Due Process Requires Oral Pronouncement (or Incorporation by Reference) of Discretionary Supervised‑Release Conditions; Appeal Waiver Does Not Compel Dismissal When the Written Judgment Conflicts with the Oral Sentence

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in United States v. Samuel Adam Buchanan, No. 23‑12879 (11th Cir. Oct. 14, 2025). The case presents two distinct issues:

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm) is unconstitutional as applied to Buchanan in light of the Second Amendment; and
Whether due process was violated when the district court included discretionary “standard” conditions of supervised release in the written judgment that were not orally pronounced at sentencing, and whether an appeal waiver in Buchanan’s plea agreement bars that challenge.

The district court sentenced Buchanan to 120 months’ imprisonment (the statutory maximum applicable in his case) and three years of supervised release. At sentencing, the court orally announced certain “special” conditions (DNA collection, substance‑abuse avoidance and treatment, and reasonable warrantless searches), but it did not identify any additional “standard” conditions. The subsequent written judgment, however, included nineteen standard conditions in addition to the special conditions orally described. Buchanan appealed both the Second Amendment issue and the supervised‑release conditions. The government opposed the former based on binding circuit precedent and sought to dismiss the latter based on an appeal waiver, while conceding the district court’s pronouncement error.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit:

Affirmed the conviction, holding that Buchanan’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by circuit precedent reaffirmed in United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025), which itself relies on United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010).
Vacated the discretionary supervised‑release conditions contained only in the written judgment and remanded for resentencing on those conditions. Applying United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231 (11th Cir. 2023), the panel held that due process requires oral pronouncement (or a clear incorporation by reference) of discretionary conditions at the sentencing hearing. Unlike the circumstances in United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832 (11th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Read, 118 F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2024), the district court here never identified the “standard” conditions at sentencing. The government’s motion to dismiss based on the appeal waiver was denied because Read did not resolve whether a waiver bars appeals when the written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement, and the government offered no additional authority to support dismissal. The panel found persuasive an analogous Sixth Circuit view that such claims are not “sentence” challenges subject to waivers. See United States v. Shaw, 139 F.4th 548, 552 (6th Cir. 2025).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

1) United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010)

In Dubois, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed Rozier’s rule that convicted felons are categorically disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior‑panel precedent rule, later panels are bound by earlier panel decisions unless abrogated by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc. Applying that rule, the Buchanan panel held that Rozier, as reaffirmed by Dubois, forecloses as‑applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) in this circuit. The panel quoted the prior‑precedent rule explicitly, emphasizing that a subsequent panel cannot deviate absent intervening authoritative change.

2) United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231 (11th Cir. 2023)

Rodriguez established a due‑process framework for supervised‑release conditions in the Eleventh Circuit:

District courts must orally pronounce discretionary (but not mandatory) supervised‑release conditions at sentencing, or incorporate them by clear reference to a written list the defendant has notice of.
Failure to identify discretionary conditions at sentencing, followed by their inclusion only in the written judgment, violates due process.
The remedy is to vacate the unannounced discretionary conditions and remand so the defendant can be heard and the court can reconsider whether to impose each condition.

In Buchanan, the panel applied Rodriguez directly. The district court had mentioned only certain special conditions and never referenced “standard conditions” at all, yet later added nineteen of them in the written judgment. That is the paradigm of a Rodriguez error, warranting vacatur and remand.

3) United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832 (11th Cir. 2024)

Hayden limited Rodriguez’s reach by holding that due process is satisfied where the sentencing court clearly references “the mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the court” in that district, providing the defendant notice and a chance to object. Because the written judgment in Hayden simply reflected what the court had referenced at sentencing, no due‑process violation occurred and no remand was required.

In Buchanan, by contrast, the district court did not reference any “standard conditions” at sentencing, making this case fundamentally different from Hayden. The panel explicitly framed Buchanan’s facts as “more like Rodriguez than Hayden.”

