Due Process, Discovery, and Use of Withdrawn Violations in Montana Probation Revocations: Commentary on State v. Pettit

I. Introduction

The Montana Supreme Court’s memorandum decision in State v. Pettit, 2025 MT 283N (DA 24-0186), although expressly nonprecedential under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules, offers an important illustration of how established due process principles are applied in probation revocation proceedings.

The case addresses three tightly connected questions:

• What does due process require in terms of disclosure of evidence to a probationer facing revocation?
• Can a district court consider conduct underlying revoked or withdrawn violations when deciding the disposition (sentence) after revocation?
• What counts as a fundamentally fair revocation hearing under the U.S. and Montana Constitutions?

The decision reaffirms settled law: a probationer is entitled to an informal but fair hearing that includes written notice of violations, disclosure of the evidence the State relies on, and an opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine witnesses. At the same time, the court makes clear that:

• Due process is not violated by failure to disclose evidence that does not exist or that has already been provided;
• An admitted violation alone can justify revocation; and
• At disposition, a district court may consider reliable information about other alleged conduct, even if the corresponding violation counts were withdrawn, so long as the defendant had notice and an opportunity to respond, and the court is not relying on misinformation.

Though this is a memorandum opinion that “shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent,” it is a useful case study in how Montana courts are currently applying U.S. Supreme Court and Montana precedents on due process in revocation settings.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Original conviction and sentencing

In 2007, Justin Allen Pettit pleaded guilty to one count of felony Sexual Assault, in violation of § 45-5-502(1), (3), and (5)(b), MCA. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Eighth Judicial District Court (Cascade County) sentenced him to a 20-year term to the Department of Corrections (DOC), with 16 years suspended. Thus:

• Pettit would serve an initial period of incarceration under DOC/MSP custody; and
• Upon release, he would be supervised on the remaining suspended portion of his sentence, subject to detailed probation conditions.

B. Multiple prior revocations

Pettit’s supervision history was troubled, resulting in multiple prior revocations:

1. 2013 revocation (February 14, 2013)
   After Pettit served his initial prison time at Montana State Prison (MSP) and was released to Missoula Probation and Parole (P&P), the State petitioned to revoke his suspended sentence. The district court:
   • Revoked the suspended sentence; and
   • Resentenced him to 16 years DOC, all suspended.
2. Second 2013 revocation (April 15, 2013)
   The State again petitioned to revoke, and Pettit was resentenced to:
   • 16 years DOC with 12 years suspended.
   After another period in MSP, Pettit was released again under P&P supervision in 2016.

Thus, by the time of the 2023–2024 revocation proceedings at issue in this appeal, Pettit was serving a 16-year DOC sentence with 12 years suspended.

C. 2023 petition to revoke and alleged violations

On May 26, 2023, the State filed a new petition to revoke Pettit’s suspended sentence. It alleged:

• One non-compliance violation – Pettit’s termination from sex offender treatment.
• Four compliance violations – arising from:
  • Possession of two unauthorized internet-capable devices (cell phones);
  • Traveling to areas that were off-limits under the conditions of his suspended sentence;
  • Possession and creation of pornography; and
  • Spending time with a 15-year-old with whom he had been communicating on social media.

Under Montana’s current statutory framework, violations are categorized as “compliance violations” (generally technical supervision breaches) and “non-compliance violations” (more serious violations, including new crimes or high-risk behavior). A proven non-compliance violation generally permits full revocation and reimposition of the suspended portion of the sentence.

D. Additional non-compliance violation (child endangerment charge)

On August 15, 2023, the State filed notice of an additional non-compliance violation after Pettit was charged in Missoula City Court with misdemeanor Endangering the Welfare of a Child. The allegation was that he gave marijuana to a 15-year-old boy in his hotel room.

