Durbin v. Durbin: Escalating Parental Conflict as a “Substantial Change in Circumstances” Justifying Custody Modification

1. Introduction

Durbin v. Durbin, decided by the Supreme Court of North Carolina on 22 August 2025, addresses when post-decree parental conflict—particularly conflict endangering a child’s health—satisfies the statutory requirement of a “substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7. The Court held that where high-conflict behavior escalates to the point of jeopardizing a child’s safety or medical welfare, the trial court may modify an existing custody order even though conflict per se is common in custody matters.

Parties: Jennifer C. Durbin (Mother, appellant before the Supreme Court) and Matthew L. Durbin (Father, appellee). After years of joint custody, Mother sought modification, alleging Father’s non-compliance with medical directives and persistent, hostile interactions with both her and the parenting coordinator.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court reversed a divided Court of Appeals panel and reinstated the District Court’s July 2022 Modified Custody Order.
Key Holding: When a parent’s escalating conflict risks injury to the child—e.g., refusal to administer asthma medication and interference with therapy—those facts constitute a substantial change in circumstances. That finding, combined with best-interest analysis, supports modification.
The Court clarified that conflict with a parenting coordinator, though not inherently a change, becomes relevant once it interferes with important decisions affecting the health, education, and welfare of the child.
The majority emphasized appellate deference to trial-court fact-finding in custody matters.
A dissent by Justice Berger warned that the majority “eliminates” Shipman’s two-step test by conflating change-in-circumstances with impact on the child.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Shipman v. Shipman

357 N.C. 471 (2003) supplies the modern, two-pronged framework: first, determine a substantial change; second, ask whether that change affects welfare, then determine best interest. Durbin re-affirms Shipman but extends it by explicitly acknowledging escalating conflict as a cognizable change when injury risk is shown.

Pulliam v. Smith

348 N.C. 616 (1998) allows modification when the change is either adverse or likely beneficial. Durbin cites Pulliam to justify that preventing future harm (ensuring medication compliance) is “beneficial.”

In re Custody of Peal

305 N.C. 640 (1982) underscores “best interest” as the guiding star. Durbin relies on this to uphold trial-court discretion once substantial change is found.

Smith v. Dressler

291 N.C. App. 197 (2023) stood for the idea that conduct considered in the prior order cannot be repackaged as a new change. The Court distinguishes Smith, noting the challenged behavior here occurred after the 2020 consent order.

Conroy v. Conroy

291 N.C. App. 145 (2023) affirmed that long-standing dysfunctional communication may become a new “substantial change” when its impact actually manifests. Durbin uses this logic analogously.

Woodring, Hibshman, Stanback, Tucker

These cases reiterate that only post-order events matter and that custody decrees deserve some stability. Durbin balances that policy against child safety.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Findings Supported by Substantial Evidence. Because Father did not challenge many findings, they were binding on appeal (James v. Pretlow). Key unchallenged facts:
- Father refused to follow the parenting coordinator’s medication-log directive.
- Missed or cancelled therapy sessions during Father’s custodial time.
- Retaliatory tactics toward the parenting coordinator (bar grievance, deposition notices).
- Premature disclosure of custody disputes to the children, causing distress.
Nexus Requirement Satisfied. The Court stressed a cause-and-effect link: medication non-adherence led to breathing issues requiring intervention, illustrating adverseness to the child’s welfare.
Distinction Between Ordinary and Dangerous Conflict. Conflict is common, but when it poses a risk to safety it passes the § 50-13.7 threshold.
Deference to Trial Court. Relying on Hamlin, the majority reaffirmed the “broad discretion” standard; appellate courts should not re-weigh evidence.
Best-Interest Confirmation. Once change was established, shifting primary physical custody and final medical decision-making to Mother reduced risk and conflict; ergo, it served the children’s best interests.

3.3 Anticipated Impact on Future Cases

Lower Evidentiary Barrier on Conflict-Driven Modifications. Trial courts may now treat documented escalation in parental hostility—when linked to medical or psychological harm—as a standalone “substantial change.”
Enhanced Role (and Protection) for Parenting Coordinators. Resistance that neutralizes a coordinator’s function can itself evidence change, encouraging parties to comply or risk losing custody share.
Guidance on Medical Non-Compliance. Refusal to administer medication is squarely within the statute’s ambit; courts need not wait for catastrophic outcomes.
Appellate Review Boundaries Clarified. Durbin reiterates that unchallenged findings bind the Court of Appeals; litigants must attack findings directly or live with them.
Potential Increase in Modification Motions. Litigants may cite Durbin when alleging recurring obstructionism; trial courts, however, retain wide discretion to filter out vexatious filings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial Change in Circumstances: A meaningful shift in facts after the last custody order that either harms or benefits the child. Ordinary parental disagreements rarely qualify unless they tangibly affect the child.
Parenting Coordinator (PC): A neutral professional appointed in “high-conflict cases” under § 50-90 et seq. to resolve day-to-day disputes (pickup times, medical logistics). PCs can issue directives that are binding unless reviewed by the court.
Best Interest of the Child: The North Carolina lodestar: courts examine safety, health, emotional well-being, and development. Once a substantial change is found, the new arrangement must still best serve these interests.
Appellate Deference: Higher courts will not second-guess factual determinations if “substantial evidence” supports them, even when contrary evidence exists.

5. Conclusion

Durbin v. Durbin crystallizes a practical rule: When parental conflict escalates and materially endangers a child’s health or therapeutic progress, it is itself a substantial change warranting custody modification. The Supreme Court buttressed trial-court discretion, sharpened the nexus test, and fortified the authority of parenting coordinators. Though the dissent warns of diluting Shipman’s two-step guardrail, the majority believes the line is maintained—just more clearly crossed when genuine risk appears. For practitioners, Durbin underscores meticulous fact-finding: contemporaneous medical records, therapy logs, and coordinator reports can make or break a modification effort. For families, the case is a cautionary tale: persistent non-cooperation and hostility, especially surrounding medical care, may swiftly shift the custodial landscape.