4) United States v. Read, 118 F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2024)

Read involved an appeal waiver and a challenge characterized as going to the “sufficiency of the oral pronouncement.” There, the sentencing court had, as in Hayden, referenced the mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the district, and the written judgment simply elaborated those conditions. The Eleventh Circuit enforced the appeal waiver, concluding there was no discrepancy between the oral and written pronouncements and treating the challenge as one to the sentence itself.

Crucially, Read expressly left open whether an appeal waiver would bar a challenge where the written judgment conflicts with (rather than elaborates on) the oral pronouncement. Buchanan squarely presents that open question. The panel declined to apply Read’s waiver analysis because (1) there is a mismatch here and (2) the government offered no authority beyond Read to show that a waiver bars this type of mismatch claim. Hence, the motion to dismiss was denied.

5) United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Shaw, 139 F.4th 548 (6th Cir. 2025)

The Buchanan panel noted that Read had described the Fourth Circuit’s Singletary decision—holding that an appeal waiver did not bar a challenge to conditions never mentioned at sentencing—as “inapposite” to the specific facts in Read. But the Buchanan panel then cited the Sixth Circuit’s Shaw decision as persuasive authority for the proposition that when a defendant argues a conflict between the written judgment and the oral sentence, he is not challenging “his sentence” such that a waiver would bar review.

While Buchanan does not promulgate a categorical rule on waivers in all mismatch cases, it signals a strong reluctance to enforce appeal waivers to insulate from review discretionary supervised‑release conditions that were never orally announced or incorporated by reference at sentencing.

Legal Reasoning

A. Second Amendment Challenge

Binding Precedent: The Eleventh Circuit’s prior‑panel precedent rule required adherence to Dubois and Rozier. Those cases, taken together, hold that felons are categorically excluded from Second Amendment protection in this circuit. Consequently, Buchanan’s as‑applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) failed as a matter of binding circuit law.
No Need to Reach Historical Analysis: Because binding precedent controls, the court did not need to conduct an independent historical‑tradition analysis of permanent felon disarmament for Buchanan’s circumstances.

B. Due Process and Supervised‑Release Conditions

Core Rule from Rodriguez: Due process requires that discretionary conditions be announced at sentencing. Judges can meet this requirement by expressly incorporating a known, written list of conditions (e.g., “the standard conditions adopted by this court”), thereby providing notice and an opportunity to object.
Matter of Mismatch: Where, as here, the district court listed only three special conditions orally yet later appended nineteen standard conditions in the written judgment, a mismatch arises. That mismatch violates due process because those nineteen discretionary conditions were not identified at the hearing.
Remedy: Per Rodriguez, the correct remedy is to vacate the unannounced discretionary conditions and remand so the district court can, after hearing from the defendant, determine anew whether to impose each condition.

C. Appeal Waiver

Read Distinguished: In Read, the court enforced an appeal waiver where there was no discrepancy: the written judgment mirrored what had been referenced orally. Read explicitly left open the waiver question for conflict cases.
Government’s Position: The government sought dismissal based solely on Read, but conceded the underlying Rodriguez error. The panel rejected dismissal because Read is not controlling where a genuine mismatch exists and no additional authority was provided.
Persuasive Authority: The panel found persuasive the Sixth Circuit’s framing in Shaw that a “conflict” claim is not a challenge to the “sentence” itself for waiver purposes. While not adopting a broad, categorical rule, the Eleventh Circuit denied dismissal and reached the merits, thereby ensuring review of unannounced discretionary conditions notwithstanding a general appeal waiver.

Impact

1) Second Amendment Litigation in the Eleventh Circuit

Buchanan confirms that, post‑Dubois, as‑applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) by felons remain foreclosed in the Eleventh Circuit. Unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc alters Rozier/Dubois, defendants with prior felony convictions cannot successfully mount as‑applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) in this circuit.