E. The February 5, 2024 evidentiary and dispositional hearing

The district court held a combined evidentiary (adjudicatory) and dispositional hearing on February 5, 2024. At that hearing:

• Pettit, through counsel, admitted “true” to the non-compliance violation of being terminated from sex offender treatment.
• In light of this admission, the State withdrew the remaining violations (both the four compliance violations and the later child endangerment non-compliance violation).
• The parties agreed that this single admitted violation was sufficient to justify revocation.

Thus, the evidentiary phase effectively ended with Pettit’s admission of a violation sufficient to revoke his suspended sentence. The proceedings shifted primarily to disposition: what sentence to impose after revocation.

Testimony by the probation and parole supervisor

During the dispositional phase, the State called Pettit’s P&P supervisor, who characterized Pettit’s transition to supervised release as “abysmal.” She testified, among other things, that:

• Pettit had been around minors, including minor boys in his car;
• He had been cited for providing marijuana to a minor boy in his hotel room;
• He frequented places where minors congregate; and
• He possessed two unauthorized smartphones, which he used to access pornography and communicate with minors via social media.

Her overall assessment was that Pettit could no longer be adequately supervised in the community, and she agreed with the State’s recommendation that he be sentenced to serve the remaining 12 years to the DOC with no time suspended.

On cross-examination, she acknowledged that forensic examination of the seized devices found no child sexual abuse material. Pettit did not question her about the allegedly exculpatory emails that he later claimed existed.

Defense testimony

Pettit presented favorable witnesses:

• A recent employer who presumably testified to positive aspects of Pettit’s work performance or behavior; and
• A “chaperone” who spent time with Pettit and testified, for example, that he (the chaperone), not Pettit, suggested walking in a park adjacent to a high school. The chaperone denied knowing such a location was off-limits to Pettit.

F. The due process objection at the hearing

In the middle of the probation officer’s testimony, defense counsel objected on “fundamental due process” grounds. Pettit argued:

• The State had not produced supposed emails from his P&P supervisor allegedly granting him permission to visit locations otherwise prohibited by his conditions.
• The State had not provided search warrants and related information for his cell phones, which he argued was necessary discovery.
• The failure to produce this material meant he did not have adequate notice of the allegations and evidence the State would rely on at disposition.

The State responded that:

• The alleged emails did not exist; Pettit was never given permission to frequent those places; and
• The relevant reports concerning the phones had, in fact, been provided to defense counsel.

The district court overruled the objection, finding that the petition to revoke and its supporting affidavit provided sufficient notice of the conduct and alleged violations.

G. Disposition in the district court

The district court:

• Revoked Pettit’s suspended sentence;
• Committed him to DOC custody for the remaining 12 years,
• Gave him credit for 280 days of jail time and 1.5 years of “street time” (time spent on supervision in the community); and
• Imposed a sentence within the parameters of his prior, underlying sentence structure.

H. Issues on appeal

On appeal, Pettit framed his claims as due process violations:

1. The State allegedly relied on withdrawn violations at disposition without having produced relevant discovery about those violations.
2. The State allegedly depended on undisclosed evidence, including:
   • Nonexistent or undisclosed emails from his P&P officer allegedly giving him permission to visit off-limits locations; and
   • Search warrants and other materials allegedly related to the seized phones.
3. The district court allegedly improperly relied on the facts underlying the withdrawn violations in deciding to impose 12 years to DOC.

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the revocation and sentence.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Justice Laurie McKinnon, writing for a unanimous Court in a memorandum opinion, held:

