Dynamic IP Circumstantial Evidence Can Sustain Criminal Contempt; Date and Time Are Not Elements of Contempt or Probation Violations in New Hampshire

Introduction

In State of New Hampshire v. Ian Todd MacDonald (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Aug. 20, 2025), the court affirmed a bench-trial conviction for indirect criminal contempt and a finding of “true” on a probation violation, both predicated on the defendant’s submission of a vulgar, impersonating message to the victim’s employer through an online support portal. The case grew out of a prior criminal case in which MacDonald violated a civil stalking protective order, resulting in a sentencing order with strict no-contact terms and a prohibition on interfering with the victim at her residence, school, or place of employment.

On appeal, MacDonald raised two principal issues: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly the State’s reliance on circumstantial digital evidence tied to a dynamic IP address and the absence of proof that he personally used the device at the precise date and time of the submission; and (2) whether the date and time of the conduct are required elements of criminal contempt and a probation violation. The Supreme Court rejected both arguments and affirmed.

The order—issued under Supreme Court Rule 20(3)—does not merely apply existing standards; it clarifies how New Hampshire courts may treat circumstantial digital evidence, including dynamic IP address records, within the established “sole rational conclusion” framework, and it reaffirms that date and time are not elements the State must prove for indirect criminal contempt or a “good conduct” probation violation.

Summary of the Opinion

Sufficiency of evidence: Construing the record in the State’s favor, the court held that the chain of circumstantial evidence—including motive, knowledge of the victim’s personal email, the targeted and hostile content sent to the victim’s employer, geolocation to Manchester, and crucially, ISP records showing that less than 24 hours earlier the IP address in question was assigned to a device connected through the defendant’s office modem—was strong enough that guilt was the sole rational conclusion.
Elements of indirect criminal contempt: The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt a valid order, the defendant’s knowledge of it, and his intentional noncompliance (via contact/interference directed at the victim’s place of employment).
Probation violation: Under a preponderance standard, the same conduct sufficed to establish a violation of the “good conduct” term of probation.
Date and time: The court reaffirmed that date and time are not elements of the offenses at issue and rejected the defendant’s contention that the State had to prove the precise time and date of the online submission. The court also noted the pleadings were amended by assent to December 21, and the proof supported that date.

Factual and Procedural Background

MacDonald, a physical therapist in Manchester, developed a friendship with a former patient who later terminated the relationship, citing “red flags.” After she obtained a stalking protective order, MacDonald violated it by approaching within 300 feet of her undisclosed residence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to probation with electronic monitoring and no-contact conditions that included prohibitions on “electronic communications” and “interfering with [the victim] at her … place of employment.”

In late 2022, the victim objected to the probation officer’s intent to end MacDonald’s electronic monitoring. On December 21, 2022, at about 10:11 a.m., someone submitted an online support ticket to the victim’s employer using her name and personal email address with the subject line “lying” and the message “How can I stop being an ugly c*nt b*tch?” The employer’s support specialist—recognizing the victim’s name as an employee—alerted her. Technical data showed a Manchester, New Hampshire origin and revealed the IP address used.

A police reporting error listed the incident date as December 20, which led to an ISP subpoena for December 20 at noon. The ISP’s records custodian testified that at that time, the ticket’s IP address was assigned to a device connected through the defendant’s business modem. The ISP used dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP), meaning IPs could change when devices (re)connected. The probation officer testified MacDonald was at his office on December 20. Before trial, the court—on the State’s motion and with the defense’s assent—corrected the pleadings to allege December 21, the actual date of the submission.

The trial court convicted MacDonald of criminal contempt and found the probation violation “true,” remarking that date and time were not elements the State had to prove. MacDonald appealed.

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

1) State v. Seibel, 174 N.H. 440 (2021)

Seibel supplies the controlling sufficiency-of-the-evidence framework. The court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the State, asking whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When the State’s case is wholly circumstantial, the “critical question” is whether the inferential chain is strong enough that guilt is the “sole rational conclusion.”