2) Sentencing Practice for Supervised Release

Buchanan reinforces Rodriguez and clarifies the Hayden/Read line:

Judges must either orally state discretionary conditions or unmistakably incorporate a written set of “standard conditions” at sentencing. Silence about “standard conditions” followed by their appearance in the written judgment is error.
Appeal waivers will not, without more, insulate such Rodriguez errors where the written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement. Prosecutors should not assume a wholesale bar to review in mismatch cases.
Defense counsel should listen for an explicit reference to “the mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the court” or similar language. If omitted, counsel should request clarification or object to preserve the issue. Even without an objection, Buchanan shows appellate courts will correct the error where due process notice was lacking.
Remedial scope is targeted: the imprisonment term stands; only the unannounced discretionary conditions are vacated and remanded for reconsideration after giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard.

3) Appellate Waiver Jurisprudence

While unpublished, Buchanan adds weight to the view—mirroring the Sixth Circuit’s Shaw—that challenges to a conflict between the oral pronouncement and written judgment are not straightforward “sentence” challenges covered by appeal waivers. At a minimum, Read does not control where a mismatch exists; thus, the government must offer more than a generic appeal‑waiver citation to foreclose review in those circumstances.

Complex Concepts Simplified

As‑Applied Constitutional Challenge: A contention that a statute is unconstitutional not in all cases, but as applied to a particular person or set of facts. Buchanan argued that permanent disarmament of felons lacks historical support as applied to him; binding Eleventh Circuit precedent foreclosed the claim.
Prior‑Panel Precedent Rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, a published decision by an earlier panel binds later panels unless overruled by the Eleventh Circuit en banc or by the Supreme Court. This rule compelled adherence to Rozier (as reaffirmed by Dubois), rejecting Buchanan’s Second Amendment argument.
Supervised Release Conditions—Mandatory vs. Discretionary: Federal law and the Sentencing Guidelines include “mandatory” conditions (imposed by statute) and “discretionary” conditions (often labeled “standard” or “special”). Due process requires courts to announce discretionary conditions at sentencing or to clearly incorporate them by reference so defendants can object in real time.
Oral Pronouncement vs. Written Judgment: The sentence is imposed at the hearing. If discretionary conditions appear only later in the written judgment and were not mentioned (or incorporated by reference) at sentencing, courts treat that as a due‑process problem. The remedy in the Eleventh Circuit is to vacate those conditions and remand.
Appeal Waiver: A plea agreement provision in which the defendant agrees not to appeal some or all issues. In the Eleventh Circuit, waivers can bar challenges to sentences in many contexts. But Read did not decide whether a waiver bars challenges where the written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement; Buchanan denies dismissal on waiver grounds in that conflict scenario.
Non‑Argument Calendar; Per Curiam; Unpublished: The panel resolved the appeal without oral argument, issued an unsigned per curiam opinion, and designated the decision as “Not for Publication.” Unpublished decisions are non‑precedential in the Eleventh Circuit but may be cited for persuasive value.

Conclusion

United States v. Buchanan does two important things. First, it reaffirms—through the machinery of the prior‑panel precedent rule—that as‑applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed in the Eleventh Circuit after Dubois and Rozier. Second, and more practically significant for day‑to‑day sentencing, it strengthens Rodriguez’s due‑process requirement that discretionary supervised‑release conditions must be orally pronounced or clearly incorporated by reference at sentencing. Where the sentencing transcript is silent about “standard” conditions but the written judgment includes them, the Eleventh Circuit will vacate those conditions and remand for resentencing on the conditions, even in the face of a general appeal waiver—particularly where the government offers no authority beyond Read to support dismissal and a mismatch exists.

For district judges, the takeaway is straightforward: state all discretionary conditions or incorporate the district’s standard conditions on the record. For prosecutors, do not rely solely on appeal waivers to defend mismatches between oral pronouncements and written judgments. For defense counsel, listen for and, if necessary, invite incorporation by reference; if omitted, object or seek clarification. Buchanan ensures that the defendant’s right to notice and an opportunity to be heard about discretionary conditions of supervised release is more than a formality—it is a due‑process obligation enforceable on appeal.