Due Process Is Satisfied By Thorough Management Of Repeated Counsel-Effectiveness Complaints; “Reasonable Efforts” Are Judged In Light Of Parental Noncooperation

Due Process Is Satisfied By Thorough Management Of Repeated Counsel-Effectiveness Complaints; “Reasonable Efforts” Are Judged In Light Of Parental Noncooperation

Roman G. v. State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children’s Services and Phoebe G., Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, No. S-18848, Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 2105 (Aug. 27, 2025)

Notice: This is a memorandum decision under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and does not create binding precedent. It may nonetheless be persuasive.

Introduction

This child in need of aid (CINA) appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights to four young children after significant bruising was discovered on one child, Yale, and extensive concerns emerged about the father’s conduct toward the children and their mother. Over the life of the case, the father, Roman G., repeatedly contested the effectiveness of his appointed counsel, prompting numerous representation hearings, while simultaneously refusing to cooperate with the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) on reunification services.

Two issues were presented on appeal: (1) whether the superior court’s handling of Roman’s ongoing complaints about his representation denied him due process; and (2) whether OCS made “reasonable efforts” to reunify the family as required before termination. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the termination order, rejecting both arguments.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the superior court did not deny due process in managing Roman’s counsel-ineffectiveness complaints. Far from depriving him of process, the court provided multiple hearings across 15 months, even convening a magistrate hearing, and consistently found counsel highly effective. Ultimately, after the attorney-client relationship became untenable due to Roman’s conduct, the court appointed conflict counsel—specifically, Roman’s counsel from his parallel custody case under the Flores entitlement.

On reasonable efforts, the Court affirmed the finding by clear and convincing evidence that OCS’s efforts were extensive and tailored, even if imperfect. Although the trial court noted two “difficulties” (OCS’s inability to provide collateral information to Roman’s privately retained evaluator due to Roman’s refusal to sign releases, and the termination of parenting-coach services), the totality of OCS’s actions—repeated five-hour case planning meetings, constant contact, arranging and paying for appropriate therapy, therapeutic visitation attempts, monthly child home visits, and service vouchers—met the statutory standard. The father’s sustained noncooperation, refusal to execute releases, intimidation of providers, and threats to staff were central to this conclusion.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Due process and the Mathews v. Eldridge framework
    • Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), applied via Seth D. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 175 P.3d 1222, 1227 (Alaska 2008): The Court weighed the private interest (fundamental parental rights), the risk of erroneous deprivation and value of additional safeguards, and the government’s interests. The father’s claim boiled down to a paradox: he argued he was given too much process over his representation complaints and that the court should have “expeditiously” ended the issue. The Court rejected this, noting the trial court provided abundant process because Roman repeatedly demanded it.
  • Right to counsel versus counsel of choice
    • Coleman v. State, 621 P.2d 869, 878 (Alaska 1980): Indigent litigants are not constitutionally entitled to counsel of their choice. The court properly reminded Roman of this limitation while ensuring he always had counsel.
    • Massey v. State, 435 P.3d 1007 (Alaska App. 2018); Shorthill v. State, 354 P.3d 1093 (Alaska App. 2015); James v. State, 730 P.2d 811 (Alaska App. 1987): Standards for knowing and intelligent waiver if a litigant wishes to proceed pro se; the court advised Roman on that option and its prerequisites.
  • Ineffective assistance in CINA matters
    • Chloe W. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 336 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2014); Chloe O. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 309 P.3d 850 (Alaska 2013): Performance must fall below that of a reasonably competent attorney; reasonable tactical decisions are “virtually immune” from second-guessing. The magistrate found Roman’s counsel had gone “above and beyond.”
    • Molly O. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 320 P.3d 303 (Alaska 2014) (Bolger, J., dissenting): Roman invoked a dissent arguing structural error when an Indian custodian is denied counsel in an ICWA context. The Court rejected the analogy; Roman never lacked counsel, and the factual and legal posture was “vastly dissimilar.”
  • Reasonable efforts to reunify
    • Statutory framework: AS 47.10.086(a) (OCS must identify, offer, and document family support services), and AS 47.10.088(a)(3) (clear and convincing proof of reasonable efforts before termination).
    • Annette H. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 450 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2019); Violet C. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 436 P.3d 1032 (Alaska 2019): Efforts must be reasonable, not perfect.
    • Amy M. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 320 P.3d 253 (Alaska 2013): Assess efforts in light of the circumstances, including a parent’s unwillingness to participate.
    • Sylvia L. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 343 P.3d 425 (Alaska 2015): Consider the entire history of services and all interactions between OCS and the parent.
    • Emma D. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 322 P.3d 842 (Alaska 2014): OCS fulfills its duty by setting out services in a way that allows the parent to use them.
    • Standards of review: Due process issues are reviewed de novo (Paula E. v. State, 276 P.3d 422 (Alaska 2012); D.M. v. DFYS, 995 P.2d 205 (Alaska 2000)), while “reasonable efforts” is a mixed question of law and fact, with factual findings reviewed for clear error and legal questions de novo (Kylie L. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 407 P.3d 442, 448 (Alaska 2017); Jay B. v. State, 382 P.3d 1154 (Alaska 2016)).
  • Right to appointed counsel in parallel custody litigation
    • Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979): Due process requires appointed counsel in a private custody case when the other parent is represented by Alaska Legal Services Corporation (ALSC). The court ultimately appointed Roman’s Flores counsel to the CINA matter once the relationship with initial appointed counsel broke down irretrievably.

