rights contrary to statute.
• Waiver under HRPP Rule 40(a)(3): If a person could have raised an issue earlier (trial, appeal, earlier Rule 40 petition) but didn’t, the claim is usually barred unless the person rebuts a presumption of knowing failure or proves “extraordinary circumstances” that explain the omission.
• “Silent” or “minimal” record and burden shifting: If the historical record of a plea is essentially absent, courts may presume the plea was not valid and require the State to prove validity. If substantial alternative records exist, the petitioner usually must prove invalidity.
• Voluntary, knowing, intelligent plea (constitutional standard): A plea is valid only if the defendant chose it freely (no coercion) and understood the rights being given up (trial, witnesses, confrontation) and the consequences (nature of charge and sentencing exposure).
• Fitness to proceed (HRS chapter 704 context): Whether a defendant is competent to participate in the case and assist counsel. In this opinion, the court treated missing evidence of a “fitness determination” as insufficient—by itself—to control waiver or invalidate the plea given the broader record.

Conclusion

Eason v. State does more than resolve a decades-late plea challenge. It (1) emphatically confirms HRPP Rule 40 as a valid exercise of constitutional judicial rulemaking power, (2) clarifies that post-conviction habeas corpus is not abolished—its procedures are governed by Rule 40—and partially overrules Gordon v. Maesaka-Hirata accordingly, and (3) tightens the doctrine governing missing plea transcripts by holding that an unavailable verbatim record does not automatically create a “minimal record” or shift the burden to the State when other reliable contemporaneous sources exist. The broader message is institutional: Hawaiʻi’s post-conviction system remains open to constitutional claims, but petitioners must navigate waiver and must prove plea invalidity when the available record is sufficiently complete to permit meaningful review.