In MacDonald, the Supreme Court invoked Seibel to uphold reliance on circumstantial digital and contextual evidence—motive, access to the victim’s personal email address, directed hostility, routing through Manchester, and the ISP tie to the defendant’s business modem within 24 hours—to conclude that alternative hypotheses (that someone else used the modem or that the IP was reassigned) were not reasonable.

2) State v. Saintil-Brown, 172 N.H. 110 (2019)

Saintil-Brown clarifies the defendant’s burden on appeal in sufficiency challenges, especially in circumstantial cases: he must show the evidence does not exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt. The analysis focuses on reasonable alternative conclusions, not all conceivable ones.

Here, MacDonald proposed that either the IP address could have been reassigned or that another person submitted the ticket through his modem. The court, echoing Saintil-Brown’s emphasis on reasonableness, held these were not reasonable inferences under the record.

3) State v. Vincelette, 172 N.H. 350 (2019)

Vincelette sets out the elements for indirect criminal contempt: a valid order, the defendant’s knowledge of it, and intentional failure to comply beyond a reasonable doubt. The MacDonald court applied these elements to conclude that submitting an impersonating, hostile message to the victim’s employer constituted prohibited “contact” by electronic means and “interfering with [the victim] at her … place of employment,” thus satisfying intentional noncompliance.

4) State v. Kelly, 159 N.H. 390 (2009)

Kelly governs probation violations: the State need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence either the fact of a criminal conviction for the acts or the commission of the acts themselves. In MacDonald, the same conduct supporting contempt easily met this lower evidentiary threshold for a “good conduct” probation violation.

5) State v. Homo, 132 N.H. 514 (1989)

Homo stands for the proposition that the specific date or time of the offense is generally not an element the State must prove unless the statute or due process concerns make timing essential. Relying on Homo, the court rejected MacDonald’s argument that date and time were required elements of either indirect criminal contempt or a probation violation premised on “good conduct,” while also noting the pleadings were amended by assent to the correct date and the proof matched that date.

Legal Reasoning

A. Sufficiency of Circumstantial Digital Evidence

The court’s analysis threads multiple circumstantial strands:

Recent, contentious history, including a violation of a protective order and ongoing tension about ending electronic monitoring;
Motive and access: the defendant knew the victim’s personal email; the message targeted the victim’s employment;
Message characteristics: inflammatory, personalized, and sent to the employer under the victim’s name and email address;
Technical trail: the submission originated from Manchester, and the IP address captured in the ticket was assigned less than 24 hours earlier to a device connected through the defendant’s business modem;
Context limiting third-party theories: the small office setting with only one employee, absence of evidence of other plausible antagonists, and the nature of the communication (impersonation and targeted harassment of the victim via her workplace).

Although the ISP used DHCP (which can reassign IP addresses when devices connect/disconnect), the court deemed it a reasonable inference that the same device remained connected through the defendant’s modem less than a day later, especially when corroborated by motive and access. The defense’s suggestions—reassignment to a different customer or an unknown third party using the defendant’s network—were characterized as not reasonable on this record. Under Seibel, the inferential chain was strong enough that guilt was the sole rational conclusion.

B. Elements and Intent for Indirect Criminal Contempt

Applying Vincelette, the court identified the valid sentencing order (no contact by any method and no interference at the victim’s workplace), the defendant’s knowledge of that order, and intentional noncompliance through the online submission. The content and targeting of the message supported an inference that the conduct was purposefully directed at the victim’s employment, satisfying the “intentional failure to comply” element.

C. Probation Violation Standard and Proof

With Kelly as the guide, the “good conduct” violation needed only a preponderance of evidence of the underlying acts. The same body of proof that cleared the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt bar for criminal contempt easily satisfied the lower standard for probation, justifying the “true” finding.

D. Date and Time Are Not Elements

The court expressly rejected the claim that the State had to prove the precise date and time of the offense as elements of either charge. Citing Homo, the court underscored that time is generally not an element unless made essential by statute or due process. While the State corrected the pleadings by assent to December 21 and the record supported that date, the court’s holding confirms that the absence of precise timing proof does not defeat these types of prosecutions.