1. Standard of review:
   • Ordinarily, revocation decisions are reviewed for whether they are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and for abuse of discretion.
   • However, where constitutional questions are raised—here, alleged due process violations—review is plenary (de novo).
2. Due process in revocation proceedings:
   • The Court reaffirmed that probationers have a “conditional liberty interest” and are entitled to the minimum requirements of due process outlined in Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, as adopted in Montana cases such as Pedersen and Sebastian.
   • This includes written notice of violations, disclosure of evidence, an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and a neutral decision-maker.
3. Alleged failure to disclose emails:
   • Pettit’s claim that P&P supervisor emails existed and were withheld was not supported by the record.
   • The State asserted the emails did not exist, and Pettit did not produce any such emails or meaningfully examine the P&P supervisor about them when given the opportunity.
   • The Court treated this as a failure of proof: there was no evidentiary basis to find a due process violation.
4. Alleged failure to disclose search warrants and related phone evidence:
   • The State represented that the relevant reports had been provided to defense counsel.
   • The Court observed that the relevance of any missing warrants or materials was unclear, especially because:
     • The violation regarding the phones was grounded in Pettit’s unauthorized possession of internet-capable devices, not in any illegal content found on them; and
     • No child sexual abuse images were found on the devices.
   • More fundamentally, Pettit had already admitted to a non-compliance violation (termination from sex offender treatment), which by itself justified revocation.
5. Use of withdrawn violations at disposition:
   • The Court reaffirmed that a sentencing court may consider a broad range of information about a defendant—including conduct underlying dismissed or acquitted charges—so long as it is relevant and not “misinformation” (citing State v. Walker).
   • Pettit did not argue that the information about his contact with minors, marijuana provision, or other conduct was factually false; he only argued it was improper to consider because the associated violations had been withdrawn.
   • Because he had been given notice of these alleged acts in the petition and supporting affidavit, and had the opportunity to cross-examine and present contrary evidence, the court could properly consider this conduct in fashioning a disposition within the original sentence range.
6. Overall fairness:
   • Pettit received:
     • Written notice through the revocation petition and affidavit;
     • Disclosure of the State’s reports about the phone violations;
     • An opportunity to cross-examine the P&P supervisor and to present his own witnesses; and
     • A sentence that fell within the boundaries of his original DOC term.
   • The admitted non-compliance violation alone was sufficient for revocation, independent of any other alleged conduct.
   • Accordingly, the Court concluded Pettit was not denied a “fundamentally fair” revocation hearing.

The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order revoking Pettit’s suspended sentence and committing him to DOC for the remaining 12 years, with the credits awarded by the district court.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Federal due process authority: Morrissey and Gagnon

The Court grounded its due process analysis in the well-known U.S. Supreme Court decisions:

• Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), involving parole revocation; and
• Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), applying Morrissey principles to probation revocations.

Morrissey held that parolees have a liberty interest in continued freedom and that revocation requires certain minimal procedural safeguards. Gagnon extended these protections to probationers and articulated a list of “minimum due process requirements” at revocation hearings:

1. Written notice of the claimed violations;
2. Disclosure of the evidence against the probationer/parolee;
3. An opportunity to be heard in person, to present witnesses, and to submit documentary evidence;
4. The right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (absent a specific finding of good cause for not permitting confrontation);
5. A neutral and detached hearing body; and
6. A written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied upon and reasons for revocation.

Morrissey and Gagnon emphasize that revocation hearings are not criminal trials; they are more informal, with fewer procedural formalities, but must nonetheless be fair and based on verified facts.

B. Montana’s articulation of revocation due process: Pedersen and Sebastian

The Court relied on its own earlier decisions applying Morrissey and Gagnon to Montana probation revocations:

• State v. Pedersen, 2003 MT 315, 318 Mont. 262, 80 P.3d 79 – recognizing that a probationer facing revocation is entitled to the “minimum requirements of due process” defined by Morrissey/Gagnon.
• State v. Sebastian, 2013 MT 347, 372 Mont. 522, 313 P.3d 198 – reiterating these protections and clarifying the standard of review:
  • Revocation decisions generally reviewed for abuse of discretion and for preponderance of evidence; and
  • Constitutional questions reviewed plenary (de novo).

Sebastian also reiterated the key language from Morrissey: what is required is “an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a [probation] violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the [probationer’s] behavior.”

C. Sentencing information and “misinformation”: Walker and Salsgiver

To address Pettit’s claim that the district court improperly relied on withdrawn violations, the Court turned to:

• State v. Walker, 2007 MT 205, 338 Mont. 529, 167 P.3d 879, overruled on other grounds by City of Kalispell v. Salsgiver, 2019 MT 126, 396 Mont. 57, 443 P.3d 504.