Legal Reasoning

1) Due process in managing representation complaints

Applying the Mathews factors, the Court acknowledged the father’s fundamental interest in the care and custody of his children. But it emphasized that the risk of erroneous deprivation was mitigated—not heightened—by the superior court’s extensive process: six representation hearings over fifteen months, a magistrate-led evidentiary exploration of the ineffectiveness claims, express advisements that indigent litigants cannot demand counsel of choice, and instruction on the possibility and prerequisites of self-representation. The court’s thoroughness directly addressed Roman’s complaints. Given that Roman had counsel at all times, and that the magistrate found counsel’s performance exceeded reasonable competence, there was no due process violation. The Court rejected the suggestion that providing more process at the litigant’s repeated insistence could itself constitute a constitutional defect; parents cannot manufacture prejudicial delay and then blame the court for accommodating their requests.

2) Reasonable efforts to reunify in the face of noncooperation

The Court reviewed the comprehensive record of OCS efforts: multiple five-hour case planning meetings within the first month; near-daily contact attempts; arranging and funding specialized therapy consistent with recommendations from Roman’s own evaluator; parenting coaching; efforts to secure therapeutic visitation; monthly home visits for the children; therapeutic supports and vouchers for the children’s needs. The superior court candidly noted two concerns in the OCS effort narrative: (a) OCS’s inability to provide collateral information to the father’s privately retained evaluator; and (b) the discontinuation of a parenting coach whom Roman initially engaged with positively.

Both issues were traced back to the father’s own decisions and conduct. OCS could not share collateral information because Roman refused to sign releases. Further, nothing in the record suggested Roman would have followed better-informed recommendations; he refused to engage with the specialized therapist OCS identified, insisted on a non-OCS-approved counselor, threatened staff, and intimidated a therapeutic visitation provider who then withdrew. The parenting-coach services ended in part because the provider would not review collateral information and Roman refused releases—again, a barrier of his own making.

Given Alaska law’s command to assess reasonableness in the totality of circumstances and to account for a parent’s unwillingness to participate, the trial court’s clear-and-convincing finding was not error. OCS’s efforts need not be perfect; they must be timely, active, tailored, and documented. On this record, they were.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although nonprecedential, the decision is instructive in two recurring CINA problem areas.

  • Managing serial complaints about counsel
    • Trial courts may hold repeated representation hearings, employ a magistrate to develop findings, and document guidance on counsel-of-choice limits and self-representation. Where the litigant continuously demands more process and the court provides it, a later due process challenge will face steep odds absent concrete prejudice.
    • Findings that counsel acted “above and beyond”—filing substantive motions, retaining experts, diligently reviewing discovery—will defeat ineffectiveness claims premised on disagreements over litigation tactics (e.g., refusal to file frivolous jurisdictional motions based on private “arbitration” documents).
    • When the relationship is irreparably damaged, appointing conflict counsel is an appropriate endpoint; courts retain discretion to transition representation without conceding ineffectiveness.
  • Reasonable efforts amid parental obstruction
    • OCS’s obligation is to identify, actively offer, and document appropriate services. Parental refusal to sign releases, hostility toward providers, or intimidation that drives providers away will weigh heavily in OCS’s favor on the reasonable-efforts inquiry.
    • Courts may candidly acknowledge imperfect steps by OCS without converting those imperfections into legal insufficiency, particularly where the parent’s conduct caused or exacerbated the gaps.
    • Incorporating recommendations from a parent’s own evaluator—even when OCS cannot supply collateral information due to the parent’s refusal—demonstrates tailoring and good faith.

