Dugan v. Sorensen:
Clarifying the “Course of Conduct” Requirement and Curtailing Justification Defenses for Harassment Protection Orders in Nebraska

1. Introduction

On 27 June 2025 the Nebraska Supreme Court issued Dugan v. Sorensen, 319 Neb. 326, a watershed opinion that reshapes the procedural and substantive contours of harassment protection orders (HPOs) in Nebraska. The dispute arose from a violent altercation between William C. Dugan (petitioner/appellee) and Steve Sorensen (respondent/appellant), the latter being the new spouse of Dugan’s ex-wife, Natalie. After a physical attack and subsequent threats, Dugan obtained an ex parte HPO which Sorensen challenged at a show-cause hearing and on appeal.

The decision answers two recurring questions in HPO litigation:

1. What constitutes a “course of conduct”?
2. May a respondent defeat an HPO by invoking criminal-law “justification” defenses (self-defense/defense of others)?

In doing so, the Court sets new precedent, expressly disapproves parts of the earlier Court of Appeals decision in Knopik v. Hahn, and provides detailed guidance for trial courts and practitioners alike.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding 1 – Course of Conduct: An HPO petitioner must prove at least two separate acts of harassment; those acts may occur “however short” a period apart and even within the same general incident, provided there is a meaningful spatial or temporal break permitting reflection and renewed intent.
• Holding 2 – Time Separation Not Required: Section 28-311.02(2)(b) does not impose any minimum interval between consecutive acts; the statutory phrase “over a period of time, however short” must be given full effect.
• Holding 3 – Limitation of Knopik v. Hahn: To the extent Knopik suggested (a) a single “brief incident” cannot supply multiple acts or (b) physical assaults are outside the harassment rubric, it is disapproved.
• Holding 4 – Justification Defense: Criminal-law justification statutes (§§28-1409-1416) do not create an automatic defense in civil protection-order proceedings because the Legislature limited their applicability to criminal cases and certain civil tort claims, not HPOs.
• Outcome: District court’s order continuing the HPO for one year is affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Analysis of § 28-311.02(2)(b)
   The phrase “series of acts over a period of time, however short” was given its ordinary meaning. Read together with the need to show a “pattern of conduct,” the Court concluded:

   A single act can never satisfy the statute; minimum of two acts required. But the statute deliberately eschews a time-gap requirement — permitting multiple acts in rapid succession.

2. Temporal/Spatial Break Concept
   Borrowing persuasive authority from Florida (Levy v. Jacobs) and Vermont (Beatty v. Keough), the Court articulated a practical test:
   • Was there a pause enabling the respondent to “pause, reflect, and form a new intent” to engage in further harassment?
   • Did the conduct move to a different location or continue after a gap in time?
   In Dugan, the break occurred when William retreated to his car, moved it to the street and waited minutes for police before Sorensen re-engaged with threats. That sufficed.
3. Objective Reasonable-Person Standard Reaffirmed
   Whether conduct “seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimidates” is judged objectively (drawing on Diedra T.). The violent tackle and subsequent threats easily met this test.
4. Rejection of Justification Defense
   The Court parsed § 28-1416 and held its reach is limited to criminal cases and certain tort suits. Because the Legislature did not insert protection-order proceedings into that statute, justification is not a complete bar. The Court also noted respondent waived any “legitimate-purpose” variant of the argument by not raising it below.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

• Streamlines HPO Litigation: Petitioners no longer need to dredge up months or years of prior harassment if two discrete acts occur within the same encounter.
• Trial-Court Guidance: Judges may focus on whether a discernible break existed and whether a renewed intent can be inferred, instead of mechanically counting “days” between acts.
• Limits on Defense Tactics: Respondents cannot rely on criminal-law justification as an automatic shield in HPO cases, forcing careful litigation strategy.
• Prospective Citation: Expect Dugan to be cited whenever Nebraska courts or practitioners litigate “course of conduct,” and when determining admissibility/relevance of self-defense evidence.
• Legislative Signal: If the Legislature wishes justification to apply in HPOs, it must amend § 28-1416 — otherwise, Dugan controls.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Harassment Protection Order (HPO)

A civil order under §§28-311.09–.11 that prohibits an individual from harassing, threatening, or contacting the petitioner. Violation is a criminal offense.

Course of Conduct

Under Nebraska law, a “pattern” consisting of two or more acts evidencing a unified purpose. After Dugan, the acts need only be separated by a meaningful pause, not any fixed timeframe.

Show-Cause Hearing

Post-ex parte evidentiary hearing where the petitioner bears the initial burden to prove the facts supporting the order; once met, the burden shifts to the respondent to show cause why the order should not remain.

Justification (Self-Defense / Defense of Others)

Criminal-law affirmative defense asserting the use of force was necessary and lawful. Dugan holds it is not automatically applicable in HPO proceedings.

De Novo Review

Appellate standard where the reviewing court re-examines the entire record and reaches its own conclusions, while giving weight to trial-court credibility findings.

5. Conclusion

Dugan v. Sorensen stands as a pivotal clarification in Nebraska’s protection-order jurisprudence. By concretizing the “two-act minimum,” rejecting rigid time-gap requirements, and disallowing wholesale importation of criminal justification defenses into civil HPO proceedings, the Court provides a coherent, victim-centred framework that balances procedural fairness with public safety. Future litigants must now dissect incidents into distinct acts, evaluate spatial/temporal breaks, and craft defenses that address the statute’s “legitimate purpose” language rather than rely on criminal-law doctrines. Practitioners and trial judges should internalize these directives to ensure accurate, efficient adjudication of harassment claims going forward.