In Walker, the Court explained:

• A sentencing court may consider any relevant information relating to:
  • The nature and circumstances of the crime;
  • The defendant’s character, background, and history;
  • The defendant’s mental and physical condition; and
  • Other acts or conduct, even if those resulted in acquittal or were dismissed pursuant to plea agreements.
• Due process is violated if the sentence is based on “misinformation”—that is, materially false or unreliable information.

Although Walker was overruled on other grounds in Salsgiver, its core principle about the broad range of information a court may consider at sentencing remains intact and was applied here in the revocation context. The Supreme Court in Pettit uses Walker to affirm that a court may consider:

• Conduct underlying withdrawn violations,
• Provided that the defendant had notice of the underlying conduct,
• Was given the chance to contest it, and
• The information is not factually incorrect or misleading.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Standard of review

The Court restates the two-layered standard:

• Non-constitutional aspects of revocation (e.g., whether a violation occurred) are reviewed to determine:
  • Whether the finding of a violation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not); and
  • Whether the district court abused its discretion in deciding to revoke or in imposing disposition.
• Constitutional questions, such as alleged due process violations, are reviewed plenary (de novo) without deference to the district court’s legal conclusions.

In this case, the core issue—whether Pettit received the process that was constitutionally due—is a legal question, so the Court applies plenary review.

B. Alleged failure to disclose evidence (emails and search warrants)

1. The supposed P&P supervisor emails

Pettit claimed that his rights were violated because:

• The State failed to produce emails from his P&P supervisor allegedly granting him permission to visit locations that his probation conditions otherwise barred, and
• The supervisor then testified at disposition about misconduct (visiting prohibited places) that Pettit believed these emails would have explained or justified.

The Supreme Court rejected this claim on two related grounds:

1. No evidence the emails exist:
   • The State flatly stated that such emails “simply did not exist.”
   • Pettit offered no copy of such emails; did not testify to their content under oath; and did not examine the P&P supervisor about them, even though he had a full opportunity for cross-examination.
   • The Court inferred that if these emails existed, Pettit himself would have them or could obtain them, yet he never produced them.
2. Failure of proof:
   • Due process claims based on nondisclosure require some evidentiary showing that the State actually withheld existing, relevant evidence.
   • On this record, the Court found no support for the assertion that such emails existed, much less that they were withheld.

In effect, the Court emphasizes that a conjectural or unsupported claim that exculpatory evidence might exist, without any proof, does not establish a due process violation.

2. The search warrants and phone-related evidence

Pettit further alleged that the State had failed to produce “search warrants and other information” related to the seized cell phones. Here the Court’s reasoning had several components:

• Disclosure already made: The State represented (and the Court accepted) that the relevant reports regarding the phone searches had been provided to defense counsel.
• Relevance not shown: The Court stated it could not “ascertain what Pettit hoped to gain from these warrants, let alone what relevance the information contained therein might have had.”
  • The alleged violation regarding the phones did not depend on finding contraband content; it depended on the fact of unauthorized possession of internet-capable devices, which Pettit did not seriously dispute.
  • The supervisor even conceded that the phones contained no child sexual abuse material, undercutting any claim that omitted information about the content might be exculpatory or mitigating.
• Irrelevance to the dispositive violation: Most importantly, Pettit had already admitted to a separate, qualifying non-compliance violation—termination from sex offender treatment—which, by itself, legally justified revocation under Montana law.
  • Therefore, even if there had been some deficiency related to the phone-evidence disclosure, it would not have undermined the validity of the revocation itself.

Taken together, the Court concluded that the due process requirement of “disclosure of the evidence against him” was satisfied. Where material was allegedly not disclosed, Pettit either failed to show that it existed at all (emails) or failed to show how any missing information was relevant or prejudicial (search warrants).