Bigger picture, the case reinforces that a parent cannot both block OCS’s efforts (e.g., by refusing releases and threatening staff) and then claim OCS failed to make reasonable efforts. Likewise, litigants cannot force serial hearings on representation and then argue the court erred by not “expeditiously” ending the very process they pursued.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • CINA (Child in Need of Aid): A legal designation under Alaska law for children who have suffered or are at risk of physical harm, sexual abuse, or mental injury, among other grounds (AS 47.10.011). It opens the door to state intervention and services, and potentially to termination of parental rights if problems are not remedied.
  • Reasonable Efforts: OCS must take timely, active, and documented steps to help parents fix the problems that made their child a CINA. Efforts must be reasonable in context, not perfect, and courts consider the full history of services and the parent’s cooperation.
  • Clear and Convincing Evidence: A high civil standard of proof—more than “more likely than not,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Required for key findings in termination cases, including reasonable efforts and failure to remedy.
  • Collateral Information and Releases: Providers, including evaluators and therapists, often need information from OCS to perform reliable assessments. Privacy laws typically require a parent’s signed release; refusing to sign can impede services and evaluation and may reflect noncooperation.
  • Ineffective Assistance in CINA: Parents have a due process right to effective counsel, but not to counsel of choice. Representation is ineffective only if it falls below the standard of a reasonably competent attorney. Strategic choices—like refusing to file frivolous motions—generally do not qualify.
  • Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing: A three-factor test used to decide what process is due: the private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation and value of more procedures, and the government’s interests, including administrative burdens.
  • Flores Counsel: In Alaska, an indigent parent may be entitled to appointed counsel in a private custody case when the other parent is represented by ALSC. In this case, that attorney was later appointed as conflict counsel in the CINA matter.
  • Therapeutic Visitation: Supervised parent-child contact with a therapeutic component designed to build safe parenting skills and address underlying issues; professional boundaries and safety are paramount.
  • Domestic Violence Protective Order (DVPO): A court order limiting contact to protect against domestic violence; here, it barred unsupervised contact with the mother and children during the case.

Key Factual Anchors

  • Four siblings (ages one to four) removed after a daycare discovered severe bruising on Yale; a forensic nurse found the injuries highly suggestive of non-accidental trauma.
  • OCS obtained temporary custody and later a long-term DV protective order limiting Roman’s contact.
  • Roman persistently demanded that counsel pursue a frivolous “Indonesian arbitration agreement” theory to oust Alaska jurisdiction; counsel refused.
  • OCS scheduled two “five hour plus” case-planning meetings within the first month, maintained “constant” contact, arranged specialized therapy and parenting coaching, and attempted therapeutic visitation; Roman refused releases, threatened staff, and intimidated a provider who then withdrew.
  • After six representation hearings (Nov. 2020–Mar. 2022), and magistrate findings that counsel exceeded competency, the court nonetheless appointed conflict counsel due to the collapsed relationship.
  • Following a nine-day trial, the court terminated on grounds of physical harm, sexual abuse, and mental injury (AS 47.10.011(6), (7), (8)), found failure to remedy, reasonable efforts by OCS, and best interests of the children.

Conclusion

This memorandum decision confirms two practical legal propositions in Alaska CINA jurisprudence. First, due process is not denied when a trial court thoroughly and repeatedly addresses a parent’s complaints about counsel—especially when the parent has counsel at all times, the court finds counsel effective, and the parent presses for additional proceedings. Courts may not be faulted for providing the very process requested. Second, “reasonable efforts” by OCS are evaluated across the entire case history and in light of the parent’s cooperation. OCS’s duty is to identify, offer, and document appropriate services; perfection is not required. A parent’s refusal to sign releases, refusal to participate in recommended services, and intimidation of providers materially supports a finding that OCS nevertheless made reasonable efforts.

Though nonprecedential, the decision offers persuasive guidance: trial courts should document robust procedural safeguards around representation issues; OCS should persist in well-tailored services and meticulous documentation; and parents should understand that obstructive conduct—especially threats and refusal to execute releases—will undercut claims that the State failed to help them reunify with their children.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of The State Of Alaska

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