Impact and Practical Implications

1) Digital Evidence: Dynamic IPs and the “Sole Rational Conclusion” Test

MacDonald provides important guidance for cases involving online harassment, cyberstalking, and protective-order violations:

Dynamic IP address evidence can be sufficient when corroborated by motive, access, targeting, geography, and contextual facts that render alternate hypotheses unreasonable.
Prosecutors need not produce ISP logs pinpointing the exact minute of the offense to a subscriber’s modem when adjacent-in-time records and circumstantial corroboration close the inferential gap.
Defense theories premised on speculative IP reassignment or anonymous third-party use of a network will be tested for reasonableness in light of the whole record, not viewed in isolation.

2) Breadth of No-Contact and “Interference with Employment” Conditions

The decision reinforces that no-contact orders covering “electronic communications” and prohibiting “interference at the victim’s place of employment” encompass indirect attempts to harm the victim professionally, including impersonation or messaging directed to the employer. Efforts to reach the victim through her workplace ecosystem may violate both the no-contact and employment-interference prongs.

3) Date/Time Proof Not Required as Elements

By reaffirming Homo in the contempt and probation contexts, the court clarifies that the State’s burden does not extend to proving precise timing as an element, which will limit defense strategies that hinge on exploiting minor timing discrepancies. That said, accurate recordkeeping and subpoenas remain best practice; here, the State succeeded despite an initial date error because the overall evidentiary chain was robust.

4) Probation Practice

The decision is a reminder that probation violations are adjudicated under a preponderance standard and that the State may proceed on the commission of acts themselves, without awaiting a separate criminal conviction. When the same conduct underlies a contempt conviction, the probation violation typically follows.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Indirect criminal contempt: Punishes intentional disobedience of a court order occurring outside the court’s presence. Elements: valid order, knowledge, intentional noncompliance.
Good-conduct probation condition: A standard term requiring the probationer to obey laws and refrain from harmful conduct; violations are proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP): An ISP assigns IP addresses dynamically to devices when they connect to a network. An IP may change over time, but adjacent-in-time assignments tied to the same modem can be compelling circumstantial evidence when combined with other facts.
“Sole rational conclusion” test: In circumstantial cases, the question is whether, assuming credibility findings favoring the State, the chain of inferences is strong enough that guilt is the only reasonable conclusion.
Supreme Court Rule 20(3): Allows the New Hampshire Supreme Court to resolve certain appeals by order rather than full opinion. The order still articulates the court’s application of governing law.

Conclusion

State v. MacDonald reaffirms core New Hampshire principles governing circumstantial proof and clarifies their application to modern, digital contexts. First, dynamic IP address evidence—when paired with motive, access, message content, and geo-context—can satisfy the State’s burden in proving indirect criminal contempt stemming from online conduct. Second, the specific date and time of the offense are not elements of indirect criminal contempt or a “good conduct” probation violation. Together, these holdings fortify the enforceability of no-contact and workplace-interference conditions against technologically mediated harassment and provide practical guidance for prosecutors and defense counsel navigating digital evidence in protective-order and probation settings.

The decision underscores that courts will evaluate digital breadcrumbs within the totality of the circumstances, and speculative alternative theories will not prevail where the inferential chain makes guilt the sole rational conclusion. It also signals that indirect routes to reach or harm a victim—such as messaging an employer—fall squarely within the prohibitions of comprehensive no-contact and employment-interference orders.

Key Takeaways

Dynamic IP evidence, even without a timestamp-perfect match, can be enough when the circumstantial record is strong.
Date and time are not elements of indirect criminal contempt or probation “good conduct” violations in New Hampshire.
Contacting or interfering with a victim via her employer can violate no-contact and employment-interference conditions.
Probation violations may rest on the commission of acts proven by a preponderance, independent of a separate conviction.

Case: State of New Hampshire v. Ian Todd MacDonald, No. 2024-0292 (N.H. Aug. 20, 2025) (order). Panel: MacDonald, C.J., Donovan, and Countway, JJ. Disposition: Affirmed.