C. Use of withdrawn violations at disposition

The second major due process claim focused on the district court’s consideration of conduct underlying withdrawn violation counts. The logic of Pettit’s complaint was:

• The State formally “withdrew” certain alleged compliance and non-compliance violations once he admitted to the treatment-termination violation.
• Even so, at disposition, the State elicited testimony and argument about the conduct underlying these withdrawn counts (minors in his car, marijuana to a minor, porn use, social-media communications, etc.).
• Therefore, the court allegedly sentenced him based on unproved or withdrawn allegations without prior discovery, violating due process.

The Supreme Court addressed this argument through the lens of Walker and settled Montana sentencing law.

1. Broad scope of information at sentencing and revocation disposition

The Court reaffirmed that a sentencing court (and by extension a court imposing disposition after revocation) may consider:

• Any relevant information about:
  • The nature and circumstances of the crime;
  • The defendant’s character, history, and background;
  • The defendant’s mental and physical condition; and
  • Other acts and conduct,
• Even where those other acts:
  • Did not result in conviction;
  • Were dismissed as part of a plea bargain; or
  • Resulted in acquittal.

The key due process limitation is that the information relied upon must not be “misinformation”—that is, it must not be materially false or lacking in minimal indicia of reliability.

2. Notice and opportunity to respond

Against this backdrop, the Court noted:

• The revocation petition and supporting affidavit described in detail the conduct underlying all the alleged violations—both those ultimately withdrawn and the one to which Pettit admitted.
• Pettit therefore had ample notice of the conduct at issue:
  • Contact with minors;
  • Use of marijuana with a minor;
  • Possession of unauthorized devices and pornography; and
  • Presence in locations where minors congregate.
• The hearing afforded him the opportunity to cross-examine the P&P supervisor and to present his own witnesses disputing or contextualizing that conduct.

The Supreme Court highlighted that Pettit did not argue on appeal that the district court had relied on false information. Instead, he argued that considering the conduct at all was improper because the corresponding violations had been formally withdrawn. The Court rejected this as inconsistent with the well-established principle that courts may consider reliable, negative information about a defendant’s conduct irrespective of the procedural status of a particular charge or violation count.

3. Central role of the admitted violation

The Court also stressed that it was undisputed that Pettit’s admission to treatment termination was alone sufficient to justify full revocation. That admission:

• Satisfied the evidentiary requirement (preponderance) for at least one non-compliance violation;
• Triggered the statutory authority to revoke the suspended portion of his sentence; and
• Made the other alleged conduct primarily relevant to the dispositional choice, rather than to the threshold question whether revocation was even legally permitted.

Thus, the Court essentially distinguished between:

• The adjudicatory phase (did a violation occur?)—resolved by Pettit’s own admission; and
• The dispositional phase (what sentence to impose?)—where broad information about the probationer’s behavior, including conduct underlying withdrawn violations, may legitimately inform the court’s exercise of discretion.

  D. Overall fairness of the proceeding

  Finally, the Court addressed the overarching question: did Pettit receive a “fundamentally fair” revocation hearing?

  The answer turned on whether the Morrissey/Gagnon due process elements were satisfied:

  • Written notice: Provided by the petition to revoke and its supporting affidavit, which detailed both the admitted and withdrawn violations.
  • Disclosure of evidence: The State provided reports regarding the phone searches; the supposed emails were not shown to exist; no concrete relevant evidence was shown to have been withheld.
  • Opportunity to be heard and present evidence: Pettit presented witnesses (employer and chaperone) and cross-examined the P&P supervisor.
  • Confrontation of adverse witnesses: The key adverse witness, the P&P supervisor, testified live and was subject to cross-examination.
  • Neutral adjudicator: The revocation was conducted by the district court judge, a neutral judicial officer.
  • Written statement: The dispositional judgment and record reflect the basis for revocation (admitted violation) and the reasons for the sentence (risk to minors, failure in supervision, etc.).

  Given this record, and given that Pettit’s sentence was:

  • Within his original sentencing parameters; and
  • Consistent with the joint recommendation of the State and the P&P supervisor,

  the Supreme Court held that Pettit was not deprived of due process or of a fundamentally fair revocation hearing.

