Due Process and Time Constraints in Family Law Hearings: Zittleman v. Bibler (2025 ND 87)

Introduction

Zittleman v. Bibler is a 2025 decision by the Supreme Court of North Dakota addressing two interrelated issues in post-divorce family law proceedings: (1) whether limiting each party to a fixed amount of hearing time violates due process, and (2) whether the moving party established a “material change in circumstances” sufficient to modify primary residential responsibility of the minor child. Kyle S. Zittleman (plaintiff/appellee) and ShanaLea M. Bibler (defendant/appellant) were divorced in 2016 by a Wyoming court, which awarded Zittleman primary residential responsibility of their child. After multiple motions and changes in domicile, Bibler sought modification of residential responsibility in Morton County, North Dakota, in 2023. The district court limited each side to 2½ hours of evidentiary time, denied Bibler’s motion for more time, heard extensive testimony and documentary submissions, and ultimately concluded Bibler had not shown a material change in circumstances. Bibler appealed, arguing (a) the time caps deprived her of due process and (b) the court erred in its findings on changed circumstances and best-interest analysis.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s order denying Bibler’s motion to modify residential responsibility.
The court held that limiting each party to 2½ hours of hearing time, with the opportunity to submit closing briefs, did not violate due process where notice was given and no continuance was requested.
The court applied a de novo standard to the constitutional claim and an abuse-of-discretion standard to courtroom management and hearing time limits.
On the merits, the court concluded Bibler failed to prove a material change in circumstances—her move to North Dakota, alleged non-compliance by Zittleman, and alleged alienation of the child did not meet the required threshold.
Because no material change existed, the district court was not required to conduct a best-interests‐of‐the‐child analysis for modification.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court’s reasoning rested on a line of North Dakota decisions governing due process in evidentiary hearings, the district court’s discretion in courtroom management, and the standards for modifying child custody orders. Key precedents include:

State v. Sorenson, 2009 ND 147: Articulates the de novo standard for reviewing alleged constitutional violations.
Krolik v. Muscha, 2020 ND 240: Defines due process in civil hearings as requiring adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be heard.
Gullickson v. Kline, 2004 ND 76: Holds that procedures denying a meaningful and reasonable opportunity to present evidence violate due process.
Gomm v. Winterfeldt, 2022 ND 172: Emphasizes flexible, case‐specific determinations of adequate hearing time under due process.
Gooss v. A.K., 2025 ND 19: Affirms that a party must object or request a continuance to preserve a claim that hearing time was insufficient.
Mairs v. Mairs, 2014 ND 132: Approves a three‐hour per party limit in a residential responsibility modification hearing as reasonable.
Sollin v. Klein, 2021 ND 75: Reviews courtroom management under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Valeu v. Strube, 2018 ND 30: Establishes the clearly erroneous standard for reviewing findings on material change in circumstances.
Hankey v. Hankey, 2015 ND 70: Identifies parental alienation as a potential material change in custody cases.
Vining v. Renton, 2012 ND 86: Clarifies that best-interests analysis follows only after a threshold finding of material change.
Rath v. Rath, 2014 ND 171: Differentiates between motions to modify custody and motions to clarify or enforce other parenting plan provisions.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s decision unfolded in two main analytical strands:

Due Process and Hearing Time Limits:
- Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard: The court reaffirmed that due process requires both adequate notice and a fair opportunity to present evidence. Here the district court provided advance notice of the five-hour cap (2½ hours per side) and offered alternative means (closing briefs) to present arguments.
- Obligation to Object or Seek Continuance: Drawing on Gooss and Mairs, the court stressed that a party must object to time constraints or request more time during the hearing to preserve the due process claim. Bibler did neither.
- Abuse of Discretion in Courtroom Management: Under Sollin and Mairs, district courts have broad authority to manage proceedings. The Supreme Court found no arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of that authority in setting reasonable time limits.
Material Change in Circumstances:
- Burden of Proof and Standard of Review: The plaintiff had the burden to show a material change in circumstances. Findings of fact in custody matters are reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard (Valeu v. Strube).
- Factors Considered: The court examined Bibler’s relocation, Zittleman’s compliance with the existing judgment, alleged disruption of the child’s behavior, and accusations of parental alienation.
- Credibility and Evidence Assessment: The district court heard live testimony from parents, therapists, relatives, and employers, received declarations and exhibits, and evaluated witness credibility—including conflicting therapist opinions on alienation.
- Threshold for Modification Not Met: The Supreme Court held that none of the circumstances proven rose to the level of a material change warranting modification.
- Best Interests Analysis Not Triggered: Following Vining, because no threshold change was found, the court was not required to conduct a detailed best‐interests analysis.

Impact

Zittleman v. Bibler reinforces several important principles in family law practice:

Courts may impose reasonable time limits on evidentiary hearings if parties receive advance notice and have the procedural tools (continuance motions, objections, written submissions) to protect their rights.
Parties must be proactive: failure to object to hearing constraints or to move for additional time waives those challenges on appeal.
Modification of custody requires a clear showing of changed circumstances; mere relocation or disagreement over rigid adherence to court orders is insufficient.
Judicial discretion in courtroom management is robust, and appellate courts will defer to sensible time‐management decisions absent a showing of arbitrary or unreasonable conduct.
Family law litigants and practitioners should strategize both live testimony and written submissions to optimize limited hearing time.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Due Process in Civil Hearings: A party must have (a) adequate notice of the issues and (b) a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and arguments. If a court shortens hearing time or limits witnesses, parties must speak up immediately or forfeit the claim on appeal.
Abuse of Discretion: An appellate court will not overturn a trial court’s procedural rulings (like time management) unless they are arbitrary, unreasonable, or contrary to law. Reasonable courtroom rules generally withstand review.
Material Change in Circumstances: To modify custody or primary residential responsibility, the moving party must show that something significant affected the child’s welfare since the last order—relocation alone, or minor disputes over rule-following, usually do not suffice.
Clearly Erroneous Standard: Appellate courts defer to the trial judge’s factual findings unless they are unsupported by evidence or clearly mistaken upon review of the whole record.

Conclusion

Zittleman v. Bibler cements the principle that due process in family law hearings encompasses both timely notice of procedural constraints and an opportunity to object or seek relief. It underscores the broad latitude trial courts have to manage their dockets and the stringent showing required to modify existing custody arrangements. Practitioners should take heed: timely procedural objections and thorough preparation for limited hearing time are indispensable. On the substantive side, the decision reaffirms that only significant, child-centered changes justify revisiting primary residential responsibility.