  VI. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

  A. Suspended sentence and probation revocation

  A suspended sentence is a portion of a criminal sentence that the court does not immediately require the defendant to serve, on the condition that the defendant:

  • Comply with court-ordered terms and conditions (e.g., treatment, reporting, location restrictions); and
  • Commit no further serious violations.

  A probation revocation (or revocation of a suspended sentence) is a proceeding where the State asks the court to:

  • Find that the defendant violated one or more conditions; and
  • “Revoke” the suspended portion—often resulting in imprisonment for some or all of the time that had been held in abeyance.

  Revocation does not impose a new sentence for a new crime; rather, it activates or modifies the original sentence based on post-sentencing misconduct.

  B. “Compliance” vs. “non-compliance” violations in Montana

  Under Montana’s current statutory framework (not reproduced in full in the opinion but reflected in the terminology), supervision violations are generally classified as:

  • Compliance violations – Technical or lower-risk violations of probation conditions (such as failing to report, being late to appointments, or certain curfew or travel violations) that are not themselves new crimes or major safety threats.
  • Non-compliance violations – More serious violations, typically involving:
    • New criminal conduct;
    • High-risk behavior (e.g., victim contact, weapons, absconding); or
    • Failure in critical risk-reduction conditions (such as mandated sex offender treatment).

  Montana’s recent criminal justice reforms emphasize graduated sanctions for compliance violations, reserving full revocation for more serious non-compliance violations. In Pettit’s case:

  • Termination from sex offender treatment and the misdemeanor charge for Endangering the Welfare of a Child were treated as non-compliance violations;
  • Possession of unauthorized smartphones, traveling to off-limits areas, and creating/possessing pornography were categorized as compliance violations.

  C. Conditional liberty interest

  A probationer’s freedom is not absolute; it is “conditional” on compliance with supervision terms. The U.S. Supreme Court calls this a “conditional liberty interest.” Because it is still a significant liberty interest, the State cannot revoke it arbitrarily; due process requires a meaningful but streamlined hearing process.

  D. Minimum due process vs. full criminal trial rights

  A revocation hearing is not a new criminal trial. Thus:

  • The State need only show a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • The rules of evidence are relaxed; reliable hearsay may sometimes be admissible.
  • However, basic fairness requires:
    • Notice;
    • Disclosure of the evidence;
    • An opportunity to present and challenge evidence; and
    • A neutral decision-maker.

  E. “Misinformation” at sentencing or revocation disposition

  Under Walker and related cases, due process is violated if a court bases its sentence or revocation disposition on materially false or unreliable information. The defendant must show:

  • The information was actually false or lacked minimal indicia of reliability; and
  • The court relied on that misinformation in making its decision.

  Merely unfavorable or uncharged conduct does not become “misinformation” simply because it did not result in conviction or because related violation counts were withdrawn.

  F. “Street time” credit

  “Street time” refers to the period a defendant spends under supervision in the community. Montana courts may, in appropriate circumstances, credit some or all of that time against the remaining sentence upon revocation. In Pettit’s case, the district court credited him with 1.5 years of street time as well as 280 days of jail time.

  G. Memorandum opinion and nonprecedential status

  The Court expressly decided this case by memorandum opinion under Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of its Internal Operating Rules. This means:

  • The opinion is not to be cited as precedent in future cases;
  • It will be listed only in the Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases; and
  • The Court believes the case is controlled by settled law or by the clear application of existing standards of review.

  Nonetheless, such decisions give insight into how the Court is currently applying established doctrines to recurring fact patterns.

  VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

  A. For defense counsel

  Although not precedential, Pettit carries several practical lessons for defense counsel in revocation cases:

  • Develop the record on alleged missing evidence:
    • If you claim the State has withheld exculpatory or relevant evidence (such as emails or warrants), you must:
      • Produce any copies your client possesses; and
      • Question witnesses directly about the existence and content of that material.
    • Simply asserting that such material must exist, without proof or follow-through in cross-examination, will almost certainly be deemed insufficient.
  • Recognize the breadth of permissible sentencing information:
    • Even if the State agrees to “withdraw” certain violation counts once your client admits one violation:
      • The facts underlying those counts may still be brought up at disposition; and
      • You should be prepared to contest those facts or contextualize them with favorable evidence.
  • Emphasize misinformation, not just procedural labels:
    • Challenging reliance on withdrawn or dismissed allegations is stronger if you can show the facts themselves are incorrect or unreliable, not merely that the violation count was dropped.
  • Careful use of admissions:
    • Admitting “true” to a non-compliance violation may strategically avoid a lengthy contested hearing, but it also removes many potential grounds of appeal about the sufficiency of evidence.
    • Once such an admission is made, most due process disputes shift to narrow issues of disclosure and fairness at disposition.

  B. For prosecutors and probation officers

  For the State and supervising officers, Pettit underscores:

  • Importance of clear documentation and notice:
    • Revocation petitions and supporting affidavits should detail the conduct underlying each alleged violation, providing early and clear notice to the defendant.
  • Disclosure obligations:
    • While revocation discovery is not as expansive as criminal trial discovery, the State must ensure reasonable disclosure of the evidence it will use, particularly reports and key documents.
  • Use of withdrawn allegations at disposition:
    • Even if certain allegations are not pursued as separate revocation counts, they may still be presented as relevant to:
      • Risk assessment;
      • Supervision feasibility; and
      • Appropriate sentence length.

  C. For trial judges

  For district courts conducting revocation hearings, the case reinforces several points:

  • Separate the adjudicatory and dispositional phases:
    • First determine whether at least one violation has been proven or admitted by a preponderance of the evidence.
    • Then, in the dispositional phase, exercise broad discretion in considering reliable information to fashion an appropriate sentence.
  • Make clear findings and reasons:
    • Doctrinally and practically, it is important to identify:
      • The specific violation(s) supporting revocation; and
      • The conduct and factors motivating the chosen disposition.
  • Guard against misinformation:
    • Ensure that adverse information about a defendant’s conduct has some evidentiary support (e.g., testimony, reports in the record).

  D. Doctrinal continuity rather than innovation

  The Court expressly notes that this case is decided under settled law and clear standards of review. Doctrinally, it:

  • Applies longstanding federal due process rules for revocations (Morrissey/Gagnon);
  • Reaffirms Montana’s articulation of those rules (Pedersen, Sebastian); and
  • Extends the familiar Walker principle on sentencing information to revocation disposition: courts may consider a wide range of conduct, including dismissed or uncharged acts, so long as the information is reliable.

  Thus, while Pettit is nonprecedential by design, it is highly consistent with, and illustrative of, existing jurisprudence rather than generating new legal rules.

  VIII. Conclusion

  State v. Pettit reaffirms three central themes in Montana revocation law:

  1. Due process in revocation is real but limited. Probationers must receive notice, disclosure of the evidence against them, and an opportunity to be heard and to confront adverse witnesses. Yet revocation remains an informal proceeding, not a full criminal trial.
  2. Revocation may rest on a single admitted violation. An admission to a qualifying non-compliance violation—such as termination from sex offender treatment—suffices to justify revocation, even if other alleged violations are withdrawn or unresolved.
  3. Sentencing and disposition can consider broad conduct, including withdrawn or dismissed matters. So long as the underlying information is not materially false, and the defendant has notice and an opportunity to contest it, the court may consider such conduct in assessing risk, supervision feasibility, and appropriate sentence severity.

  In rejecting Pettit’s due process claims, the Montana Supreme Court emphasizes that the mere absence of certain evidence (especially when its existence is unproven), or the State’s reliance on conduct underlying withdrawn violations, does not itself create a constitutional violation. The touchstone remains fundamental fairness: whether the revocation is based on verified facts, disclosed in advance, with a meaningful opportunity to challenge them, and whether the resulting disposition falls within lawful sentencing bounds. On that test, Pettit’s revocation and sentence passed muster.